Mary Price v. Kaiser Foundation Health Plan Inc.

Filing 22

MINUTES IN CHAMBERS-COURT ORDER by Judge Percy Anderson. The Court finds that Price's estate and Roper have abandoned their claims by failing to respond to the Order to Show Cause or otherwise prosecute this action. The Court dismisses this action without prejudice for lack of prosecution and for failure to comply with a Court order. The Court will issue a Judgment consistent with this order. (See document for further details). (aco)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL
Case No.

CV 24-10517 PA (JCx)

Title

Mary Price v. Kaiser Foundation Health Plan Inc.

Present: The Honorable

Date

March 11, 2025

PERCY ANDERSON, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Kamilla Sali-Suleyman

Not Reported

N/A

Deputy Clerk

Court Reporter

Tape No.

Attorneys Present for Plaintiffs:

Attorneys Present for Defendants:

None

None

Proceedings:

IN CHAMBERS - COURT ORDER

Plaintiff Mary Price (“Price”) filed this action pro se on December 6, 2024. On January
27, 2025, Price’s son, William Roper (“Roper”) filed a Notice pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 25, that Price died on January 17, 2025. According to Roper’s Notice, filed pro se, he
is the “acting interim executor” of Price’s estate and it is his intention to file a Motion for
Substitution once the Probate Court appoints him as the estate’s executor and to then pursue
Price’s claims on behalf of her estate.
Upon receiving Roper’s filing, the Court, on January 31, 2025, issued a Minute Order in
which the Court explained that Roper may not purse Price’s claims on behalf of the estate pro se.
See Simon v. Hartford Life, Inc., 546 F.3d 661, 666 (9th Cir. 2008) (citing Jones v. Corr. Med.
Servs., 401 F.3d 950, 951-52 (8th Cir. 2005) (non-attorney administrator of decedent’s estate
may not proceed pro se on behalf of estate); see also Iannaccone v. Law, 142 F.3d 553, 559 (2nd
Cir. 1998) (administrator of estate may not appear pro se on behalf of estate); Pridgen v.
Andresen, 113 F.3d 391, 393 (2nd Cir. 1997) (executrix may not appear pro se on behalf of
estate)). The Court therefore ordered Roper to show cause in writing why this action should not
be dismissed without prejudice. To allow Roper time to obtain counsel on behalf of the estate,
or to otherwise respond to the Order to Show Cause, the Court gave Roper until March 3, 2025,
to file a response, and stated that a Notice of Appearance from an attorney licensed to practice
law in California by that date shall be deemed a sufficient response to the Order to Show Cause.
The Court warned that the failure to respond, or to respond sufficiently, to the Order to Show
Cause by March 3, 2025, may, without further warning, result in the dismissal of this action
without prejudice. Despite the expiration of his deadline to do so, Roper has not responded to
the Order to Show Cause and no attorney has filed a Notice of Appearance.
The Court may dismiss with prejudice an action or claim sua sponte if “the plaintiff fails
to prosecute or to comply with the [Federal Rules of Civil Procedure] or a court order.” See Fed.
R. Civ. P. 41(b); Link v. Wabash R.R. Co., 370 U.S. 626, 629-30 (1962) (dismissal for failure to
prosecute); Yourish v. Cal. Amplifier, 191 F.3d 983, 987–88 (9th Cir. 1999) (dismissal for
failure to comply with court order). This inherent power supports the orderly and expeditious
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL
Case No.

CV 24-10517 PA (JCx)

Date

Title

Mary Price v. Kaiser Foundation Health Plan Inc.

March 11, 2025

disposition of cases. See Link, 370 U.S. at 629-30; Yourish, 191 F.3d at 987-88; Ferdik v.
Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1260 (9th Cir. 1992).
In Henderson v. Duncan, the Ninth Circuit set forth five factors for a district court to
consider before resorting to the penalty of dismissal: “(1) the public’s interest in expeditious
resolution of litigation; (2) the court’s need to manage its docket; (3) the risk of prejudice to the
defendants; (4) the public policy favoring disposition of cases on their merits and (5) the
availability of less drastic sanctions.” 779 F.2d 1421, 1423 (9th Cir. 1986). Dismissal is
appropriate “where at least four factors support dismissal, or where at least three factors
‘strongly’ support dismissal.” Hernandez v. City of El Monte, 138 F.3d 393, 399 (9th Cir. 1998)
(internal citations omitted) (citing Ferdik, 963 F.2d at 1263). Cases involving sua sponte
dismissal warrant special focus on the fifth Henderson factor. Id.
Here, an evaluation of the Henderson factors ultimately weighs in favor of the Court’s
decision to dismiss this action. In assessing the first Henderson factor, the public’s interest in
expeditious resolution of litigation will be satisfied by a dismissal. See Pagtalunan v. Galaza,
291 F.3d 639, 642 (9th Cir. 2002) (citing Yourish, 191 F.3d at 990 (“[t]he public’s interest in
expeditious resolution of litigation always favors dismissal.”)). Relatedly, with respect to the
second factor, the Court’s need to manage its docket will be served by dismissal. See id. (“The
trial judge is in the best position to determine whether the delay in a particular case interferes
with docket management and the public interest.”). The third Henderson factor at least
marginally favors dismissal because defendants may be further prejudiced unless the complaint
is dismissed. See Yourish, 191 F.3d at 991.
Finally, in considering the fourth and fifth Henderson factors, the Court notes that Roper
was warned about the consequences of failing to respond to the Order to Show Cause or obtain
the services of an attorney to represent the estate. Nevertheless, Roper and Price’s estate have
taken no action. On this record, the Court finds that Roper and Price’s estate have abandoned
prosecution of this action, and any less drastic alternatives to dismissal would be inadequate to
remedy their failure to prosecute and obey Court orders. Because the Court has adopted the
“less-drastic” sanction of dismissal without prejudice, the fifth Henderson factor favors
dismissal. See McHenry v. Renne, 84 F.3d 1172, 1179 (9th Cir. 1996) (district court should first
consider less drastic alternatives to dismissal with prejudice).
The Court finds that Price’s estate and Roper have abandoned their claims by failing to
respond to the Order to Show Cause or otherwise prosecute this action. The Court dismisses this
action without prejudice for lack of prosecution and for failure to comply with a Court order.

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CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL
Case No.

CV 24-10517 PA (JCx)

Date

Title

Mary Price v. Kaiser Foundation Health Plan Inc.

March 11, 2025

See Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b); see also Yourish, 191 F.3d at 986-88; Ferdik, 963 F.2d at 1260. The
Court will issue a Judgment consistent with this order.
IT IS SO ORDERED.

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CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL

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