Diane Beall v. Federal National Mortgage Association et al

Filing 31

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS by Judge Dean D. Pregerson. Presently before the court is Defendants Federal National Mortgage Association ("Fannie Mae") and Ocwen Loan Servicing LLC (collectively, "Defendants")& #039;s Motion to Dismiss, in which Defendant Quality Loan Service Corporation joins. Having considered the submissions of the parties, the court grants the motion and adopts the following order. Defendants' Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED. The Complaint is dismissed with prejudice,, (Made JS-6. Case Terminated.) (bp)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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DIANE BEALL fka TEMPLIN,

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Plaintiff,

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v.
FEDERAL NATIONAL MORTGAGE
ASSOCIATION, doing business
as Fannie Mae, et al.,
Defendants.
___________________________

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Case No. EDCV 13-01621 DDP (DTBx)

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION
TO DISMISS

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Presently before the court is Defendants Federal National

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Mortgage Association (“Fannie Mae”) and Ocwen Loan Servicing LLC

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(collectively, “Defendants”)’s Motion to Dismiss, in which

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Defendant Quality Loan Service Corporation joins.1

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considered the submissions of the parties, the court grants the

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motion and adopts the following order.

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I.

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Having

Background
In July 2003, Plaintiff executed a Promissory Note and

obtained a home loan, secured by a Deed of Trust in favor of

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Onewest Bank FSB is not named as a defendant, but is
described and referred to in the body of the Complaint. (See,
e.g., Complaint ¶¶ 1, 8, 14.)

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Indymac Bank FSB.

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acquired the Note and Deed.

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Bank FSB (“OneWest”) acquired the loan servicing rights.

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14-15.)

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(Complaint ¶ 11.)

Soon after, Fannie Mae

(Compl. ¶ 12.)

In March 2009, Onewest
(Id. ¶¶

In May 2010, Defendant Quality Loan Service Corporation

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recorded a Notice of Default.2

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recorded a Notice of Sale.

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Defendant has any authority to collect on or service her loan, or

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to foreclose on her property.

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In August 2010, Quality Loan

Plaintiff alleges, however, that no

(Compl. ¶ 166.)

In September 2010, soon after Quality Loan recorded the Notice

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of Sale, Plaintiff filed an action in the United States District

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Court for the Southern District of California. See

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Quality Loan Serv. Corp., No. 10-CV-1900 AJB, 2011 WL 2784594 (S.D.

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Cal. Jul. 15, 2011) (“Beall I”).

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of action related to the pending foreclosure.

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extensive motion practice, and having allowed Plaintiff to amend

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her claims twice, the Beall I court dismissed all of Plaintiff’s

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causes of action with prejudice, including claims for violations of

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the Truth in Lending Act, the Real Estate Settlement Procedures

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Act, California Business and Professions Code Section 7200,

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California Civil Code Section 2923.5, and wrongful foreclosure,

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fraud, quiet title, and declaratory relief.

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14, 15, 50, 51.)

Beall v.

Plaintiff alleged twenty causes
Id. at *1.

After

(Beall I, Dkt. Nos.

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Though the Complaint names Quality Loan Service as a
Defendant, it makes no further mention of Quality Loan Service.
Quality Loan recorded the Notice of Default in its capacity as
agent for the Beneficiary, OneWest, and was later substituted in as
Trustee by OneWest. (Defendant’s Request for Judicial Notice Exs.
3, 4.)
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On April 4, 2012, Plaintiff filed another complaint, this time

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in Riverside County Superior Court.

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Serv. Corp., No. EDCV 12-601 DDP, 2013 WL 1294516 (C.D. Cal. Mar.

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28 2013) (“Beall II”.)

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removed the action to this court.

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complaint in Beall II, like the Beall I complaint, alleged several

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causes of action related to the pending foreclosure.

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n.2.

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Plaintiff’s Beall II claims had been or should have been brought in

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See Beall v. Quality Loan

OneWest, a named defendant in Beall II,
Id. at *1.

Plaintiff’s amended

On OneWest’s Motion to Dismiss, this court concluded that

Beall I, and dismissed the complaint with prejudice.

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Id. at *1

Id. at 2-3.

Plaintiff proceeded to file this action on September 10, 2013.

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As in Beall I and Beall II, Plaintiff alleges that no defendant

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possesses an interest in her Note or Deed or has any authority to

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foreclose.

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defendant here.3

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Plaintiff’s prior suits.

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instant complaint.4

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Unlike the previous actions, OneWest is not named as a
Moving Defendant Fannie Mae was not named in
Fannie Mae now moves to dismiss the

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See note 1, supra. As with Quality Loan, the Complaint
names Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC as a defendant, but alleges no
facts related to Ocwen. That alone would be sufficient reason to
dismiss all claims against Ocwen. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a).
Ocwen
was not named in Beall I or Beall II. Quality Loan has been named
in each of Plaintiff’s three actions. As described in note 2,
supra, the Complaint here makes no substantive allegations against
Quality Loan.
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As in Beall II, the court notes that Plaintiff, an attorney
proceeding pro se, once again failed to timely oppose the instant
Motion, and did not seek an extension of time or continuance of the
motion. See C.D. Cal. L.R. 7-9. This alone warrants granting of
the motion and dismissal of Plaintiff’s claims. C.D. Cal. L.R. 712. Nevertheless, in the interest of deciding issues on the
merits, the court has once again considered Plaintiff’s late-filed
opposition.
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II.

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Legal Standard
A complaint will survive a motion to dismiss when it contains

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“sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to

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relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.

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662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544,

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570 (2007)).

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“accept as true all allegations of material fact and must construe

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those facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.” Resnick

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v. Hayes, 213 F.3d 443, 447 (9th Cir. 2000).

When considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a court must

Although a complaint

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need not include “detailed factual allegations,” it must offer

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“more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me

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accusation.”

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allegations that are no more than a statement of a legal conclusion

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“are not entitled to the assumption of truth.” Id. at 679. Even

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under the liberal pleading standard of Federal Rule of Civil

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Procedure 8(a)(2), under which a party is only required to make a

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“short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is

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entitled to relief,” a “pleading that offers ‘labels and

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conclusions’ or a ‘formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause

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of action will not do.’” Id. 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at

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555).

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III. Discussion

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Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.

Conclusory allegations or

Fannie Mae first argues that, even accepting Plaintiff’s

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allegations as true, all of Plaintiff’s claims are barred by the

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doctrines of res judicata and/or collateral estoppel.

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judicata, a final judgment on the merits of an action precludes the

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parties or their privies from relitigating issues that were or

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could have been raised in that action.”
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“Under res

Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S.

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90, 94 (1980).

“Under collateral estoppel, once a court has

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decided an issue of fact or law necessary to its judgment, that

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decision may preclude relitigation of the issue in a suit on a

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different cause of action involving a party to the first case.”

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Id.

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Fannie Mae was not a party to either Beall I or Beall II.

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California courts find privity between nonparties and prior parties

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where “the nonparty has an identity of interest with, an adequate

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representation by, the party in the first action and the nonparty

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should reasonably expect to be bound by the prior adjudication.”

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City of Martinez v. Texaco Trading & Transp., Inc., 353 F.3d 758,

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764 (9th Cir. 2003) (internal quotation and citation omitted).

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Fannie Mae contends that it is in privity with OneWest, which,

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though not named here, was a defendant in the prior actions.5

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Though Fannie Mae was not named in Plaintiff’s prior suits.

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the Complaint here alleges that Fannie Mae acquired Plaintiff’s

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Promissory Note and Deed of Trust in 2003.

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Beall I and Beall II, Plaintiff brought a cause of action to Quiet

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Title, seeking “a judicial decree and order declaring Plaintiff to

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be the title owner of record of the property . . . and voiding any

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liens or encumbrances upon the property created by Defendants or

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their putative predecessors.”

(Complaint ¶ 3.)

In

(Beall II Complaint, ¶ 178.)

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Fannie Mae argues, and Plaintiff does not dispute, that had

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Plaintiff prevailed in an earlier action, the judgment, quieting

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title to the property at issue here, would have bound Fannie Mae

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and extinguished its interest in Plaintiff’s Note and Deed.

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See note 1, supra.
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Fannie

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Mae is, therefore, in privity with the Beall I and Beall II

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defendants.

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appears to dispute the privity relationship, the basis for her

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position is unclear.

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parties to the suit or in privity with a party.

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privity with [Fannie Mae]. . . . So the doctrine of Res Judicata

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simply fails.”))

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has been met.

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City of Martinez, 353 F.3d at 764.

Though Plaintiff

(Opposition at 2 (“Defendants . . . were not
They were in

The privity element of the res judicata analysis

Plaintiff also appears to dispute that Fannie Mae’s ownership

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of the Note and Deed were raised or determined in prior

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proceedings.

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claims are related to the ownership of a Fannie Mae Trust which was

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not litigated in any way or fashion.”)) The thrust of Plaintiff’s

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opposition appears to be that this case involves ownership

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questions regarding an entity not named in the complaint, the

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“Fannie Mae Trust” or “Fannie Mae as Trustee (‘FMT’).”

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described above, however, the Complaint alleges that Fannie Mae

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acquired Plaintiff’s loan and, as discussed above, that interest

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was placed at issue by Plaintiff’s prior quiet title claims.

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also Defendant’s Request for Judicial Notice, Ex. A (“Plaintiff’s

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Notice to Court that Plaintiff’s Loan is Owned By Fannie Mae and

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Not OneWest.” (Beal I Dkt.11)).)

(Opp. at 2 (“Res judicata is inapplicable as the

Plaintiff’s claims are barred by res judicata.

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As

(See

Fannie Mae is

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in privity with the defendants in Plaintiff’s earlier cases, and

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the issues in this case were raised, or could have been raised, in

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those cases.

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IV.

Conclusion
For the reasons stated above, Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss is

GRANTED.

The Complaint is dismissed with prejudice.

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IT IS SO ORDERED.

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Dated: July 30, 2014
DEAN D. PREGERSON
United States District Judge

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