Barbara Velasquez v. Carolyn W Colvin

Filing 19

MEMORANDUM AND OPINION by Magistrate Judge Alka Sagar. For all of the foregoing reasons, this Court affirms the decision of the Administrative Law Judge. (See Order for complete details) (afe)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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BARBARA VELASQUEZ,

) No. ED CV 13-1542-AS
)
) MEMORANDUM AND OPINION
Plaintiff,
)
v.
)
)
CAROLYN W. COLVIN,
)
Acting Commissioner of the
Social Security Administration, )
)
)
Defendant.
)
)
PROCEEDINGS

18
19
20

Plaintiff Barbara Velasquez (“Plaintiff”), a former fast food

21

worker,

asserts

disability

since

June

22

physical impairments.

23

(“ALJ”) examined the record and heard testimony from Plaintiff and a

24

vocational expert on February 8, 2012.

25

29, 2012, the ALJ denied Plaintiff benefits in a written decision.

26

(A.R. 8—23).

27

the ALJ’s decision.

(A.R. 102, 105).

1,

2009,

based

on

alleged

The Administrative Law Judge
(A.R. 24—37).

On February

On July 10, 2013, the Appeals Council denied review of
(A.R. 1—3).

28
1

1

On September 4, 2013, Plaintiff filed a Complaint, pursuant to

2

42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g) and 1383(c), alleging that the Social Security

3

Administration erred in denying her disability benefits (Docket Entry

4

No. 3).

5

Complaint, and the Certified Administrative Record (“A.R.”) (Docket

6

Entry Nos. 13, 14).

7

United States Magistrate Judge (Docket Entry Nos. 9, 11).

8

11,

9

setting forth their respective positions on Plaintiff’s claim (Docket

10

On December 31, 2013, Defendant filed an Answer to the

2014,

the

The parties have consented to proceed before a

parties

filed

a

Joint

Stipulation

On April

(“Joint

Stip.”)

Entry No. 18).

11

THE FIVE-STEP SEQUENTIAL EVALUATION PROCESS

12
13

“Social Security disability benefits claimants have the burden

14
15

of proving disability.”

16

F.3d 1380, 1380 (9th Cir. 1985).

17

the

18

reason

19

impairment...which

20

continuous

21

§

22

disabled, ALJs follow a five-step process set forth in 20 C.F.R.

23

§ 404.1520(a)(4).

24

one through four.”

25

2007).

“inability
of

to

any
period

423(d)(1)(A).

Bellamy v. Sec’y Health & Human Serv., 755

engage

in

A claimant is disabled if she has

any

substantial

medically

determinable

has

or

of
In

lasted
not

less

order

to

can
than

be

physical
expected

12

determine

gainful
to

months.”
whether

a

activity

by

or

mental

last

for

42

a

U.S.C.

claimant

is

“The claimant bears the burden of proving steps
Parra v. Astrue, 481 F.3d 742, 746 (9th Cir.

26
27

At step one, the ALJ must determine whether or not the claimant

28

is actually engaged in any “substantial gainful activity,” as defined
2

1

by

20

C.F.R.

§

404.1572.

If

2

claimant

evaluation continues to step two.

is

not

so

engaged,

the

See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(i).

3

At step two, the ALJ determines whether the claimed physical or

4
5

mental impairments are severe.

6

determining severity, “the ALJ must consider the combined effect of

7

all of the claimant’s impairments on her ability to function, without

8

regard to whether each alone was sufficiently severe.”

Smolen v.

9

Chater,

42

80

F.3d

1273,

423(d)(2)(B)).

20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(ii).

1290

(9th

evidence “establishes a slight abnormality that has ‘no more than a

12

minimal effect on an individual’s ability to work.’”

13

(quoting Yuckert v. Bowen, 841 F.2d 303, 306 (9th Cir. 1988)).

14

the ALJ concludes that the claimant does have a medically severe

15

impairment, the ALJ proceeds to the next step in the sequence.”

16

v.

17

§ 404.1520(a)(4)(ii).

683,

686

(9th

Cir.

severe

U.S.C

11

F.3d

considered

(citing

§

433

are

1996)

10

Barnhart,

Impairments

Cir.

When

2005);

unless

the

Id. at 1290

See

20

“[I]f
Webb
C.F.R.

18
19

At step three, the ALJ considers whether the claimant’s severe

20

impairments are disabling.

21

claimant is considered disabled if her purported conditions meet or

22

are medically equivalent to a listing found in 20 C.F.R. Part 404,

23

Subpart P, Appendix 1.

24

Cir. 2005).

25

impairment in appendix 1 if it is at least equal in severity and

26

duration

27

404.1526.

28

rather

to

20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iii).

The

Burch v. Barnhart, 400 F.3d 676, 679 (9th

“[An] impairment is medically equivalent to a listed
the

criteria

of

any

listed

impairment.”

20

C.F.R.

“Medical equivalence must be based on medical findings[]”

than

“[a]

generalized

assertion”
3

or

opinion

testimony

1

regarding “functional problems.”

Tackett v. Apfel, 180 F.3d 1094,

2

1100 (9th Cir. 1999) (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1526).

3
4

If the ALJ concludes that claimant is not disabled at step

5

three, the ALJ moves to step four and considers whether the claimant

6

can return to her past relevant work.

7

C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iv).

8

claimant’s

9

§ 404.1520(a)(4)(iv).

Residual

despite

Burch, 400 F.3d at 679; See 20

In order to do so, the ALJ determines

Functional

Capacity

(“RFC”).

20

C.F.R.

A claimant’s RFC is “what [claimant] can still

10

do

[claimant’s]

limitations,”

and

is

“based

on

11

relevant medical and other evidence in [the] case record.”

12

416.945(a)(1).

13

her past relevant work, she is not considered disabled.

14

all

the

F.3d at 679.

20 C.F.R.

If the claimant’s RFC dictates that she can return to
Burch, 400

15
16

If the claimant proves in step four that she cannot return to

17

her past relevant work, the ALJ proceeds to step five.

18

§ 404.1520(a)(4)(v).

19

Secretary to show that the claimant can do other kinds of work.”

20

Embrey v. Bowden, 849 F.2d 418, 422 (9th Cir. 1988).

21

ALJs “can call upon a vocational expert to testify as to: (1) what

22

jobs the claimant, given his or her [RFC], would be able to do; and

23

(2) the availability of such jobs in the national economy.”

24

180 F.3d at 1101.

If claimant does not have the RFC to work in any

25

available

she

26

§ 404.1520(a)(4)(v).

jobs,

20 C.F.R.

At step five “the burden of proof shifts to the

is

considered

27
28
4

disabled.

At this point,

20

Tackett,
C.F.R.

BACKGROUND AND SUMMARY OF ADMINISTRATIVE DECISION

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2

In applying for disability insurance benefits, Plaintiff alleged

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4

the

following

5

diabetes, asthma, and joint pain, and alleged that the onset date of

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these impairments was June 1, 2009.

7

at

8

testified that she has pain in both knees and her lower back.

9

29).

the

disabling

hearing

before

severe

the

impairments:

ALJ

arthritic

(A.R. 102, 105).
on

February

8,

knee

pain,

Additionally,

2012,

Plaintiff
(A.R.

She testified that sometimes she takes Vicodin two to three

10

times a day, due to the pain.

(A.R. 33).

Plaintiff claimed that she

11

cannot walk for more than five minutes at a time, or stand for more

12

than ten to fifteen minutes at a time.

13

stated that she uses an albuterol inhaler daily, and takes daily

14

medication for her diabetes.

15

that she left work in 2003 due to a complicated pregnancy, and that

16

she has been unable to find work since then.

(A.R. 29).

(A.R. 30—31).

Plaintiff also

She further testified
(A.R. 32).

17
18

The ALJ applied the five-step evaluation process to determine

19

whether Plaintiff was disabled.

(A.R. 13—19).

20

determined

not

21

gainful activity.”

22

Plaintiff

23

obesity, mild bilateral chondromalacia patellae, diabetes mellitus,

24

and asthma.

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of skin cancer, a right ankle sprain, abscesses, a cystic lesion,

26

bilateral epicondylitis, and had surgery to remove a small foreign

27

object lodged in her ear, but did not find these impairments severe

that

Plaintiff

suffers
(Id.).

was

(A.R. 13).
from

the

engaged

At step one, the ALJ
in

any

“substantially

At step two, the ALJ found that

following

severe

impairments:

morbid

The ALJ also noted that Plaintiff has a history

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5

1

because they did not last the durational requirement or did not have

2

“more than a minimal effect” on Plaintiff’s ability to work.

(Id.).

3

At

4

step

three,

the

ALJ

determined

that

Plaintiff’s

severe

5

impairments did not meet or equal a medical listing found in 20

6

C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1.

7

of the record, the ALJ found that Plaintiff’s medically determinable

8

impairments

9

symptoms.

could

reasonably

(A.R. 15).

be

(A.R. 13—14).

expected

to

cause

Upon review
the

alleged

The ALJ also found, however, that Plaintiff’s

10

“statements

concerning

the

intensity,

persistence,

11

effects of these symptoms are not credible.”

and

limiting

(Id.).

12

Before proceeding to step four, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had

13
14

the RFC to perform light work with the following limitations:

15

lift and carry 20 pounds occasionally and 10 pounds
frequently. She can stand and walk for 6 hours out of an
8-hour workday, and she can sit for 6 hours out of an 8hour workday. She can occasionally climb ramps and stairs;
and she can occasionally balance, stoop, kneel, crouch, and
crawl[].
She cannot climb ladders, ropes, or scaffolds.
She should avoid concentrated exposure to gases, dusts,
fumes, and environmental irritants.
She should avoid
extreme cold.

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17
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20
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24
25
26
27

(A.R. 14).

The ALJ based the RFC finding on the opinions of Dr.

Bilezikjian, who conducted an orthopedic consultative examination,
and

medical

consultants

Dr.

Lockie

and

Dr.

Meek,

all

of

whom

determined that Plaintiff had the RFC to perform work at the medium
exertion level.

(A.R. 17, 171—174, 175—181, 192—193).

However, the

ALJ found that Plaintiff had the RFC to perform light work after

28
6

1

considering Plaintiff’s subjective complaints, her morbid obesity,

2

and the objective medical evidence.

(A.R. 17).

3
4

At step four, the ALJ, relying on the testimony of the VE, found

5

that Plaintiff was able to perform her past relevant work as a fast

6

food worker, as generally performed.

(A.R. 17—18, 34).

7

Alternatively,

8

the

ALJ

found

that,

in

addition

to

her

past

9

relevant work, Plaintiff was also able to perform other jobs existing

10

in significant numbers in both the regional and national economies,

11

such

12

“cleaner/housekeeper.”

13

testimony of the VE, who considered all of Plaintiff’s limitations in

14

providing his opinion.

15

the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff was not disabled under 42 U.S.C. §

16

423(d)(1)(A).

as

an

“assembler,

small

products,”

(A.R. 18).

a

“cashier

II,”

or

a

The ALJ’s findings relied on the

(A.R. 33—36).

As a result of these findings,

17

STANDARD OF REVIEW

18
19
20

This court reviews the Administration’s decision to determine

21

if: (1) the Administration’s findings are supported by substantial

22

evidence; and (2) The Administration used proper legal standards.

23

Smolen,

24

scintilla, but less than a preponderance.”

25

F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 1995).

26

evidence supports a finding, “a court must consider [] the record as

27

a

28

detracts from the [Commissioner’s] conclusion.”

80

whole,

F.3d

at

weighing

1279.

both

“Substantial

evidence

is

more

than

a

Andrews v. Shalala, 53

To determine whether substantial

evidence

that
7

supports

and

evidence

that

Reddick v. Chater,

1

157 F.3d 715, 720 (9th Cir. 1998).

2

reasonably

3

conclusion, [a] court may not substitute its judgment for that of the

4

ALJ.”

5

Cir. 2004).

support

either

As a result, “[i]f evidence can

affirming

or

reversing

the

ALJ’s

Batson v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 359 F.3d 1190, 1196 (9th

6

PLAINTIFF’S CONTENTION

7
8

Plaintiff

9

contends

that

the

ALJ

erred

in

her

assessment

of

10

Plaintiff’s credibility, and failed to provide clear and convincing

11

reasons for rejecting Plaintiff’s testimony.

(Joint Stip. 2—10).

12

DISCUSSION

13
14

After consideration of the record as a whole, the Court finds

15
16

that

the

Commissioner's

findings

are

supported

17

by

substantial

evidence and are free from material1 legal error.

18

A. The ALJ Did Not Err in Evaluating Plaintiff’s Credibility

19
20

If a claimant asserts that pain is the primary reason a severe

21
22

impairment

23

subjective symptoms may be crucial to the ALJ’s evaluation.

24

Johnson v. Shalala, 60 F.3d 1428, 1433 (9th Cir 1995).

25
26
27
28

is

disabling,

the

claimant’s

1

testimony

regarding

her
See

The ALJ must

The harmless error rule applies to the review of administrative
decisions regarding disability. See McLeod v. Astrue, 640 F.3d 881,
886-88 (9th Cir. 2011); Burch v. Barnhart, 400 F.3d 676, 679 (9th
Cir. 2005) (stating that an ALJ’s decision will not be reversed for
errors that are harmless).
8

1

make

“an

explicit

credibility

finding

whenever

the

claimant’s

2

credibility is a critical factor in the Secretary’s determination.”

3

Rashad v. Sullivan, 903 F.2d 1229, 1231 (9th Cir. 1990).

4

determine whether a claimant’s testimony is credible, the ALJ engages

5

in a two-step analysis.

6

Cir. 2014).

In order to

Garrison v. Colvin, 759 F.3d 995, 1014 (9th

7

First, the claimant “must produce objective medical evidence of

8
9

an

underlying

impairment

‘which

could

reasonably

be

expected

to

10

produce the pain or other symptoms alleged.’”

11

947

12

423(d)(5)(A)(1988)).

13

impairment, “the claimant need not produce objective medical evidence

14

of the pain or fatigue itself, or the severity thereof.”

Smolen, 80

15

F.3d

that

16

impairment] could reasonably have caused some degree of the symptom.”

17

Id.

F.2d

at

341,

1282.

344

(9th
In

Instead,

Cir.

1991)

producing

the

Bunnell v. Sullivan,

(quoting

evidence

claimant

“need

of

only

42
the

show

U.S.C.

§

underlying

[the

18
19

Second, once the claimant has produced the requisite objective

20

medical

evidence,

21

regarding the severity of her symptoms.”

22

Absent affirmative evidence of malingering, however, the ALJ may only

23

reject

24

convincing reasons for doing so.”

25

alleged symptoms, an ALJ may consider: “(1) ordinary techniques of

26

credibility

27

prior

28

testimony by the claimant that appears to be less than candid; (2)

a

the

plaintiff’s

“ALJ

testimony

evaluation,

inconsistent

may

such

statements

as

reject

“by

the

specific,

clear

and

In assessing a claimant’s

claimant’s

concerning

testimony

Smolen, 80 F.3d at 1284.

offering
Id.

9

claimant’s

reputation

the

symptoms,

for
and

lying,
other

1

unexplained or inadequately explained failure to seek treatment or to

2

follow a prescribed course of treatment; and (3) the claimant’s daily

3

activities.”

4

record

5

other third parties.”

and

Id.

An ALJ may also consider “the claimant’s work

observations

of

treating

and

examining

physicians

and

Id.

6

Here,

7

the

ALJ

examined

8

testimony from Plaintiff.

9

ALJ

determined
of

that

an

the

(A.R. 13—37).

Plaintiff

underlying

Administrative

had

Record

heard

Based on the record, the

“produce[d]

impairment

and

which

objective

10

evidence

11

expected to produce the pain or other symptoms alleged.”

12

However, the ALJ rejected the

13

disabling effects of her symptoms, and offered specific, clear and

14

convincing reasons for doing so.

15

the ALJ are supported by the record.

claimant’s

could

medical

testimony

(A.R. 15—17).

reasonably

be

(A.R. 15).

regarding

the

The reasons given by

16
17

Conservative Treatment

18
19

“[E]vidence
a

of

‘conservative

claimant’s

testimony

treatment’
regarding

is

the

sufficient
severity

of

to

20

discount

an

21

impairment.”

22

(holding that Plaintiff’s use of over-the-counter pain medications to

23

treat pain was inconsistent with Plaintiff’s claims that pain was

24

disabling).

25

visits,

26

ibuprofen in order to manage her pain.

27

327, 361, 385).

28

fact that December 26, 2011, was the “only time recently that any

Parra v. Astrue, 481 F.3d 742, 751 (9th Cir. 2007)

Here, the ALJ pointed out that on a number of clinical

Plaintiff

stated

that

she

was

only

taking

Tylenol

or

(A.R. 16—17, 171, 250, 263,

Furthermore, the ALJ included in her decision the
10

1

care provider has prescribed [Plaintiff] Vicodin.”

2

Accordingly, the ALJ properly relied on the medical records which

3

showed that, until recently, plaintiff had largely treated her pain

4

with

5

Plaintiff’s assertions regarding the severity of her pain.

the

use

of

over-the-counter

medication

(A.R. 17, 450).

in

discounting

6

Objective Medical Evidence

7
8
9

While a claimant’s testimony regarding her symptoms “cannot be

10

rejected on the sole ground that it is not fully corroborated by

11

objective medical evidence, the medical evidence is still a relevant

12

factor in determining the severity of the claimant’s pain and its

13

disabling effects.”

14

Cir. 2001) (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1592(c)(2)); Burch v. Barnhart,

15

400 F.3d 676, 681 (9th Cir. 2005) (“Although lack of medical evidence

16

cannot form the sole basis for discounting pain testimony, it is a

17

factor that the ALJ can consider in his credibility analysis.”).

18

Here, the ALJ found that, despite Plaintiff’s claims of disabling

19

impairments, Plaintiff’s “[medical] treatment has consisted largely

20

of visits for minor issues and transient complaints.”

21

This finding is supported by the record.

Rollins v. Massanari, 261 F.3d 853, 857 (9th

(A.R. 17).

22

Of

23

the

numerous

occasions

on

which

Plaintiff

sought

medical

24

treatment in 2010 and 2011, only a few involved complaints of back or

25

knee pain.

26

despite

27

2

28

her

(A.R. 276, 361, 371, 396, 427).2
complaints

of

debilitating

knee

The ALJ found that
pain,

“x-rays

of

It should be noted, however, that two of Plaintiff’s visits were
the result of knee pain that occurred after she fell.
(A.R. 361,
396).
11

1

[Plaintiff’s] knee have been normal.”

2

Furthermore,

3

Plaintiff “is able to move about the office slowly, without any

4

assistance,

5

table...without any assistance or difficulty.”

6

ALJ also noted Dr. Bilezikjian’s observations that Plaintiff’s gait

7

appeared normal, her knees displayed “no instability,” and that she

8

“[did] not use assistive devices or braces for normal ambulation.”

9

(A.R. 15, 172—173).

the
and

ALJ
is

reiterated
able

to

Dr.

get

(A.R. 17, 173, 386, 391).
Bilezikjian’s

onto

and

off

findings

the

that

examination

(A.R. 15, 172).

The

10
11

With respect to Plaintiff’s asthma, the ALJ pointed out that

12

although Plaintiff suffers from asthma, there is “no evidence of

13

emergency

14

exacerbation.”

15

are unsupported by objective medical evidence, the ALJ properly found

16

Plaintiff’s

17

symptoms to be less than credible.

room

visits

or

(A.R. 17).

statements

hospitalization

for

acute

asthma

Because Plaintiff’s allegations of pain

regarding

the

disabling

effects

of

her

18
19

Contradiction With The Medical Record

20
21

“Contradiction with the medical record is a sufficient basis for

22

rejecting the claimant’s subjective testimony.”

23

Soc. Sec. Admin., 533 F.3d 1155, 1161 (9th Cir. 2008).

24

found that Plaintiff’s statements regarding her use of Vicodin were

25

contradicted by the medical record.

26

that, in order to manage the disabling pain in her knees and lower

27

back, she takes Vicodin two to three times per day.

28

However, the ALJ noted that December 26, 2011, was the “only time
12

(A.R. 16).

Carmickle v. Comm’r
Here, the ALJ

Plaintiff testified
(A.R. 29).

1

recently that any care provider has prescribed [Plaintiff] Vicodin[]”

2

(A.R.

3

prescription or treatment for her pain or ongoing prescriptions for

4

Vicodin.”

5

required a prescription drug as powerful as Vicodin in order to

6

manage

7

contends that she “misunderstood” the ALJ’s questions about when and

8

how

9

unavailing.

17,

450),

and

that

(A.R. 16).

her

often

pain
she

is

took

“the

record

does

not

show

any

ongoing

Accordingly, Plaintiff’s testimony that she
undercut

by

Vicodin.

the

(Joint

medical
Stip.

record.

7).

This

Plaintiff
argument

is

Plaintiff testified that she must take Vicodin multiple

10

times a day to manage her disabling pain in response to questioning

11

by her own attorney.

(A.R. 29).

12

when

prescribed

13

Therefore, Plaintiff’s testimony about taking Vicodin in a continuous

14

manner in order to manage her discomfort was not ambiguous or based

15

on any misunderstanding of what was being asked of her.

16

Plaintiff’s testimony about her use of Vicodin is belied by the

17

medical record, the ALJ correctly found Plaintiff’s testimony about

18

the use of Vicodin to be less than forthcoming and self-serving.

she

had

been

The ALJ’s questions were limited to
Vicodin

and

who

prescribed

it.

Because

19

Inconsistent Statements

20
21

An

22

ALJ

may

rely

on

“ordinary

techniques

of

credibility

23

evaluation” in considering Plaintiff’s credibility.

Smolen, 80 F.3d

24

at 1284.

25

allegations based on inconsistencies in the testimony,” Bunnell, 947

26

F.2d at 346, or based on “inconsistencies between...the testimony and

27

the claimant’s conduct,” Molina v. Astrue, 674 F.3d 1104, 1112 (9th

28

Cir.

As a result, “the adjudicator may discredit the claimant’s

2012).

The

ALJ

found

that
13

Plaintiff

“made

inconsistent

1

statements regarding why she stopped working.”

2

171).

3

hearing,

4

complications with her pregnancy.

5

for

6

stopped working on June 1, 2009, due to knee pain.

7

Plaintiff told Dr. Bilezikjian, at her orthopedic consultation, that

8

she quit work in 2004 to take care of her children.

9

ALJ

The record supports this finding.
Plaintiff

disability

was

testified

insurance

entitled

to

Plaintiff’s

that

quit

find

At the administrative

working

(A.R. 32).

benefits,

that

these

affected

11

discredited

12

because Plaintiff continues to smoke,

13

that

14

throughout

15

keeping busy with household chores.

16

to

17

2003,

due

to

she

claimed

that

(A.R. 134).

(A.R. 171).

inconsistencies

Plaintiff’s

the
on

day,
these

Additionally,

she

The

adversely

credibility.

Plaintiff’s

despite

rely

credibility.

in

When Plaintiff applied

however,

10

(A.R. 17, 32, 134,

testimony
claims

Plaintiff
factors

regarding

ALJ

debilitating

also
asthma

(A.R. 17, 32, 172),3 and noted

that

she

testified
in

the

requires

that

(A.R. 30).
her

she

frequent
spends

her

rest
day

The ALJ was entitled

assessment

of

Plaintiff’s

18

Even

19

though

Plaintiff

only

challenges

the

ALJ’s

adverse

20

credibility findings based upon her poor work history, statements

21

concerning Vicodin usage, and daily activities, (Joint Stip. 2—10),

22

the ALJ’s decision to deny benefits was also based on the ALJ’s

23

findings about the lack of objective medical evidence, conservative

24

3

25
26
27
28

Plaintiff told Dr. Bilezikjian that she smokes two cigarettes
per day, (A.R. 172), and her medical records also reflect that she
smokes. (A.R. 219, 222, 232, 250, 263, 290, 313, 345, 371, 427).
However, when asked by the ALJ whether she smokes, Plaintiff
responded “[i]t’s not a big issue. I could quit. I could go a week
without one or a month.” The ALJ was entitled to find, based on the
facts, that Plaintiff was likely attempting to understate this
detrimental fact. (A.R. 32).
14

1

treatment, and inconsistent statements, (A.R. 15—17).

2

even if this Court were to accept all of Plaintiff’s arguments, which

3

it

4

substantial evidence.

does

not,

the

ALJ’s

decision

would

still

be

As a result,
supported

by

5

CONCLUSION

6
7

“If the ALJ’s credibility finding is supported by substantial

8
9

evidence

in

the

record,

we

may

not

engage

in

second

guessing.”

10

Thomas, 278 F.3d at 958-959.

11

and

12

regarding her subjective symptoms.

13

that Plaintiff failed to establish disability was properly based upon

14

substantial evidence.

convincing

reasons

for

Here, the ALJ provided specific, clear
discounting

Plaintiff’s

statements

Therefore, the ALJ’s decision

15

ORDER

16
17
18
19

For

all

of

the

foregoing

reasons,

this

Court

affirms

decision of the Administrative Law Judge.

20
21

LET JUDGMENT BE ENTERED ACCORDINGLY.

22
23
24
25
26

Dated: November 19, 2014.
_/s/__________________________
ALKA SAGAR
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

27
28
15

the