Steven Hernandez Jr v. Carolyn W Colvin

Filing 19

DECISION AND ORDER by Magistrate Judge Victor E Bianchini. (See Order for complete details.) IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that: Judgment be entered AFFIRMING the Commissioner's decision; and The Clerk of the Court shall file this Decision and Order, serve copies upon counsel for the parties, and CLOSE this case. (wr)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
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CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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Case No. EDCV14-00321-VEB
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STEVEN HERNANDEZ, JR.,
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DECISION AND ORDER

Plaintiff,
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vs.
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CAROLYN W. COLVIN, Acting
Commissioner of Social Security,
Defendant.

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I. INTRODUCTION
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In September of 2010, Plaintiff Steven Hernandez, Jr. applied for Disability
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Insurance Benefits under the Social Security Act. The Commissioner of Social
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Security denied the application.

Plaintiff, represented by Bill LaTour, Esq.,

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DECISION AND ORDER – HERNANDEZ v COLVIN 14-CV-03195-VEB

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commenced this action seeking judicial review of the Commissioner’s partial denial

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of benefits pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 405 (g) and 1383 (c)(3).

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The parties consented to the jurisdiction of a United States Magistrate Judge.

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(Docket No. 9, 10). On December 28, 2015, this case was referred to the

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undersigned pursuant to General Order 05-07. (Docket No. 18).

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II. BACKGROUND

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Plaintiff applied for benefits on September 27, 2010, alleging disability

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beginning May 4, 2009, due to various physical impairments. (T at 59).1 The

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application was denied initially and on reconsideration. Plaintiff requested a hearing

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before an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”). On January 20, 2012, a hearing was

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held before ALJ Mark Greenberg. (T at 30). Plaintiff appeared with his attorney and

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testified. (T at 33-47). The ALJ also received testimony from Gloria Lasoff, a

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vocational expert (T at 48-53).

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On January 27, 2012, the ALJ issued a written decision denying the

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application for benefits.

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Commissioner’s final decision on January 10, 2014, when the Appeals Council

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denied Plaintiff’s request for review. (T at 1-3).

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(T at 11-28).

The ALJ’s decision became the

 Citations to (“T”) refer to the administrative record at Docket No. 14.
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On February 20, 2014, Plaintiff, acting by and through his counsel, filed this

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action seeking judicial review of the Commissioner’s decision. (Docket No. 3). The

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Commissioner interposed an Answer on August 27, 2014. (Docket No. 13). The

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parties filed a Joint Stipulation on November 24, 2014. (Docket No. 17).

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After reviewing the pleadings, Joint Stipulation, and administrative record,

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this Court finds that the Commissioner’s decision should be affirmed and this case

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be dismissed.

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III. DISCUSSION
A.

Sequential Evaluation Process

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The Social Security Act (“the Act”) defines disability as the “inability to

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engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable

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physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has

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lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than twelve

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months.” 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(1)(A), 1382c(a)(3)(A). The Act also provides that a

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claimant shall be determined to be under a disability only if any impairments are of

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such severity that he or she is not only unable to do previous work but cannot,

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considering his or her age, education and work experiences, engage in any other

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substantial work which exists in the national economy. 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(2)(A),

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1382c(a)(3)(B). Thus, the definition of disability consists of both medical and

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vocational components. Edlund v. Massanari, 253 F.3d 1152, 1156 (9th Cir. 2001).

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The Commissioner has established a five-step sequential evaluation process

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for determining whether a person is disabled. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920. Step

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one determines if the person is engaged in substantial gainful activities. If so,

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benefits are denied. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404. 1520(a)(4)(i), 416.920(a)(4)(i). If not, the

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decision maker proceeds to step two, which determines whether the claimant has a

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medially severe impairment or combination of impairments. 20 C.F.R. §§

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404.1520(a)(4)(ii), 416.920(a)(4)(ii).

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If the claimant does not have a severe impairment or combination of

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impairments, the disability claim is denied. If the impairment is severe, the

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evaluation proceeds to the third step, which compares the claimant’s impairment(s)

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with a number of listed impairments acknowledged by the Commissioner to be so

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severe as to preclude substantial gainful activity. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(iii),

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416.920(a)(4)(iii); 20 C.F.R. § 404 Subpt. P App. 1. If the impairment meets or

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equals one of the listed impairments, the claimant is conclusively presumed to be

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disabled. If the impairment is not one conclusively presumed to be disabling, the

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evaluation proceeds to the fourth step, which determines whether the impairment

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prevents the claimant from performing work which was performed in the past. If the

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claimant is able to perform previous work, he or she is deemed not disabled. 20

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C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(iv), 416.920(a)(4)(iv). At this step, the claimant’s residual

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functional capacity (RFC) is considered. If the claimant cannot perform past relevant

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work, the fifth and final step in the process determines whether he or she is able to

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perform other work in the national economy in view of his or her residual functional

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capacity, age, education, and past work experience. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(v),

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416.920(a)(4)(v); Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137 (1987).

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The initial burden of proof rests upon the claimant to establish a prima facie

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case of entitlement to disability benefits. Rhinehart v. Finch, 438 F.2d 920, 921 (9th

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Cir. 1971); Meanel v. Apfel, 172 F.3d 1111, 1113 (9th Cir. 1999). The initial burden

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is met once the claimant establishes that a mental or physical impairment prevents

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the performance of previous work. The burden then shifts, at step five, to the

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Commissioner to show that (1) plaintiff can perform other substantial gainful

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activity and (2) a “significant number of jobs exist in the national economy” that the

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claimant can perform. Kail v. Heckler, 722 F.2d 1496, 1498 (9th Cir. 1984).

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B.

Standard of Review

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Congress has provided a limited scope of judicial review of a Commissioner’s

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decision. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). A Court must uphold a Commissioner’s decision,

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made through an ALJ, when the determination is not based on legal error and is

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supported by substantial evidence. See Jones v. Heckler, 760 F.2d 993, 995 (9th Cir.

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1985); Tackett v. Apfel, 180 F.3d 1094, 1097 (9th Cir. 1999).

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“The [Commissioner’s] determination that a plaintiff is not disabled will be

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upheld if the findings of fact are supported by substantial evidence.” Delgado v.

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Heckler, 722 F.2d 570, 572 (9th Cir. 1983)(citing 42 U.S.C. § 405(g)). Substantial

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evidence is more than a mere scintilla, Sorenson v. Weinberger, 514 F.2d 1112, 1119

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n 10 (9th Cir. 1975), but less than a preponderance. McAllister v. Sullivan, 888 F.2d

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599, 601-02 (9th Cir. 1989). Substantial evidence “means such evidence as a

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reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Richardson v.

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Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971)(citations omitted). “[S]uch inferences and

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conclusions as the [Commissioner] may reasonably draw from the evidence” will

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also be upheld. Mark v. Celebreeze, 348 F.2d 289, 293 (9th Cir. 1965). On review,

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the Court considers the record as a whole, not just the evidence supporting the

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decision of the Commissioner. Weetman v. Sullivan, 877 F.2d 20, 22 (9th Cir.

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1989)(quoting Kornock v. Harris, 648 F.2d 525, 526 (9th Cir. 1980)).

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It is the role of the Commissioner, not this Court, to resolve conflicts in

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evidence. Richardson, 402 U.S. at 400. If evidence supports more than one rational

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interpretation, the Court may not substitute its judgment for that of the

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Commissioner. Tackett, 180 F.3d at 1097; Allen v. Heckler, 749 F.2d 577, 579 (9th

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Cir. 1984). Nevertheless, a decision supported by substantial evidence will still be

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set aside if the proper legal standards were not applied in weighing the evidence and

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making the decision. Brawner v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, 839 F.2d

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432, 433 (9th Cir. 1987). Thus, if there is substantial evidence to support the

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administrative findings, or if there is conflicting evidence that will support a finding

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of either disability or non-disability, the finding of the Commissioner is conclusive.

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Sprague v. Bowen, 812 F.2d 1226, 1229-30 (9th Cir. 1987).

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C.

Commissioner’s Decision

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The ALJ determined that Plaintiff had not engaged in substantial gainful

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activity since May 4, 2009 (the alleged onset date) and met the insured status

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requirements of the Social Security Act through December 31, 2012. (T at 16). The

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ALJ found that Plaintiff’s degenerative disc disease with failed back syndrome post

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fusion and history of reported seizures were “severe” impairments under the Act.

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(Tr. 16).

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However, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff did not have an impairment or

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combination of impairments that met or medically equaled one of the impairments

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set forth in the Listings. (T at 16).

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The ALJ determined that Plaintiff retained the residual functional capacity

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(“RFC”) to perform sedentary work as defined in 20 CFR § 416.967 (a), as follows:

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DECISION AND ORDER – HERNANDEZ v COLVIN 14-CV-03195-VEB

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he can lift/carry 10 pounds occasionally and less than 10 pounds frequently; he can

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stand/walk for 6 hours in an 8-hour workday with regular breaks; he can sit for 6

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hours in an 8-hour workday with regular breaks; he needs a sit/stand option every 20

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to 30 minutes as needed; he has no limitation as to pushing or pulling; he can

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perform occasional stooping, kneeling, crouching, crawling or balancing; he cannot

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climb ladders, ropes, or scaffolds; he must avoid hazards and environments with

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vibrations; and he must avoid concentrated extremes of cold or humidity. (T at 17).

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The ALJ found that Plaintiff could not perform his past relevant work as a

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store laborer, sales clerk, library helper, vehicle washer, waiter, or bell captain. (T at

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22). Considering Plaintiff’s age (33 on the alleged onset date), education (at least

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high school), work experience, and residual functional capacity, the ALJ determined

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that there were jobs that exist in significant numbers in the national economy that

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Plaintiff can perform. (T at 22).

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As such, the ALJ found that Plaintiff was not entitled to benefits under the

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Social Security Act from May 4, 2009 (the alleged onset date) through January 27,

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2012 (the date of the ALJ’s decision). (T at 23-24). As noted above, the ALJ’s

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decision became the Commissioner’s final decision when the Appeals Council

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denied Plaintiff’s request for review. (T at 1-6).

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D.

Disputed Issues

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As set forth in the parties’ Joint Stipulation (Docket No. 17), Plaintiff offers

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two (2) arguments in support of his claim that the Commissioner’s decision should

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be reversed. First, he contends that the ALJ did not properly weigh the medical

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opinion evidence. Second, Plaintiff challenges the ALJ’s credibility determination.

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This Court will address both arguments in turn.

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IV. ANALYSIS
A.

Medical Opinion Evidence

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In disability proceedings, a treating physician’s opinion carries more weight

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than an examining physician’s opinion, and an examining physician’s opinion is

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given more weight than that of a non-examining physician. Benecke v. Barnhart,

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379 F.3d 587, 592 (9th Cir. 2004); Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 830 (9th Cir.

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1995). If the treating or examining physician’s opinions are not contradicted, they

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can be rejected only with clear and convincing reasons. Lester, 81 F.3d at 830. If

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contradicted, the opinion can only be rejected for “specific” and “legitimate” reasons

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that are supported by substantial evidence in the record. Andrews v. Shalala, 53 F.3d

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1035, 1043 (9th Cir. 1995). Historically, the courts have recognized conflicting

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medical evidence, and/or the absence of regular medical treatment during the alleged

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period of disability, and/or the lack of medical support for doctors’ reports based

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substantially on a claimant’s subjective complaints of pain, as specific, legitimate

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reasons for disregarding a treating or examining physician’s opinion. Flaten v.

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Secretary of Health and Human Servs., 44 F.3d 1453, 1463-64 (9th Cir. 1995).

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An ALJ satisfies the “substantial evidence” requirement by “setting out a

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detailed and thorough summary of the facts and conflicting clinical evidence, stating

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his interpretation thereof, and making findings.” Garrison v. Colvin, 759 F.3d 995,

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1012 (9th Cir. 2014)(quoting Reddick v. Chater, 157 F.3d 715, 725 (9th Cir. 1998)).

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“The ALJ must do more than state conclusions. He must set forth his own

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interpretations and explain why they, rather than the doctors,’ are correct.” Id.

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In this case, Dr. Sam Lin, Plaintiff’s treating physician, completed a Medical

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Source Statement Concerning the Nature and Severity of an Individual’s Physical

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Impairment in January of 2012.

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monthly since May of 2009. He diagnosed low back pain due to failed back surgery

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and characterized Plaintiff’s prognosis as “poor.” (T at 531). He noted that Plaintiff

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suffered from chronic pain, fatigue, and limited mobility, and was unable to bend,

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stoop, or kneel. (T at 531). On a scale of 1-10, Dr. Lin rated Plaintiff’s level of pain

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as a 9 and level of fatigue as a 7. (T at 531). Dr. Lin opined that Plaintiff could sit

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for 0-2 hours in an 8-hour workday and stand/walk for 0-2 hours in an 8-hour

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Dr. Lin reported that he had treated Plaintiff

DECISION AND ORDER – HERNANDEZ v COLVIN 14-CV-03195-VEB

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workday. (T at 532). He found that Plaintiff could not sit continuously in a work

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setting, could not lift/carry any weight, had significant limitations with regard to

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repetitive reaching, handling, fingering or lifting, and needed a cane or other

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assistive device when standing/walking. (T at 532).

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Dr. Lin believed Plaintiff’s condition would interfere with his ability to keep

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his neck in a constant position (e.g. looking at a computer screen or down at a desk)

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and opined that Plaintiff could not perform a full time competitive job that required

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activity on a sustained basis. (T at 532-33). Dr. Lin stated that Plaintiff was not a

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malingerer and was incapable of even a low stress job. (T at 533). He explained that

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he would expect Plaintiff to be absent from work more than 3 times per month as a

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result of his impairments or treatment. (T at 534). Dr. Lin reported that he expected

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Plaintiff’s condition to worsen over time. (T at 535).

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The ALJ afforded little weight to Dr. Lin’s opinion. (T at 20). This Court

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finds the ALJ’s decision supported by substantial evidence and consistent with

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applicable law. First, Dr. Lin did not cite detailed clinical or diagnostic findings to

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support his highly restrictive assessment. The ALJ is not obliged to accept a treating

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source opinion that is “brief, conclusory and inadequately supported by clinical

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findings.” Lingenfelter v. Astrue, 504 F.3d 1028, 1044-45 (9th Cir. 2007) (citing

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Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 957 (9th Cir. 2002)).

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DECISION AND ORDER – HERNANDEZ v COLVIN 14-CV-03195-VEB

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Second, the ALJ found that Dr. Lin’s assessment was inconsistent with his

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contemporaneous treatment notes. On May 25, 2011, Dr. Lin noted that Plaintiff

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wanted to decrease his pain medication and was able to walk without pain. (T at

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522). On June 11, 2011, Dr. Lin described Plaintiff as “doing well” on methadone

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and “happy” with his current medications. (T at 524). The treatment notes from

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August 1, 2011 and October 10, 2011 indicate that Plaintiff planned to engage in

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vocational training. (T at 525, 526). Notes from September and October of 2011

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reported that Plaintiff was “more mobile” and not using a cane. (T at 526, 528). On

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November 22, 2011, Dr. Lin described Plaintiff’s pain as “controlled.” (T at 529).

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The ALJ reasonably relied on the inconsistency between Dr. Lin’s treatment

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notes and his highly restrictive assessment as a reason for discounting the

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physician’s opinion.

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2005)(finding that “discrepancy” between treatment notes and opinion was “a clear

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and convincing reason for not relying on the doctor's opinion regarding” the

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claimant’s limitations).

See Bayliss v. Barnhart, 427 F.3d 1211, 1216 (9th Cir.

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Third, the ALJ noted that Dr. Lin’s assessment was contradicted by the

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conservative course of treatment and other evidence of record. The record indicated

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that Plaintiff’s condition improved following surgery in May of 2009 and that his

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pain was controlled with medication. (T at 19-20, 313, 316, 524, 525, 526). A

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DECISION AND ORDER – HERNANDEZ v COLVIN 14-CV-03195-VEB

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January 2010 lumbar spine x-ray showed the screws from Plaintiff’s surgery, but no

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compromise of disc space height and no subluxation. (T at 256). A December 2010

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MRI revealed no fracture or subluxation, no significant marrow signal abnormality,

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mild diffuse disc bulge at L3-4, mild bilateral facet hypertrophy and mild right

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neural foramen at L4-5 (but no disc protrusion or spinal stenosis), and mild bilateral

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facet hypertrophy at L5-S1 (but no disc protrusion, spinal stenosis, or significant

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neural foramen). (T at 412). The lack of medical support for a physician’s opinion is

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a proper reason for discounting a treating physician’s opinion. Flaten v. Secretary of

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Health and Human Servs., 44 F.3d 1453, 1463-64 (9th Cir. 1995).

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The ALJ also noted the lack of aggressive treatment (e.g. additional surgical

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intervention, referral to a specialist), finding the conservative course of treatment

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inconsistent with the extreme restrictions assessed by Dr. Lin. (T at 18). The fact

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that a claimant received only conservative treatment is a proper basis upon which to

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reject an opinion that the impairment is disabling. See Johnson v. Shalala, 60 F.3d

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1428,1434 (9th Cir. 1995)(finding that the claimant received only conservative

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treatment for back injury is a clear and convincing reason for disregarding testimony

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that the claimant is disabled).

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Lastly, the ALJ noted that Dr. Lin’s opinion was contradicted by the

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assessment of Dr. Francis Greene and Dr. Thu Do, non-examining State Agency

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review physicians. In November of 2010, Dr. Greene reviewed the record and

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concluded that Plaintiff could frequently lift 10 pounds, stand/walk for at least 2

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hours in an 8-hour workday, and sit for about 6 hours in an 8-hour workday with

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normal breaks. (T at 370). He opined that Plaintiff could occasionally climb ramps

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and stairs, but never climb ladders/rope/scaffolds, and could occasionally balance,

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stoop, kneel, crouch, and crawl. (T at 371). Dr. Greene concluded that Plaintiff

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could perform sedentary work. (T at 373). Dr. Do performed a review in February of

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2011 and likewise concluded that Plaintiff retained the RFC to perform sedentary

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work. (T at 487-88).

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State Agency review physicians are highly qualified experts and their

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opinions, if supported by other record evidence, may constitute substantial evidence

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sufficient to support a decision to discount a treating physician’s opinion. See Saelee

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v. Chater, 94 F.3d 520, 522 (9th Cir. 1996); see also 20 CFR § 404.1527

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(f)(2)(i)(“State agency medical and psychological consultants and other program

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physicians, psychologists, and other medical specialists are highly qualified

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physicians, psychologists, and other medical specialists who are also experts in

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Social Security disability evaluation.”).

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DECISION AND ORDER – HERNANDEZ v COLVIN 14-CV-03195-VEB

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For the foregoing reasons, this Court finds the ALJ’s decision to discount the

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opinion of Dr. Lin was supported by substantial evidence and consistent with

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applicable law.

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B.

Credibility

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A claimant’s subjective complaints concerning his or her limitations are an

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important part of a disability claim. Batson v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 359 F.3d

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1190, 1195 (9th Cir. 2004)(citation omitted). The ALJ’s findings with regard to the

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claimant’s credibility must be supported by specific cogent reasons. Rashad v.

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Sullivan, 903 F.2d 1229, 1231 (9th Cir. 1990). Absent affirmative evidence of

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malingering, the ALJ’s reasons for rejecting the claimant’s testimony must be “clear

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and convincing.” Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 834 (9th Cir. 1995). “General

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findings are insufficient: rather the ALJ must identify what testimony is not credible

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and what evidence undermines the claimant’s complaints.” Lester, 81 F.3d at 834;

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Dodrill v. Shalala, 12 F.3d 915, 918 (9th Cir. 1993).

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However, subjective symptomatology by itself cannot be the basis for a

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finding of disability. A claimant must present medical evidence or findings that the

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existence of an underlying condition could reasonably be expected to produce the

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symptomatology alleged. See 42 U.S.C. §§423(d)(5)(A), 1382c (a)(3)(A); 20 C.F.R.

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§ 404.1529(b), 416.929; SSR 96-7p.

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DECISION AND ORDER – HERNANDEZ v COLVIN 14-CV-03195-VEB

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In this case, Plaintiff testified as follows: He was born in October of 1975 and

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has a college education. He has been disabled since May of 2009, when he had the

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first of two back operations. (T at 33). Neither surgery (the first, in May of 2009, or

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the second, in February of 2011) were successful in terms of addressing Plaintiff’s

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chronic pain. (T at 34). He made an attempt to return to work in June 2011 at a

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“Michael’s” store, but it lasted only four hours and was a “nightmare.” (T at 34). He

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cannot sit for more than 20-30 minutes before needing to get up due to chronic pain;

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standing is limited to 30-45 minutes before he needs to lie down due to pain. (T at

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35). Most of his day is spent lying down. (T at 35).

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Medication helps Plaintiff function around the house, e.g. brushing teeth,

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showering. (T at 35). He lives with his parents and spends his typical day dealing

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with pain and limited mobility. (T at 35-36). He uses a cane to walk, even in the

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house, and uses a “grabber” to pick items up. (T at 36). He lies down for 2 to 3

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hours periods during each day and alternates between sitting, standing, and lying

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down. (T at 38). Medication allows him to do laundry, use the computer, and make

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doctors’ appointments. (T at 40). He can sit at a computer for about 15 minutes and

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perform simple cooking tasks. (T at 40). He does no yard work and cannot lift more

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than 10 pounds. (T at 41). He does not need assistance with self-care tasks, but it

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takes longer than it did before his back problems. (T at 42).

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DECISION AND ORDER – HERNANDEZ v COLVIN 14-CV-03195-VEB

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Pain causes difficulty sleeping. (T at 43). He has chronic fatigue. (T at 43).

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He relies on his parents for shopping. (T at 43). He no longer engages in hobbies or

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attends social functions.

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activities with her are limited by pain. (T at 44). In September of 2010, Plaintiff was

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looking for work, but he no longer believes he could perform full-time work. (T at

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46).

(T at 44).

His daughter occasionally visits, but his

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The ALJ concluded that Plaintiff’s medically determinable impairments could

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reasonably be expected to cause the alleged symptoms, but that his statements

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concerning the intensity, persistence, and limiting effects of the symptoms were not

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fully credible. (T at 22).

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This Court finds that the ALJ’s credibility determination was supported by

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substantial evidence and consistent with applicable law. First, the ALJ noted that

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Plaintiff’s testimony was contradicted by the objective medical evidence. Plaintiff

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testified that he had experience no improvement in his symptoms since his first

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surgery. (T at 34-35). However, as discussed above, the treatment notes showed

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improvement and indicated that Plaintiff’s pain was generally well-controlled with

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medication. (T at 524-30). The x-ray and MRI findings were also generally benign.

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(T at 256-57, 412). Although the lack of supporting medical evidence cannot form

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the sole basis for discounting subjective pain testimony, it is a factor the ALJ may

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DECISION AND ORDER – HERNANDEZ v COLVIN 14-CV-03195-VEB

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consider when analyzing credibility. Burch v. Barnhart, 400 F.3d 676, 680 (9th Cir.

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2005). In other words, an ALJ may properly discount subjective complaints where,

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as here, they are contradicted by medical records. Carmickle v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec.

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Admin., 533 F.3d 1155, 1161 (9th Cir. 2008); Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947,

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958-59 (9th Cir. 2002).

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Second, the ALJ noted that Plaintiff had a conservative course of treatment,

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e.g. no additional surgical intervention, no referral to a specialist. (T at 18).

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“Evidence of ‘conservative treatment’ is sufficient to discount a claimant’s

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testimony regarding the severity of an impairment.” Parra v. Astrue, 481 F.3d 742,

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751 (9th Cir. 2007).

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Third, the ALJ noted that Plaintiff was less than truthful regarding his receipt

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of unemployment benefits. Although Plaintiff testified that he had not received

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unemployment benefits since the alleged onset date (T at 46), this was contradicted

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by the record. (T at 121, 367). This inconsistency was a valid reason for discounting

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the overall credibility of Plaintiff’s claims.

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In light of the above, this Court finds that the ALJ’s credibility determination

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must be sustained. See Morgan v. Commissioner, 169 F.3d 595, 599 (9th Cir.

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1999)(“[Q]uestions of credibility and resolutions of conflicts in the testimony are

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functions solely of the [Commissioner].”).

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DECISION AND ORDER – HERNANDEZ v COLVIN 14-CV-03195-VEB

1

V.

CONCLUSION

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After carefully reviewing the administrative record, this Court finds

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substantial evidence supports the Commissioner’s decision, including the objective

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medical evidence and supported medical opinions. It is clear that the ALJ thoroughly

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examined the record, afforded appropriate weight to the medical evidence, including

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the assessments of the examining medical providers and the non-examining

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consultants, and afforded the subjective claims of symptoms and limitations an

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appropriate weight when rendering a decision that Plaintiff is not disabled. This

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Court

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finds

no

reversible

error

and

substantial

evidence

supports

the

Commissioner’s decision.
VI. ORDERS

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IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that:

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Judgment be entered AFFIRMING the Commissioner’s decision; and

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The Clerk of the Court shall file this Decision and Order, serve copies upon

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counsel for the parties, and CLOSE this case.
DATED this 6th day of March, 2016.
/s/Victor E. Bianchini
VICTOR E. BIANCHINI
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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DECISION AND ORDER – HERNANDEZ v COLVIN 14-CV-03195-VEB