Desmond Jones v. Prueite et al
Filing
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ORDER ACCEPTING FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATION OF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE by Judge Josephine L. Staton. IT IS ORDERED: 1. The Final Report and Recommendation 120 is accepted. 2. The Motion for Summary Judgment of defendants' Pruette and Ponder (ECF No. 98 ) is DENIED. 3. The clerk shall serve this Order on all counsel or parties of record. SEE ORDER FOR DETAILS. (ch)
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
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CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
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EASTERN DIVISION
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DESMOND JONES,
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Plaintiff,
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v.
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PRUETTE, et al.,
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Defendants.
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No. ED CV 14-0936-JLS (PLA)
ORDER ACCEPTING FINDINGS,
CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATION
OF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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I.
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INTRODUCTION
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On July 11, 2017, the Magistrate Judge issued a Final Report and Recommendation
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(“R&R,” ECF No. 120). On August 14, 2017, defendants filed Objections to the R&R (ECF No.
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123); plaintiff filed a Response thereto on September 1, 2017. (ECF No. 124). Defendants object
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that (1) the Magistrate Judge erred by not analyzing plaintiff’s Equal Protection Claim under a
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“class-of-one” theory; and (2) they are entitled to qualified immunity.
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II.
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DISCUSSION
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In arguing that plaintiff’s operative pleading, the Third Amended Complaint (“TAC”), only
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raises a “class-of-one” Equal Protection claim, defendants cite to plaintiff’s TAC at “ECF No. 22
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at 11” (see ECF No. 123 at 3 & n.1) and at “ECF No. 22 at 21-22” (see ECF No. 123 at 4).
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Plaintiff’s TAC, however, is only nine pages in length. To the extent that defendants intended to
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refer to the TAC at ECF No. 22 at 8, plaintiff does both allege that he was subjected to “unequal
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treatment for the grievances plaintiff filed” and that Officer Pruette “intentionally discriminated
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against plaintiff based on race and ancestory [sic].” (ECF No. 22 at 8). Plaintiff further alleges in
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the TAC that “Officer Ponder’s invidious conduct of racial harassment lacks a legitimate
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penological goal,” that “Officer Ponder acted with discriminatory animus,” that Pruette and Ponder
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acted “with racial harassment,” and that defendants “acted to harm plaintiff with invidious acts of
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racial harassment.” (Id.). Defendants appear to contend in their Objections that these allegations
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only allege that plaintiff was being “treated differently for who he is” (ECF No. 123 at 2), which
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necessarily implies that his claim is being raised pursuant to a “class-of-one” theory.
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In plaintiff’s Response to defendants’ Objections, plaintiff once again affirms that he is
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claiming that defendants treated him “differently based on his race, and ancestory [sic],” both of
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which pertain to his “being Black in America,” and that he does allege that “he was treated
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differently based on his race.” (ECF No. 124 at 2-3).
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As set forth in the R&R, the Court has an obligation where plaintiff is a prisoner proceeding
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pro se, particularly in a civil rights case, to construe the pleadings liberally and to afford plaintiff
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the benefit of any doubt. See, e.g., Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94, 127 S. Ct. 2197, 167 L.
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Ed. 2d 1081 (2007) (noting that, a “document filed pro se is to be liberally construed” and held to
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“less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers” (internal quotation marks
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omitted)); Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 (9th Cir. 2010) (“where the petitioner is pro se,
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particularly in civil rights cases, [courts should] construe the pleadings liberally and . . . afford the
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petitioner the benefit of any doubt.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Roy v. Lampert, 465 F.3d
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964, 970 (9th Cir. 2006) (explaining that the pro se status of a petitioner “informs and colors the
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lens through which we view the [petitioner’s] filings”); United States v. Seesing, 234 F.3d 456, 462
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(9th Cir. 2001) (“Pro se complaints and motions from prisoners are to be liberally construed.”).
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To the extent that defendants are pointing to the allegations set forth in plaintiff’s TAC to elucidate
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the legal basis for plaintiff’s remaining Equal Protection claim, the Court must look to pleading
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standards for pro se litigants to ascertain the adequacy of those allegations. In this case, plaintiff’s
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TAC also alleges claims for retaliation under the First Amendment (ECF No. 22 at 5-7), on which
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defendants earlier were granted summary judgment because plaintiff had failed to exhaust his
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administrative remedies for those claims. (See ECF No. 120 at 2-3). Being untrained in the law,
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plaintiff appears to have confused the required elements for the retaliation and equal protection
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claims that he raises in the TAC. Liberally construing plaintiff’s pleadings and filings, and drawing
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all inferences in the light most favorable to plaintiff, the Court finds that the Magistrate Judge was
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correct in concluding that plaintiff has raised genuine disputes of material fact sufficient to preclude
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summary judgment on plaintiff’s remaining Equal Protection claim.
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Further, to the extent that defendants contend that plaintiff’s allegations in his TAC
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alleging that defendants violated “his right to equal protection by treating him differently for who
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he is” necessarily implies that he is raising a claim under the “class-of-one theory” (ECF No.
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123 at 2), part of “who he is,” of course, is plaintiff’s racial classification.
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Defendants also point to plaintiff’s earlier Opposition in which plaintiff argued that his
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“individualized invidious treatment” created a “class of one” claim and cited to a case involving
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a challenge to a regulatory zoning decision. (ECF No. 41 at 21-22 (citing N. Pacifica LLC v.
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City of Pacifica, 526 F.3d 478 (9th Cir. 2008)). The Court disagrees with defendants’
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contention raised in a footnote in their Objections that plaintiff’s allegations in his TAC and
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statements that he made in his earlier Opposition are “binding judicial admissions.” (See ECF
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No. 123 at 4 n.3). Neither of the pleadings that defendants point to was signed by plaintiff
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under penalty of perjury (see ECF Nos. 22, 41), and the cases on which defendants rely did
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not pertain to plaintiffs who were proceeding pro se.
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Defendants’ argument that the “class-of-one” theory does not apply to “discretionary
decisions” in the “prison context,” also is not relevant to plaintiff’s claim alleging deliberate
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conduct by defendants that was intended to cause harm. Further, the district court cases from
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other circuits cited by defendants are not binding authority for this Court. (See ECF No. 98 at
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20-21). In addition, the Court rejects defendants’ contention that plaintiff is challenging
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Ponder’s “daily” decision as to “how to divvy up work assignments between eight to ten
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inmates.” (ECF No. 98 at 21). To the contrary, plaintiff alleges that Ponder made a deliberate
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decision one evening to assign to plaintiff all of the work that should have been distributed
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among the entire yard crew.
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Moreover, even if plaintiff’s allegations were construed to raise a “class-of-one” equal
protection claim based on his allegations that defendants’ “discriminatory treatment was
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intentionally directed just at him,” the Magistrate Judge’s findings that it is undisputed that
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Officer Ponder never ordered any other worker, including the other two paid yard crew
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members, to sweep the quarter-mile track by himself; that plaintiff was the only yard crew
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worker paged to work on the evening in question; and that Officer Ponder assigned plaintiff to
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perform a task that evening that typically is assigned to not one, but to eight inmates, are
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sufficient to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to whether defendants had a rational
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basis for intentionally treating plaintiff differently from the other paid yard crew workers. See,
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e.g., N. Pacifica LLC, 526 F.3d at 486.
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Finally, defendants object to the Magistrate Judge’s finding that they are not entitled to
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qualified immunity. (ECF No. 123 at 4-7). The relevant context here is not whether it was
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clearly established that “it was unconstitutional to treat a single prisoner differently than other
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prisoners on a single occasion” (ECF No. 123 at 4), or that it violated the Equal Protection
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Clause to require “an inmate to perform a tasks [sic] he was already obligated to perform” (id.
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at 6). As set forth in the R&R, it would have been clear to any reasonable prison official at the
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relevant time that it was unconstitutional to single out one inmate to assign atypical work tasks
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in part because of that inmate’s race. (ECF No. 120 at 20). Defendants’ attempt to distinguish
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Serrano v. Francis, 345 F.3d 1071 (9th Cir. 2003), on the basis that “although the district
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court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of defendants in Serrano was reversed, liability
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was not imposed” is both incomprehensible and misplaced. (ECF No. 123 at 5). The Ninth
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Circuit held in 2003 in Serrano that, with respect to one incident, the plaintiff had raised
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“sufficient facts to convince a reasonable trier of fact by a preponderance of the evidence that
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the decision not to allow live witness testimony was racially motivated.” 345 F.3d at 1083.
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Similarly, plaintiff here has raised genuine disputes of material fact that, on the one evening in
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question, defendants’ actions in giving work assignments only to plaintiff were racially
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motivated.
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Accordingly, the Court concludes that nothing in defendants’ Objections alters the
conclusions reached in the Final Report and Recommendation.
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III.
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CONCLUSION
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Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636, the Court has reviewed the Third Amended Complaint, the
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other records on file herein, including the Motion for Summary Judgment, the Magistrate
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Judge’s Final Report and Recommendation, defendants’ objections to the R&R, and plaintiff’s
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response thereto. The Court has engaged in a de novo review of those portions of the Final
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Report and Recommendation to which objections have been made. The Court accepts the
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recommendations of the Magistrate Judge.
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ACCORDINGLY, IT IS ORDERED:
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1.
The Final Report and Recommendation is accepted.
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2.
The Motion for Summary Judgment of defendants’ Pruette and Ponder (ECF No.
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98) is denied.
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The clerk shall serve this Order on all counsel or parties of record.
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__________________________________
HONORABLE JOSEPHINE L. STATON
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
DATED: September 25, 2017
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