Luis Alejandro Madrigal et al v. United States of America et al

Filing 61

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND by Judge Virginia A. Phillips re: 52 MOTION for Judgment on the Pleadings. (See document for specifics.) (MD JS-6. Case Terminated.) (iva)

JS-6
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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11 LUIS ALEJANDRO MADRIGAL )
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AND LAMBERTO AVITIA
12 PEREZ,
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Plaintiffs, )
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v.
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15 UNITED STATES OF
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AMERICA, ET AL,
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Defendants.
17 ________________________

Case No. EDCV 15-00261-VAP
(DTBx)
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT'S
MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE
PLEADINGS WITHOUT LEAVE TO
AMEND (DOC NO. 52)
[Motion filed on August 3,
2015]

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Plaintiffs' Third Amended Complaint (("TAC") Doc. No.

20 41) alleges that San Bernardino County violated
21 Plaintiffs' civil and constitutional rights by improperly
22 obtaining disclaimers of seized property and failing to
23 sufficiently provide notice to Plaintiffs of the
24 forfeiture of the property.
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(TAC ¶¶ 47-48.)

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I. BACKGROUND

2 A.

Factual Background

3

In June 2012, a San Bernardino County law enforcement

4 task force seized money and drugs from a house located at
5 1007 West D Street in Ontario, California.

(TAC ¶ 13.)

6 Plaintiffs Luis Madrigal and Lamberto Perez were in the
7 house where the drugs and money were seized and they
8 disclaimed ownership in writing.

(TAC ¶ 23.)

Alleging

9 that the money was being used in connection to drug
10 transactions, the San Bernardino District Attorney's
11 Office filed civil forfeiture proceedings and a
12 California Superior Court granted the application and
13 ordered that the money be forfeited to the State, in part
14 based on Plaintiffs' signed disclaimers.

(TAC ¶¶ 21-23.)

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16 B.

Procedural Background

17

On February 11, 2015, Plaintiffs filed their initial

18 complaint which was repeatedly amended by stipulations to
19 dismiss all defendants except Defendant San Bernardino
20 County and all claims except the Monell liability claim.
21 (Doc. Nos. 30, 40, 46, 47, 49.)

On August 3, 2015,

22 Plaintiffs filed a motion for summary judgment and
23 Defendant filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings.
24 (Doc. Nos. 50 & 52.)
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II. LEGAL STANDARD
The standard for assessing a Rule 12(c) motion for

3 judgment on the pleadings is the same as the standard for
4 a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss.

Enron Oil Trading &

5 Trans. Co. v. Walbrook Ins. Co., Ltd., 132 F.3d 526, 529
6 (9th Cir. 1997).

In considering a motion for judgment on

7 the pleadings, a court must accept as true all material
8 allegations in the complaint and must construe those
9 allegations in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.
10

Pillsbury, Madison & Sutro v. Lerner, 31 F.3d 924, 928

11 (9th Cir. 1994).

A court should grant a motion for

12 judgment on the pleadings only when the moving party is
13 entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

Fajardo v.

14 County of Los Angeles, 179 F.3d 698, 699 (9th Cir. 1999).
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III. DISCUSSION

17

Plaintiffs' complaint alleges that Defendant County

18 of San Bernardino is liable under section 1983 because it
19 failed to afford Plaintiffs with the "opportunity to
20 contest the forfeiture of the currency" and that its
21 policies and customs were the reason for the violation
22 and injury.

Defendant argues that Plaintiffs' claim

23 fails because the San Bernardino District Attorney was
24 acting as a state official when conducting the forfeiture
25 proceeding.

(Mot. at 6.)

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To state a claim under section 1983, a plaintiff must

2 allege (1) a violation of a right secured by the
3 Constitution or laws of the United States, and (2) that
4 the alleged violation was committed by a person acting
5 under the color of state law.
6 42, 48 (1988).

West v. Atkins, 487 U.S.

A state actor is not a "person" for

7 purposes of liability under section 1983.

Will v.

8 Michigan Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 66 (1989)
9 ("We hold that neither a State nor its officials acting
10 in their official capacities are 'persons' under §
11 1983."); Howlett v. Rose, 496 U.S. 356, 365 (1990)
12 ("Persons" does not include 'the State and arms of the
13 State ... ' which receive sovereign immunity from the
14 Eleventh Amendment.").
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16 A.

Was the District Attorney a State Actor?

17

Defendant argues that Plaintiffs have provided no

18 authority standing for the proposition that a county can
19 be held liable for the conduct of a district attorney,
20 when that district attorney is acting as a state
21 official.

(Reply at 2.)

This is not true.

While there

22 is no bright line rule on this issue, Plaintiffs have
23 cited a number of cases that are instructive.
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In McMillian, the Supreme Court describes the

26 analysis used to determine whether a policymaker acts on
27 behalf of the state or local government.
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McMillian v.

1 Monroe Cnty., 520 U.S. 781.

The Court was clear that the

2 inquiry is not undertaken in a "categorical, 'all or
3 nothing' manner," but rather that the "cases on the
4 liability of local governments under section 1983
5 instruct us to ask whether governmental officials are
6 final policymakers for the local government in a
7 particular area, or on a particular issue."

Id. at 785.

8 The "inquiry is dependent on an analysis of state law."
9 Id. at 786.
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Here, based on an analysis of relevant California

12 law, the Court concludes that the San Bernardino District
13 Attorney acts as local policymaker when adopting and
14 implementing policies and procedures related to civil
15 forfeiture of personal property.

In Pitts v. Cnty. of

16 Kern, 17 Cal. 4th 340, 363 (1998), the California Supreme
17 Court concluded that a "district attorney represents the
18 state, not the county, when preparing to prosecute and
19 when prosecuting crimes, and when establishing policy and
20 training employees in these areas."

The Pitts court

21 noted that it was "not seeking to make a characterization
22 of [California district attorneys] that will hold true
23 for every type of official activity they engage in," but
24 instead focused on the district attorney's function "when
25 preparing to prosecute and when prosecuting criminal
26 violations of state law."

Id. at 352.

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The San Bernardino District Attorney's function at

2 issue here is distinguishable from that

confronted in

3 Pitts. Here, Plaintiffs challenge the District Attorney's
4 failure to provide proper notice upon forfeiture of
5 personal property.

(Opp. at 13.)

The conduct at issue

6 involves not prosecutorial strategy, but rather
7 administrative oversight of civil forfeiture proceedings.
8 The decision in Weiner v. San Diego County, 210 F.3d 1025
9 (9th Cir. 2000) is of no avail to Defendant either.

In

10 Weiner, the Ninth Circuit held that a "district attorney
11 act[s] on behalf of the state, not the county, in
12 deciding to prosecute" a person for a crime, but
13 acknowledged that "this is not to say that district
14 attorneys in California are state officers for all
15 purposes.

Id. at 1032. To the contrary, California law

16 suggests that a "district attorney is a county officer
17 for some purposes."

Id. at 1031.

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In Goldstein v. City of Long Beach, 715 F.3d 750, 751

20 (9th Cir. 2013), the Ninth Circuit found that California
21 district attorneys act as local policymakers when
22 adopting and implementing internal policies and
23 procedures related to the use of jailhouse informants.
24 Under the court's analysis in Goldstein, other provisions
25 indicating that the San Bernardino District Attorney here
26 acts on behalf of the county include the following:
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District attorney is paid "out of the county

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treasury," Cal. Gov. Code § 28000, and the board

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of supervisors "shall prescribe the

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compensation" of the district attorney, Cal.

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Gov. Code § 25300.

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Necessary expenses incurred "in the prosecution

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of criminal cases" are "county charges," and the

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district attorney must "account for all money

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received by him in his official capacity and pay

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it over to the treasurer" of the county board of

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supervisors.

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Cal. Gov. Code § 29601.

The district attorney shall render legal

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services to the county without fee," Cal. Gov.

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Code § 26520; is the "legal adviser" for the

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county if there is no county counsel, Cal. Gov.

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Code § 26526; cannot "in any way advocate"

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against the county, Cal. Gov. Code § 26527; and

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may defend the county against the State of

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California in a state eminent domain proceeding,

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Cal. Gov. Code § 26541.

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Counties are required to defend and indemnify

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the district attorney in an action for damages.

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Cal. Gov. Code §§ 815.2, 825.

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obligation to defend and indemnify the district

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attorney in an action for damages is a "crucial

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factor [that] weighs heavily[.]" Streit v. Cnty.

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of Los Angeles, 236 F.3d 552, 562 (9th Cir.

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2001).

The county's

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Read as a whole, these authorities reveal that

11 although a district attorney acts on behalf of the state
12 when conducting prosecutions that is not the case where
13 he or she is carrying out administrative policies such as
14 those here.

Accordingly, the Court finds that the San

15 Bernardino District Attorney was acting as a local
16 government official when conducting the forfeiture
17 proceeding.
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B.

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Section 1983 applies to the actions of "persons"

Municipality Liability

21 acting under color of state law.

West, 487 U.S. at 48.

22 A local governmental unit or municipality can be sued as
23 a "person" under section 1983.

Here, the San Bernardino

24 County District Attorney is a "sub-unit" of the County of
25 San Bernardino, which is the proper defendant because
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1 that is the governmental entity considered to be "person"
2 under section 1983.1

See Monell v. Department of Social

3 Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978).
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In Monell, the Supreme Court held that "a

6 municipality can be found liable under § 1983 only where
7 the municipality itself causes the constitutional
8 violation at issue.

Monell, 436 U.S. at 694.

A section

9 1983 plaintiff may establish municipal liability in one
10 of three ways.

First, the plaintiff may prove that a

11 city employee committed the alleged constitutional
12 violation pursuant to a formal governmental policy or a
13 "longstanding practice or custom which constitutes the
14 'standard operating procedure' of the local governmental
15 entity."

Second, the plaintiff may establish that the

16 individual who committed the constitutional tort was an
17 official with "final policy-making authority" and that
18 the challenged action itself thus constituted an act of
19 official governmental policy.

Third, the plaintiff may

20 prove that an official with final policy-making authority
21 ratified a subordinate's unconstitutional decision or
22 action and the basis for it.

Gillette v. Delmore, 979

23 F.2d 1342, 1346-47 (9th Cir. 1992).
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Municipal departments and bureaus are generally not
27 considered “persons” within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. §
28 1983. Hervey v. Estes, 65 F.3d 784, 791 (9th Cir. 1995).
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1

Here, Defendant argues that Plaintiffs have failed to

2 plead a sufficient factual basis for Monell liability
3 because their claims are all conclusory, have not
4 identified specific unconstitutional practices or
5 policies, and have not identified an incident, other than
6 the current one, as a source of liability.

(Mot. at 8.)

7 Plaintiffs argue their complaint factually alleged a
8 clear constitutional violation - Defendant's failure to
9 serve Plaintiffs with notice of the civil forfeiture
10 proceedings.

(Opp. at 14; TAC ¶¶47-48.)

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To survive a motion to dismiss or judgment on the

13 pleadings, Plaintiffs must allege "enough facts to state
14 a claim to relief that is plausible on its face" and
15 "asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant
16 has acted unlawfully."

Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550

17 U.S. 544, 570; Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677
18 (2009).

Plaintiffs allege only this incident in support

19 of their claim; however, Monell liability may not be
20 based on a single incident of unconstitutional action by
21 a non-policymaking employee.

Davis v. City of

22 Ellensberg, 869 F.2d 1230, 1233 (9th Cir. 1989).
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Plaintiffs' complaint does not allege more than mere

25 legal conclusions and a formulaic recitation of the
26 elements.

The Fourth Cause of Action in the Third

27 Amended Complaint alleges that the County of San
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1 Bernardino engaged in an unconstitutional act without
2 identifying a formal governmental policy, longstanding
3 practice, or custom as Monell requires.

(TAC ¶¶ 47-48.)

4 Moreover, Plaintiffs do not allege that a "final policy5 making authority" committed or ratified the
6 unconstitutional act as a part of an official government
7 policy.

Hence, Plaintiffs have failed to state a claim

8 for Monell liability under the pleading standards of
9 Twombly and Iqbal.
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11 C.

Leave to Amend

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Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a) provides that a

13 Court "should freely give leave [to amend] when justice
14 so requires."

Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2).

Although

15 liberally granted, leave to amend is not automatic.
16 Jackson v. Bank of Hawaii, 902 F.2d 1385, 1387 (9th Cir.
17 1990).

The Ninth Circuit considers a motion for leave to

18 amend under five factors: bad faith, undue delay,
19 prejudice to the opposing party, futility of amendment,
20 and whether plaintiff has already amended the complaint.
21 In re W. States Wholesale Natural Gas Antitrust Litig.,
22 715 F.3d 716, 738 (9th Cir. 2013) (quoting Allen v. City
23 of Beverly Hills, 911 F.2d 367, 373 (9th Cir.1990)).
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Plaintiffs do not seek leave to amend in bad faith;

26 nevertheless, allowing leave to amend would cause undue
27 delay.

This is not a complex case, yet Plaintiffs have

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1 added claims and dismissed defendants by amending their
2 complaint through stipulation three times already.
3 Doc. Nos. 30, 40, 46.)

(See

The deadline to amend the

4 pleadings was June 29, 2015.

(Doc. No. 32.)

At the

5 motion hearing, Plaintiffs' counsel said he needed to do
6 more research in order to state a Monell claim against
7 Defendant, but failed to describe any additional facts
8 that could support such a claim.

Moreover, the complaint

9 was filed on February 11, 2015, over six months ago, has
10 been amended three times, and no explanation offered as
11 to why such research has not already been undertaken.
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Allowing Plaintiffs to amend the complaint would be

14 futile.

First, Plaintiffs have not been able to state a

15 claim having three chances to do so.

Second, Plaintiffs'

16 motion for summary judgment as to their single Monell
17 claim fails to identify specific unconstitutional
18 practices or policies as required by Monell.
19 Part III.B.

See supra

When questioned about the lack of facts

20 giving rise to Monell liability at the motion hearing,
21 Plaintiffs were not able to articulate an incident, other
22 than the current one, as a source of liability.

Giving

23 Plaintiffs more time to research alternative sources of
24 liability would be futile since Monell is the only way to
25 bring a constitutional claim against a municipality.
26 Monell, 436 U.S. at 694.
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Finally, while Defendant has not shown prejudice, the

2 strong showing of the other factors warrants granting the
3 motion for judgment on the pleadings without leave to
4 amend.

See Eminence Capital, LLC v. Aspeon, Inc., 316

5 F.3d 1048, 1052 (9th Cir. 2003).
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IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS

9 Defendant's motion for judgment on the pleadings without
10 leave to amend and renders Plaintiffs' motion for summary
11 judgment MOOT.
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13 Dated: September 3, 2015
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VIRGINIA A. PHILLIPS
United States District Judge

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