Cecil Shaw v. Jar-Ramona Plaza LLC et al

Filing 69

MINUTES (IN CHAMBERS) by Judge Christina A. Snyder: The Court hereby DENIES Jar-Ramona's motion to strike certain allegations from the First Amended Complaint and also DENIES Jar-Ramona's motion to sever and dismiss based on misjoinder 58 . Court Reporter: Not Present. (gk)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL
Case No.

5:13-cv-01563-CAS(SPx)

Title

CECIL SHAW V. JAR-RAMONA PLAZA LLC ET AL.

Present: The Honorable

Date

May 29, 2014

CHRISTINA A. SNYDER

Catherine Jeang
Deputy Clerk

Not Present
Court Reporter / Recorder

N/A
Tape No.

Attorneys Present for Plaintiff:

Attorneys Present for Defendants:

Not Present

Not Present

I

Proceedings:

(In chambers:) DEFENDANT JAR-RAMONA’S MOTION TO
STRIKE CERTAIN ALLEGATIONS IN THE FIRST AMENDED
COMPLAINT (dkt. 58, filed May 2, 2014)
(In chambers:) DEFENDANT JAR-RAMONA’S MOTION TO
SEVER AND DISMISS BASED ON MISJOINDER (dkt. 58-1,
filed May 2, 2014)

The Court finds this motion appropriate for decision without oral argument. Fed.
R. Civ. P. 78; Local Rule 7-15. Accordingly, the hearing date of June 2, 2014, is vacated,
and the matter is hereby taken under submission.
I.

INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND

On March 7, 2013, plaintiff Cecil Shaw filed this action against defendants JarRamona Plaza, LLC (“Jar-Ramona”), Leslie’s Poolmart (“Leslie’s”), Dollar Tree Stores,
Inc. (“Dollar Tree”), Radio Shack Corporation (“RadioShack”), Grocery Outlet, Inc.
(“Grocery Outlet”), Grocery Outlet Hemet #100 Inc. (“Grocery Outlet #100”), and
Mehnga Foods, doing business as Subway #33424 (“Subway”). Plaintiff’s operative
First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) asserts claims under (1) certain provisions of the
American with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12182-83, (2) California’s Unruh
Act, Cal. Civ. Code §§ 51 et seq, and (3) California Health and Safety Code § 19955. In
brief, plaintiff asserts that he is disabled and was denied equal access and
accommodations in defendants’ shopping plaza and store. FAC ¶ 10.
On May 2, 2014, Jar-Ramona filed (1) a motion to strike certain allegations from
the FAC, and (2) a motion to sever and dismiss based on misjoinder. Dkt. 58. Plaintiff
filed oppositions on May 16, 2014, dkts. 61-62, and Jar-Ramona replied on May 19,
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL
Case No.

5:13-cv-01563-CAS(SPx)

Date

May 29, 2014

Title

CECIL SHAW V. JAR-RAMONA PLAZA LLC ET AL.

2014, dkt. 63. After considering the parties’ arguments, the Court finds and concludes as
follows.
II.

ANALYSIS
A.

Motion to Strike

Jar-Ramona moves to strike subparagraphs 10(b)(1) and 10(c)(1) from the FAC.
Subparagraph 10(b)(1) asserts that a particular handicapped parking space is too narrow,
while subparagraph 10(c)(1) asserts that there is no handicapped parking space near the
Subway store in the shopping center parking lot. Jar-Ramona contends that the Court
previously adjudicated these claims in its February 10, 2014 order granting in part and
denying in part Jar-Ramona’s motion for summary judgment. Dkt. 48. In that order, the
Court dismissed the parking space allegations as moot based on evidence that the parking
lot is currently in compliance with all applicable parking lot regulations.
However, on May 28, 2014, the Court issued an amended order on Jar-Ramona’s
motion for summary judgment. This amended order clarified that although plaintiff’s
parking-lot claims under the ADA and California Health and Safety Code § 19955 were
moot, plaintiff’s claims under the Unruh Act were not moot because “[u]nlike the ADA,
the Unruh Act permits the recovery of monetary damages.” Vogel v. Rite Aid Corp.,
2014 WL 211789, at *8 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 17, 2014). As such, plaintiff could potentially
still recover damages even if the parking-space violations were subsequently remedied by
defendants. Wilson v. Pier 1 Imports (US), Inc., 439 F. Supp. 2d 1054, 1069 (E.D. Cal.
2006) (“[T]he court must conclude that defendants have cured the defect. Therefore, the
court concludes that the issue is moot for the purposes of the ADA. However, the claim
is not moot under the Unruh Act, since damages are still available . . . .”).
Accordingly, the Court concludes that it did not previously adjudicate plaintiff’s
claims under the Unruh Act, and thus declines to strike subparagraphs 10(b)(1) and
10(c)(1) from the FAC.

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL
Case No.

5:13-cv-01563-CAS(SPx)

Title

CECIL SHAW V. JAR-RAMONA PLAZA LLC ET AL.
B.

Date

May 29, 2014

Motion to Sever Based on Misjoinder

Jar-Ramona also moves to sever the individual store defendants from this action,
arguing that they were misjoined. Jar-Ramona argues that joinder of all of the individual
store defendants prevents Jar-Ramona from properly asserting defenses that might protect
Jar-Ramona from liability with respect to violations that may have occurred in particular
stores.
Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 20(a)(2), permissive joinder of defendants is proper if: “(A)
any right to relief is asserted against them jointly, severally, or in the alternative with
respect to or arising out of the same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or
occurrences; and (B) any question of law or fact common to all defendants will arise in
the action.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 20(a)(2). “Under the Rules, the impulse is toward
entertaining the broadest possible scope of action consistent with fairness to the parties;
joinder of claims, parties and remedies is strongly encouraged.” United Mine Workers of
Am. v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 724 (1966). “Rule 20(a)(2) is designed to promote judicial
economy and trial convenience.” Hard Drive Prods., Inc. v. Does 1-188, 809 F. Supp. 2d
1150, 1156 (N.D. Cal. 2011).
Here, overwhelming considerations of judicial economy compel the Court to deny
Jar-Ramona’s motion to sever. The Court is not prepared to try five separate cases for
accessibility violations that all allegedly occurred within a single shopping center.
Although the Court previously granted defendant Dollar Tree’s motion to sever, it did so
because the motion was explicitly unopposed, see dkt. 51, and declines to take the
additional step of severing all of the remaining individual store defendants.
III.

CONCLUSION

In accordance with the foregoing, the Court hereby DENIES Jar-Ramona’s motion
to strike certain allegations from the FAC and also DENIES Jar-Ramona’s motion to
sever and dismiss based on misjoinder.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
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Initials of Preparer

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CMJ

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