Luis F. Amaral Rangel v. Jaguar Land Rover North America LLC

Filing 22

MINUTES (IN CHAMBERS) ORDER DENYING MOTION TO REMAND [ECF 10] by Judge Monica Ramirez Almadani. The Motion to Remand is DENIED, see order for details. (gga)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
CIVIL MINUTES – GENERAL
Case No.

2:24-cv-02827-MRA-PD

Title

Luis F. Amaral Rangel v. Jaguar Land Rover North America LLC ,et al.

Present: The Honorable

Date

November 22, 2024

MÓNICA RAMÍREZ ALMADANI, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Gabriela Garcia
Deputy Clerk

None Present
Court Reporter

Attorneys Present for Plaintiffs:

Attorneys Present for Defendants:

None Present

None Present

Proceedings:

(IN CHAMBERS) ORDER DENYING MOTION TO REMAND
[ECF 10]

Before the Court is Plaintiff’s Motion to Remand Case. ECF 10. The Court read and
considered the Motion and deemed the matter appropriate for decision without oral argument.
See Fed. R. Civ. P. 78(b); L.R. 7-15. The hearing was therefore vacated and removed from the
Court’s calendar. For the reasons stated herein, the Court DENIES the Motion.
I.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff Luis F. Amaral Rangel brings suit against Defendant Jaguar Land Rover North
America, LLC, a Delaware limited liability company operating and doing business in California,
to recover damages for a defective vehicle. ECF 1-1, ¶¶ 2-3.
On July 8, 2022, Plaintiff purchased a 2019 Land Rover Range Rover Velar (the “Subject
Vehicle”) from Land Rover South Bay, one of Defendant’s authorized dealerships. Id. ¶¶ 8, 35;
ECF 1 at 7 ¶ 5. Plaintiff purchased the Subject Vehicle as a certified pre-owned vehicle, as
defined by California Civil Code section 1793.22(e)(2). Id. Defendant issued a written
warranty for the Subject Vehicle. Id. ¶¶ 8-9. Plaintiff alleges that the Subject Vehicle was
delivered to Plaintiff with serious defects and subsequently developed steering, engine, structural,
emission, electrical system, and other defects. Id. ¶ 10. In April, November, and December
2023, Plaintiff presented the Subject Vehicle to Defendant for various repairs. Id. ¶¶ 11-13.
Based on the foregoing, on February 9, 2024, Plaintiff filed this case in Los Angeles
County Superior Court, alleging various violations of California’s Song-Beverly Consumer
Warranty Act. Cal. Civ. Code §§ 1790, et seq.; ECF 1-1 at 15-16, 19-60. Plaintiff seeks general,
special, and actual damages according to proof at trial; rescission of the purchase contract and
restitution of all monies expended; diminution of value; incidental and consequential damages
according to proof at trial; civil penalty in the amount of two times Plaintiff’s actual damages;
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
CIVIL MINUTES – GENERAL
Case No.

2:24-cv-02827-MRA-PD

Date

November 22, 2024

Title

Luis F. Amaral Rangel v. Jaguar Land Rover North America LLC ,et al.

prejudgment interest; and reasonable attorney’s fees and costs. Id. at 23.
On February 12, 2024, Defendant was served with the Complaint. ECF 1 ¶ 2. On March
13, 2024, Defendant filed its Answer to the Complaint. Id. On April 8, 2024, Defendant
removed this case to federal court based on diversity jurisdiction. ECF 1. Defendant asserts that
it removed this matter within 30 days of receiving a copy of the Purchase Agreement for the
Subject Vehicle, through which it first learned that the amount in controversy exceeded $75,000.
Id. ¶ 7; 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). In response to Defendant’s subpoena, on March 7, 2024, Defendant
first received a copy of the Agreement, when Plaintiff received it from the Land Rover South Bay
dealership. ECF 1 at 7 ¶ 5 (Declaration of Matthew Wolf); ECF 1-1 ¶ 35. Because Plaintiff’s
Complaint did not specify the purchase price or an amount in controversy, Defendant asserts that
it did not have sufficient information to remove the case prior to receiving the Agreement. Id.
¶¶ 15, 35. The Agreement shows that Plaintiff’s total payment for the vehicle was $85,813.75.
ECF 1-1 ¶ 14. Therefore, Defendant argues that “Plaintiff’s claims for compensatory damages
and attorneys’ fees cause[] the amount in controversy to exceed [] $75,000[.]” Id.
On May 8, 2024, Plaintiff filed a Motion to Remand this matter to Los Angeles County
Superior Court, solely on the ground that Defendant’s Notice of Removal was untimely and thus
procedurally defective. ECF 10.
II.

LEGAL STANDARDS

“Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. They possess only that power authorized
by Constitution and statute, which is not to be expanded by judicial decree.” Kokkonen v.
Guardians Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994) (citations omitted). Indeed, removal
of a state action to federal court is proper only if the district court would have had original
jurisdiction over the action. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). “If at any time before final judgment it
appears that the district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, the case shall be remanded.” Id.
§ 1447(c).
The removing defendant bears the burden of establishing that removal is proper. Abrego
Abrego v. Dow Chem. Co., 443 F.3d 676, 685 (9th Cir. 2006). A removal’s propriety “may later
be tested in the federal court, either on a motion by a party to remand, or by the court on its own
motion.” Libhart v. Santa Monica Dairy Co., 592 F.2d 1062, 1065 (9th Cir. 1979). Any doubt
about the existence of subject matter jurisdiction must be resolved in favor of remanding the action
to state court. Gaus v. Miles, Inc., 980 F.2d 564, 566 (9th Cir. 1992) (citing Libhart, 592 F.2d at
1064); see also Moore-Thomas v. Alaska Airlines, Inc., 553 F.3d 1241, 1244 (9th Cir. 2009) (“The
removal statute is strictly construed, and any doubt about the right of removal requires resolution
in favor of remand.” (citation omitted)).
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
CIVIL MINUTES – GENERAL
Case No.

2:24-cv-02827-MRA-PD

Date

November 22, 2024

Title

Luis F. Amaral Rangel v. Jaguar Land Rover North America LLC ,et al.

A federal district court has diversity jurisdiction over a matter where the amount in
controversy exceeds the sum or value of $75,000, and there is complete diversity among opposing
parties. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1). “[A] notice of removal ‘need not contain evidentiary
submissions.’” Arias v. Residence Inn by Marriott, 936 F.3d 920, 925 (9th Cir. 2019) (quoting
Dart Cherokee Basin Operating Co., LLC v. Owens, 574 U.S. 81, 82 (2014)). But “evidence
showing the amount in controversy is required . . . when the plaintiff contests, or the court
questions, the defendant’s allegation.” Id. (quotation marks and citation omitted). “A court
cannot base a finding of jurisdiction on a defendant’s speculation and conjecture; ‘[r]ather, [the]
defendant must set forth the underlying facts supporting its assertion that the amount in
controversy exceeds the statutory minimum.’” Jackson v. Specialized Loan Servicing, LLC, No.
CV 14-05981 MMM (PLAx), 2014 WL 5514142, at *8 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 31, 2014) (alterations in
original) (quoting Fong v. Regis Corp., No. C 13-04497 RS, 2014 WL 26996, at *2 (N.D. Cal.
Jan. 2, 2014)).
III.

DISCUSSION
A.

Timeliness of Removal

Plaintiff argues that, because Defendant removed the case more than 30 days after it was
served with the Summons and Complaint, Defendant’s removal is untimely under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1446(b)(1). ECF 10 at 6. According to Plaintiff, Defendant could have investigated, but did
not investigate, removability due to its own lack of diligence. Id. at 6-7. Defendant disagrees,
arguing that its Notice of Removal was timely because it was filed within 30 days of Defendant
receiving the Purchase Agreement, which contained the information it needed to determine the
amount in controversy in this matter. ECF 13 at 2. It is undisputed that Plaintiff’s Complaint
did not include any details about the amount in controversy; therefore, Defendant argues that the
clock for removal did not start to run until Defendant received the Purchase Agreement. Id. at 6.
With respect to the timing of removal, “[t]here are two different potential . . . deadlines.”
Isabelle Franklin, et al. v. Healthsource Glob. Staffing, Inc., et al., No. 23-CV-0662-AGS-DEB,
2024 WL 1055996, at *2 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 11, 2024). The first potential deadline is triggered if
an initial pleading “affirmatively reveals on its face the facts necessary for federal court
jurisdiction.” Harris v. Bankers Life & Case. Co., 425 F.3d 689, 691 (9th Cir. 2005); see also 28
U.S.C. § 1446(b)(1). “If an initial pleading is not removable on its face, then the first 30-day
period for removal is not triggered.” Avina v. Ford Motor Co., No. CV 23-10573-PA-E, 2024
WL 688664, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 20, 2024). The second potential deadline for removal is
triggered after “the defendant receives ‘an amended pleading, motion, order or other paper’ from
which it can be ascertained from the face of the document that removal is proper.” Harris, 425
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
CIVIL MINUTES – GENERAL
Case No.

2:24-cv-02827-MRA-PD

Date

November 22, 2024

Title

Luis F. Amaral Rangel v. Jaguar Land Rover North America LLC ,et al.

F.3d at 694 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(3)). The clock for the second removal deadline begins
running upon “defendant’s receipt of a document from the plaintiff or the state court—not by any
action of defendant.” Solis v. Nissan North Am., No. CV 24-00728-MWF (Ex), 2024 WL
1311275, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 27, 2024) (quoting Franklin, 2024 WL 1055996, at *2).
Beyond those two deadlines, a defendant may remove a case where it “could have ventured
beyond the pleadings to demonstrate removability initially[.]” Kuxhausen v. BMW Fin. Servs.
NA LLC, 707 F.3d 1136, 1141 n.3 (9th Cir. 2013) (internal quotation marks omitted). However,
it is not “obligated to do so.” Id. In Kuxhausen, the Ninth Circuit explained that a defendant is
not obligated to “look[] in its files within the first thirty days” after a case is filed to determine
removability because the court preferred a “clear rule” and was “unwilling to embroil the courts
in inquiries ‘into the subjective knowledge of [a] defendant[.]’” Id. at 1141 (quoting Harris, 425
F.3d at 696). Therefore, the court “decline[d] to hold that materials outside the complaint start
the thirty-day clock.” Id. (holding that defendant BMW was “not obligated to supply
information”—in that case, business records identifying a “representative valuation” of the
vehicles at issue—“which [plaintiff] had omitted [from the complaint]”).
Here, too, the Court finds that Defendant was not required to search through its records to
find what Plaintiff had not provided in the Complaint. See Kuxhausen, 707 F.3d 1141. It is
undisputed that Plaintiff’s Complaint did not contain allegations that facially demonstrated the
amount in controversy or the Subject Vehicle’s purchase price. See ECF 1-1. As such, Plaintiff
“le[ft] the window for removal open.” Kuxhausen, 707 F.3d at 1139 (requiring plaintiffs to
“assume the costs associated with their own indeterminate pleadings[.]”). Defendant first
received a copy of the Purchase Agreement on March 7, 2024, when Plaintiff received the
Agreement from Land Rover South Bay, the authorized dealership that sold Plaintiff the Subject
Vehicle. ECF 1 at 7 ¶ 5 (Declaration of Matthew Wolf); ECF 1-1 ¶ 35. Based on this document,
the deadline for removal would have been April 6, 2024. 28 U.S.C. § 1446. However, because
April 6, 2024, was a Saturday, Defendant’s April 8, 2024, Notice of Removal filed the Monday
after the 30-day deadline was timely. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a) (If a deadline falls “on Saturday,
Sunday, or legal holiday, the period continues to run until the same time on the next day that is
not a Saturday, Sunday, or legal holiday.”). The Court denies the Motion on this basis.
B.

Amount in Controversy

Plaintiff argues for the first time in his reply brief that Defendant separately failed to meet
the amount-in-controversy requirement. ECF 16 at 6. Plaintiff contends that the sale price in
the Purchase Agreement ($85,813.75) is insufficient to meet the requirement because Defendant
failed to consider the statutorily prescribed mileage offset and other offsets in actual damage
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
CIVIL MINUTES – GENERAL
Case No.

2:24-cv-02827-MRA-PD

Date

November 22, 2024

Title

Luis F. Amaral Rangel v. Jaguar Land Rover North America LLC ,et al.

calculations and manufacturer rebates. Id. at 7. Moreover, Plaintiff argues that civil penalties
cannot support the amount-in-controversy requirement because Defendant makes no showing as
to the possibility of civil damages, which here may be no greater than twice the amount of actual
damages and are awarded only if Defendant’s violations were willful. Id. (citing Cal. Civ. Code
§ 1794(c)). Id.
As an initial matter, Plaintiff may not raise a new argument for the first time in a reply
brief—the universe of the reply brief is confined to issues and facts raised in the initial motion
and those that are responsive to legal arguments and facts raised in the response in opposition.
See Simpson v. Lear Astronics Corp., 77 F.3d 1170, 1176 & n.4 (9th Cir. 1995) (issues not raised
in opening brief may not be properly raised in reply); see also Zamani v. Carnes, 491 F.3d 990,
997 (9th Cir. 2007) (“The district court need not consider arguments raised for the first time in a
reply brief.”) (citing Koerner v. Grigas, 328 F.3d 1039, 1048 (9th Cir. 2003)).
Nevertheless, the Court finds that Defendant has met the amount-in-controversy
requirement by a preponderance of the evidence.1 See Canela v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 971
F.3d 845, 849 (9th Cir. 2020). The Purchase Agreement shows that the Subject Vehicle was
purchased for $85,813.75. ECF 1-1 ¶ 14. It is undisputed that Plaintiff seeks damages (based
on the cost of the vehicle), civil penalties, and attorney’s fees and costs. In determining the
amount in controversy, the Court considers the “maximum recovery” that Plaintiff can reasonably
recover in this action. Arias, 936 F.3d at 927. It does not require Defendant to prove up its own
liability for damages or civil penalties. See Greene v. Harley-Davidson, Inc., 965 F.3d 767, 774
(9th Cir. 2020) (“[T]he amount in controversy represents only the ‘amount at stake in the
underlying litigation,’ not the likely liability.”); Selinger v. Ford Motor Co., No. 2:22-CV-08883SPG-KS, 2023 WL 2813510, at *9 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 5, 2023) (reasoning that requiring a defendant
to provide evidence that civil penalties will be awarded “would lead to the untenable result of
Defendant having to prove up its own liability for civil penalties to demonstrate the amount in
1

In assessing the amount in controversy, a court “may consider [the] allegations in the
complaint and in the notice of removal, as well as summary-judgment-type evidence.” Chavez
v. JP Morgan Chase & Co., 888 F.3d 413, 416 (9th Cir. 2018)). “[A] party’s allegations in its
opposition to a motion to remand are [also] considered amendments to its notice of removal.”
Selinger v. Ford Motor Co., No. 2:22-CV-08883-SPG-KS, 2023 WL 2813510, at *5 (C.D. Cal.
Apr. 5, 2023) (citing Cohn v. Petsmart, Inc., 281 F.3d 837, 840 n.1 (9th Cir. 2002). Because
Plaintiff did not raise its amount-in-controversy argument until the reply brief, Defendant did not
have an opportunity to submit any counterarguments, evidence, or calculations. Therefore, the
Court considers only the information provided in Defendant’s Notice of Removal. ECF 1-3 at 2.
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
CIVIL MINUTES – GENERAL
Case No.

2:24-cv-02827-MRA-PD

Date

November 22, 2024

Title

Luis F. Amaral Rangel v. Jaguar Land Rover North America LLC ,et al.

controversy”); Canesco v. Ford Motor Co., 570 F. Supp. 3d 872 (S.D. Cal. 2021) (finding same);
Treauhaf v. Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC, No. 2:20-cv-11155-SVW-GJS, 2021 WL 2864877, at *2
(C.D. Cal. July 6, 2021) (same); Rahman v. FCA US LLC, No. 2:21-cv-02584-SB (JCx), 2021
WL 2285102, at *2-3 (C.D. Cal. June 4, 2021) (same). Nor must Defendant account for potential
“mileage offsets” that might apply to reduce damages. See Selinger, 2023 WL 281351, at *7
(finding that Ninth Circuit caselaw weighs against requiring the removing defendant to present
evidence regarding the mileage offset to establish the amount in controversy for claims under the
Song-Beverly Act).
Based on the price of the Subject Vehicle listed in the Purchase Agreement and the
additional requested civil penalties, the Court finds that Defendant has shown by a preponderance
of the evidence that the amount-in-controversy requirement has been met.
IV.

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Motion to Remand is DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Initials of Deputy Clerk

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gga

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