Jose Martinez v. Sunnova Energy Corporation, et al

Filing 25

(IN CHAMBERS) ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO REMAND [ECF 10 , 11 ] by Judge Monica Ramirez Almadani. The Court finds that Defendant has demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence that the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000. See order for details. (gga)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
CIVIL MINUTES – GENERAL

Case No.

2:24-cv-06346-MRA-MAR

Title

Jose Martinez v. Sunnova Energy Corporation, et al

Present: The Honorable

Date

November 25, 2024

MÓNICA RAMÍREZ ALMADANI, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Gabriela Garcia

None Present

Deputy Clerk

Court Reporter

Attorneys Present for Plaintiffs:

Attorneys Present for Defendants:

None Present

None Present

Proceedings:

(IN CHAMBERS) ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION
TO REMAND [ECF 10, 11]

Before the Court is Plaintiff Jose Martinez’s Motion to Remand and Amendment to the
Motion to Remand (the “Motion”).1 ECF 10, 11. The Court has read and considered the Motion
and held a hearing on October 3, 2024. ECF 15. For the reasons stated herein, the Court
DENIES the Motion.
I.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff Jose Martinez (“Plaintiff” or “Martinez”) filed this putative class action against
Defendant Sunnova Corporation (“Defendant” or “Sunnova”) on June 26, 2024, in Los Angeles
County Superior Court. See generally ECF 1 at 8-37, Ex. A (Compl.). Martinez, who worked
for Sunnova as an hourly, non-exempt solar technician, alleges that Sunnova violated the
California Labor Code and engaged in unfair business practices stemming from its purported
failure to pay overtime compensation, provide meal breaks and rest periods, pay minimum
wage, provide accurate wage statements, maintain accurate time and payroll records, reimburse
necessary business-related expenses, and pay reporting wages. Compl. ¶¶ 1, 16-110.
On July 26, 2024, Defendant removed this action to federal court based on diversity
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a).2 See generally ECF 1. On August 26, 2024,
1

The Court hereinafter refers only to the Amendment to the Motion to Remand.
Although Plaintiff brought this case as a putative class action, Defendant removed it
based on diversity jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s individual claims. See ECF 1. In Gibson v.
Chrysler Corp., the Ninth Circuit held that “there is supplemental jurisdiction over the claims of
unnamed class members when the claim of an individual named plaintiff satisfies the amount-incontroversy requirement.” 261 F.3d 927, 940 (9th Cir. 2001). In moving to remand, Plaintiff
does not contest supplemental jurisdiction over the claims of the unnamed class members, only
2

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
CIVIL MINUTES – GENERAL

Case No.

2:24-cv-06346-MRA-MAR

Date

Title

Jose Martinez v. Sunnova Energy Corporation, et al

November 25, 2024

Plaintiff filed the instant Motion, arguing that Defendant has not established that the amount in
controversy exceeds the jurisdictional minimum, $75,000.3 ECF 11-1 at 7. Defendant filed an
Opposition to the Motion on September 12, 2024, ECF 12, and Plaintiff filed a Reply on
September 19, 2024, ECF 13. The Court held a hearing on October 3, 2024. ECF 15.
II.

LEGAL STANDARD

“Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. They possess only that power
authorized by Constitution and statute, which is not to be expanded by judicial decree.”
Kokkonen v. Guardians Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994) (internal citations
omitted). Removal of a state action to federal court is only proper if the district court would
have had original jurisdiction over the action. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). “If at any time before final
judgment it appears that the district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, the case shall be
remanded.” Id. § 1447(c).
Where removal is sought based on diversity jurisdiction, the party asserting jurisdiction
must show that (1) the parties are “citizens of different States,” and (2) “the matter in
controversy exceeds the sum or value of $75,000, exclusive of interest and costs.” Id. § 1332(a).
“The amount in controversy is simply an estimate of the total amount in dispute, not a
prospective assessment of defendant’s liability.” Lewis v. Verizon Commc’ns, Inc., 627 F.3d
395, 400 (9th Cir. 2010); see also Chavez v. JPMorgan Chase & Co., 888 F.3d 413, 417 (9th
Cir. 2018) (describing the amount in controversy as what is “‘at stake’ in the litigation, whatever
the likelihood that [plaintiff] will actually recover [that amount]”). “[T]his amount includes,
inter alia, damages (compensatory, punitive, or otherwise) and the cost of complying with an
injunction, as well as attorneys’ fees awarded under fee shifting statutes.” Gonzalez v. CarMax
Auto Superstores, Inc., 840 F.3d 644, 648-49 (9th Cir. 2016).
In most cases, this amount is determined by “the sum demanded in good faith in the
initial pleading[.]” 28 U.S.C. § 1446(c)(2). However, “[w]here it is not facially evident from
the complaint that more than $75,000 is in controversy, the removing party must prove, by a
preponderance of the evidence, that the amount in controversy meets the jurisdictional
threshold.” Corral v. Select Portfolio Servicing, Inc., 878 F.3d 770, 774 (9th Cir. 2017)
whether the amount in controversy has been satisfied to establish diversity jurisdiction over his
individual claims. See generally ECF 11-1.
3
Plaintiff does not dispute that there is complete diversity of citizenship between
Plaintiff, a California resident, and Defendant, a corporation incorporated under Delaware law
with its principal place of business in Texas. See generally ECF 11; see also ECF 1 ¶¶ 5-6.
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
CIVIL MINUTES – GENERAL

Case No.

2:24-cv-06346-MRA-MAR

Date

Title

Jose Martinez v. Sunnova Energy Corporation, et al

November 25, 2024

(quoting Matheson v. Progressive Specialty Ins. Co., 319 F.3d 1089, 1090 (9th Cir. 2003)); see
also 28 U.S.C. § 1446(c)(2)(A)-(B).
“[A] defendant’s notice of removal need include only a plausible allegation that the
amount in controversy exceeds the jurisdictional threshold,” Dart Cherokee Basin Operating
Co., LLC v. Owens, 574 U.S. 81, 89 (2014), and the amount-in-controversy allegation “should
be accepted when not contested by the plaintiff or questioned by the court,” id. at 87. “Evidence
establishing the amount is required . . . only when the plaintiff contests, or the court questions,
the defendant’s allegation.” Id. at 89. “In such a case, both sides submit proof and the court
decides, by a preponderance of the evidence, whether the amount-in-controversy requirement
has been satisfied.” Id. at 88. “Along with the complaint, [courts] consider allegations in the
removal petition, as well as ‘summary-judgment-type evidence relevant to the amount in
controversy at the time of removal.’” Fritsch v. Swift Transportation Co. of Arizona, LLC, 899
F.3d 785, 793 (9th Cir. 2018) (quoting Kroske v. U.S. Bank Corp., 432 F.3d 976, 980 (9th Cir.
2005)).
III.

DISCUSSION

Plaintiff was employed by Sunnova as an hourly, non-exempt employee for
approximately three years from January 2020 until September 2023. Compl. ¶ 17. There is no
dispute that for purposes of computing the amount in controversy, Plaintiff was employed for at
least 667 workdays. See ECF 11-1 at 8, 9, 12; ECF 12 at 17; ECF 12-1 (Rillo Decl.) ¶ 7.
Defendant submits uncontroverted evidence that Plaintiff’s pro rata hourly wage rate was
$39.18. See Rillo Decl. ¶¶ 4, 5, Exs. 1-3.
In its analysis, the Court does not consider Plaintiffs’ minimum wage, reimbursement,
and unfair business practices claims (Claims 4, 8, 9) because Defendant did not include these
claims as part of its amount-in-controversy allegations in the Notice of Removal. See generally
ECF 1; see also ECF 12 at 24-25 (alleging, without more, that damages as to these claims could
be “significant”). The Court also adopts Plaintiffs’ concessions in his Reply. Plaintiff concedes
that the amount in controversy as to his overtime wage claim (Claim 3), based on a pro rata
hourly rate of $58.77,4 is at least $9,146.57. ECF 13 at 12. He also concedes that the amount in
controversy as to his wait-time claim pursuant to California Labor Code sections 201-203
(Claim 5) is at least $11,880. Id.

4

Defendant calculated Plaintiff’s overtime rate by multiplying an hourly rate of $39.18
by 1.5. See ECF 12 at 19 n.6.
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
CIVIL MINUTES – GENERAL

Case No.

2:24-cv-06346-MRA-MAR

Title

Jose Martinez v. Sunnova Energy Corporation, et al
A.

Date

November 25, 2024

Claims 1 and 2: Meal and Rest Period Penalties

Plaintiff alleges that he was not provided meal breaks and rest periods and was not paid
premium pay for missed or interrupted meal breaks and rest periods. Compl. ¶¶ 23, 26, 27, 29,
54-74. Plaintiff seeks, inter alia, an award of one hour of pay at his regular rate of
compensation for each workday that a meal period was not provided and premium wages. Id.
¶¶ 11, 13, at 32. California Labor Code section 226.7 provides that if “an employer fails to
provide an employee a meal or rest or recovery period in accordance with a state law . . . the
employer shall pay the employee one additional hour of pay at the employee’s regular rate of
compensation for each workday that the meal or rest or recovery period is not provided.” In its
Notice of Removal, Defendant assumed a 100% daily rate of meal break and rest period
violations. See ECF 1 ¶ 16.
In his Motion, Plaintiff contends that Defendant “provides no basis whatsoever to support
his claim nor does Defendant explain how it reached this figure or what evidence there is to
suggest that Plaintiff is owed a meal and rest period violation for every single day he worked for
Defendant.” ECF 11-1 at 8. This argument misstates Defendant’s burden. See Korn v. Polo
Ralph Lauren Corp., 536 F. Supp. 2d 1199, 1204 (E.D. Cal. 2008) (“The preponderance of the
evidence standard means the ‘defendant must provide evidence establishing that it is more likely
than not that the amount in controversy exceeds that amount.’ (quoting Sanchez v. Monumental
Life Ins. Co., 102 F.3d 398, 404 (9th Cir. 1996))); see also Muniz v. Pilot Travel Centers LLC,
No. CIV. S-07-0325-FCD-EFB, 2007 WL 1302504, at *5 (E.D. Cal. May 1, 2007). “A
removing defendant is not obligated to research, state, and prove the plaintiff’s claims for
damages.” Korn, 536 F. Supp. 2d at 1204-05 (citation omitted); see also Lopez v. Aerotek, Inc.,
No. SACV 14-00803-CJC, 2015 WL 2342558, at *3 (C.D. Cal. May 14, 2015) (explaining that
a defendant “is not required to comb through its records to identify and calculate the exact
frequency of violations”).
Plaintiff maintains that Defendant’s 100% violation rate is not supported by Plaintiff’s
time records, which show a facial violation rate of 19%. ECF 11-2 (Domb Decl.) ¶ 2, Ex. 1.
Plaintiff argues that the time records show no meal period was recorded, the meal period was
shorter than 30 minutes, or the meal period took place after the end of the fifth hour of work on
127 of 667 days. Defendant argues that although rest periods are not recorded in the same
manner as meal periods, “it makes logical sense to assume a similar violation rate [for rest
period violations] in the absence of any other evidence.” ECF 11-1 at 9-10. Defendant responds
that Plaintiff’s 19% violation rate is “disingenuous and contradicts his Complaint.” ECF 12 at
16-17. First, it argues that the Court should apply a 100% violation rate because Plaintiff
alleges in his Complaint that these meal break and rest period violations were “routine” and
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
CIVIL MINUTES – GENERAL

Case No.

2:24-cv-06346-MRA-MAR

Date

Title

Jose Martinez v. Sunnova Energy Corporation, et al

November 25, 2024

“systematic.” ECF 12 at 15. Second, Defendant asserts that “facial violations” do not make up
the majority of Plaintiff’s meal break and rest period allegations. Id. at 16. It notes that Plaintiff
lists at least seven ways that Defendant allegedly caused meal period violations, most of which
would not be evinced in a time record. Id.
The Complaint “offer[s] no guidance as to the frequency of the alleged violations.”
Bryant v. NCR Corp., 284 F. Supp. 3d. 1147, 1151 (S.D. Cal. 2018). Plaintiff claims that
Defendant maintained a “policy and/or practice” that not only failed to provide Plaintiff with
meal breaks, but also failed to relinquish control over Plaintiff and relieve him of his duties
during recorded meal breaks. Compl. ¶ 23. Plaintiff also alleges that Defendant failed to
maintain accurate records of meal breaks. Id. Furthermore, Plaintiff concedes that rest periods
are not recorded in the same manner as meal breaks and “are not subject to a similar analysis.”
ECF 11-1 at 9-10.
Courts considering the reasonableness of a violation rate arising from “pattern and
practice” allegations have generally done so in the context of determining jurisdiction under the
Class Action Fairness Act (“CAFA”). In Ibarra v. Manheim Investments, Inc., the Ninth Circuit
affirmed the district court’s holding that “a ‘pattern and practice’ of doing something does not
necessarily mean always doing something.” 775 F.3d 1193, 1198-99 (9th Cir. 2015). The court
reasoned that “[b]ecause the complaint does not allege that [the defendant] universally, on each
and every shift, violates labor laws by not giving rest and meal breaks, [the defendant] bears the
burden to show that its estimated amount in controversy relied on reasonable assumptions.” Id.
at 1199; cf. LaCross v. Knight Transp., Inc., 775 F.3d 1200, 1202-03 (9th Cir. 2015) (holding
that the maximum assumption is reasonable where plaintiff alleged that defendant categorically
misclassified truck drivers as independent contractors and sought reimbursement of expenses
including all fuel costs). In remanding the case, the court instructed the parties to submit
evidence related to the contested amount in controversy but acknowledged that “a damages
assessment may require a chain of reasoning that includes assumptions. When that is so, those
assumptions cannot be pulled from thin air but need some reasonable ground underlying them.”
Ibarra, 775 F.3d at 1199; see also Arias, 936 F.3d at 927 (rejecting district court’s requirement
that the defendant “prove it actually violated the law at the assumed rate,” holding instead that
“assumptions made part of the defendant’s chain of reasoning need not be proven”).
On the record presented here, the Court finds that Defendant’s assessment of a 100%
violation rate is a reasonable evaluation of the “maximum recovery the plaintiff could reasonably
recover” on his meal break and rest period claims. Arias v. Residence Inn by Marriot, 936 F.3d
920, 927 (9th Cir. 2019) (emphasis added). While it is true that Plaintiff’s time records indicate
Defendant denied Plaintiff a meal break on 19% of workdays, this evidence does not controvert
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
CIVIL MINUTES – GENERAL

Case No.

2:24-cv-06346-MRA-MAR

Date

Title

Jose Martinez v. Sunnova Energy Corporation, et al

November 25, 2024

the broad allegations in the Complaint that Defendant inaccurately recorded meal breaks and
interrupted recorded meal breaks. Nor does Plaintiff make any persuasive argument for why
this 19% violation rate applies to his rest period claims. Defendant reasonably assumes, absent
evidence to the contrary, that these rest period violations could have occurred every workday.
Defendant is not expected to prove Plaintiff’s case while demonstrating an appropriate amount
in controversy; “‘proving the case’ is irrelevant for amount-in-controversy determinations. As
that phrase makes relatively clear, the issue is the amount that a plaintiff has put in controversy
by filing a Complaint, not what the evidence will actually show.” Toribio v. ITT Aerospace
Controls LLC, No. CV 19-5430-GW-JPRX, 2019 WL 4254935, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 5, 2019).
This is not a case where Defendant has grounded its amount-in-controversy assessment on
Plaintiff’s general pattern and practice allegations or otherwise “pulled [its assumptions] from
thin air.” Ibarra, 775 F.3d at 1199.
The Court therefore finds that Plaintiff’s meal and rest break claims have placed
$52,266.12 (667 * $39.18 * 2 = $52,266.12) in controversy.
B.

Claim 6: Waiting Time Penalties During Employment

Plaintiff alleges that he was not paid all wages during his employment in violation of
California Labor Code sections 204 and 210. Compl. ¶¶ 36, 86-91. He seeks statutory “waiting
time” penalties. Id. ¶ 36, at 34.
Section 204 of the California Labor Code provides that “[a]ll wages . . . earned by any
person in any employment are due and payable twice during each calendar month.” Cal. Lab.
Code § 204(a). An employer that fails to pay wages for each employee as provided under
section 204(a) is subject to (1) a penalty of $100 for an initial violation and $200 for each further
violation, plus (2) 25 percent of the amount unlawfully withheld. Id. § 210(a). Willful
violations are subject to an initial penalty of $200. Id. § 210(a)(2).
In its Notice of Removal, Defendant contends that Plaintiff’s allegation—that he was not
lawfully compensated for each of his 69 pay periods—puts at issue minimum statutory penalties
of $46,690. ECF 1 ¶ 14. In his Opposition, Defendant elaborates that even adopting Plaintiff’s
19% violation rate as to meal breaks and rest periods would amount to an average of one meal
break and rest period violation per week or four per pay period. ECF 12 at 22. In his Reply,
Plaintiff contends that wait time penalties under section 210 are subject to a one-year statute of
limitations, such that his waiting time claim only covers pay periods and days of work which
occurred after June 26, 2023. ECF 13 at 13-14.
Plaintiff’s argument is unavailing. It is well established that “statutes of limitations are
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
CIVIL MINUTES – GENERAL

Case No.

2:24-cv-06346-MRA-MAR

Date

Title

Jose Martinez v. Sunnova Energy Corporation, et al

November 25, 2024

affirmative defenses.” Wyatt v. Terhune, 315 F.3d 1108, 1117 (9th Cir. 2003), overruled on
other grounds by Albino v. Baca, 747 F.3d 1162 (9th Cir. 2014) (en banc). Applying a one-year
limitations period to Plaintiff’s claim for waiting time penalties at this stage would require the
Court to impermissibly weigh the merits of Defendant’s potential affirmative defense prior to
determining whether it has subject-matter jurisdiction. See Geographic Expeditions, Inc. v. Est.
of Lhotka ex rel. Lhotka, 599 F.3d 1102, 1108 (9th Cir. 2010) (“[J]ust because a defendant might
have a valid defense that will reduce recovery to below the jurisdictional amount does not mean
the defendant will ultimately prevail on that defense. Further, if a district court had to evaluate
every possible defense . . . [it] would essentially have to decide the merits of the case before it
could determine if it had subject matter jurisdiction.”). In Greene v. Harley-Davidson, Inc.,
relied upon by Defendant, the Ninth Circuit expressly held that a district court erred in
considering the merits of the defendant’s potential statute of limitations defense to determine the
amount in controversy, reasoning that the “strength of any defenses indicates the likelihood of
the plaintiff prevailing; it is irrelevant to determining the amount that is at stake in the
litigation.” 965 F.3d 767, 774 (9th Cir. 2020) (quoting Arias, 936 F.3d at 928); see also
Jauregui v. Roadrunner Transportation Serv., Inc., 28 F.4th 989, 994 n.6 (9th Cir. 2022)
(stating, in a putative wage and hour class action, that plaintiff’s reliance on various statutes of
limitation to challenge defendant’s calculations “confuses the amount in controversy with the
amount that will ultimately be recovered”).5
Plaintiff has alleged that at least one violation reasonably occurred during each pay
period, such that penalties can be assessed as to every pay period. Moreover, because Plaintiff
alleges that Defendant’s violations were willful, see Compl. ¶ 90, a $200 penalty applies from
the outset. For purposes of calculating the amount in controversy, the parties agree that Plaintiff
received at least 69 paychecks in the course of his employment. See ECF 12 at 22; ECF 13 at
13; see also Rillo Decl. ¶¶ 4, 8, Ex. 3. Thus, at step one, the penalties total $13,800 (69 * $200).
At step two, section 210 allows for recovery of an additional 25 percent of the amount
unlawfully withheld. See Cal. Lab. Code § 210(a)(2). Defendant reasonably calculates that this
amount is $7,708.85. See ECF 12 at 22-23, 23 n.7.

5

Plaintiff’s reliance on Roth v. Comerica Bank, 799 F. Supp. 2d 1107 (C.D. Cal. 2010),
is misplaced because it was decided prior to Greene and its progeny. Cf. McCollum v. TGI
Friday’s, Inc., No. SACV 22-00392-FWS-JDE, 2022 WL 2663870, at * (C.D. Cal. July 11,
2022) (citing Jauregui in rejecting plaintiff’s argument that defendant must account for the
statute of limitation in its calculations in a putative wage and hour class action).
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
CIVIL MINUTES – GENERAL

Case No.

2:24-cv-06346-MRA-MAR

Date

Title

Jose Martinez v. Sunnova Energy Corporation, et al

November 25, 2024

Thus, Plaintiff’s claim for wages not timely paid during employment puts at least an
additional $21,528.85 ($13,800 + $7,708.85) in controversy.
C.

Claim 7: Wage Statement Penalties

Plaintiff claims that Defendant failed to provide complete and accurate wage statements
in violation of California Labor Code section 226(a). Compl. ¶¶ 37, 92-98. He seeks, inter alia,
statutory penalties. Id. ¶ 40, at 34. An employer who knowingly and intentionally fails to
comply with section 226(a) may be liable for “the greater of all actual damages or fifty dollars
($50) for the initial pay period in which a violation occurs and one hundred dollars ($100) per
employee for each violation in a subsequent pay period, not to exceed an aggregate penalty of
four thousand dollars ($4,000).” Cal. Lab. Code § 226(e)(1). In its Notice of Removal,
Defendant contends that the amount in controversy as to Plaintiff’s wage statement claim is the
statutory maximum of $4,000. ECF 1 ¶ 15.
In his Motion, Plaintiff argues that his wage statement claim is subject to a one-year
limitations period, and because he filed his lawsuit on June 26, 2024, his claim for statutory
penalties covers only pay periods after June 26, 2023. ECF 11-1 at 10-11. As explained above,
Plaintiff cannot rely on a statute of limitations to whittle down the amount in controversy. See
Greene, 965 F.3d at 774; Jauregui, 28 F.4th at 994 n.6. Because Plaintiff could recover the
statutory maximum, notwithstanding any affirmative defense raised by Defendant, the Court
determines that the amount in controversy as to Plaintiff’s wage statement claim is $4,000.
D.

Attorneys’ Fees

Plaintiff seeks to recover attorneys’ fees as permitted by California law. Compl. ¶¶ 53,
78, 110. The California Labor Code and California Code of Civil Procedure permit a prevailing
party to recover attorneys’ fees and costs. See Cal. Lab Code §§ 1194(a), 2802(c); Cal. Civ.
Proc. Code § 1021.5. In its Notice of Removal, Defendant includes an attorneys’ fees award of
at least $50,000 in its amount in controversy allegation. ECF 1 ¶ 18.
In its Motion, Plaintiff argues that Defendant’s inclusion of attorneys’ fees in the
damages calculation is “legally and logically defective,” and that its $50,000 assessment
constitutes “an impermissible attempt to aggregate the attorney’s fees which might be recovered
on behalf of the unnamed class members and for Plaintiff on an individual basis.” ECF 11-1 at
12-13. Plaintiff proposes dividing up the amount of the attorneys’ fees claim by the actual
number of class members, but acknowledges that both figures remain speculative at this stage of
litigation. Id. at 13. In its Opposition, Defendant considers Plaintiff’s individual claims in the
context of a class-wide settlement to compute the attorneys’ fees award that Plaintiff is likely to
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
CIVIL MINUTES – GENERAL

Case No.

2:24-cv-06346-MRA-MAR

Date

Title

Jose Martinez v. Sunnova Energy Corporation, et al

November 25, 2024

recover individually. ECF 12 at 25-26. Plaintiff does not disagree with this general approach in
his Reply.
First, Plaintiff’s argument that attorneys’ fees are too speculative to be considered in the
amount in controversy is wrong on the law. “That the amount in controversy is assessed at the
time of removal does not mean that the mere futurity of certain classes of damages precludes
them from being part of the amount in controversy.” Chavez, 888 F.3d at 417. “Because the
law entitles [Plaintiff] to an award of attorneys’ fees if he is successful, such future attorneys’
fees are at stake in the litigation and must be included in the amount in controversy.” Fritsch,
899 F.3d at 794.
Second, the Court considers only Plaintiff’s pro rata share of the attorneys’ fees
attributable to the entire class. See Gibson v. Chrystler Corp., 261 F.3d 927, 942 (9th Cir.
2001). Because Plaintiff has not provided any estimate of total damages for the purported class,
the Court finds that it is reasonable to use the amount of Plaintiff’s alleged damages to calculate
his proportional share of the fee award. In the Ninth Circuit, where a class action settlement
produces a common fund for the benefit of the entire class, “courts typically calculate 25% of
the fund as the ‘benchmark’ for a reasonable fee award.” In re Bluetooth Headset Prods. Liab.
Litig., 654 F.3d 935, 942 (9th Cir. 2011). Here, the amount of Plaintiff’s individual claims is at
least $94,821.54. Both parties assume a class of 100 members. See ECF 11-1 at 13; ECF 12 at
26. Assuming Plaintiff’s individual claims are proportional to the remainder of the class, the
total class-wide damages amount is $9,482,154 ($94,821.54 * 100). The attorneys’ fees award
attributable to Plaintiff is therefore $23,705.39 (($9,482,154 / 100) * 0.25).
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
CIVIL MINUTES – GENERAL

Case No.

2:24-cv-06346-MRA-MAR

Title

Jose Martinez v. Sunnova Energy Corporation, et al

IV.

Date

November 25, 2024

CONCLUSION

The Court finds that Defendant has demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence that
the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000, as set forth below.
Claim
Overtime Wage Claim
Meal and Rest Period Penalties
Waiting Time Penalties
Wage Statement Penalties
Attorneys’ Fees

Amount in Controversy
$9,146.57
$52,266.12
$33,408.85
$4,000
$23,705.39
TOTAL: $118,526.93

For the foregoing reasons, the Motion is DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Initials of Deputy Clerk

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:

-

gga

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