Dana Benjamin v. Carolyn W Colvin

Filing 18

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER OF REMAND by Magistrate Judge Charles F. Eick. Plaintiff's and Defendant's motions for summary judgment are denied and this matter is remanded for further administrative action consistent with this Opinion. (sp)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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DANA BENJAMIN,

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Plaintiff,
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v.
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CAROLYN W. COLVIN, ACTING
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COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY,
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Defendant.
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___________________________________)

NO. ED CV 13-2343-E

MEMORANDUM OPINION
AND ORDER OF REMAND

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Pursuant to sentence four of 42 U.S.C. section 405(g), IT IS

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HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiff’s and Defendant’s motions for summary

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judgment are denied and this matter is remanded for further

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administrative action consistent with this Opinion.

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PROCEEDINGS

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Plaintiff filed a complaint on January 8, 2014, seeking review of

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the Commissioner’s denial of disability benefits.

The parties filed a

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consent to proceed before a United States Magistrate Judge on March 3,

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2014.

Plaintiff filed a motion for summary judgment on June 19, 2014.

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Defendant filed a motion for summary judgment on July 21, 2014.

The

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Court has taken the motions under submission without oral argument.

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See L.R. 7-15; Minute Order, filed January 9, 2014.

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BACKGROUND AND SUMMARY OF ADMINISTRATIVE DECISION

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Plaintiff, a former administrative assistant, asserts disability

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since October 8, 2008, based on “mental problems” (Administrative

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Record (“A.R.”) 128-46, 161-63).

An Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”)

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found Plaintiff has the following severe conditions: “schizoaffective

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disorder; post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD); history of alcohol

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dependency, in early remission; and personality disorder” (A.R. 21).

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The ALJ found that, notwithstanding these impairments: (1) Plaintiff

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retains the residual functional capacity for work at all exertion

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levels with certain nonexertional limitations;1 and (2) a person with

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this residual functional capacity could perform work as a general

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clerk, clerk typist, or office helper (A.R. 23, 30-31 (adopting

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vocational expert testimony at A.R. 62-64)).

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ALJ deemed Plaintiff’s subjective complaints less than fully credible

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(A.R. 24-28).

In denying benefits, the

The Appeals Council denied review (A.R. 5-7).

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Specifically, the ALJ found that Plaintiff would have
the following nonexertional limitations:

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[Plaintiff] cannot perform work requiring hypervigilance or intense concentration on a particular
task; she could perform work involving things or data
rather than people; [Plaintiff] cannot tolerate
frequent changes in her workplace setting, routine or
schedule; and she cannot perform work involving fastpaced production or assembly-line type work.
(A.R. 23).
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STANDARD OF REVIEW

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Under 42 U.S.C. section 405(g), this Court reviews the

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Administration’s decision to determine if: (1) the Administration’s

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findings are supported by substantial evidence; and (2) the

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Administration used correct legal standards.

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Commissioner, 533 F.3d 1155, 1159 (9th Cir. 2008); Hoopai v. Astrue,

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499 F.3d 1071, 1074 (9th Cir. 2007); see also Brewes v. Commissioner

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of Social Sec. Admin., 682 F.3d 1157, 1161 (9th Cir. 2012).

See Carmickle v.

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Substantial evidence is “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind

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might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.”

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Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971) (citation and quotations omitted);

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see Widmark v. Barnhart, 454 F.3d 1063, 1066 (9th Cir. 2006).

Richardson v.

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DISCUSSION

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I.

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The ALJ Materially Erred in the Analysis of Plaintiff’s
Credibility.

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When an ALJ finds that a claimant’s medically determinable

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impairments reasonably could be expected to cause the symptoms

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alleged, the ALJ may not discount the claimant’s testimony regarding

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the severity of the symptoms without making “specific, cogent”

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findings, supported in the record, to justify discounting such

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testimony.

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also Rashad v. Sullivan, 903 F.2d 1229, 1231 (9th Cir. 1990); Varney

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Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 834 (9th Cir. 1995); see

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v. Secretary, 846 F.2d 581, 584 (9th Cir. 1988).2

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conclusory findings do not suffice.

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882, 885 (9th Cir. 2004) (the ALJ’s credibility findings “must be

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sufficiently specific to allow a reviewing court to conclude the ALJ

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rejected the claimant’s testimony on permissible grounds and did not

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arbitrarily discredit the claimant’s testimony”) (internal citations

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and quotations omitted); Holohan v. Massanari, 246 F.3d 1195, 1208

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(9th Cir. 2001) (the ALJ must “specifically identify the testimony

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[the ALJ] finds not to be credible and must explain what evidence

Generalized,

See Moisa v. Barnhart, 367 F.3d

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undermines the testimony”); Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d 1273, 1284 (9th

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Cir. 1996) (“The ALJ must state specifically which symptom testimony

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is not credible and what facts in the record lead to that

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conclusion.”); see also Social Security Ruling 96-7p.

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In the present case, the ALJ found that Plaintiff’s “medically

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determinable impairments could reasonably be expected to cause some of

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the alleged symptoms” (A.R. 25) (emphasis added).

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characterized Plaintiff’s testimony regarding the severity of her

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symptoms and limitations as “greater than expected in light of other

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statements and the objective evidence of record,” given:

However, the ALJ

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In the absence of a finding of “malingering,” or at
least evidence of “malingering,” most recent Ninth Circuit cases
have applied the “clear and convincing” standard. See, e.g.,
Ghanim v. Colvin, 2014 WL 4056530, at *7 n.9 (9th Cir. Aug. 18,
2014); Molina v. Astrue, 674 F.3d 1104, 1112 (9th Cir. 2012);
Taylor v. Commissioner of Social Security Admin., 659 F.3d 1228,
1234 (9th Cir. 2011); Valentine v. Commissioner, 574 F.3d 685,
693 (9th Cir. 2009); Ballard v. Apfel, 2000 WL 1899797, at *2 n.1
(C.D. Cal. Dec. 19, 2000) (collecting cases). In the present
case, the ALJ’s findings are insufficient under either standard,
so the distinction between the two standards (if any) is
academic.
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(1) Plaintiff’s “largely normal” level of daily activities;

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(2) Plaintiff’s receipt of unemployment compensation during the

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alleged disability period; and (3) Plaintiff’s “limited” treatment

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records showing (a) no evidence of treatment for Plaintiff’s

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psychiatric condition from the alleged onset date until Plaintiff was

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hospitalized in October of 2010, (b) Plaintiff’s refusal to attend

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group psychotherapy sessions and insistence on “only a few individual

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sessions,” (c) no evidence that Plaintiff actually received

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psychotherapy, (d) gaps in Plaintiff’s psychiatric treatment,

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(e) noncompliance with medications because Plaintiff would forget to

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take them at times, and (f) evidence suggesting that Plaintiff only

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contacted the mental health clinic when she ran out of medication, and

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would do so by walk-in visits where she showed no signs of psychotic

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or manic behavior (A.R. 24-28).3

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Turning first to the treatment records, a limited course of

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treatment sometimes can justify the rejection of a claimant’s

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testimony, at least where the testimony concerns physical problems.

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See, e.g., Burch v. Barnhart, 400 F.3d 676, 681 (9th Cir. 2005) (lack

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of consistent treatment such as where there was a three to four month

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gap in treatment properly considered in discrediting claimant’s back

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pain testimony); Meanel v. Apfel, 172 F.3d 1111, 1114 (9th Cir. 1999)

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(in assessing the credibility of a claimant’s pain testimony, the

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Defendant also emphasizes the medical evidence,
particularly the medical opinion evidence. Where, as here, the
other stated reasons for discounting a claimant’s testimony are
insufficient, the medical evidence cannot constitute a sufficient
reason. See Burch v. Barnhart, 400 F.3d 676, 681 (9th Cir.
2005).
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Administration properly may consider the claimant’s failure to request

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treatment and failure to follow treatment advice) (citing Bunnell v.

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Sullivan, 947 F.2d 341, 346 (9th Cir. 1991) (en banc)); Matthews v.

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Shalala, 10 F.3d 678, 679-80 (9th Cir. 1993) (permissible credibility

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factors in assessing pain testimony include limited treatment and

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minimal use of medications); see also Johnson v. Shalala, 60 F.3d

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1428, 1434 (9th Cir. 1995) (absence of treatment for back pain during

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half of the alleged disability period, and evidence of only

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“conservative treatment” when the claimant finally sought treatment,

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sufficient to discount claimant’s testimony).

However, the Ninth

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Circuit has observed that “it is a questionable practice to chastise

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one with a mental impairment for the exercise of poor judgment in

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seeking rehabilitation.”

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Cir. 1996) (citations and quotations omitted); see also Garrison v.

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Colvin, ___ F.3d ___, 2014 WL 3397218, at *23, n.24 (9th Cir. July 14,

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2014) (quoting Nguyen v. Chater); Regennitter v. Commissioner of

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Social Sec. Admin., 166 F.3d 1294, 1299-1300 (9th Cir. 1999) (same;

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also noting that mental illness is notoriously underreported);

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Martinez v. Colvin, 2014 WL 3809048, at *12 (D. Ariz. Aug. 1, 2014)

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(finding noncompliance with mental health treatment not to be an

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appropriate basis for the ALJ to discount claimant’s credibility);

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Rosas v. Colvin, 2014 WL 3736531, at *11 (C.D. Cal. July 28, 2014)

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(claimant’s limited treatment for mental illness not by itself a clear

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and convincing reason for rejecting claimant’s credibility); Etter v.

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Colvin, 2014 WL 2931145, at *2-*3 (C.D. Cal. June 26, 2014) (finding

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ALJ’s residual functional capacity assessment not supported by

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substantial evidence where ALJ gave "little" weight to the psychiatric

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consultative examiner’s opinion and, in doing so, highlighted that the

Nguyen v. Chater, 100 F.3d 1462, 1465 (9th

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claimant had not received mental health treatment; citing, inter alia,

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Nguyen v. Chater); accord Pate-Fires v. Astrue, 564 F.3d 935, 945 (8th

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Cir. 2009) (“a mentally ill person’s noncompliance with psychiatric

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medications can be, and usually is, the result of the mental

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impairment itself and, therefore, neither willful nor without a

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justifiable excuse”) (internal citations and quotations omitted);

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Kangail v. Barnhart, 454 F.3d 627, 630 (7th Cir. 2006) (“mental

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illness in general . . . may prevent the sufferer from taking her

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prescribed medicines or otherwise submitting to treatment”) (internal

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citations omitted).

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Plaintiff, who was 36 years old at the time of the hearing,

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testified that she quit high school because she ran away, tried to

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kill herself, and went to a mental hospital, adding “I went to mental

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hospitals back then” (A.R. 41).

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working due to problems with anxiety and nervousness, she had missed

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approximately four days of work per month, and she was terminated

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because of her attitude with clients and because she would not, or

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could not, “dress up” (A.R. 43-44).

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sought treatment for issues dealing with her work behavior because she

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did not have insurance when she lost her job and thought she “could

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deal with it on [her] own” (A.R. 45).

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the only therapy available to her, group therapy,4 because she did not

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feel comfortable talking in front of men concerning her issues (which

Plaintiff testified that she stopped

Plaintiff said that she never

Plaintiff also did not undergo

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See A.R. 260, 280-81 (treatment notes indicating
Plaintiff requested and was denied individual therapy); A.R. 342,
344 (Plaintiff again requesting individual therapy but reportedly
expressing no interest in transferring to another agency for long
term therapy).
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included a history of molestation) (A.R. 47-48).

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Although Plaintiff’s treatment notes consist primarily of

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medication refill walk-in visits or calls (see, e.g., A.R. 284, 331-

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33, 336-45, 354-55), as of the hearing date Plaintiff was taking

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Prozac, Lithium, and Seroquel, and had been prescribed Zyprexa (A.R.

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45).

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Lithium, Seroquel, and Zyprexa, connotes mental health treatment which

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is not “conservative,” within the meaning of social security

Courts specifically have recognized that the prescription of

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jurisprudence.

See, e.g., Carden v. Colvin, 2014 WL 839111, at *3

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(C.D. Cal. Mar. 4, 2014) (Zyprexa, Lithium and Seroquel); Mason v.

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Colvin, 2013 WL 5278932, at *3-6 (Seroquel); Armstrong v. Colvin, 2013

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WL 3381352, at *4-5 (C.D. Cal. July 8, 2013) (Seroquel); Gentry v.

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Colvin, 2013 WL 6185170, at *12 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 26, 2013) (Zyprexa);

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Simington v. Astrue, 2011 WL 1261298, at *7 (D. Or. Feb. 23, 2011),

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adopted, 2011 WL 1225581 (D. Or. Mar. 29, 2011) (Lithium); compare

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Scott v. Astrue, 2013 WL 3243777, at *16 (N.D. Cal. June 26, 2013)

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(approving of ALJ’s “conservative treatment” reasoning for rejecting

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claimant’s credibility, where the claimant was taking only Prozac and

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was “not willing to consider therapy, which tends to suggest that her

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symptoms were not as bothersome as she alleged”); Adams v. Astrue,

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2012 WL 4107882, at *5 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 19, 2012) (mental health

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treatment that consisted of periodic prescriptions for antidepressants

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(Wellbutrin and Prozac) and individual therapy for only a portion of

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the disability period was considered “conservative” and “non-

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aggressive”).

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In view of all of the attendant circumstances, under the

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authorities discussed above, the nature of Plaintiff’s treatment for

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her mental health condition is not a specific, cogent finding upon

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which to uphold the ALJ’s adverse credibility determination.

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The ALJ’s remaining stated reasons for discounting Plaintiff’s

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credibility similarly fail to constitute the requisite specific,

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cogent findings.

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necessarily inconsistent with disability under the Social Security

First, the receipt of unemployment benefits is not

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Rules.

See Freeman v. Colvin, 2014 WL 793148, at *2 & n.1 (W.D. Wash.

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Feb. 26, 2014) (quoting the Appeals Council as stating: “The Chief

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Administrative Law Judge’s memorandum, dated August 9, 2010, makes it

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clear that one’s claim to be able to work doesn’t contradict one’s

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claim to be disabled under Social Security Rules.

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sequential evaluation process, one can be found able to perform some

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work, and still be found disabled. . . .

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Judge’s memorandum also states that applications for unemployment

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benefits must be considered as part of the overall evidence of record

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that is to support the ultimate determination.

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application cannot alone disqualify one for disability benefits, as

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the hearing decision suggests, it is to be considered as part of the

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sequential evaluation.”); see also Mulanax v. Commissioner of Social

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Sec., 293 Fed. App’x 522, 523 (9th Cir. 2008) (unpublished decision

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stating that the receipt of unemployment benefits by itself fails to

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support a conclusion that a claimant is not credible; “Generally, in

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order to be eligible for disability benefits under the Social Security

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Act, the person must be unable to sustain full-time work – eight hours

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per day, five days per week.

Under our

The Chief Administrative Law

While such an

However under Oregon law, a person is
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eligible for unemployment benefits if she is available for some work,

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including temporary or part-time opportunities.

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[claimant’s] claim of unemployment in Oregon is not necessarily

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inconsistent with her claim of disability benefits under the Social

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Security Act.”) (internal citations omitted).

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person who is only available for part-time work may still be eligible

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for unemployment benefits.

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this case, there is no indication whether Plaintiff based her claim

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for unemployment benefits on full-time or part-time work.

Therefore,

Under California law, a

See Cal. Unemp. Ins. Code § 1253.8.

In

On this

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record, therefore, the fact that Plaintiff may have claimed to be able

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to do some work does not support the ALJ’s adverse credibility

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determination.

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(9th Cir. 2008) (“[W]hile receipt of unemployment benefits can

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undermine a claimant’s alleged inability to work full time, the record

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here does not establish whether [the claimant] held himself out as

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available for full-time or part-time work.

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inconsistent with his disability allegations.

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the ALJ’s credibility finding is not supported by substantial

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evidence.”) (citations omitted); Vasquez v. Colvin, 2014 WL 65305, at

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*17 (D. Ariz. Jan. 8, 2014) (substantial evidence failed to support

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adverse credibility finding where the record did not establish whether

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the claimant who sought unemployment benefits held herself out as

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See Carmickle v. Commissioner, 533 F.3d 1155, 1161–62

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Only the former is
Thus, such basis for

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available for full-time or part-time work).5

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Second, the ALJ’s characterization of Plaintiff’s daily

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activities as “largely normal” and assertedly consistent with the

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requisites for obtaining and maintaining employment, is not a cogent

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reason to support the ALJ’s adverse credibility finding.

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stated that Plaintiff cares for two teenage daughters, drives, cooks

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simple meals, cleans, does laundry, shops weekly, attends church

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weekly (although she sits in the back), and visits her brother who

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lives in the same neighborhood.

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The ALJ

See A.R. 24-25.

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Ninth Circuit case law in this area does not appear to
be entirely consistent. In Webb v. Barnhart, 433 F.3d 683 (9th
Cir. 2005), the Ninth Circuit rejected as a basis for finding a
claimant not credible the claimant’s having held himself out as
being able to work during the period of alleged disability. Id.
at 687-88. Other Ninth Circuit decisions have upheld adverse
credibility determinations based at least in part on a claimant’s
having held himself or herself out as being able to work during
the period of alleged disability. See Bray v. Commissioner, 554
F.3d 1219, 1227 (9th Cir. 2009) (among the specific findings
supporting ALJ’s adverse credibility determination was fact that
claimant had sought employment); Copeland v. Bowen, 861 F.2d 536,
542 (9th Cir. 1988) (upholding ALJ’s adverse credibility
determination where the ALJ relied in part on the fact that the
claimant “received unemployment insurance benefits . . .
apparently considering himself capable of work and holding
himself out as available for work”). Most recently, in Ghanim v.
Colvin, 2014 WL 4056530, at *8 (9th Cir. Aug. 18, 2014), the
Ninth Circuit stated that “continued receipt” of unemployment
benefits casts doubt on a claim of disability, but also stated
that the receipt of some unemployment benefits followed by the
subsequent refusal of unemployment benefits actually supports a
claim of disability.
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Plaintiff testified that she has two daughters, ages 19 and 13,

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and that the 13 year old lived at home (A.R. 50-51).6

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Plaintiff was taking medications, she explained that it was harder for

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her to perform daily activities like getting up, making something to

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eat, and washing herself (A.R. 56).

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ghost in her house because she is always hearing footsteps and talking

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in the next room when no one is there (A.R. 56).

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stays home and tends to avoid going out because she feels safer inside

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(A.R. 57).

Although

Plaintiff said thought she had a

Plaintiff said she

Plaintiff did say she goes to church on Sunday, but she

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reportedly sits in back near the door (A.R. 58).

Plaintiff said she

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visits her brother and his family at his home, which is six or seven

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houses down from Plaintiff’s home (A.R. 58).

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Plaintiff reported in an activity form that she rarely leaves the

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house because she thinks people are following her “due to a lawsuit”

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(A.R. 183, 186-89; see also A.R. 242 (note in medical record

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indicating that Plaintiff’s brother confirmed Plaintiff had legal

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When Plaintiff was hospitalized in October of 2010, she
was pulled over for driving on the wrong side of the road (A.R.
52). Plaintiff thought people were following her (A.R. 52).
Plaintiff had her 13 year old daughter with her at the time (A.R.
52). When police pulled Plaintiff over she ran and left her
daughter in the car (A.R. 52). This incident led to Plaintiff’s
first mental health treatment during the disability period, and
also led to the taking away of Plaintiff’s daughter by the
Department of Children and Family Services (A.R. 54; see also
A.R. 237-55 (records from hospitalization)). Thus, for at least
a portion of the disability period it appears that Plaintiff was
unable to care for her daughter without assistance.
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problems with businessmen that resulted in a court battle)).7

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Plaintiff reportedly spends her days trying to clean her house,

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waiting for her kids to walk home from school, cooking dinner, and

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watching DVDs before going to bed (A.R. 183).

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sandwiches and frozen dinners daily, clean and do laundry for two

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hours every other day, and grocery shop once a week for two hours

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(A.R. 185-86).

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instructions “good,” but indicated that she has trouble concentrating

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and getting along with others (A.R. 188).8

Plaintiff could make

Plaintiff thought she followed written and spoken

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A claimant does not have to be completely incapacitated to be

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disabled.

See Fair v. Bowen, 885 F.2d 597, 603 (9th Cir. 1989); see

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also Vertigan v. Halter, 260 F.3d 1044, 1049-50 (9th Cir. 2001)

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(“Vertigan”) (“the mere fact that a plaintiff has carried on certain

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daily activities, such as grocery shopping, driving a car, or limited

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In a third party report dated January 24, 2011,
Plaintiff’s brother repeatedly described Plaintiff as “very
paranoid,” “very withdrawn” and more secluded, explaining that he
had seen an increase in Plaintiff’s seclusion and wanting to be
home alone (A.R. 168-75). The ALJ rejected Plaintiff’s brother’s
report because, inter alia, Plaintiff’s brother could not “be
considered a disinterested third party witness whose testimony
would not tend to be colored by affection for the claimant.” See
A.R. 25. The Ninth Circuit consistently has held that bias
cannot be presumed from a familial or personal relationship.
See, e.g., Regennitter v. Commissioner of Soc. Sec. Adm., 166
F.3d 1294, 1298 (9th Cir. 1999); Dodrill v. Shalala, 12 F.3d 915,
918 (9th Cir. 1993).
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After a face-to-face meeting with Plaintiff on
November 18, 2010, the disability interviewer reported that
Plaintiff had been “very monotone,” “very lathargic [sic],” and
had appeared to have been heavily medicated (A.R. 159). The
interviewer observed Plaintiff having difficulty with coherency
and concentration (A.R. 159).
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walking for exercise, does not in any way detract from her credibility

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as to her overall disability”); Gallant v. Heckler, 753 F.2d 1450,

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1453-55 (9th Cir. 1984) (“Gallant”) (fact that claimant could cook for

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himself and family members as well as wash dishes did not preclude a

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finding that claimant was disabled due to constant back and leg

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pain).

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reported that she performed activities which would translate to

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sustained activity in a work setting on a regular and continuing basis

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for eight hours a day, five days a week.

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The record does not suggest that Plaintiff at any time

See Social Security Ruling

96-8p (defining scope of residual functional capacity).9

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II.

Remand is Appropriate.

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Because the circumstances of the case suggest that further

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administrative review could remedy the ALJ’s errors, remand is

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appropriate.

McLeod v. Astrue, 640 F.3d 881, 888 (9th Cir. 2011); see

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In Burch v. Barnhart, 400 F.3d at 680 (“Burch”), the
Ninth Circuit upheld an ALJ’s rejection of a claimant’s
credibility in partial reliance on the claimant’s daily
activities of cooking, cleaning, shopping, interacting with
others and managing her own finances and those of her nephew. In
doing so, the Ninth Circuit did not purport to depart from the
general rule that an ALJ may consider daily living activities in
the credibility analysis only where “a claimant engages in
numerous daily activities involving skills that could be
transferred to the workplace.” Id. at 681. Undeniably, however,
it is difficult to reconcile the result in Burch with the results
in cases like Vertigan and Gallant. Certainly, “the relevance of
a claimant carrying on daily activities should be evaluated on a
case-by-case basis.” Bloch on Social Security § 3.37 (Jan.
2005). In the present case, in light of the seemingly
conflicting Ninth Circuit case law as well as the evidence in the
record suggesting that Plaintiff’s daily activities are not
“largely normal,” this Court does not believe Burch compels
affirmance.
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Connett v. Barnhart, 340 F.3d 871, 876 (9th Cir. 2003) (“Connett”)

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(remand is an option where the ALJ fails to state sufficient reasons

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for rejecting a claimant’s excess symptom testimony); but see Orn v.

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Astrue, 495 F.3d at 640 (appearing, confusingly, to cite Connett for

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the proposition that “[w]hen an ALJ’s reasons for rejecting the

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claimant’s testimony are legally insufficient and it is clear from the

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record that the ALJ would be required to determine the claimant

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disabled if he had credited the claimant’s testimony, we remand for a

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calculation of benefits”) (quotations omitted); see also Garrison v.

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Colvin, 2014 WL 3397218, at *21 (9th Cir. July 14, 2014) (court may

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“remand for further proceedings, even though all conditions of the

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credit-as-true rule are satisfied, [when] an evaluation of the record

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as a whole creates serious doubt that a claimant is, in fact,

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disabled”); Vasquez v. Astrue, 572 F.3d 586, 600-01 (9th Cir. 2009)

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(agreeing that a court need not “credit as true” improperly rejected

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claimant testimony where there are outstanding issues that must be

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resolved before a proper disability determination can be made); see

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generally INS v. Ventura, 537 U.S. 12, 16 (2002) (upon reversal of an

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administrative determination, the proper course is remand for

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additional agency investigation or explanation, except in rare

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circumstances).10

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///

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///

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There are outstanding issues that must be resolved
before a proper disability determination can be made in the
present case. For example, it is not clear whether the ALJ would
be required to find Plaintiff disabled for the entire claimed
period of disability even if Plaintiff’s testimony were fully
credited. See Luna v. Astrue, 623 F.3d 1032, 1035 (9th Cir.
2010).
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CONCLUSION

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For all of the foregoing reasons,11 Plaintiff’s and Defendant’s

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motions for summary judgment are denied and this matter is remanded

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for further administrative action consistent with this Opinion.

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LET JUDGMENT BE ENTERED ACCORDINGLY.

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DATED: September 9, 2014.

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_____________/S/_________________
CHARLES F. EICK
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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The Court has not reached any other issue raised by
Plaintiff except insofar as to determine that reversal with a
directive for the immediate payment of benefits would not be
appropriate at this time. “[E]valuation of the record as a whole
creates serious doubt that [Plaintiff] is in fact disabled.”
See Garrison v. Colvin, 2014 WL 3397218, at *21.
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