Johnson Safety Inc v. Voxx International Corporation et al

Filing 95

CLAIM CONSTRUCTION ORDER by Judge Otis D. Wright, II .(lc) Modified on 11/16/2016. (lc).

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United States District Court

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Central District of California

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JOHNSON SAFETY, INC.,
Plaintiff,

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Case № 5:14-cv-02591-ODW(DTB)

v.
VOXX INTERNATIONAL
CORPORATOIN; VOXX
ELECTRONICS CORPORATION; and
INVISION AUTOMOTIVE SYSTEMS
INC.,
Defendants.

CLAIM CONSTRUCTION ORDER
U.S. PATENT NO. 6,871,356
U.S. PATENT NO. 7,267,402
U.S. PATENT NO. 7,448,679
U.S. PATENT NO. 7,379,125
U.S. PATENT NO. 5,775,762

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U.S. PATENT NO. 7,050,124

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U.S. PATENT NO. 7,245,274

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U.S. PATENT NO. 6,678,892

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U.S. PATENT NO. 7,839,355

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I.

INTRODUCTION

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This case involves several patents, owned and/or licensed by either Plaintiff

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Johnson Safety, Inc. (“Johnson”) or Defendants Voxx International Corporation, Voxx

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Electronics Corporation, and Invision Automotive Systems, Inc. (collectively,

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“Voxx”). (Compl. ¶¶ 7—23, ECF No. 1; Countercompl. ¶¶ 17—36, ECF No. 42.)

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Both Johnson and Voxx are in the consumer vehicle electronics market. (See Compl.

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¶¶ 1, 17—23; Countercompl. ¶¶ 1, 17—36.) The patents at issue cover video systems

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for vehicles, which are embedded in the front seat headrests or hang from the ceiling.

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(See id.) The parties dispute fifteen terms (five within Johnson’s patents, and ten

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within Voxx’s patents) that they have agreed are “significant,” and they list an

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additional eight “less significant” disputed terms. (Joint Claim Chart (“JCC”), ECF

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No. 74). For purposes of claim construction, and in accord with this Court’s Patent

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Standing Order (ECF No. 54), the Court will construct only the terms labeled

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“significant” in the JCC.

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All of the patents at issue cover vehicle electronics, specifically video systems

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and monitors affixed to a car ceiling or headrest.

(See Compl. ¶¶ 7—23;

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Countercompl. ¶¶ 17—36.) The types of electronics products that the patents cover

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can be broken down into three categories: Headrest Patents, Overhead Patents, and

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Portable/Non-Specified System Patents.

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 The Headrest Patents include: Johnson’s Patent Nos. 6,871,356

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(“the ’356 patent”), 7,267,402 (“the ’402 patent”), and

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7,448,679 (“the ’679 patent”), and Voxx’s Patent Nos.

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7,245,274 (“the ’274 patent”) and 7,839,355 (“the ’355

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patent”);

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 The Overhead Patents include: Johnson’s Patent No. 7,379,125

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(“the ’125 patent”) and Voxx’s Patent No. 5,775,762 (“the ’762

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patent”); and

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 The Portable/Non-Specified System Patents include: Voxx’s

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Patent Nos. 7,050,124 (“the ’124 patent”) and 6,678,892 (“the

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’892 patent”).

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In the interest of brevity, and due to the number of claims to be constructed, each

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patent’s background is detailed within the analysis section below.

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In short, both parties (Defendants, collectively, and Johnson) allege that the

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other is selling products that infringe on its patents.

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Countercompl. ¶¶ 38—196.)

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construction hearing on the disputed terms that the parties have deemed significant.

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For the reasons discussed below, the Court adopts the described constructions outlined

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herein.

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II.

(See Compl. ¶¶ 30—125;

On October 28, 2016, the Court held a claim

LEGAL STANDARD

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Claim construction is an interpretive issue “exclusively within the province of

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the court,” and it begins with an analysis of the claim language itself. Markman v.

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Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 372 (1996).

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A.

Claim Construction Generally

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Claims are to be interpreted from the perspective of a person of ordinary skill in

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the art. Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2005). That “person

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of ordinary skill” is deemed to read the claim term in two contexts: the context of the

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claim in which the term appears and the context of the entire patent. Id. Accordingly,

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claims must be read in light of the specification, which is “always highly relevant to

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the claim construction analysis.” Id. at 1315 (internal quotations omitted).

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However, the general rule is that limitations from the specification must not be

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imported into the claims. Comark Commc’ns, Inc. v. Harris Corp., 156 F.3d 1182,

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1186-87 (Fed. Cir. 1998).

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limitations can be discerned with reasonable certainty and predictability if the court’s

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focus remains on understanding how a person of ordinary skill in the art would

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understand the claim terms.” Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1323.

“[T]he line between construing terms and importing

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The “ordinary and customary meaning” of the words of a disputed claim is at

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the heart of claim construction. Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1312-13 (internal quotations and

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citations omitted). But in two situations, the “ordinary and customary” meaning of the

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terms is superseded: 1) when a patentee sets out a definition and acts as its own

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lexicographer; or 2) when the patentee disavows the full scope of a claim term either

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in the specification or during prosecution. Thorner v. Sony Computer Entm't Am.

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LLC, 669 F.3d 1362, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2012).

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“To act as its own lexicographer, a patentee must ‘clearly set forth a definition

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of the disputed claim term’ other than its plain and ordinary meaning.” Id. Disavowal

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occurs “[w]here the specification makes clear that the invention does not include a

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particular feature.” Id. at 1366. “[T]hat feature is [then] deemed to be outside the

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reach of the claims of the patent, even though the language of the claims, read without

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reference to the specification, might be considered broad enough to encompass the

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feature in question.” Id.

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B.

Special Rules Regarding 35 U.S.C. § 122¶6

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Means-plus-function claims are a particular class of claims, and they are

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governed by 35 U.S.C. § 112¶6. Section 112¶6 provides that the scope of a claim

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expressing a means or step for accomplishing something covers the structure,

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material, or acts (and equivalents thereof) in the claim language that correspond with

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the means in the patent’s specification. If § 112¶6 does apply, then the claim is

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limited to the embodiments in the specification and equivalents thereof. See Philips,

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415 F.3d at 1303.

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The first step in the analysis is to determine whether § 112¶6 actually applies to

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the claim at issue; it applies only to claims that describe a function without defining

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the structure with which to carry out the function. DePuy Spine, Inc. v. Medtronic

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Sofamor Danek, Inc., 469 F.3d 1005, 1023 (Fed. Cir. 2006). If the word “means”

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appears in a claim element in association with a function, a rebuttable presumption

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arises that §112¶6 applies. Callicrate v. Wadsworth Mfg., Inc., 427 F.3d 1361, 1368

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(Fed. Cir. 2005). If the claim term lacks the word “means,” the term will be construed

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under § 112¶6 only if the “challenger demonstrates that the claim fails to recite

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sufficiently definite structure or else recites function without reciting sufficient

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structure for performing that function.” Williamson v. Citrix Online LLC, 792 F.3d

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1339, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2015). In other words, if the claim does not include the word

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“means,” then the challenger wishing to construe under § 112¶6 must show that the

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structure described in the claim is too indefinite. See id. The overall inquiry is

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whether the claim term, in the context of the broader claim language, suggests a class

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of specific structures. Id. If it does, then the term should not be construed under §

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112¶6. Id.

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The second step, once it is determined that § 112¶6 applies, is interpretation.

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See JVW Enters., Inc. v. Interact Accessories, Inc., 424 F.3d 1324, 1330 (Fed. Cir.

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2005). The first facet of interpretation is that the court must identify the function of

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the claim term. Id. After identifying the claimed function, the court must then

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identify the corresponding structure by looking at the specification. Callicrate, 427

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F.3d at 1369. All structures in the specification corresponding to the claimed function

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are relevant; it is an error to limit the structure to just the preferred embodiment. Id.

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If the specification does not provide corresponding structure for the claimed function,

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then the claim is invalid as indefinite. Williamson, 792 F.3d at 1352.
In addition to the structures, materials, or acts of the embodiments described in

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the patent’s specification, the patentee is also entitled to “equivalents thereof” as of the

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time the patent was issued. See Palumbo v. Don-Joy Co., 762 F.2d 969 (Fed. Cir.

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1985). However, the “equivalents” issue arises in the context of the infringement

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determination; thus, whether something constitutes an equivalent is a question of fact

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for the jury. Id.

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III.

DISCUSSION

Below, the Court constructs each of the “significant” terms in the order they appear

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in the JCC.

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A.

The ’356 Patent

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The ’356 Patent discloses headrest mounted video systems with two major

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components: a housing and a display that folds into and out of the housing. (See

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generally the ’356 Patent, Pl. Opening Br., Ex. A, ECF No. 73). The folding function

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of the screen allows the viewer to adjust the tilt of the screen. (Id.) The location of

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the hinge allowing this tilt is the subject of the disputed claim term.
The disputed terms, along with each party’s proposed construction, are as

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follows (disputed claim term in bold):

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U.S. Patent No. 6,871,356, Claims 1 and 5:

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Claim 1: “. . . the first video monitor comprising: a housing comprising a first hinge

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portion adjacent an upper edge thereof and defining a storage cavity having a floor .

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. . .”

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Claim 5: “. . . the first video monitor comprising: a housing comprising a first hinge

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portion adjacent an upper edge thereof, the viewing screen facing the passenger

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compartment . . . .”

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Disputed Claim

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Term

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“upper edge”

Johnson’s Construction

Voxx’s Construction

Plain and ordinary

“the highest surface of an object,

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meaning, or if construction a top surface”

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is necessary, “upward

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edge”

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(The ’356 Patent, Col. 17:36–40.)

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In relevant part, the specification provides that the video monitor and housing

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(affixed to the back of a headrest on a vehicle seat) contain two hinges which

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cooperate to allow the screen structure to pivot. (The ’356 Patent, Col. 14:47—49.)

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These two hinges are, according to the specification, “[p]referably . . . located near an

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upper edge of the screen structure and housing,” which causes that upper edge of the

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screen structure to remain mostly stationary, while a lower edge is capable of

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protruding substantially from the front face of the housing, providing a better viewing

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angle for the user. (Id.)

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Notably, a few months after the ’356 Patent was issued to Johnson, Voxx filed a

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request for inter partes reexamination of the patent with the USPTO. (Inter Partes

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Reexamination Certificate, Pl. Opening Br., Ex. A.) Each claim of the ’356 Patent

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was ultimately confirmed patentable; no amendments to the claim language were

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made. (Id.)

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The difference in the parties’ constructions of “upper edge” boils down to a

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disagreement over whether the term is definite and superlative (“the highest”) or

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indefinite and comparative (“an upper”).

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necessary for this term; a Court and jury will easily understand its meaning. (Pl.

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Opening Br. 7.) If construction is necessary, then Johnson’s alternate position is that

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the word “upward” should be used as a “readily understandable synonym” of “upper.”

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(Id.) Johnson argues that this term must remain indefinite and comparative, allowing

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the hinge located adjacent “an upper edge” to, in theory, be located in a variety of

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different locations in different embodiments of the patent, so long as the location were

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adjacent an upper/upward edge (not necessarily the upper/uppermost edge). (See id.

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at 9.) In contrast, Voxx wishes to limit the claim term to its definite, superlative

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version: “the highest surface of an object, the top surface.” (Def. Responsive Br. 2–3.)

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Voxx’s justification for introducing this limitation when the language of the claim

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itself is “an upper edge” is that Figures 8A and 9A accompanying the specification

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(duplicated below) illustrate the upper edge as the highest or top surface of the

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housing. (Id.)

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Johnson states that no construction is

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(The ’356 Patent, Figs. 8A, 9A.)

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In addition, Voxx argues that the term “upward” is ambiguous, noting that it

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could be construed to allow the hinge to be placed at the upward side of the bottom

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edge of the housing. (Def. Responsive Br. at 2.) Voxx states that during prosecution,

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Johnson disavowed the claim to the extent it allowed the hinge to be placed at the

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bottom edge of the housing, in order to overcome rejections based on prior art. (Id. at

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2–3.)

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Based on the general rule that claim construction should give preference to the

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plain and ordinary meaning of claim terms, Johnson’s construction should be upheld.

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See Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1313.

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comparative nature of the claim language (“an upper edge”) rather than distorting it

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into, in essence, “the uppermost edge.” Especially dispositive in the Court’s decision

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is the claim language’s use of the word “an,” which connotes the possibility that the

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hinge could be located on one of multiple “upper edges.” (See the ’356 Patent, Col.

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17:36–40.) In addition, as Johnson points out, Figure 9A from the ’356 Patent in fact

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uses the term “upper edge” to refer to a surface that is not the highest surface of the

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housing. (See Pl. Opening Br. 8.) Item 482 is described as “an upper edge” and also

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“a top edge,” but the “J”-shaped arrow accompanying that number clearly points to an

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edge within the housing that is near the top, but not the highest surface. (See the ’356

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Patent, Fig. 9A.) As such, Voxx is incorrect in arguing that the specification supports

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its construction of “an upper edge.” The Court adopts Johnson’s construction for the

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term “upper edge.”

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B.

Johnson’s construction preserves the indefinite,

The ’402 Patent

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The ’402 Patent differs from other Headrest Patents in part because of the

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manner in which the video system screen is adjustable and can be opened all the way

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forward, like a latch. (See the ’402 Patent, Pl. Opening Br., Ex. B.) The asserted

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claim outlines a method for replacing the headrest mounted video system.

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The disputed terms, along with each party’s proposed construction, are as

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follows (disputed claim terms in bold):

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U.S. Patent No. 7,267,402, Claim 10:

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“A method of replacing a mobile entertainment system, said method comprising . . .

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removing said first monitor from said headrest; providing a second monitor

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comprising: a second housing . . . and a second screen structure . . . .”

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Disputed Claim

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Term

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“second housing”

Johnson’s Construction

Voxx’s Construction

Plain and ordinary

“a housing including like features

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meaning, or if construction relative to the first housing”

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is necessary, then the term

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“second” in conjunction

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with the independent

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claim’s paragraph

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structure, associates this

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proposed term with the

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“second monitor”

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“second screen

Plain and ordinary

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structure”

meaning, or if construction features relative to the first screen

“a screen structure including like

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is necessary, then the term

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“second” in conjunction

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with the independent

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claim’s paragraph

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structure, associates this

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proposed term with the

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“second monitor”

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structure”

(The ’402 Patent, Col. 8:41–55.)
The relevant portion of this patent includes two aspects of the replacement

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method: steps for removing the current headrest-mounted video system, and steps for

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installing a replacement system. (Id.) In all, there are five steps involving the

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replacement of a first monitor with a second monitor. (Id.) The steps are fairly

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straightforward, and the actual method for replacement is not in issue. The parties’

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disagreement centers around the type of monitor the consumer should use in replacing

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the system. (See Def. Responsive Br. 5–6; Pl. Opening Br. 13–16.) In context, the

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claim provides that the first housing and screen structure should be replaced with a

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second housing and screen structure. (The ’402 Patent, Col. 8:41–55.)

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Johnson’s argument is that the Court should apply the plain and ordinary

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meaning, with fewest limitations imported, to both claim terms. (Pl. Opening Br. 15.)

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According to Johnson, this means that the terms must be construed simply to signify

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that the replacement housing and screen structure comprise a second, physically

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different structure from the first. (Id.) On the other hand, Voxx contends that the

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terms must be construed to mean that the second screen structure and housing must

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have identical features to the first/original housing. (Def. Responsive Br. 5.) Voxx

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argues that this added limitation is necessary so that the claim is not construed so

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broadly as to cover “upgrading” to a totally different type of screen structure or

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housing. (Id.) Voxx’s reasoning is that only one screen structure and one housing is

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disclosed in the ’402 Patent, so the claim does not support Johnson’s broad

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construction. (Id.)

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Voxx’s argument appears to contradict one of the basic rules of Phillips: that the

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claims of a patent are not necessarily limited to the embodiment or specification of

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that patent, even if the claim language describes only a single embodiment. 415 F.3d

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at 1323 (citation omitted).

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structure and housing, the claim should not be limited to the specification, and it is not

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difficult to imagine numerous other iterations of a screen structure and housing that

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could be used to replace the original system while remaining within the scope of the

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patent. As such, Voxx’s attempt to limit the claim terms is not a valid one. Further,

While the specification discloses one type of screen

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Voxx’s assertion that the second screen structure and housing could comprise a

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completely different “upgrade” when compared with the original screen structure and

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housing is unsupported by logic and by physical limitations of the headrest. (See Def.

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Responsive Br. 5.) For example, the original monitor could not be replaced with a

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wildly different, thirty-inch screen structure and housing, because it simply would not

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fit on the headrest. However, the replacement screen structure may differ somewhat

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from the original, and the limitations of the specification should not be imported into

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claim construction. For these reasons, the Court adopts Johnson’s construction for the

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terms “second housing” and “second screen structure.”

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C.

The ’679 Patent

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The ’679 Patent is also a Headrest Patent. (See generally the ’679 Patent, Pl.

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Opening Br., Ex. C.) It was issued on November 11, 2008, and Johnson is the

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assignee. (Id.) The relevant portion of Claim 1 is directed to a pivoter that stops the

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screen in the headrest video unit from opening fully.

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embodiment, a bracket is used to achieve this effect. Figure 5B is copied below to

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illustrate.

For example, in one

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The disputed term in context of the broader claim language at issue in the ’679

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Patent, along with each party’s proposed construction, is as follows (disputed claim

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term in bold):

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U.S. Patent No. 7,448,679, Claim 1 (Johnson’s Patent):

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“A mobile video system comprising: a headrest; a screen structure having a front

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face, a rear face opposite the front face, and a first hinge portion; a pivot-limiting

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portion; and a housing . . . .”

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Disputed Claim

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Term

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“pivot-limiting

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portion”

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Johnson’s Construction

Voxx’s Construction

No construction necessary.

This term is governed by 35
U.S.C. § 112¶6.

To the extent construction

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is necessary, “pivot limiter, “a bracket [structure] that limits

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distinct from the housing

the rotation of the screen to less

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and the first and second

than perpendicular relative to the

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hinge portions, that limits

closed position of the screen

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the outward rotation of the

structure [function.]”

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screen structure”

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(The ’679 Patent, Col. 7:53–62.)

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The pivot-limiting portion exists to increase the safety functions of the product.

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(See id. Col 1:47–54.) The device restrains the video screen from being opened fully

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in such a way that it could be perpendicular to the housing. (Id. at Col. 8:61–9:11.)

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In addition, if force is applied to the front of the screen while it is tilted slightly

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outward (as far as the pivot-limiting portion will allow), the pivot-limiting portion will

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not resist the force and the screen will close fully. (Id. at Col. 1:47–54.) Both of these

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aspects of the product protect a person whose head may be thrown forward in a crash

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and hit the front of the screen. (See id.)

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The parties disagree about whether this term is governed by 35 U.S.C. § 112¶6.

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(See Pl. Opening Br. 19–21; Def. Responsive Br. 7–10.) If it is, then the scope of the

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term must be limited to that set forth in the specification. See Philips, 415 F.3d at

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1303. But if § 112¶6 does not apply, as Johnson argues, then the term should not be

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limited to the specification. (See Pl. Opening Br. 19–21.)

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Johnson points out that Voxx failed to identify this term as being governed by §

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112¶6 in its (1) invalidity contentions; (2) disclosure of terms for construction; and (3)

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exchange of preliminary claim constructions and extrinsic evidence. (See id. at 19–

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20.) The Court’s Patent Local Rules require disclosure of terms that a party intends to

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argue are governed by § 112¶6 in each of those three filings, and Voxx did not disclose

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this term in any of them. (See Patent L.R. 3-3(c); 4-1(a); 3-6.)

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However, Voxx did identify the term as falling under § 112¶6 prior to the claim

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construction hearing, and the Patent Local Rules do not identify non-application of §

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112¶6 as the penalty for failing to timely identify a term as being governed by such.

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(See Def. Responsive Br. 7; Patent L.R. 3-3(c); 4-1(a); 3-6.) For these reasons, the

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Court declines to decide this term on Voxx’s failure to timely identify the application

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of § 112¶6, and instead reaches the merits of constructing the term.

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The wording of the claim does not sufficiently define the structure that acts as a

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“pivot-limiting portion.” (See the ’679 Patent, Col. 8:55 – 9:11.) Because the claim

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term lacks the word “means,” § 112¶6 should apply if the claim describes a function

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without sufficiently reciting corresponding structure. Williamson, 792 F.3d at 1349.

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Here, the claim states that a pivot-limiting portion is part of the claimed invention and

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describes the way that device limits rotation of the screen structure relative to the

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housing. (Id.) However, this leaves open the question of what structure comprises the

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pivot-limiting portion.

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corresponding structure, and § 112¶6 applies. In order to find the corresponding

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structure, the Court draws from the specification and determines that the structure is a

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bracket. (See id. Col. 7:63–66.) As a result, the appropriate construction must reflect

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what is recited in the specification. The Court therefore adopts Voxx’s construction of

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“pivot-limiting portion.”

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D.

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(See id.)

As such, the claim recites a function without

The ’125 Patent
This Overhead Patent, owned by Johnson, was issued on May 27, 2008. (See

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generally the ’125 Patent, Col. 2:25—34; 3:4—6; 4:49—53, Pl. Opening Br., Ex. D.)

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Like some of the other patented products, the screen of this system can pivot to

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provide a preferred angle for the viewer. (See id.) The angle of this pivoting, and the

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screen structure’s angular relationship to the roof of the vehicle, is the subject of the

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dispute for this claim term.

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The disputed term in context of the broader claim language at issue in the ’125

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Patent, along with each party’s proposed construction, is as follows (disputed claim

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term in bold):

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U.S. Patent No. 7,379,125, Claims 1-6; 8-11 (Johnson’s Patent):

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“An assembly mountable to an interior surface of a roof of a vehicle, the assembly

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comprising: a housing . . . and a video display . . . substantially parallel with an

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interior surface of a roof . . . .”

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Disputed Claim

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Term

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“substantially

“substantially parallel with “essentially parallel with an

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parallel with an

the ceiling of a vehicle

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interior surface of

cabin”

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a roof”

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(The ’125 Patent, Col. 2:25–34; 3:4–6; 4:49–53.)

Johnson’s Construction

Voxx’s Construction

interior surface of a roof”

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The parties have already agreed on the meaning of “interior surface of a roof of

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a vehicle cabin”; their agreed construction is “ceiling of a vehicle cabin.” (See Pl.

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Opening Br. 23–24.) Johnson and Voxx disagree about the extent to which the screen

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structure can pivot backwards, measured by whether the screen is parallel with the

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ceiling of the vehicle cabin. (See id. at 22–25; Def. Responsive Br. 4.) Figure 9 from

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the patent, copied below, illustrates the backwards-extended position of the screen

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structure.

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Johnson seeks to maintain the original “substantially” phrasing in the

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construction. (See Pl. Opening Br. 23–25.) Johnson offers Webster’s Third New

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International Dictionary of the English Language, Unabridged 2280 (1986) as

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extrinsic evidence for the meaning of “substantially”; Webster’s defines it as “being

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that specified to a large degree or in the main.” (Id. at 24.) Johnson also argues that

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the plain meaning of “substantially” in the relevant context (overhead monitors

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mounted in vehicles) is something that jurors would have everyday experience with,

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given the ubiquity of such monitors. (Id.) Johnson substitutes “ceiling of a vehicle

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cabin” for “roof” in its construction; this reflects the agreed construction for this term,

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noted above. (See Pl. Opening Br. 23–24.)

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Voxx’s argument is that Johnson need not import the phrase “ceiling of a

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vehicle cabin” into its construction, suggesting that it will “only act to confuse the

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jury.”

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stating that the latter is the commonly understood meaning of the former. (Def.

19

Responsive Br. 4.)

Further, Voxx defends its insertion of “essentially” for “substantially” by

20

Voxx’s argument that “ceiling of a vehicle cabin” should not be imported to

21

replace “roof” in the construction focuses on an immaterial factor, as this phrasing has

22

already been agreed upon between the parties as a construction. (See Pl. Opening Br.

23

23.) Moreover, Voxx’s defense of its replacing “substantially” with “essentially” is

24

weak. Voxx has merely replaced one adverb with another; there is nothing to suggest

25

that a jury would understand the meaning of “essentially” any more than it would

26

“substantially,” and Voxx has produced no evidence to suggest that “essentially”

27

actually represents the commonly-understood meaning of “substantially.” That being

28

said, the lack of clarity that either “essentially” or “substantially” provide is not reason

15

1

to adopt Johnson’s construction; the claim calls for a more precise construction. As

2

such, the Court adopts the following construction for the term “substantially parallel

3

with an interior surface of a roof”: “having an angular relationship between 170

4

degrees and 180 degrees, inclusive, with the ceiling of a vehicle cabin.”

5

construction provides for an arc of ten degrees difference in the relationship of the

6

display to the roof when the display is fully extended.

7

E.

This

The ’762 Patent

8

The ’762 Patent is an Overhead Patent and belongs to Voxx. (See generally the

9

’762 Patent, Pl. Responsive Br., Ex. B., ECF No. 76) It was issued on July 7, 1998.

10

(Id.) The console of this patent includes a leading end, a trailing end, and an optional

11

central section. (Id. Col 2:2–6.) The monitor, video source, and wiring for this

12

entertainment system are all located within a console; however, the specification does

13

not limit the console to a specific size or shape. (See id.)

14

The disputed terms in context of the broader claim language at issue in the ’762

15

Patent, along with each party’s proposed construction, are as follows (disputed claim

16

terms in bold):

17

U.S. Patent No. 5,775,762, Claim 1:

18

“An overhead console . . . comprising: an elongated console housing . . . a

19

compartment for storing a source of video signals formed in the trailing end of

20

the console housing, and conductive means associated with the compartment for

21

connecting the television monitor to the compartment to provide ready

22

attachment of the source of video signals to the television monitor and

23

transmission of video signals between the source of video signals and the

24

television monitor.”

25

Disputed Claim

26

Term

27

“elongated console “A console housing longer

“a console housing that is

28

housing”

extended or lengthened to include

Johnson’s Construction

than it is wide, [wherein

16

Voxx’s Construction

1

length is determined by the a television monitor and a

2

longitudinal axis of

compartment capable of storing a

3

symmetry of a vehicle and

course of video signals”

4

width is determined by the

5

axis of the monitor

6

width],” otherwise

7

indefinite

8

“a compartment

“a separate and partitioned

Voxx asserts that this claim term

9

for storing a source space formed entirely

should be given its plain and

10

of video signals

within the trailing end of

ordinary meaning (no

11

formed in the

the console housing”

construction needed).

12

trailing end of the

13

console housing”

14

“conductive means This term is governed by

This term is governed by 35

15

associated with the 35 U.S.C. § 112¶6.

U.S.C. § 112¶6.

16

compartment for

17

connecting the

18

television monitor

19

to the compartment Connecting the television

20

to provide ready

monitor to the

to the compartment to provide

21

attachment of the

compartment to provide

ready attachment of the source of

22

source of video

ready attachment of the

video signals to the television

23

signals to the

source of video signals to

monitor and transmission of

24

television monitor

the television monitor and

video signals between the source

25

and transmission

transmission of video

of video signals and the television

26

of video signals

signals between the source

monitor

27

between the source of video signals and the

28

of video signals

Function:

Function:

Connecting the television monitor

Structures:

television monitor

17

1

and the television

2

monitor”

Electrical wires or equivalents

Structures:

thereof

3
4

Insulated electrical wires,

5

and this term is not entitled

6

to any equivalents under

7

35 U.S.C. § 112¶6

8

(The ’762 Patent, Col. 5:36–50.)

9

There are several sources of disagreement on the terms in the ’762 Patent. The

10

parties submit competing proposed constructions regarding the shape and size of the

11

console containing the monitor, video source, and wiring. (See Def. Opening Br. 10–

12

15 (ECF No. 75); Pl. Responsive Br. 2–10.) There are three disputed terms for the

13

’762 Patent, and each is addressed in turn below.

14

1.

15

Johnson argues that the first disputed term, “elongated console housing,” must

16

be construed as meaning “longer than it is wide.” (Pl. Responsive Br. 2.) Johnson

17

offers extrinsic dictionary evidence to support this definition. Webster’s Third New

18

International Dictionary of the English Language, Unabridged 737 (1981) defines

19

“elongated” as “having a form notably long in comparison to its width,” and The

20

Concise Oxford Dictionary 439 (9th ed 1995) defines it as “long in relation to its

21

width.” Further, Johnson argues that the patent figures and specification support

22

Johnson’s construction (Figure 3 from the ’762 patent is copied below):

“Elongated console housing”

23
24
25
26
27
28

18

1

Voxx wishes to avoid a limitation on this claim term, and it points to the

2

specification’s statement that “the console may take on a variety of shapes without

3

departing from the spirit of the present invention.” (See the ’762 Patent, Col. 3:18–

4

20.)

5

components and it could be elongated in multiple orientations.” (Def. Opening Br.

6

12.) According to Voxx and as outlined in the specification, the central section of the

7

console is optional; other possible embodiments could include a more compact

8

console. (See id. at 13.)

Voxx defines “elongated” as “big enough to include the system’s key

9

Neither party’s proposed construction appears to correctly define the term

10

“elongated console housing.” Based on the commonly-understood meaning of the

11

word “elongated,” and bolstered by the dictionary definitions provided, Johnson is

12

correct in asserting that “elongated” means “longer than it is wide.”

13

Responsive Br. 2–10.) To that extent, its proposed construction will control. Voxx’s

14

use of the words “extended”/“lengthened” to define “elongated” is an attempt to

15

broaden the scope of the term in a way that does not comport with the meaning of the

16

original phrasing, “elongated.” (See Def. Opening Br. 10–15.) However, Johnson’s

17

definition of the way length and width are determined (“by the longitudinal axis of

18

symmetry of a vehicle and . . . by the axis of the monitor width,” respectively),

19

imports an unnecessary limitation into the construction. “Elongated console housing”

20

does not dictate the orientation of the console, but it does require that the console be

21

longer than it is wide. Further, while the Background of the Invention and Description

22

of the Prior Art section of the ’762 Patent states that these types of overhead consoles

23

are generally “mounted coincident with the longitudinal axis of symmetry of the

24

vehicle,” nothing in the actual claim language commands this. (See the ’762 Patent,

25

Col. 1:14–17.) Therefore, the Court adopts the construction “a console housing longer

26

than it is wide” for the term “elongated console housing.”

27
28

2.

(See Pl.

“A compartment for storing a source of video signals formed in the
trailing end of the console housing”

19

1

The specific word at the center of this disputed term is “compartment.”

2

Johnson wishes to define “compartment” as a separate space that is divided

3

(partitioned) from the encapsulating space. (Pl. Responsive Br. 4.) Johnson offers

4

some dictionary definitions of “compartment” to support this, including “a space

5

within a larger space, separated from the rest by partitions” from The Oxford English

6

Dictionary 593 (2d ed 1989). (See Pl. Responsive Br. 4.)

7

Voxx, on the other hand, argues that no construction is needed for this term.

8

(Def. Opening Br. 10–11.) It asserts that “compartment” is a commonly understood

9

term and that no additional definition is needed.

(Id.) Voxx’s main issue with

10

Johnson’s proposed construction is that it unnecessarily restricts the claim by using

11

the language “a separate and partitioned space formed entirely within” in its proposed

12

construction. (Id.) Voxx cites Phillips in supporting its argument that the claim scope

13

should not be limited to the embodiment of the invention. (Id.); Phillips, 415 F.3d at

14

1315.

15

Though Voxx is correct, to a degree, that “compartment” is a commonly

16

understood term, Johnson’s proposed construction adds the necessary structure and

17

gloss to a claim term that otherwise could be overbroad. As Phillips establishes, a

18

claim term should be read and constructed in the context of the claim in which it

19

appears and in the context of the entire patent. 415 F.3d at 1315. Here, the word

20

“compartment” is followed closely by “formed in the trailing end of the console

21

housing.” (The ’762 Patent, Col. 5:43–50.) Johnson’s proposed construction clarifies

22

the meaning of “compartment” by using the dictionary definition “a separate and

23

partitioned space.”

24

“compartment” as “a separate and partitioned space,” it follows that the separate and

25

partitioned space is formed apart from other areas within the encapsulating space.

26

Thus, Johnson’s proposed construction language of “formed entirely within the

27

trailing end of the console housing” is appropriate.

28

(Pl. Responsive Br. 4–5.)

Based on the definition of

As such, the Court adopts Johnson’s construction for this term.

20

1

3.

2

The parties agree that 35 U.S.C. § 112¶6 governs this disputed claim term, but

3

they disagree on whether that means that the term “insulated electrical wires” is

4

entitled to equivalents under § 112¶6. Here, use of the word “means” in the claim

5

language triggers § 112¶6’s applicability, and the corresponding structure can be

6

found in the specification. (The ’762 Patent, Col. 5:43–50); see Callicrate, Inc., 427

7

F.3d at 1368. The parties agree on which portion of the claim term represents the

8

function. (See Def. Opening Br. 13.) The function that this term describes, for

9

purposes of § 112¶6, is “connecting the television monitor to the compartment to

10

provide ready attachment of the source of video signals to the television monitor and

11

transmission of video signals between the source of video signals and the television

12

monitor.” (Id.) The dispute centers on the corresponding structures, which Johnson

13

asserts are “insulated electrical wires, and this term is not entitled to any equivalents

14

under 35 U.S.C. § 112¶6.”

15

corresponding structures are “electrical wires or equivalents thereof.” (Id.)

“Conductive means associated with . . . the television monitor.”

(Def. Opening Br. 13.)

Voxx contends that the

16

The Court finds that the scope of this means-plus-function claim term includes

17

equivalents of electrical wires. The fact that Voxx added a limitation in the course of

18

patent prosecution does not estop it from applying the doctrine of equivalents. (See

19

Response to Office Action, Dec. 1997, 9, Pl. Responsive Br., Ex. H.) Voxx is correct

20

in citing Engingeered Products Co. v. Donaldson Co., Inc., as an example of a case

21

where a court rejected an estoppel argument similar to Johnson’s. 313 F.Supp.2d 951

22

(N.D. Iowa 2004). Engineered Products holds that estoppel in the context of patent

23

equivalents does not apply to means-plus-function claims.

24

Supreme Court case Festo Corporation v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co.,

25

Ltd., underlies the relevant rule in Engineered Products. See 535 U.S. 722 (2002)

26

(standing for the rule that where amendments to a patent application narrow the

27

claims, the prosecution history estops the patentee from later claiming the rejected

28

equivalents, but leaving open certain types of amendments as not triggering estoppel).

21

Id. at 981-82.

The

1

Without the estoppel argument, Johnson has no valid claim that Voxx should not be

2

entitled to equivalents for “insulated electrical wires.” The general § 112¶6 rule is that

3

the covered structure includes what is laid out in the specification, plus equivalents.

4

Palumbo, 762 F.2d at 974. Therefore, the Court adopts Voxx’s construction for this

5

term.

6

F.

The ’124 Patent

7

The ’124 Patent is a portable video/entertainment system. (See generally the

8

’124 Patent, Pl. Responsive Br., Ex. J.) Voxx is the assignee for this patent. (Id.) It

9

was issued on May 23, 2006. (Id.) The basic configuration of the patented product is

10

a portable DVD-stereo that can be used in the home or mounted with straps between

11

car seats (and removed as needed). (Id.)

12

The disputed terms in context of the broader claim language at issue in the ’124

13

Patent, along with each party’s proposed construction, are as follows (disputed claim

14

terms in bold):

15

U.S. Patent No. 7,050,124, Claims 38 and 51:

16

Claim 38: “A video system mounted to a seat in a vehicle comprising . . . at least one

17

display is mountable to the assembly housing at a location between the first and

18

second panels.”

19

Claim 51: “A portable video system comprising . . .”

20
21

Disputed Claim

22

Term

23

Johnson’s Construction

Voxx’s Construction

“a location

“A location along the

Voxx asserts that this claim term

24

between the first

common physical border

should be given its plain and

25

and second panels” shared by the first and

26

second panels”

ordinary meaning: “One skilled
in the art would readily

27

understand the meaning of a

28

location between the first and

22

second panels.”

1

“easily transferable by a

Voxx asserts that this term is

3

user between vehicles and

merely a portion of the preamble

4

other settings”

and should not be construed as a

2

“portable”

5

claim limitation. Therefore, Voxx

6

contends that no construction is

7

necessary.

8

(The ’124 Patent, Col. 11:41–42; 12:27.)

9

The technology here is fairly straightforward; the dispute regarding the terms

10

lies in the distinction between two simple phrases. First, the parties disagree about

11

whether “a location between the first and second panels” means that the location must

12

be along the common physical border shared by the two panels, or whether it can be

13

construed more broadly.

14

Second, the parties argue over whether “portable,” a word in the preamble of the

15

patent, should constitute a limitation. (See Pl. Responsive Br. 13–14; Def. Opening

16

Br. 18–19.)

(See Pl. Responsive Br. 11–13; Def. Opening Br. 18.)

17

1.

18

The Court is unpersuaded by Johnson’s argument that the “location” in this

19

claim term refers to a place along the common physical border between the first and

20

second panels. (See Pl. Responsive Br. 11.) While it is true that the claim language

21

describes the two panels as being “adjacent” to one another, this does not necessarily

22

mean that the two panels share a common physical border. (See the ’124 Patent, Col.

23

11:39.) In fact, the claim language suggests the opposite interpretation. The claim

24

states that “at least one display is mountable to the assembly housing at a location

25

between the first and second panels,” which suggests that there is a space between the

26

two panels in which to mount a display. (See id. Col. 11:40–42.) For this reason, the

27

court adopts Voxx’s construction of the term “a location between the first and second

28

panels.”

“A location between the first and second panels”

23

1

2.

2

The conflict here revolves around whether “portable,” which is part of the

“Portable”

3

preamble of the claim, should act as a limitation.

4

Garmin International, Inc., provides clarity here; it stands for the rule that preamble

5

language can limit the scope of a claim when limitations in the body of the claim rely

6

upon the preamble and draw support from it. 778 F.3d 1021, 1023-24 (Fed. Cir.

7

2015). Put another way, if the preamble language describes what a claimed invention

8

is or does (rather than a purpose or intended use), it can act as a limitation. See id.

9

The Court finds that the relevant preamble language in this instance does just that.

10

Indeed, this patent is different from the others presently being constructed because it is

11

meant to be removable from a car when not in use; the Background of the Invention

12

section of this patent specifically describes the anti-theft benefits of this feature. (See

13

’the 124 Patent, Col. 1:28.) As such, Voxx should not now be allowed to assert that

14

“portable” is only one intended use; this does not describe the overall purpose of the

15

invention. (See Def. Opening Br. 19.) The Court adopts Johnson’s construction of

16

this term.

17

G.

Pacing Technologies, LLC v.

The ’274 Patent

18

The ’274 Patent is a Headrest Patent. (See generally the ’274 Patent, Pl.

19

Responsive Br., Ex. L.) Voxx is the assignee, and the patent was issued on July 17,

20

2007. (Id.)

21

The disputed term in context of the broader claim language at issue in the ’274

22

Patent, along with each party’s proposed construction, is as follows (disputed claim

23

term in bold):

24

U.S. Patent No. 7,245,274, Claim 11 (Voxx’s Patent):

25

“A video system comprising: a base portion . . . wherein the base portion

26

accommodates a media player . . . .”

27

Disputed Claim

28

Term

Johnson’s Construction

24

Voxx’s Construction

1

“accommodates”

“the base portion, and not

2

the display, incorporates a

3

“provides sufficient space for”

media player”

4

(The ’274 Patent, Col. 6:41–46.)

5

In broader context, this claim term is about which portion of the invention

6

houses the media player that allows the product to function. (See id.) Johnson’s

7

position on this term is that some of the figures included within the patent represent a

8

configuration that is not in the spirit of the invention. (See Pl. Responsive Br. 16–17.)

9

Specifically, Johnson notes that Figures 3A–3C show a media player within the

10

door/display that is hinged or attached to the base (rather than being situated within

11

the base itself). (See id.) Johnson argues that the correct construction of this term is

12

such that it requires an allocation of sufficient space within the base portion (and not

13

the display/door) to incorporate a media player. (Id.)

14

This is an attempt to limit the term “accommodates” in a way that is already

15

limited elsewhere in the claim language. Johnson’s proposed construction makes

16

explicit that there must be sufficient space left in the base, not the display/door, to

17

incorporate the media player. (Id.) The original claim language already provides that

18

“the base portion accommodates a media player.” (The ’274 Patent, Col. 6:43.) As

19

such, it is an unnecessary redundancy to construe “accommodates” to include only the

20

base portion.

21

“accommodates.”

22

H.

The Court therefore adopts Voxx’s construction of the term

The ’892 Patent

23

The ’892 Patent is unique among the patents at issue here in that it can be

24

installed in a variety of locations within a vehicle’s interior. (See generally the ’892

25

Patent, Pl. Responsive Br., Ex. M.) It was issued on January 13, 2004, and Voxx is

26

the assignee for this patent. (Id.)

27

The disputed terms in context of the broader claim language at issue in the ’892

28

Patent, along with each party’s proposed construction, are as follows (disputed claim

25

1

terms in bold):

2

U.S. Patent No. 6,678,892, Claims 1, 25, 26:

3

Claim 1: “. . . at least one wireless transmitter operatively coupled to said audio

4

bus, adapted to wirelessly and simultaneously transmit a plurality of audio

5

programs from each of the plurality of input devices to a plurality of wireless

6

headphones.”

7
8

[The terms are substantially the same in Claims 25 and 26; differences shown

9

below]

10

Disputed Claim

11

Term

12

Three similar

Voxx asserts that this claim term

13

phrases combined

should be given its plain and

14

for efficiency

ordinary meaning: “One skilled

15

purposes:

in the art would readily

Johnson’s Construction

Voxx’s Construction

understand the meaning of [these

16
17

“at least one

“at least one wireless

18

wireless

transmitter, each of which

19

transmitter . . .,

is operatively coupled to

20

adapted to

aid said audio bus, and

21

wirelessly and

each of which is adapted

22

simultaneously

to wirelessly and

23

transmit a plurality simultaneously . . .” (claim

24

of audio programs

25

from each of the

26

plurality of input

27

devices to a

28

plurality of

1)

26

terms].”

1

wireless

2

headphones”

3

(claim 1)

4
5

“a wireless

“a wireless transmitter,

6

transmitter . . .,

each of which is

7

adapted to

operatively coupled to said

8

wirelessly and

audio bus, and each of

9

simultaneously

which is adapted to

10

transmit a plurality wirelessly and

11

of audio programs

simultaneously . . .” (claim

12

from at least some

25)

13

of the plurality of

14

input devices to a

15

plurality of

16

wireless

17

headphone sets”

18

(claim 25)

19
20

“a wireless

“a wireless transmitter,

21

transmitter . . .,

each of which is

22

adapted to

operatively coupled to said

23

wirelessly and

audio bus, and each of

24

simultaneously

which is adapted to

25

transmit the audio

wirelessly and

26

signals from the at

simultaneously . . .” (claim

27

least two input

26)

28

devices to at least

27

1

two wireless

2

headphone sets, so

3

that each wireless

4

headphone set

5

receives an audio

6

signal from a

7

different one of the

8

at least two input

9

devices” (claim

10

26)

11

“bus”

“one or more electrical

“one or more wires or other

12

conductors carrying

signal transmission means”

13

similar types of signals”

14

(The ’892 Patent, Col. 10:33–34, 41–45; 12:32–36, 43–48.)

15

The ’892 Patent discloses a video system for a vehicle that allows a user to

16

select among many audio and visual inputs. (See id. Col. 4:42.) The product uses

17

wireless transmitters to allow two people in a car to listen to different audio and video

18

programs at the same time. (Id. Col. 3:63–4:2.) Two different embodiments exist for

19

this patent: in one, a single wireless transmitter transmits two audio programs

20

simultaneously via Code-Division Multiple Access (“CDMA”) technology. (Id. Col.

21

12:1–4.)

22

program on different frequencies.

23

construction of four terms in this claim, three of which are very similar and thus are

24

treated as one (the “Wireless Transmitter” terms).

In the other, two wireless transmitters each transmit a different audio
(Id. Col. 8: 46–47.)

The parties dispute the

25

1.

26

These three terms (from claims 1, 25, and 26) provide that certain embodiments

27

of the claimed invention include a means for wirelessly and simultaneously

28

transmitting audio signals from at least two input devices to at least two wireless

The Wireless Transmitter Terms

28

1

headphone sets. (See id. Col. 10:41–45; 12:32–36, 43–48.) Johnson attempts to limit

2

the scope of this term by proposing a construction that would mean each of the one or

3

more wireless transmitters in the claimed invention must be capable of wirelessly and

4

simultaneously transmitting audio signals in such a way. (Pl. Responsive Br. 18–20.)

5

Voxx asserts that this term should be given its plain and ordinary meaning. (Def.

6

Opening Br. 21.)

7

Based on the language of the claims and the specification, each wireless

8

transmitter should not necessarily have to be adapted to wirelessly and simultaneously

9

transmit multiple audio programs at once. Johnson’s attempt to limit the claim scope

10

by construing the term to mean that each transmitter must include this capability

11

would be placing a limitation on the term that is not supported by the plain language

12

of the claim. Claim 20 already requires that at least one wireless transmitter be

13

adapted to transmit multiple audio programs using CDMA technology. (The ’892

14

Patent, Col. 12:1–4.) Whether the other transmitters (should they be included in an

15

iteration of the product) make use of this technology does not appear to be required by

16

the claim. As such, the Court adopts Voxx’s construction of this term.

17

2.

18

The dispute over “bus” revolves around whether the bus must be comprised of

19

electrical wire(s) that carry similar types of signals. Johnson argues that without this

20

specificity, “bus” would simply mean “any possible way to transmit a signal,” which

21

could include things like Sonar and take the claim scope far outside the spirit of the

22

invention. (Pl. Responsive Br. 20.) Voxx’s position is that the term “bus” could be

23

embodied by multiple different means of signal transmission, not just wires. (Def.

24

Opening Br. 22.) The language of the specification is instructive here. It states in

25

relevant part, “While the buses . . . are simply aggregations of wires carrying similar

26

types of signals, other types of buses may be employed. For example, one or more

27

wires or other signal transmission means may be used . . . .” (The ’892 Patent, Col. 9:

28

62–64.) This language suggests that the means of transmission within a bus must

“Bus”

29

1

carry similar types of signals, but that the means do not have to take the form of wires.

2

And while limitations from the specification should not be imported into the

3

construction of a claim term, here, the specification adds breadth rather than a

4

limitation to construction. See Comark Commc’ns, Inc., 156 F.3d at 1186-87. In light

5

of the claim language and specification, the Court decides to adopt its own

6

construction of the term, which is a combination of the parties’ proposed

7

constructions. The Court adopts the construction, “one or more wires or other signal

8

transmission means carrying similar types of signals.”

9

I.

The ’355 Patent

10

Finally, the ’355 Patent is another of the Headrest Patents; it was issued on

11

November 23, 2010. (See generally the ’355 Patent, Pl. Responsive Br., Ex. P.) Voxx

12

is the assignee for this patent. (Id.)

13

The disputed terms in context of the broader claim language at issue in the ’355

14

Patent, along with each party’s proposed construction, are as follows (disputed claim

15

terms in bold):

16

U.S. Patent No. 7,839,355, Claims 1, 14, 26, 38:

17

“A display device for a vehicle having a seat, comprising: an assembly housing . . .

18

at least one wireless transmitter adapted to wirelessly transmit the audio signals . . .

19

and the face portion rests outside of the hole on an outside surface of the seat . . .

20

.”

21

Disputed Claim

22

Term

23

“assembly

“a housing constituting one Voxx asserts that this claim term

24

housing”

integral body with a

should be given its plain and

display”

ordinary meaning: “One skilled

25

Johnson’s Construction

Voxx’s Construction

26

in the art would readily

27

understand the meaning of

28

assembly housing.”

30

1

“the face portion

The sides and recessed

Voxx asserts that this claim term

2

rests outside of the

portion of a hole are not

should be given its plain and

3

hole on an outside

part of the outside surface

ordinary meaning: “One skilled

4

surface of the seat” of the seat.

in the art would readily

5

understand the meaning of [the

6

term] when read in the context of

7

the specification and drawings of

8

the ’355 Patent.”

9

(The ’355 Patent, Col. 10:17–18, 23–33.)

10

This patent discloses a video system for a seatback wherein the “rear portion”

11

of the video system rests in a hole in the seatback/headrest, and the front of the device

12

rests on top of the surface of the seatback/headrest. (Id.) The parties disagree on

13

whether the assembly housing disclosed in this patent must constitute one solid,

14

integrated body. (See Pl. Responsive Br. 24–25; Def. Opening Br. 23.) In addition,

15

there is a dispute over what it means for the device to rest on a surface of a seat that is

16

outside of a hole. (See Pl. Responsive Br. 21–23; Def. Opening Br. 22–23.)

17

1.

18

In order for this claim term to be validly limited to “a housing constituting one

19

integral body with a display,” one of the Thorner scenarios would need to apply. 669

20

F.3d at 1365 (holding that meanings other than the “ordinary and customary” will

21

supersede when a patentee sets out a definition and acts as its own lexicographer or

22

when the patentee disavows the full scope of a claim term either in the specification or

23

during prosecution). The Court is unpersuaded by Johnson’s attempt to show that

24

disavowal occurred through Voxx’s linking of the claim term to a specific

25

embodiment. (See Pl. Responsive Br. 25; Response to Office Action, Aug. 2009,11,

26

Pl. Responsive Br., Ex. R.) In reality, Voxx only referenced the specific embodiment

27

with a “see, e.g.,” citation, implying that other embodiments could exist within the

28

claim scope. (See id.) Without any other valid reason for limiting this claim term, the

Assembly Housing

31

1
2
3

Court adopts Voxx’s construction.
2.

“The face portion rests outside of the hole on an outside surface of
the seat”

4

The “hole” referred to in this term, in the context of the overall patent, is a

5

recessed portion of the seatback which houses the device. (See the ’355 Patent, Col.

6

9:3–10.) The dispute over this term is whether the display’s positioning must be such

7

that the screen is flush with the surface of the seat, or whether it can be slightly

8

recessed into a surface of the seat. (See Pl. Responsive Br. 21–23; Def. Opening Br.

9

22–23.) The specification provides the following description of this positioning:

10

“When mounted in a vehicle seat, the rear portion is positioned in the vehicle seat so

11

that the face portion sits substantially flush with the surface of the seat.” (The ’355

12

Patent, Col. 9:3–5.) Johnson, however, wishes to limit this claim term to “the sides

13

and recessed portion of a hole are not part of the outside surface of a seat.” (Pl.

14

Responsive Br. 21.)

15

Similarly to Johnson’s proposed construction for “accommodates” in the ’274

16

Patent, this proposed construction attempts to add a limitation that the claim language

17

itself already establishes. The claim language’s plain and ordinary meaning makes

18

clear what Johnson’s construction attempts to define: that “outside” does not mean

19

“within,” or even slightly within, with respect to the hole/recessed portion. (See the

20

’355 Patent, 10: 23–33.) In addition, Johnson’s construction is not worded in a way

21

that could stand in for the existing claim language and make grammatical sense. Such

22

a construction would likely serve to confuse jurors. For these reasons, the Court

23

adopts Voxx’s construction of this term.

24
25
26
27

IV.

CONCLUSION

For the above reasons, the Court hereby adopts the following table of constructions
for the “significant” disputed terms in this case.
Term
Patent

Court’s Adopted
Construction

28

32

1

“upper edge”

6,871,356

Plain and ordinary meaning
(no construction necessary)

2
3

“second housing”

7,267,402

Plain and ordinary meaning
(no construction necessary)

4
5

“second screen structure

7,267,402

Plain and ordinary meaning

6
7

(no construction necessary)
“pivot-limiting portion”

7,448,679

“a bracket [structure] that

8

limits the rotation of the

9

screen to less than

10

perpendicular relative to the

11

closed position of the screen

12
13
14
15

structure [function]”
“substantially parallel with

7,379,125

“having an angular

an interior surface of a roof”

relationship between 170

16

degrees and 180 degrees,

17

inclusive, with the ceiling of

18

a vehicle cabin.”

19

“elongated console housing” 5,775,762

“a console housing longer
than it is wide”

20
21

“a compartment for storing a 5,775,762

“a separate and partitioned

22

source of video signals

space formed entirely within

23

formed in the trailing end of

the trailing end of the console

24

the console housing”

housing”

25
26
27
28

“conductive means

5,775,762

This term is governed by 35

associated with the

U.S.C. § 112¶6.

compartment for connecting

33

1

the television monitor to the

2

compartment to provide

3

ready attachment of the

Connecting the television

4

source of video signals to

monitor to the compartment

5

the television monitor and

to provide ready attachment

6

transmission of video

of the source of video signals

7

signals between the source

to the television monitor and

8

of video signals and the

transmission of video signals

9

television monitor”

between the source of video

Function:

10

signals and the television

11

monitor

12

Structures:

13
14
15

Electrical wires or

16

equivalents thereof

17

“a location between the first

18

and second panels”

19

“portable”

7,050,124

Plain and ordinary meaning
(no construction necessary)

7,050,124

“easily transferable by a user

20

between vehicles and other

21

settings”
“provides sufficient space

22

“accommodates”

7,245,274

23
24
25
26
27

for”
Three similar phrases

6,678,892

Plain and ordinary meaning
(no construction necessary)

combined for efficiency
purposes:

28

34

1

“at least one wireless

2

transmitter . . ., adapted to

3

wirelessly and

4

simultaneously transmit a

5

plurality of audio programs

6

from each of the plurality of

7

input devices to a plurality

8

of wireless headphones”

9

(claim 1)

10
11

“a wireless transmitter . . .,

12

adapted to wirelessly and

13

simultaneously transmit a

14

plurality of audio programs

15

from at least some of the

16

plurality of input devices to

17

a plurality of wireless

18

headphone sets” (claim 25)

19
20

“a wireless transmitter . . .,

21

adapted to wirelessly and

22

simultaneously transmit the

23

audio signals from the at

24

least two input devices to at

25

least two wireless

26

headphone sets, so that each

27

wireless headphone set

28

35

1

receives an audio signal

2

from a different one of the at

3

least two input devices”

4

(claim 26)

5

“bus”

6,678,892

“one or more wires or other

6

signal transmission means

7

carrying similar types of

8

signals”

9
10

“assembly housing”

13
14

Plain and ordinary meaning
(no construction necessary)

11
12

7,839,355

“the face portion rests

7,839,355

Plain and ordinary meaning
(no construction necessary)

outside of the hole on an
outside surface of the seat”

15
16
17

IT IS SO ORDERED.

18
19

November 16, 2016

20
21

____________________________________

22

OTIS D. WRIGHT, II

23

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

24
25
26
27
28

36