Fred H Meier III et al v. Riverside County et al

Filing 65

JUDGMENT by Judge Beverly Reid O'Connell. Plaintiffs FRED H. MEIER, III, andROBERT E. SCHAEFER shall take nothing from Defendants and the First AmendedComplaint shall be dismissed with prejudice, with Defendants to recover theirstatutory costs of suit. 60 (MD JS-6, Case Terminated). (rfi)

JS-6
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DISENHOUSE &
IVICEVIC, LLP

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
FRED H. MEIER, III, and ROBERT E. ) CASE NO: EDCV 08-01720 BRO (VBKx)
SCHAEFER,
)
) JUDGMENT
)
Plaintiffs,
)
)
v.
)
)
RIVERSIDE COUNTY a political
)
subdivision and Body Politic of the State )
of California; COUNTY OF RIVERSIDE )
a political subdivision and Body Politic )
of the STATE OF CALIFORNIA;
)
COUNTY OF RIVERSIDE PLANNING )
DEPARTMENT; COUNTY OF
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RIVERSIDE DEPARTMENT OF
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BUILDING AND SAFETY; COUNTY )
OF RIVERSIDE LAND USE
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SERVICES; COUNTY OF RIVERSIDE )
FIRE DEPARTMENT; STATE OF
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CALFORNIA; JAY E. ORR, COUNTY )
OF RIVERSIDE CODE
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ENFORCEMENT DIRECTOR;
)
JENNIFER MORRIS, COUNTY OF
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RIVERSIDE ENFORCEMENT AGENT; )
LANEE PADILLA, CODE
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ENFORCEMENT OFFICER I; MARY )
OVERHOLT, COUNTY OF
)
RIVERSIDE SUPERVISING CODE
)
ENFORCEMENT OFFICER; and DOES )
1 through 10 inclusively,
)
)
)
Defendants.
)
______________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________

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JUDGMENT

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On June 2, 2014, Defendants COUNTY OF RIVERSIDE, on behalf of itself

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and erroneously sued as Riverside County a political subdivision and Body Politic of

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the State of California; County of Riverside a political subdivision and Body Politic

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of the State of California; County of Riverside Planning Department; County of

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Riverside Department of Building and Safety; County of Riverside Land Use

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Services; County of Riverside Fire Department; JAY E. ORR; JENNIFER MORRIS;

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LANEE PADILLA; and MARY OVERHOLT, filed a Motion for Summary

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Judgment. On June 9, 2014, Plaintiff’s filed their opposition to the motion, and on

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June 16, 2014, Defendants filed their reply.

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The Court heard oral argument on July 7, 2014, and took the motion under

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submission. On July 7, 2014, the Court subsequently ruled on the motion by minute

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order.

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A. FACTUAL HISTORY
Because Plaintiffs did not address Defendants’ Separate Statement of

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Uncontroverted Material Facts in their opposition, the Court has accepted the factual

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assertions made therein as true. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e)(2).

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Plaintiff Meier is an individual California resident who owns property located

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at 9101 Avenida Maravilla in an unincorporated area of the County of Riverside.

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(Dkt. No. 52-2 at 2). In 2002, the Riverside County Code Enforcement (“RCCE”)-a

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department of Riverside County-cited Mr. Meier following an administrative

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investigation for continuing violations of certain Riverside County land use

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ordinances and codes related to the storage of inoperable vehicles on his property.

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These ordinances include sections 10.04.010 and 17.24.010 of the Riverside County

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Code. (Dkt. No. 52-2 at 2). Section 10.04.010 provides that “abandoned, wrecked,

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dismantled, or in operative vehicles” on either private or public property constitutes a

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public nuisance that may be abated. (Dkt. No 52-2 at 2). Section 17.24.010 limits

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outside storage on improved parcels of land to 200 square feet, with a maximum

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height of three feet. (Dkt. No. 52-2 at 2).

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JUDGMENT

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Following RCCE’s citation, Mr. Meier took various remedial measures, but he

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kept twenty-nine vehicles on his property. (Dkt. No. 52-2 at 3). Concluding that

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these vehicles continued to constitute a public nuisance, Riverside County took

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affirmative steps to “administratively abate” the nuisance. (Dkt. No. 52-2 at 3).

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Following an administrative hearing on July 31, 2008, (at which Mr. Meier was not

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present), the RCCE determined that all but two of these vehicles were in operative

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and in violation of Riverside County ordinances. (Dkt. No. 52-1 at 84-88). The

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RCCE then ordered Mr. Meier to remove his vehicles within ten days or Riverside

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County would remove the vehicles without his consent. (Dkt. No. 52-1 at 90).

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When Mr. Meier did not remove the vehicles, Riverside County

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representatives posted (and mailed) a “notice of Intention to Seize Abandoned,

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Wrecked, Dismantled or Inoperable Vehicles for Reported Violations of Riverside

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County Code 10.04.150.” (Dkt. No. 52-1 at 95). Several months later, Riverside

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County representatives realized that the notice cited the incorrect ordinance. (Dkt.

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No. 52-1 at 98). Upon learning this, the RCCE closed Mr. Meier’s case and then

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reopened the file under the proper citation. (Dkt. No. 52-1 at 98, 101). Although the

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RCCE found that Mr. Meier was still in noncompliance, it elected to close its case on

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April 12, 2012, citing a lack of resources to pursue civil remedies. (Dkt. No. 52-2 at

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105). As a result, the RCCE recorded a Release of Notices of Noncompliance and

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returned, unexecuted, the inspection warrant it had issued for Mr. Meier’s property.

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(Dkt. No. 52-2 at 105).

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B. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On November 25, 2008, Plaintiff Fred Meier filed this action against

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Defendants, (Dkt. No. 1). Mr. Meier later amended his complaint on December 11,

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2008, adding Plaintiff Robert Schaefer. (Dkt. No. 7). On January 13, 2009,

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Defendants answered Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint. (Dkt. No. 8). On

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October 14, 2009, the Honorable A. Howard Matz, United States District Court

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JUDGMENT

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Judge, referred the matter to the magistrate judge up through any pretrial conference

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and jury trial. (Dkt. No. 11). The case then proceeded for several years.

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On May 7, 2013, this Court was assigned to the matter. (Dkt. No. 31). On

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May 19, 2014, this Court held a pretrial conference wherein the parties agreed that

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the underlying facts were not disputed in this matter.

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C. DEFENDANTS ARE ENTITLED TO

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JUDGMENT AS A MATTER OF LAW

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Plaintiffs seek remedies pursuant to 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 for violations of
their constitutional rights under the Fourth, Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments; they

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also allege violations of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations

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(“RICO”) Act. (Dkt. No. 7). Plaintiffs name as Defendants the County of Riverside

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and various departments of the County, as well as several individual County

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officials. (Dkt. No. 7). Plaintiffs’ claims essentially allege that their constitutional

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rights have been violated because the County is not permitted to regulate their land.

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Plaintiffs primary argument in opposition to Defendants’ motion asserts that

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the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution precludes Defendants from

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enacting laws regulating land.1 (See Dkt. No. 53). The Supremacy Clause

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establishes federal law as the supreme law of the land and carries with it the

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corollary principle that “the activities by the Federal Government are to be free from

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regulation by any state.” United States v. Alaska Pub. Utils. Comm’n, 23 F.3d 257,

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260-61 (9th Cir. 1994) (quoting Mayo v. United States, 319 U.S. 441, 445 (1943)).

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But as the Supreme Court has noted, “regulation of land use is perhaps the

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quintessential state activity.” F.E.R.C. v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 767 (1982).

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State land use regulations are thus permissible under the Supremacy Clause when

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those regulations do not conflict with federal law.

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The Court understands Plaintiffs’ frustration being, as they describe it, robbed of doing as they
chose during their “golden years;” however, there is simply no genuine issue as to a Constitutional
violation.
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JUDGMENT

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Riverside County possesses the authority to pass ordinances regulating land

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use under California state law and the California Constitution. First, Article 7,

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Section 11 of the California Constitution states: “A county or city may make and

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enforce within its limits all local, police, sanitary and other ordinances and

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regulations not in conflict with general laws.” Cal.Const. art. XI, Section 7. The

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passing of land use restrictions has long been recognized as a valid exercise of a

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local government’s police power. See, e.g., Vill. Of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S.

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1, 4 (1974); MacLeod v. Santa Clara Cnty, 749 F.2d 541, 544 (9th Cir. 1984).

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Second, California Government Code Section 37100 gives the legislative body of

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cities in California the authority to “pass ordinances not in conflict with the

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Constitution and laws of the State or the United States.” Cal. Gov’t Code Section

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37100. Thus, Riverside County may pass ordinances restricting land use provided

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that they do not conflict with federal or California law.

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Riverside County’s ordinances are valid because they comply with both the

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United States Constitution and the California Constitution. Conner v. City of Santa

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Ana, 897 F.2d 1487 (9th Cir. 1990), is instructive. In Conner, the Ninth Circuit

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rejected the argument that a municipal ordinance authorizing a seizure of inoperable

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automobiles as a means of abating a public nuisance was an unconstitutional exercise

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of a city’s police power. Id at 1493. The municipal ordinance at issue here is

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virtually identical that in Conner, as well as in other cases across jurisdictions that

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have consistently rejected Plaintiffs and similar arguments. See, e.g., Price v. City of

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Junction, Tex., 711 F.2d 582, 589 (5th Cir. 1983) (finding a similar ordinance to be a

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constitutional exercise of a city’s general police powers); Miller v. Wayne Twp. Bd.

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Of Trustees, 3:10-cv-172, 2011 WL 3515902, at *5 (S.D. Ohio Aug. 11,

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2011)(same); City of Costa Mesa v. Soffer, 11 Cal. App. 4th 378, 383 (1992)(same);

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People v. Greene, 264 Cal.App.2d 774, 776 (Cal.Ct. App. 1968)(same); cf. Wyss v.

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City of Hoquiam, 111 F.App’x 449, 451 (9th Cir. 2004) (upholding the

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constitutionality of a city’s act of ordering plaintiff’s house to be vacated and the

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JUDGMENT

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electricity shut off as “as a reasonable exercise of the City’s police power based on

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the unsafe condition of the building”). Riverside County’s ordinance is materially

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indistinguishable from the public ordinances in these cases. Accordingly, the Court

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finds Riverside County’s municipal ordinances to be a constitutional exercise of

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Riverside County’s general police power.

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Because the Court finds that sections 10.04.010 and 17.24.010 of the

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Riverside County Code are constitutional, Defendants may properly enforce these

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provisions without committing any constitutional violations. Plaintiffs present no

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evidence that they were subject to any constitutional violations. Plaintiff’s present

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no evidence that they were subject to any conduct beyond that mandated by these

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provisions. In fact, the record demonstrates that Riverside County declined to pursue

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civil remedies against Mr. Meier despite being legally entitled to do so. Plaintiffs

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have therefore failed to establish a genuine issue as to any constitutional violations

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by the Defendants.

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Plaintiffs seek to hold Riverside County liable under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983

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for purported constitutional violations. (Dkt. No. 7 at 23). Under Monell v.

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Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978) a local government may be

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liable under Section 1983 when its “policy or custom . . . inflicts the [constitutional]

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injury.” Nevertheless, a local government may not be liable under Monell without an

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underlying constitutional violation. Cf. City of Los Angeles v. Heller, 475 U.S. 796,

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799 (1986)(“If a person has suffered no constitutional injury at the hands of the

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individual police officer, the fact that the department regulations might have

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authorized the use of constitution excessive force is quite beside the point”).

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Accordingly, Riverside County (or any of its departments named as Defendants) may

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not be subject Monell liability.

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Finally, Plaintiffs have alleged RICO violations against both Riverside County

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and various public officials acting on behalf of Riverside County. (Dkt. No. 7 at 17-

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18). Yet Plaintiffs did not provide any evidence in opposition to Defendants’ motion

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JUDGMENT

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for summary judgment on their RICO claim. To create a genuine issue of fact to

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overcome summary judgment, Plaintiffs must provide more than a scintilla of

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evidence, or evidence that is merely colorable or not significantly probative. Addisu

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v. Fred Meyer, 198 F.3d 1130, 1134 (9th Cir. 2000). Because Plaintiffs have failed to

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do so, Defendants are entitled to judgment on Plaintiff’s RICO claims as a matter of

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law.

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Alternatively, the Court notes that RICO claims may not properly be brought

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against government entities because those entities are incapable of forming the intent

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required for a RICO violation. See Pedrina v. Chun, 97 F.3d 1296, 1300 (9th Cir.

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1996) (“[G]overnment entities are incapable of forming [the] malicious intent’

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necessary to support a RICO action.” (quoting Lancaster Cnty. Hosp. v. Antelope

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Valley Hosp., 940 F.2d 397, 404 (9th Cir. 1991))). Similarly, Plaintiffs are suing the

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individual Defendants for acts committed in their official capacity as Riverside

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public officials, and government employees may not be subject to civil RICO

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authority for actin gin their official capacity. See Smith v. Cnty of Santa Cruz, 13-cv-

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00595-LHK, 2014 WL 1118014, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 19, 2014)(“Government

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Entities and their employees are not subject to RICO liability.”); Tate v. Bd. Of

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Prison Terms, CV06-04505-AHM VBK, 2010 WL 1980141, at *13 (C.D. Cal.Apr.

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9, 2010)(“Suing a government official in his official capacity is the equivalent of

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suing the government, and the government cannot form the requisite criminal intent

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to be sued under RICO.”), report and recommendation adopted, CV 06-04505-AHM

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VBK, 2010 WL 1980149 (C.D. Cal. May 13, 2010). Plaintiffs’ RICO claims against

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Defendants thus fail on these grounds as well as a matter of law.

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WHEREFORE, by reason of the foregoing, judgment shall be entered in favor

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of Defendants COUNTY OF RIVERSIDE, on behalf of itself and erroneously sued

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as Riverside County a political subdivision and Body Politic of the State of

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California; County of Riverside a political subdivision and Body Politic of the State

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of California; County of Riverside Planning Department; County of Riverside

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JUDGMENT

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Department of Building and Safety; County of Riverside Land Use Services; County

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of Riverside Fire Department; JAY E. ORR; JENNIFER MORRIS; LANEE

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PADILLA; and MARY OVERHOLT; Plaintiffs FRED H. MEIER, III, and

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ROBERT E. SCHAEFER shall take nothing from Defendants and the First Amended

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Complaint shall be dismissed with prejudice, with Defendants to recover their

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statutory costs of suit.

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IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: July 25, 2014

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HONORABLE BEVERLY REID O’CONNELL
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

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JUDGMENT