Ronald Collins v. City of Colton, et al.

Filing 51

MINUTES (IN CHAMBERS) - DEFENDANT SCOTT CHADWICK'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ( 37 , filed February 24, 2017); DEFENDANTS CITY OF COLTON AND JACK MORENBERG'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ( 38 , filed February 24, 2017) by Judge Christina A. Snyder. In accordance with the foregoing, the Court GRANTS defendants' motions for summary judgment. IT IS SO ORDERED. MD JS-6. Case Terminated. (lom)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

Case No. 
Title 

CIVIL MINUTES – GENERAL
JS-6
5:15-cv-01771-CAS(KKx);
Date April 5, 2017
c/w 5:15-cv-02470-CAS(KKx)
RONALD J. COLLINS v. CITY OF COLTON; ET AL.

‘O’

Present: The Honorable 

CHRISTINA A. SNYDER 

Attorneys Present for Plaintiffs: 

N/A 

Tape No.

Attorneys Present for Defendants: 

Not Present 

Not Present

Catherine Jeang 
Deputy Clerk 

Proceedings:  

Not Present 
Court Reporter / Recorder

(IN CHAMBER) - DEFENDANT SCOTT CHADWICK’S
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT (Dkt. 37, filed February
24, 2017)
DEFENDANTS CITY OF COLTON AND JACK MORENBERG’S
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT (Dkt. 38, filed February
24, 2017)

I.

INTRODUCTION

On February 10, 2015, plaintiff Ronald J. Collins filed an action in San Bernardino
Superior Court against defendants City of Colton (the “City”) and Jack Morenberg
(collectively, the “City defendants”). Dkt. 1-1. On June 9, 2015, plaintiff filed a first
amended complaint in Superior Court. Dkt 1-9 (“FAC”). In the FAC, Collins asserted
three claims for relief: (1) conversion; (2) intentional infliction of emotional distress; and
(3) unreasonable seizure in violation the Fourth Amendment, pursuant to 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983. Id. On August 31, 2015, the City defendants removed the action to this Court.
Dkt. 1.
On October 19, 2015, the Court dismissed without prejudice plaintiff’s Section
1983 claim against the City and Collins’ conversion claim against both City defendants.
Dkt. 17. On December 29, 2015, the Court entered an order, pursuant to the stipulation
of Collins and the City defendants to dismiss the claim for conversion in its entirety, and
the Section 1983 claim as against the City. Dkt. 25.

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

Case No. 
Title 

CIVIL MINUTES – GENERAL
JS-6
5:15-cv-01771-CAS(KKx);
Date April 5, 2017
c/w 5:15-cv-02470-CAS(KKx)
RONALD J. COLLINS v. CITY OF COLTON; ET AL.

‘O’

On October 8, 2015, Collins filed a second action in San Bernardino County
Superior Court against the City defendants and Scott Chadwick, owner of the automobile
dealership. Collins v. City of Colton et al., Case No. 5:15-cv-02470-CAS-KK (“Second
Action”), dkt. 1-4, Ex. A (“Second Action Compl.”). Collins asserted two claims the
City defendants and Chadwick: (1) unreasonable seizure in violation the Fourth
Amendment, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983; and (2) malicious prosecution. Id. On
December 3, 2015, this case was removed to this Court. Second Action dkt. 1. On
December 15, 2015, pursuant to Collins’ request, the Court dismissed plaintiff’s Section
1983 claim as against Chadwick. Second Action dkt. 13.
On February 11, 2016, pursuant to the stipulation of all of the parties, the Court
consolidated Collins’ two actions. Dkt. 28. The following claims remain at issue in the
consolidated case: (1) unreasonable seizure, pursuant to Section 1983, as against the City
defendants; (2) malicious prosecution as against all defendants; and (3) intentional
infliction of emotional distress as against the City defendants.
On February 24, 2017, Chadwick filed a motion for summary judgment on Collins’
claim of malicious prosecution. Dkt. 37 (“Chadwick MSJ”). On the same day, the City
defendants filed a motion for summary judgment or summary adjudication of the claims
against them. Dkt. 38 (“City MSJ”). On March 3, 2017, Collins filed his oppositions to
defendants’ motions. Dkts. 40 (“Opp’n to Chadwick”), 41 (“Opp’n to City”). The City
defendants and Chadwick filed replies in support of their respective motions on March
13, 2017.1
Having carefully considered the parties’ arguments, the Court finds and concludes
as follows.

1

On March 13, 2017, the City defendants objected to the evidence Collins
submitted in large part because the depositions that Collins introduced lacked cover pages
and reporters’ certificates, and therefore lacked foundation and authentication. Dkt. 43.
On March 14, 2017, Collins filed a supplemental declaration including the appropriate
cover pages and reporters’ certificates for the relevant depositions. Dkts. 46, 47. Even
considering the evidence submitted by Collins, the Court finds in favor of defendants.
Therefore, the Court declines to exclude the material submitted by Collins.

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

Case No. 
Title 

CIVIL MINUTES – GENERAL
JS-6
5:15-cv-01771-CAS(KKx);
Date April 5, 2017
c/w 5:15-cv-02470-CAS(KKx)
RONALD J. COLLINS v. CITY OF COLTON; ET AL.

‘O’

II.

BACKGROUND
The following facts are not disputed.

On April 8, 2013, plaintiff purchased a truck from Chadwick Auto Wholesale,
which is owned by Chadwick.2 At the time of purchase, plaintiff signed, under penalty of
perjury, a California Department of Motor Vehicles Statement of Facts attesting that the
purchase of the truck constituted “an out of state sale” and that “NO sales tax or license
fees were collected at time of sale.”3 Because the sale of the truck was completed as an
out-of-state sale, Chadwick directed Hector Flores, an employee, to remove the truck’s
license plates before the truck was turned over to plaintiff.4
On May 31, 2013, Collins filed an action against Chadwick in Alabama alleging
that Chadwick had sold Collins a defective truck.5 The Circuit Court of Mobile County
dismissed Collins’ complaint for failure to state a claim on which relief can be granted.6
While the Alabama case was pending, Daniel Ruiz—Collins’ neighbor at a
Howard Johnson Hotel in Norco (“Norco hotel”), California—called Chadwick and
stated that Collins had asked Ruiz’s daughter to write a statement on Collins’ behalf
stating that the truck plaintiff purchased from Chadwick did not run properly.7 Ruiz also

2

Dkt 37-1, Chadwick’s Statement of Uncontroverted Facts (“Chadwick’s SUF”) at
no. 1; dkt. 40-1, Plaintiff’s Statement of Genuine Disputes of Material Fact (“Collins’
Facts in Opp’n to Chadwick”) at no. 13.
3
Collins’ Facts in Opp’n to Chadwick at no. 17; dkt. 40-2, Ex. 14.
4
Chadwick’s SUF at no. 4; Dkt 37-3, Declaration of Hector Flores ¶¶ 4–6
(testifying that Chadwick and the financial manager asked Flores to remove the license
plates from the truck).
5
Dkt 37-4, Ex. G (complaint filed in the Circuit Court for Mobile County, AL).
6
Dkt 37-4, Ex. H (dismissal of the Alabama complaint).
7
Dkt 37-3, Declaration of Scott Chadwick (“Chadwick Decl.”) ¶ 14; dkt. 37-5, Ex
M Deposition of Daniel Ruiz (“Ruiz Depo.”) at 7:6–24;13:13–14:15 (testifying that Ruiz
called Chadwick’s dealership and told Chadwick that Collins had asked Ruiz to sign a
statement saying that the truck had been broken down).

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

Case No. 
Title 

CIVIL MINUTES – GENERAL
JS-6
5:15-cv-01771-CAS(KKx);
Date April 5, 2017
c/w 5:15-cv-02470-CAS(KKx)
RONALD J. COLLINS v. CITY OF COLTON; ET AL.

‘O’

stated that Collins asked Ruiz to lie about the condition of the truck and promised Ruiz
money, the truck, and a trip to Hawaii.8
In or about July 2013, Gary Boyd—the prior owner of the truck in question—
called Chadwick and told him that Collins had contacted Boyd because Collins was upset
that the truck had broken down.9 After the conversation, Boyd sent Chadwick a letter
stating that the truck was in good working condition when Boyd sold the truck to
Chadwick.10
In or about September 2013, Ruiz called Chadwick and stated that Collins
continued to stay at the Norco hotel and had been driving the truck in question daily, with
license plates.11 At Chadwick’s request, Ruiz sent Chadwick a photograph of the truck.12
Chadwick confirmed that the license plates matched those that he had directed Flores to
remove on April 8, 2013.13
On or about September 11, 2013, Colton Police Officer Samuel Smith was
dispatched to Chadwick Auto Wholesale regarding a report of stolen license plates.14
When he arrived at Chadwick Auto Wholesale, Smith spoke with Chadwick, who
reported that that someone had stolen license plates from his business on or about April 8,
2013.15 Chadwick told Smith that he sold a Chevrolet truck to plaintiff on April 8, 2013,
and that the transaction constituted an out-of-state sale that required Chadwick to return

8

Chadwick Decl. ¶ 14; Ruiz Depo. at 19:1–24; 68:23–69:24.
Chadwick Decl. ¶ 15; dkt. 37-5, Ex P, Deposition of Gary Boyd (“Boyd Depo.”)
at 8:8–24 (testifying the he called Chadwick to tell him that Collins called Boyd to say
that the truck had broken down).
10
Chadwick Decl. ¶ 15; Boyd Depo. at 10:25–11:21 (testifying that he sent
Chadwick a letter); dkt. 37-4, Ex I (July 10, 2013 letter from Boyd to Chadwick).
11
Chadwick Decl. ¶¶ 17, 18; Ruiz Depo. at 22:3–21.
12
Chadwick Decl. ¶ 18.
13
Id.; dkt. 27-4, Ex. J.
14
Dkt. 38-1, City Defendants’ Statement of Uncontroverted Facts (“City SUF”) at
no. 1; dkt. 38-2, Ex. A, Deposition of Samuel Smith (“Smith Depo.”) at 5:24–6:5.
15
City SUF at no. 2; Smith Depo. at 5:21–22, 6:21–24; dkt. 38-2, Ex. B (“Theft
Report”).
9

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

Case No. 
Title 

CIVIL MINUTES – GENERAL
JS-6
5:15-cv-01771-CAS(KKx);
Date April 5, 2017
c/w 5:15-cv-02470-CAS(KKx)
RONALD J. COLLINS v. CITY OF COLTON; ET AL.

‘O’

the license plates to the state.16 Chadwick also stated that he received an anonymous call
on September 10, 2013 from a man who stated that the truck was at the Norco hotel.17
On September 23, 2013, Chadwick encountered Colton City Detective Morenberg
at a business that they both frequented.18 Chadwick told Morenberg that Chadwick had
additional information about an incident at Chadwick’s business.19 Later, Morenberg met
Chadwick at his business and Chadwick recounted the April 8, 2013 transaction with
Collins.20 Chadwick showed Morenberg a signed DMV Statement of Fact, the letter from
Boyd, and a letter from Ruiz.21 Chadwick also reported and described the phone calls
from Boyd and Ruiz.22 The signed DMV statement that Morenberg was shown included
typed text providing: “Customer demand title, out of state sale. No Sales tax or license
fees were collected at time of Sale” and a handwritten statement providing: “Customer
took on flatbed to AL. Window sticker was shredded in error. Customer will register +
title in AL. No CA record for this transaction is needed.”23 However, Chadwick later
testified that there was a second copy of the signed statement without the handwritten
terms, leading Chadwick to believe the statement was “signed and then filled out later.”24
Chadwick told Morenberg that Chadwick had asked an employee to remove the license
plates from the truck.25 Chadwick did not seek out the employee, Flores, to confirm that
Chadwick had asked Flores to remove the plates.26 Chadwick reported to Morenberg that
he had noticed the license plates were missing the day after the sale to plaintiff, but

16

Theft Report.
Id.; City SUF at no. 5.
18
City SUF at no. 8; Collins’ Facts in Opp’n to Chadwick at no. 36; dkt. 41-1,
Plaintiff’s Statement of Genuine Disputes of Material Fact (“Collins’ Facts in Opp’n to
City”) at no. 53.
19
City SUF at no 9; Collins’ Facts in Opp’n to City at no. 55; dkt. 28-2, Ex. E,
Deposition of Jack Morenberg (“City’s Morenberg Depo.”) at 14:7–11.
20
City SUF at no. 11; Collins’ Facts in Opp’n to City at nos. 56–57.
21
City’s Morenberg Depo. at 14:22–15:8; Collins’ Facts in Opp’n to City at no. 60.
22
City SUF at no. 17; Dkt 38-2, Ex D (“Morenberg Crime Report”); Dkt 38-5.
23
Dkt 38-5, Declaration of Jack Morenberg (“Morenberg Decl.”) ¶ 5.
24
Dkt. 37-6, Transcript of Preliminary Hearing at 32:3–33:7.
25
City’s Morenberg Depo. at 20:5–10; Collins’ Facts in Opp’n to City at no. 61.
26
City’s Morenberg Depo. at 20:11–13; Collins’ Facts in Opp’n to City at no. 62.
17

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

Case No. 
Title 

CIVIL MINUTES – GENERAL
JS-6
5:15-cv-01771-CAS(KKx);
Date April 5, 2017
c/w 5:15-cv-02470-CAS(KKx)
RONALD J. COLLINS v. CITY OF COLTON; ET AL.

‘O’

Chadwick assumed that his employees had processed the return of the plates to the
DMV.27 Chadwick also told Morenberg that plaintiff had filed suit against Chadwick.28
On October 2, 2013, Morenberg drove over to the Norco Hotel and observed a
truck matching the description of the vehicle purchased by Collins.29 The truck had the
same license plate number as the plates that had been removed at the time of sale.30
Morenberg impounded the truck, removed the license plates, and placed the plates into
evidence.31 Morenberg then knocked on Collins’ door and interviewed him.32 Collins
stated that there were materials in the truck which he intended to use in a future lawsuit
contemplated against Chadwick.33 Morenberg denied Collins’ request to remove his
paperwork from the backseat of the truck.34 Collins asserted several times that the plates
were on the vehicle when he purchased it.35 Collins called the paramedics after
Morenberg left the hotel.36
On October 10, 2013, Morenberg authored a police report.37 Morenberg reported
that he interviewed Boyd and Ruiz.38 Ruiz confirmed that plaintiff had offered money or
trips to Ruiz in exchange for Ruiz’s assistance in writing letters that the truck was

27

Morenberg Crime Report; Morenberg Decl. ¶ 7.
Dkt. 41-2, Deposition of Jack Morenberg (“Plaintiff’s Morenberg Depo.”) at
29:5–12.
29
Morenberg Crime Report; Collins’ Facts in Opp’n to City no. 38.
30
City SUF at 21; City’s Morenberg Depo. at 36:2–5;
31
Morenberg Crime Report; Collins’ Facts in Opp’n to City at no. 40.
32
Morenberg Crime Report; City SUF at no. 23; Collins’ Facts in Opp’n to City at
no. 40.
33
Dkt. 38-2, Ex. F (“Transcript of Morenberg’s Belt Recording”) at 3:20–25; 5:9–
24; 8:3–7.
34
Id. at 9:17–10:3.
35
Id. at 4:21–23; 6:9–7:1; 13:7–25; 15:24–16:1; 21:3–7; 24:15–18; 27:16–24.
36
Transcript of Preliminary Hearing at 70:3–4.
37
Morenberg Crime Report; Collins’ Facts in Opp’n to City at no. 44.
38
Morenberg Crime Report; City SUF at no. 27
28

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

Case No. 
Title 

CIVIL MINUTES – GENERAL
JS-6
5:15-cv-01771-CAS(KKx);
Date April 5, 2017
c/w 5:15-cv-02470-CAS(KKx)
RONALD J. COLLINS v. CITY OF COLTON; ET AL.

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defective.39 Although Morenberg reported that he contacted Boyd by phone, during
Boyd’s deposition, Boyd could not recall any police officer or detective speaking to him
about the truck or the surrounding circumstances.40
Morenberg concluded that the report should be referred to the District Attorney’s
office for review for possible filing of criminal charges.41 Morenberg subsequently
submitted the case to the San Bernardino District Attorney’s Office for evaluation and the
possible filing of criminal charges.42
On October 13, 2013, Lieutenant Jim Joliff received a letter from Rene Korper,
Collins’ counsel.43 In the letter, Korper asserted that: (1) Morenberg’s allegation, at the
time he impounded the truck, that plaintiff attempted to bribe a witness to the prospective
lawsuit between Collins and Chadwick was false; (2) there was no justification for
impounding the truck; (3) there was no probable cause to believe the vehicle was or
contained evidence of a crime; (4) Collins suffered severe seizures as a result of the
emotional distress caused by the impounding of his vehicle.44 Korper requested the
return of Collins’ vehicle.45 Joliff spoke by telephone with Korper that same day and
requested that Korper’s client complete a citizen complaint form if he desired to initiate a
formal internal investigation.46 Joliff faxed the “Citizen Complaint Form” to Korper,
along with a document setting forth the Colton Police Department’s procedure for
reporting police misconduct and a form requiring the complainant to attest that he knows

39

Morenberg Crime Report; see also Ruiz Depo. at 66:17–69:24 (testifying that
plaintiff asked Ruiz to lie about the condition of the truck in order to assist in plaintiff’s
lawsuit against Chadwick, in exchange for money).
40
41-2 Ex. BE, Deposition of Gary Boyd at 12:12–14:11.
41
Morenberg Crime Report.
42
City SUF at 30.
43
City SUF at no. 32; dkt 41-2 Ex. BD, Deposition of Jim Joliff 10:19–11:1; dkt
41-2 Ex. 35 (“Korper Letter”); dkt. 38-6 Declaration of Jim Joliff (“Joliff Decl.”) ¶ 6.
44
Korper Letter.
45
Id.
46
Joliff Decl. ¶ 7.

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

Case No. 
Title 

CIVIL MINUTES – GENERAL
JS-6
5:15-cv-01771-CAS(KKx);
Date April 5, 2017
c/w 5:15-cv-02470-CAS(KKx)
RONALD J. COLLINS v. CITY OF COLTON; ET AL.

‘O’

that “[i]t is against the law to make a complaint that you know to be false.”47 Joliff never
received a completed complaint form from plaintiff or his counsel.48
On or about October 22, 2013, Morenberg asked Chadwick for any additional
documentation related to the case.49 Chadwick provided signed sales documents and
attorney correspondence related to the Alabama litigation, and identified the employee
who filled out the DMV Statement of Facts.50 Morenberg provided this information to
the District Attorney’s office in a supplemental report.51
On or about November 6, 2013, the San Bernardino County District Attorney’s
office filed a felony complaint against plaintiff in San Bernardino Superior Court.52 The
complaint alleged that plaintiff had committed perjury, second degree commercial
burglary, and bribery of a witness.53
On August, 13, 2014, the San Bernardino County Superior Court held a
preliminary hearing on the criminal charges against Collins.54 During the hearing,
plaintiff’s counsel elicited testimony tending to undermine the prosecution’s case against
plaintiff. For example:

47

41-2 Ex. 36 (Joliff’s fax); 38-2, Ex. I (same)
Joliff Decl. ¶ 9.
49
Morenberg Decl. ¶ 21.
50
Id.
51
Id.
52
Dkt. 38-2 Ex. 1. The City defendants request that the Court take judicial notice
of the felony complaint and the first amended felony complaint filed in San Bernardino
Superior Court. See dkt 38-3. The Court GRANTS these requests because the
documents are in the public record and their existence is “capable of accurate and ready
determination by resort to sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned.”
Fed. R. Evid. 201(b).
53
Id.
54
City SUF at no. 39; Collins’ Facts in Opp’n to City at no. 47; see Transcript of
Preliminary Hearing.
48

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

Case No. 
Title 

CIVIL MINUTES – GENERAL
JS-6
5:15-cv-01771-CAS(KKx);
Date April 5, 2017
c/w 5:15-cv-02470-CAS(KKx)
RONALD J. COLLINS v. CITY OF COLTON; ET AL.

‘O’

 Chadwick testified that he did not look at the DMV Statement of Facts before
plaintiff signed it and that he believed the handwritten portion of the Statement
was filled out after plaintiff signed the document.55
 Chadwick testified that the handwritten portion the DMV Statement of Facts
providing “Window sticker was shredded in error” was incorrect; the stickers
were not shredded.56
 Chadwick testified at the hearing that he saw the license plates after they were
removed, and told Morenberg as much.57 However, Morenberg testified that
Chadwick’s assertion that he saw the plates after they were removed was
inconsistent with the Chadwick’s September 2013 statement to Morenberg.58
 Morenberg testified that, before speaking with Chadwick about this incident,
Morenberg and Chadwick knew one another because they participated in a
common hobby.59
 Collins’ counsel elicited testimony from Morenberg demonstrating
inconsistencies in what Collins offered to Ruiz in exchange for his assistance in
Collins’ lawsuit against Chadwick.60
On the evidence presented at the preliminary hearing, the Superior Court
concluded that “[i]t does appear . . . that the offenses alleged in the complaint have been
committed and that sufficient cause exists to believe the defendant committed those
offenses.”61 The Superior Court therefore ordered Collins “to be held to answer for the
offenses as charged in the complaint and any other offenses that as are shown from the
evidence.”62 Also on August 13, 2014, after the preliminary hearing, the District

55

Transcript of Preliminary Hearing at 31:26–33:3.
Id. at 35:4–16.
57
Id. at 31:4–15.
58
Id. at 55:12–56:3.
59
Id. at 58:5–19.
60
Id. at 61:13–64:18.
61
Id. at 81:2–5.
62
Id. at 81:5–7.
56

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

Case No. 
Title 

CIVIL MINUTES – GENERAL
JS-6
5:15-cv-01771-CAS(KKx);
Date April 5, 2017
c/w 5:15-cv-02470-CAS(KKx)
RONALD J. COLLINS v. CITY OF COLTON; ET AL.

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Attorney’s office filed an amended complaint adding the allegation that Collins obtained
money, labor, or property by false pretenses.63 The charges against Collins were
subsequently dismissed before trial.
III.

LEGAL STANDARD

Summary judgment is appropriate where “there is no genuine dispute as to any
material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P.
56(a). The moving party bears the initial burden of identifying relevant portions of the
record that demonstrate the absence of a fact or facts necessary for one or more essential
elements of each claim upon which the moving party seeks judgment. See Celotex Corp.
v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986).
If the moving party meets its initial burden, the opposing party must then set out
specific facts showing a genuine issue for trial in order to defeat the motion. Anderson v.
Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250 (1986); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c), (e). The
nonmoving party must not simply rely on the pleadings and must do more than make
“conclusory allegations [in] an affidavit.” Lujan v. Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n, 497 U.S. 871,
888 (1990); see also Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324. Summary judgment must be granted for
the moving party if the nonmoving party “fails to make a showing sufficient to establish
the existence of an element essential to that party’s case, and on which that party will
bear the burden of proof at trial.” Id. at 322; see also Abromson v. Am. Pac. Corp., 114
F.3d 898, 902 (9th Cir. 1997).
In light of the facts presented by the nonmoving party, along with any undisputed
facts, the Court must decide whether the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter
of law. See T.W. Elec. Serv., Inc. v. Pac. Elec. Contractors Ass’n, 809 F.2d 626, 631 &
n.3 (9th Cir. 1987). When deciding a motion for summary judgment, “the inferences to
be drawn from the underlying facts . . . must be viewed in the light most favorable to the
party opposing the motion.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S.
574, 587 (1986) (citation omitted); Valley Nat’l Bank of Ariz. v. A.E. Rouse & Co., 121
F.3d 1332, 1335 (9th Cir. 1997). Summary judgment for the moving party is proper
when a rational trier of fact would not be able to find for the nonmoving party on the
claims at issue. See Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587.

63

City SUF at 46; dkt. 38-2 Ex. 3.

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

Case No. 
Title 

CIVIL MINUTES – GENERAL
JS-6
5:15-cv-01771-CAS(KKx);
Date April 5, 2017
c/w 5:15-cv-02470-CAS(KKx)
RONALD J. COLLINS v. CITY OF COLTON; ET AL.

‘O’

IV.

DISCUSSION
A.

Unreasonable Seizure

Plaintiff brings a Section 1983 claim against the City defendants for the alleged
violation of his Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable seizure. The basis
for Collins’ Section 1983 claim is Collins’ allegation that Morenberg intentionally and
wrongfully seized Collins’ truck (and the documents within it) in violation of the Fourth
and Fourteenth Amendments. FAC ¶¶ 95–96; Second Action Compl. ¶¶ 46, 49. Section
1983 provides for a cause of action against a person who, acting under color of state law,
deprives another of rights guaranteed under the U.S. Constitution. 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
“To prove a case under section 1983, the plaintiff must demonstrate that (1) the action
occurred ‘under color of state law’ and (2) the action resulted in the deprivation of a
constitutional right or federal statutory right.” Jones v. Williams, 297 F.3d 930, 934 (9th
Cir. 2002).
California law permits a peace officer to impound a vehicle without a warrant
when there is probable cause to believe the vehicle is or contains evidence tending to
show that a crime has been committed. Cal. Veh. Code § 22655.5(b). Furthermore,
under the Fourth Amendment, “the police may seize a car from a public place without a
warrant when they have probable cause to believe that the car itself is an instrument or
evidence of crime.” United States v. Cooper, 949 F.2d 737, 747 (5th Cir. 1991); see also
Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325, 330 (1990) (noting that a police officer could lawfully
seize evidence “which was in plain view and which the officer had probable cause to
believe was evidence of a crime”); United States v. Bagley, 772 F.2d 482, 491 (9th Cir.
1985) ( “[I]f the existence of probable cause alone justifies the warrantless search of a
vehicle parked in a public place, certainly a warrantless seizure of such a vehicle, based
only on probable cause, also falls within the automobile exception.”). Therefore, if
Morenberg had probable cause to seize Collins’ truck, Morenberg did not deprive Collins
of his Fourth Amendment rights.
“Probable cause does not require proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every
element of a crime. Rather, probable cause exists where under the totality of the
circumstances known to the officer, a prudent person would have concluded that there
was a fair probability that the suspect had committed or was committing a crime.” United
States v. Noster, 590 F.3d 624, 629–30 (9th Cir. 2009) (citation omitted); see also Florida

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

Case No. 
Title 

CIVIL MINUTES – GENERAL
JS-6
5:15-cv-01771-CAS(KKx);
Date April 5, 2017
c/w 5:15-cv-02470-CAS(KKx)
RONALD J. COLLINS v. CITY OF COLTON; ET AL.

‘O’

v. Harris, 133 S. Ct. 1050, 1055 (2013) (“The test for probable cause is not reducible to
precise definition or quantification. Finely tuned standards such as proof beyond a
reasonable doubt or by a preponderance of the evidence . . . have no place in the
[probable-cause] decision. All we have required is the kind of fair probability on which
reasonable and prudent [people,] not legal technicians, act.” (citation and quotation marks
omitted)).
1.

Morenberg

In support of its motion for summary judgment as to Collins’ Section 1983 claim
against Morenberg for unreasonable seizure, the City defendants make two arguments:
(1) Morenberg’s seizure of the truck was supported by probable cause; and
(2) Morenberg is shielded by qualified immunity. City MSJ at 10–13.
The City defendants contend that Morenberg had probable cause to impound
Collins’ truck because: (1) Chadwick made a theft report; (2) Chadwick provided
Morenberg with a DMV Statement of Facts indicating that Collins’ purchase of the truck
was an out-of-state sale, with no sales or license fees paid, and that the truck would be
taken to Alabama; (3) Chadwick told Morenberg that Chadwick had instructed his
employee to remove the license plates from the truck; and (4) Morenberg observed a
truck matching the description of the vehicle purchased by Collins at the Norco hotel.
City MSJ at 11.
Collins does not dispute these facts. Rather, Collins contends that Morenberg
“made up the very facts that he based his probable cause on . . . . Probable cause based on
known lies is not probable cause at all.” Opp’n to City at 8. Collins points to the
following evidence to support this assertion: (1) Morenberg had known Chadwick for 20
to 25 years;64 (2) Morenberg never spoke with Flores to confirm that Flores removed the
plates from the car; (3) Morenberg may have seen both versions of the DMV Statement
of Facts when Chadwick provided him with the documents relating to the sale to Collins;
(4) Chadwick never mentioned the two different versions of the DMV Statement of Facts
until confronted with it on cross-examination; (5) Morenberg stated that, when he spoke
to Boyd, Boyd said plaintiff offered him money to write a letter stating that the truck had

64

Plaintiff’s Morenberg Depo. at 8:44–7.

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

Case No. 
Title 

CIVIL MINUTES – GENERAL
JS-6
5:15-cv-01771-CAS(KKx);
Date April 5, 2017
c/w 5:15-cv-02470-CAS(KKx)
RONALD J. COLLINS v. CITY OF COLTON; ET AL.

‘O’

a bad engine;65 but Boyd testified at his deposition that he never spoke to a police officer
or detective about the circumstances.66
Even viewing the facts in the light most favorable to plaintiff, the Court concludes
that a rational trier of fact would not be able to find for plaintiff. Plaintiff does not
dispute any of the facts underlying Morenberg’s determination of probable cause. The
Court concludes, based on those undisputed facts, that “a prudent person would have
concluded that there was a fair probability that [plaintiff] had committed or was
committing a crime.” See Noster, 590 F.3d at 6230. In addition, plaintiff has not
provided sufficient evidence such that a rational trier of fact could conclude that
Morenberg and Chadwick fabricated the facts on which Morenberg based his finding of
probable cause. Accordingly, the Court GRANTS the City defendants’ motion for
summary judgment on Collins’ Section 1983 claim against Morenberg.67
2.

The City

Collins also asserts a claim against the City for violation of his Fourth Amendment
right to be free from unreasonable seizure. Second Action Compl. ¶ 50. Specifically,
Collins alleges that the City had a policy not to investigate the accuracy of its police
offers’ reports, even if made aware of an allegation that the report contained false
information. Id.
Local government entities may be sued directly under Section 1983 when their
policies or customs are the moving force behind a constitutional violation. Monell v.
Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978). To establish
liability for governmental entities under Monell, “a plaintiff must prove (1) that [he]
possessed a constitutional right of which [he] was deprived; (2) that the municipality had
a policy; (3) that this policy amounts to deliberate indifference to the plaintiff’s
constitutional right; and, (4) that the policy is the moving force behind the constitutional
violation.” Dougherty v. City of Covina, 654 F.3d 892, 900 (9th Cir. 2011) (quotation
marks omitted). “[E]vidence of inaction—specifically, failure to investigate and

65

Plaintiff’s Morenberg Depo. at 32:4–11.
Boyd Depo. at 12:12–14:11.
67
Having concluded that Morenberg’s seizure was supported by probable cause,
the Court need not decide whether Morenberg is entitled to qualified immunity with
respect to Collins’ Section 1983 claim.
66

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

Case No. 
Title 

CIVIL MINUTES – GENERAL
JS-6
5:15-cv-01771-CAS(KKx);
Date April 5, 2017
c/w 5:15-cv-02470-CAS(KKx)
RONALD J. COLLINS v. CITY OF COLTON; ET AL.

‘O’

discipline employees in the face of widespread constitutional violations—can support an
inference that an unconstitutional custom or practice has been unofficially adopted by a
municipality.” Hunter v. Cty. of Sacramento, 652 F.3d 1225, 1234 n.8 (9th Cir. 2011).
Because the Court has concluded that Morenberg had probable cause to seize
Collins’ truck, Collins was not deprived of his Fourth Amendment rights. In addition, the
Court finds that the City’s requirement that Collins complete a citizen complaint form to
trigger an investigation does not constitute a policy not to investigate. Indeed, Joliff did
not demonstrate inaction, rather he actively provided Collins’ counsel with a complaint
form and instructions on how to initiate a citizen complaint. Cf. Reyes v. City of
Glendale, No. 05-cv-0253-CAS-MAN, 2009 WL 2241602, at *19 (C.D. Cal. July 23,
2009) (“Plaintiff has also presented no authority for the proposition that a constitutional
right to an investigation was triggered by plaintiff’s complaint that his arrest was a
mistake.”). Accordingly, the Court GRANTS the City defendants’ motion for summary
judgment with respect to Collins’ Section 1983 claim against the City.
B.

Malicious Prosecution

“To establish a cause of action for malicious prosecution, a plaintiff must
demonstrate that the prior action (1) was initiated by or at the direction of the defendant
and legally terminated in the plaintiff’s favor, (2) was brought without probable cause,
and (3) was initiated with malice.” Siebel v. Mittlesteadt, 161 P.3d 527, 530 (Cal. 2007).
The burden to show a lack of probable cause is high because California law gives a
malicious prosecution defendant the benefit of the doubt: “[i]n making its determination
whether the prior action was legally tenable, the trial court must construe the allegations
of the underlying complaint liberally in a light most favorable to the malicious
prosecution defendant.” Sangster v. Paetkau, 68 Cal. App. 4th 151, 165 (1998).
The filing of a criminal complaint by the District Attorney gives rise to a
presumption that a decision to file a criminal complaint resulted from an independent
decision on the part of the District Attorney and would preclude liability for those who
participated in the investigation or filed a report that resulted in the initiation of
proceedings. See Smiddy v. Varney, 665 F.2d 261, 266 (9th Cir. 1981) (“Smiddy I”)
overruled on other grounds by Beck v. City of Upland, 527 F.3d 853, 865 (9th Cir.
2008)). However, this Smiddy presumption can be rebutted if the investigating official
“improperly exerted pressure on the prosecutor, knowingly provided misinformation to
him, concealed exculpatory evidence, or otherwise engaged in wrongful or bad faith

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

Case No. 
Title 

CIVIL MINUTES – GENERAL
JS-6
5:15-cv-01771-CAS(KKx);
Date April 5, 2017
c/w 5:15-cv-02470-CAS(KKx)
RONALD J. COLLINS v. CITY OF COLTON; ET AL.

‘O’

conduct that was actively instrumental in causing the initiation of legal proceedings.”
Awabdy v. City of Adelanto, 368 F.3d 1062, 1067 (9th Cir. 2004) (applying Smiddy I
presumption to malicious prosecution case). A “plaintiff’s account of the incident in
question, by itself, does not overcome the presumption of independent judgment.”
Newman v. County of Orange, 457 F.3d 991, 994 (9th Cir. 2006). The Ninth Circuit has
further explained the type of evidence that will suffice to overcome the presumption. For
example, in Borunda v. Richmond, 885 F.2d 1384 (9th Cir. 1988), the Ninth Circuit
found that the plaintiff had rebutted the presumption of independent judgment where the
defendant officers “procured the filing of the criminal complaint by making
misrepresentations to the prosecuting attorney.” Id. at 1390; see also Blankenhorn v. City
of Orange, 485 F.3d 463, 483–84 (9th Cir. 2007) (finding summary judgment improper
where evidence demonstrated that prosecutor had not viewed a key videotape prior to
filing charges and other evidence demonstrated that the officers’ reports were false and
misleading); Newman, 457 F.3d at 995 (“Because Sloman had no evidence of material
omissions, or inconsistent police or eyewitness accounts, he could not demonstrate a
genuine issue of material fact as to whether the prosecutor exercised independent
judgment. Summary judgment for the defendant officers was therefore appropriate.”
(citing Sloman v. Tadlock, 21 F.3d 1462, 1474 (9th Cir. 1994))); Barlow v. Ground, 943
F.2d 1132, 1136–37 (9th Cir. 1991) (civil rights plaintiff overcame the Smiddy
presumption where the prosecutor relied solely on the arresting officers’ reports, which
omitted critical information, an independent witness corroborated at least part of
plaintiff's version of events, and the officers’ accounts varied).
The City defendants argue that the Smiddy presumption applies to Morenberg and
that plaintiff has failed to meet his burden to rebut that presumption. City MSJ at 18.
Collins argues that the Smiddy presumption does not apply because Morenberg presented
information to the District Attorney’s office that he knew to be false. Opp’n to City at
10–12. Notwithstanding the evidence Collins introduces suggesting that Chadwick and
Morenberg could have had improper motives, Collins presents no evidence actually
demonstrating that Morenberg knew that the crime report he submitted to the District
Attorney’s office was false. Accordingly, the Smiddy presumption applies, and Collins
has not demonstrated a genuine issue of material fact that Morenberg is liable for
malicious prosecution.
Even if the Smiddy presumption did not apply, the City defendants argue that
Morenberg had probable cause to submit the case to the San Bernardino District

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

Case No. 
Title 

CIVIL MINUTES – GENERAL
JS-6
5:15-cv-01771-CAS(KKx);
Date April 5, 2017
c/w 5:15-cv-02470-CAS(KKx)
RONALD J. COLLINS v. CITY OF COLTON; ET AL.

‘O’

Attorney’s office on the basis of plaintiff’s alleged burglary of the license plates, perjury,
and bribery. City MSJ at 17. The Court agrees. As described above, the Court has
already determined that Morenberg had probable cause to seize the truck on the basis of
his reasonable belief that the attached license plates had been stolen. Furthermore,
plaintiff does not dispute that he signed a DMV Statement of Facts, under penalty of
perjury, stating “Customer demand title, out of state sale. NO Sales tax or license fees
were collected at time of Sale.” As a result, the Court concludes that Morenberg’s
discovery that plaintiff was driving the truck in California with California license plates
constitutes probable cause to believe that plaintiff had committed perjury. Finally,
Morenberg spoke with Ruiz, who reported that plaintiff attempted to bribe Ruiz to assist
plaintiff in a law suit against Chadwick. Therefore, the Court finds that Morenberg had
probable cause to believe plaintiff had attempted bribery.
The City defendants and Chadwick argue that Collins’ claim of malicious
prosecution is collaterally estopped by the Superior Court’s conclusion that there was
probable cause to believe plaintiff committed the charged offenses. City MSJ at 19;
Chadwick MSJ at 9–11. Collins, in turn, argues that where a plaintiff alleges that an
officer is lying, collateral estoppel only applies if the judge decided the “credibility
issue.” Opp’n to City at 12; Opp’n to Chadwick at 17. Collins contends that the Superior
Court’s determination of probable cause did not constitute a finding of the credibility of
the witnesses. Opp’n to City at 13; Opp’n to Chadwick at 18.
Federal courts must give “preclusive effect to state-court judgments whenever the
courts of the State from which the judgments emerged would do so.” Allen v. McCurry,
449 U.S. 90, 96 (1980). Under California law, collateral estoppel applies when five
requirements are met:
(1) the issue sought to be relitigated must be identical to the issue decided in
the earlier action; (2) the issue must have been actually litigated and
(3) necessarily decided in the earlier action; (4) the earlier decision must be
final and made on the merits; and (5) the party against whom issue
preclusion is asserted must have been a party to the earlier action or in
privity with such a party.
Wige v. City of Los Angeles, 713 F.3d 1183, 1185 (9th Cir. 2013). “As a general rule,
each of these requirements will be met when courts are asked to give preclusive effect to

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

Case No. 
Title 

CIVIL MINUTES – GENERAL
JS-6
5:15-cv-01771-CAS(KKx);
Date April 5, 2017
c/w 5:15-cv-02470-CAS(KKx)
RONALD J. COLLINS v. CITY OF COLTON; ET AL.

‘O’

preliminary hearing probable cause findings in subsequent civil actions for false arrest
and malicious prosecution.” Id. “In California, as in virtually every other jurisdiction, it
is a long-standing principle of common law that a decision by a judge or magistrate to
hold a defendant to answer after a preliminary hearing constitutes prima facie—but not
conclusive—evidence of probable cause.” Awabdy, 368 F.3d at 1067. A plaintiff can
rebut a prima facie finding of probable cause “by showing that the criminal prosecution
was induced by fraud, corruption, perjury, fabricated evidence, or other wrongful conduct
undertaken in bad faith.” Id. The “fabricated evidence exception allows plaintiffs who
can establish that an officer lied or fabricated evidence to relitigate the issue of probable
cause with the falsified evidence removed from the equation or, in cases involving
intentional concealment of exculpatory evidence, with the undisclosed evidence added
back into the equation.” Wige, 713 F.3d at 1186 (emphasis added). On the whole,
“when a determination in a state preliminary hearing is claimed to preclude relitigation in
the federal court § 1983 suit, the specific preliminary hearing determination must be
carefully evaluated to determine if the issue in the state court proceeding was the same as
that in the § 1983 action and, if so, whether the party against whom the state court
determination is asserted realistically had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the federal
issue in the preliminary hearing.” Martin A. Schwartz, Section 1983 Litigation, § 10.4[c]
(4th ed.).
The Ninth Circuit has recognized that “in some circumstances a probable cause
finding necessarily entails a rejection of challenges raised to the veracity of the [witness
in the preliminary hearing].” Wige, 713 F.3d at 1187 (emphasis added). The Wige court
found that this principle did not apply in that case because “the state court never
purported to find” the credibility of the relevant testimony. Id. At the preliminary
hearing in Wige, the lead detective on the case testified that he and his partner
interviewed Torres, the victim of the charged attempted murder, and that Torres
identified Wige as the shooter. Id. at 1184. Torres, however, testified that (a) he had
never seen Wige before being interviewed by the detectives, (b) he initially told the
detectives his shooter was not in the photographic lineup presented to him, and (c) that he
circled Wige’s photograph and identified Wige as the shooter only after the officers
pressured him into doing so after several hours of interrogation. Id. At the conclusion of
preliminary hearing, Wige moved to dismiss the attempted murder charge for lack of
probable cause. Id. The state court denied Wige’s motion and stated “There are issues in
the case. I think most of the issues you addressed are really for the jury to decide; not the
Court at the preliminary hearing.” Id. The Ninth Circuit subsequently clarified that what

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

Case No. 
Title 

CIVIL MINUTES – GENERAL
JS-6
5:15-cv-01771-CAS(KKx);
Date April 5, 2017
c/w 5:15-cv-02470-CAS(KKx)
RONALD J. COLLINS v. CITY OF COLTON; ET AL.

‘O’

was significant in Wige was that the allegation of fabricated evidence was not presented
in the state court preliminary hearing. See Forest v. City of Ft. Bragg, 520 F. App’x 616,
617 (9th Cir. 2013) (“This case is distinguishable from this court’s recent decision in
Wige v. City of Los Angeles where plaintiff’s allegation of fabricated evidence was not
heard in his state court proceedings and, if true, would have undermined the existence of
probable cause.”). The California Court of Appeal addressed similar circumstances in
Greene v. Bank of America, 236 Cal. App. 4th 922 (2015). However, in contrast to
Wige, the state court noted that the “plaintiff challenged [the witness’s] veracity at [the]
preliminary hearing and the magistrate expressly found that [the witness] was telling the
truth when she testified about plaintiff’s [illegal conduct].” Id. at 934. Because the “the
magistrate decide[d] the credibility issue in the arresting officer’s favor,” the fabricated
evidence claim was already litigated, with the effect that the identity-of-issues
requirement of collateral estoppel was satisfied. Id. For that reason, the Green court
found that the case before it was distinguishable from Wige. Id. Notably, Green relied
on Guenther v. Holmgreen, 738 F.2d 879 (7th Cir. 1984). Green, 236 Cal. App. 4th at
935. In Guenther, the Seventh Circuit concluded that where a plaintiff attacked the
sufficiency and integrity of the evidence supporting probable cause, and thoroughly
litigated and challenged the veracity of the arresting officer and other prosecution
witnesses who supplied the basis for probable cause, “[t]here can be little doubt that the
issue of [the officer’s] veracity and good faith . . . was both raised and actually litigated in
the preliminary hearing.” Guenther v. Holmgreen, 738 F.2d 879, 884 (7th Cir. 1984).
Notably, in Wige, the Ninth Circuit relied on Guenther in recognizing that “in some
circumstances a probable cause finding necessarily entails a rejection of challenges raised
to the veracity of the arresting officer.” Wige, 713 F.3d at 1187 (citing Guenther, 738
F.2d at 884); see also Haupt v. Dillard, 17 F.3d 285, 289 (9th Cir. 1994) (citing
approvingly to Guenther). Therefore,
[t]he Court reads Greene to establish the following rule: where a plaintiff
alleges a claim for malicious prosecution or false arrest and the defendant
shows that the court in the underlying criminal case found probable cause,
that plaintiff cannot avoid collateral estoppel by alleging that fraud or other
wrongful conduct induced that finding if (1) he raised the same factual basis
for his wrongful conduct claim in the preliminary hearing and (2) that
argument was necessarily rejected.

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Page 18 of 21 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

Case No. 
Title 

CIVIL MINUTES – GENERAL
JS-6
5:15-cv-01771-CAS(KKx);
Date April 5, 2017
c/w 5:15-cv-02470-CAS(KKx)
RONALD J. COLLINS v. CITY OF COLTON; ET AL.

‘O’

Jen v. City & Cty. of San Francisco, No. 15-cv-03834-HSG, 2016 WL 3669985, at *10
(N.D. Cal. July 11, 2016). In explaining the Greene rule, the court in Jen concluded that
Greene was controlling on the court’s analysis and that “the Ninth Circuit would follow
Greene in the appropriate case,” which Wige defined as “circumstances [in which] a
probable cause finding necessarily entails a rejection of challenges raised to the veracity
of the [witness in the preliminary hearing.]” Jen, 2016 WL 3669985, at *10 (quoting
Wige, 713 F.3d at 1187) (emphasis added).
In the present case, Collins’ counsel cross-examined Chadwick and Morenberg at
the preliminary hearing, challenging their veracity and credibility and eliciting testimony
that raised same credibility issues that plaintiff raises again here. For example, Collins’
counsel elicited testimony regarding the two DMV Statements of Facts; discrepancies in
Chadwick’s testimony regarding whether he saw the removed license plates; Chadwick
and Morenberg’s past relationship; inconsistencies in Ruiz’s statements regarding what
Collins offered him; and Morenberg’s knowledge about a legal proceeding by Collins
against Chadwick. See generally Transcript of Preliminary Hearing. Nonetheless, the
Superior Court concluded that probable cause existed to believe that Collins committed
the charged offenses. Accordingly, having “carefully evaluated” the “specific
preliminary hearing determination[,]” made at Collins’ preliminary hearing, the Court
finds that Collins “realistically had a fully and fair opportunity to litigate” the question of
probable cause, see Schwartz, supra, at § 11.04[C], and that Chadwick and Morenberg’s
credibility was actually litigated and necessarily decided by the Superior Court. See
Cotton v. Cty. of San Bernardino, No. 15-cv-2314-VAP-AGR, 2016 WL 7187442, at *9
(C.D. Cal. Nov. 9, 2016) (though plaintiff argued that the probable cause finding at the
preliminary hearing was based on the withholding of evidence, the court found that the
relevant evidence was in fact introduced at the preliminary hearing and, therefore,
concluded that collateral estoppel applied), report and recommendation adopted, No. 15cv-2314-VAP-AGR, 2016 WL 7176575 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 8, 2016); Hinchman v. Moore,
312 F.3d 198, 203 (6th Cir. 2002) (“A state court judge ruling on the presence or absence
of probable cause in a criminal action must necessarily take into account the veracity of
the officers’ statements.”); Smith v. Thornburg, 136 F.3d 1070, 1087 (6th Cir. 1998)
(“[W]here the state affords an opportunity for an accused to contest probable cause at a
preliminary hearing and the accused does so, a finding of probable cause by the
examining magistrate or state judge should foreclose relitigation of that finding in a
subsequent § 1983 action.”); Hubbert v. City of Moore, 923 F.2d 769, 773 (10th Cir.
1991) (“[W]e are convinced the question of probable cause is conclusively determined at

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

Case No. 
Title 

CIVIL MINUTES – GENERAL
JS-6
5:15-cv-01771-CAS(KKx);
Date April 5, 2017
c/w 5:15-cv-02470-CAS(KKx)
RONALD J. COLLINS v. CITY OF COLTON; ET AL.

‘O’

a preliminary hearing when the parties have had a full and fair opportunity to litigate that
issue.”); cf. Ayers v. City of Richmond, 895 F.2d 1267, 1272 (9th Cir. 1990) (a ruling in
a state court suppression hearing that arrests did not violate the Fourth Amendment
collaterally estopped federal court Section 1983 claimant from relitigating the Fourth
Amendment issue where the issue in state and federal court was the same and criminal
defendant had full motivation and opportunity to litigate Fourth Amendment issue at
suppression hearings). In addition, Collins may not rely on the “fabricated evidence
exception” because he has not introduced facts that “establish that an officer lied or
fabricated evidence[.]” See Wige, 713 F.3d at 1186 (emphasis added). In Wige, the
plaintiff’s claim of fabricated evidence was not “mere speculation[,]” but “testimony
under oath from [the victim of the charged offense] himself that the officers pressured
him into making a false identification.” Id. Collins presents no such evidence here. The
Court therefore concludes that Collins is barred from re-litigating probable cause in this
matter.
Because Collins cannot as a matter of law demonstrate that prior action against him
was brought without probable cause, the Court GRANTS defendants’ motions for
summary judgment as to Collins’ claim of malicious prosecution as against the City
defendants and Chadwick.68
C.

Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress

Collins alleges that Morenberg’s seizure of Collins’ truck and the documents inside
the vehicle “under false pretenses was outrageous.” FAC ¶ 88.
The City defendants argue that Morenberg’s conduct in seizing the truck and the
subsequent interview of Collins did not constitute conduct “beyond the bounds of human
decency.” City MSJ at 24. Collins contends that Morenberg’s conduct was outrageous
because Morenberg falsely accused Collins of crimes, threatened arrest, confiscated of
property without a warrant or probable cause, and abused his relationship and power as a
police officer. Opp’n to City at 18.

68

Having concluded that Morenberg is entitled to summary judgment on Collins’
malicious prosecution claim as a result of the Smiddy presumption and collateral
estoppel, the Court need not decide whether Morenberg is entitled to qualified immunity.

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

Case No. 
Title 

CIVIL MINUTES – GENERAL
JS-6
5:15-cv-01771-CAS(KKx);
Date April 5, 2017
c/w 5:15-cv-02470-CAS(KKx)
RONALD J. COLLINS v. CITY OF COLTON; ET AL.

‘O’

The elements of the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress are:
“(1) extreme and outrageous conduct by the defendant with the intention of causing, or
reckless disregard of the probability of causing, emotional distress; (2) the plaintiff’s
suffering severe or extreme emotional distress; and (3) actual and proximate causation of
the emotional distress by the defendant’s outrageous conduct.” Wilson v. Hynek, 207
Cal. App. 4th 999, 1009 (2012). “A defendant’s conduct is ‘outrageous’ when it is so
extreme as to exceed all bounds of that usually tolerated in a civilized community. And
the defendant’s conduct must be intended to inflict injury or engaged in with the
realization that injury will result.” Hughes v. Pair, 209 P.3d 963, 976 (Cal. 2009)
(citation and quotation marks omitted). “Ordinarily mere insulting language, without
more, does not constitute outrageous conduct.” Johnson v. Ralphs Grocery Co., 204 Cal.
App. 4th 1097, 1108 (2012) (quotation marks omitted).
The Court has already concluded that (a) Collins has failed to introduce evidence
showing that Morenberg knew the charges against Collins were false and (b) Morenberg
had probable cause to seize the vehicle, and to believe that Collins had committed perjury
and bribery. Furthermore, after reviewing the transcript and audio recording of
Morenberg’s interview with Collins, the Court finds that while Morenberg may indeed
have been “rude and dismissive,” Opp’n to City at 18, a rational trier of fact would not be
able to find that Morenberg’s conduct was beyond the bounds of conduct usually
tolerated in a civil community.
Accordingly, the Court GRANTS the City defendants’ motion for summary
judgment as to Collins’ claim for intentional infliction of emotion distress.
V.

CONCLUSION

In accordance with the foregoing, the Court GRANTS defendants’ motions for
summary judgment.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
00 
Initials of Preparer

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: 

00 

CMJ 

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