Samuel Love v. Jesus Garcia et al

Filing 41

MINUTES (IN CHAMBERS) by Judge Christina A. Snyder: The Court DENIES Plaintiff Samuel Love's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment 37 and DENIES Defendants' request that the Court dismiss Plaintiff's claim for lack of standing. Court Reporter: Not Present. (gk)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

Case No. 
Title 

CIVIL MINUTES – GENERAL
5:15-cv-02004-CAS(SPx)
Date
SAMUEL LOVE v. JESUS GARCIA ET AL.

‘O’
February 7, 2017

Present: The Honorable 
Catherine Jeang 
Deputy Clerk 

CHRISTINA A. SNYDER 

N/A 

Tape No.

Attorneys Present for Defendants: 

Not Present 
Court Reporter / Recorder

Attorneys Present for Plaintiffs: 

Not Present 
Not Present 
(IN CHAMBERS) - PLAINTIFF SAMUEL LOVE’S MOTION
Proceedings:  
FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT (Dkt. 37, filed January
13, 2017)
The Court finds this motion appropriate for decision without oral argument. See
Fed. R. Civ. P. 78; C.D. Cal. Local Rule 7-15. Accordingly, the hearing date of February
13, 2017 is vacated, and the matter is hereby taken under submission.
I.

INTRODUCTION

On September 29, 2015, plaintiff Samuel Love filed a complaint against Jesus
Garcia, Faviola I. Garcia, and Does 1–10 (collectively “defendants”) asserting claims for
violations of (1) the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), pursuant to 42 U.S.C.
§ 12101 et seq. and (2) California’s Unruh Civil Rights Act (“Unruh Act”), pursuant to
California Civil Code § 51 et seq. Dkt. 1 (“Compl.”). The gravamen of plaintiff’s
complaint is that defendants’ business lacks a parking space that complies with the ADA
Accessibility Guidelines because the slope of defendants’ reserved parking space for
persons with disabilities and the accompanying access aisle to the store exceeds four
percent.
On September 26, 2016, the Court granted defendants’ motion for summary
judgment with respect to plaintiff’s ADA claim because defendants presented evidence
demonstrating that they had altered their facilities to comply with the ADA. Dkt. 34.
The Court decided to exercise its supplemental jurisdiction over plaintiff’s remaining
Unruh Act claim. Id. at 6.
On January 13, 2017, plaintiff filed a motion for summary judgment with respect
to his Unruh Act claim. Dkt. 37-1 (“MSJ”). On January 27, 2017, defendants filed their
opposition. Dkt. 39 (“Opp’n”). On January 31, 2017, plaintiff filed his reply. Dkt. 40.

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

Case No. 
Title 

CIVIL MINUTES – GENERAL
5:15-cv-02004-CAS(SPx)
Date
SAMUEL LOVE v. JESUS GARCIA ET AL.

‘O’
February 7, 2017

II.

BACKGROUND

The parties do not dispute that plaintiff is a paraplegic who uses a wheelchair for
mobility. Dkt. 39-1, Defendants’ Statement of Undisputed Facts (“Defs. SUF”) No. 1.
The parties also agree that Jesus Garcia and Faviola I. Garcia are the real property and
business owners of Chuy’s Market (“the Market”), a place of public accommodation
located at 9787 Mission Boulevard, Riverside, California. Id. Nos. 3–5.
Plaintiff contends that he visited the Market on November 7, 2013 to purchase
drinks. MSJ at 1. Plaintiff asserts that in November 2013, there were no marked parking
spaces for persons with disabilities, no parking space with an adjacent access aisle, and
no signage indicating disabled parking. Id. Plaintiff avers that he has had bad
experiences in the past when he has parked in a space without an access aisle. Id. at 2.
Plaintiff states that he was deterred from visiting the Market due to a lack of an accessible
parking space. Id. Plaintiff contends that he returned to the Market in September 2015
and found a parking space for use by persons with disabilities. Id. However, when
plaintiff attempted to assemble his wheel chair, he realized the space and access aisle had
excessive slopes because the wheelchair rolled away from him. Id. As a result, plaintiff
asserts that he was again deterred from visiting the Market. Id. Plaintiff supports these
contentions by submitting a declaration in which he sets forth these facts. See generally
dkt. 37-2, Plaintiff’s Statement of Undisputed Facts (“Pl. SUF”) (citing dkt. 37-5, Love
Decl.).
III.

LEGAL STANDARDS

Summary judgment is appropriate where “there is no genuine dispute as to any
material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P.
56(a). The moving party bears the initial burden of identifying relevant portions of the
record that demonstrate the absence of a fact or facts necessary for one or more essential
elements of each claim upon which the moving party seeks judgment. See Celotex Corp.
v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986).
If the moving party meets its initial burden, the opposing party must then set out
specific facts showing a genuine issue for trial in order to defeat the motion. Anderson v.
Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250 (1986); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c), (e). The
nonmoving party must not simply rely on the pleadings and must do more than make
“conclusory allegations [in] an affidavit.” Lujan v. Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n, 497 U.S. 871,

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

Case No. 
Title 

CIVIL MINUTES – GENERAL
5:15-cv-02004-CAS(SPx)
Date
SAMUEL LOVE v. JESUS GARCIA ET AL.

‘O’
February 7, 2017

888 (1990); see also Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324. Summary judgment must be granted for
the moving party if the nonmoving party “fails to make a showing sufficient to establish
the existence of an element essential to that party’s case, and on which that party will
bear the burden of proof at trial.” Id. at 322; see also Abromson v. Am. Pac. Corp., 114
F.3d 898, 902 (9th Cir. 1997).
In light of the facts presented by the nonmoving party, along with any undisputed
facts, the Court must decide whether the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter
of law. See T.W. Elec. Serv., Inc. v. Pac. Elec. Contractors Ass’n, 809 F.2d 626, 631 &
n.3 (9th Cir. 1987). When deciding a motion for summary judgment, “the inferences to
be drawn from the underlying facts . . . must be viewed in the light most favorable to the
party opposing the motion.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S.
574, 587 (1986) (citation omitted); Valley Nat’l Bank of Ariz. v. A.E. Rouse & Co., 121
F.3d 1332, 1335 (9th Cir. 1997). Summary judgment for the moving party is proper
when a rational trier of fact would not be able to find for the nonmoving party on the
claims at issue. See Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587.
IV.

DISCUSSION
A.

Motion for Summary Judgment

Plaintiff seeks summary judgment with respect to his Unruh Act claim because he
has introduced evidence showing that: (1) he is disabled within the meaning of the ADA;
(2) defendants own and operate the Market, which is a place of public accommodation;
and (3) plaintiff was denied public accommodation because of his disability. See MSJ at
3–9; Arizona ex rel. Goddard v. Harkins Amusement Enterprises, Inc., 603 F.3d 666, 670
(9th Cir. 2010). A violation of the ADA constitutes a violation of the Unruh Act. See
Cal. Civ. Code § 51(f).
Defendants argue that plaintiff has failed to support his factual allegations with any
evidence. Opp’n at 8. Defendants also generally contest plaintiff’s credibility. Id. at 9–
11. In particular, defendants dispute that plaintiff ever visited the Market. Id. 9–12.
Jesus Garcia, who works at the Market seven days each week, has stated that he does not
recall anyone who uses a wheelchair attempting to visit the Market on the dates that
plaintiff alleges that he visited. Id.; dkt. 39-4 (“Garcia Decl.”) ¶ 7. Defendants also
dispute that plaintiff had any intention of visiting the Market—which is more than 30
miles from plaintiff’s home and whose products are sold at higher prices than those

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

Case No. 
Title 

CIVIL MINUTES – GENERAL
5:15-cv-02004-CAS(SPx)
Date
SAMUEL LOVE v. JESUS GARCIA ET AL.

‘O’
February 7, 2017

offered by nearby markets. Opp’n at 11; Garcia Decl. ¶ 6. Defendants contend that
plaintiff could have obtained drinks from one of three gas stations on plaintiff’s likely
route to the Market. Opp’n at 11–12. As a result, defendants argue that plaintiff was not
deterred from entering the Market because he had no intention of visiting in the first
place. Id. at 13.
The Court finds that there remain disputed questions of material fact with respect
to plaintiff’s Unruh Act claim. Namely, there is a genuine dispute as to whether plaintiff
actually visited the Market and whether plaintiff intended to enter the Market. The
resolution of these questions turns on the credibility of the parties. “The Court, however,
may not weigh credibility in summary judgment proceedings.” Hernandez v. Polanco
Enterprises, Inc., 19 F. Supp. 3d 918, 935 (N.D. Cal. 2013); see SEC v. Koracorp Indus.,
Inc., 575 F.2d 692, 699 (9th Cir. 1978) (“The courts have long recognized that summary
judgment is singularly inappropriate where credibility is at issue. Only after an
evidentiary hearing or a full trial can these credibility issues be appropriately resolved.”).
As a result, the Court concludes that it cannot resolve plaintiff’s Unruh Act claim on the
record before it. The Court therefore DENIES plaintiff’s motion for partial summary
judgment.
B.

Article III Standing

Defendants assert that plaintiff lacked standing to bring his ADA claim. Opp’n at
15. As a result, defendants argue that the Court lacks the authority to exercise
supplemental jurisdiction over plaintiff’s Unruh Act claim and request that the Court
dismiss the claim.1 Id. at 15, 19. Plaintiff argues that he need not satisfy the standing
requirements of the ADA because the only claim now before the Court is plaintiff’s
Unruh Act claim for statutory damages. Reply at 5.
Defendants are correct in asserting that, if plaintiff lacked standing to bring his
claim under the ADA, the Court lacked original jurisdiction in this case and may not
exercise supplemental jurisdiction over plaintiff’s state law claim. If a plaintiff lacks

1

Defendants’ request that the Court dismiss plaintiff’s Unruh Act claim is in the
nature of a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(1). Accordingly, the Court applies the Rule 12(b)(1) standards to this
request. Namely, when deciding a Rule 12(b)(1) motion, the court construes all factual
disputes in favor of the non-moving party. See Dreier v. United States, 106 F.3d 844,
847 (9th Cir. 1996).

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

Case No. 
Title 

CIVIL MINUTES – GENERAL
5:15-cv-02004-CAS(SPx)
Date
SAMUEL LOVE v. JESUS GARCIA ET AL.

‘O’
February 7, 2017

standing under Article III of the U.S. Constitution, then the Court lacks subject matter
jurisdiction, and the case must be dismissed. See Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t,
523 U.S. 83, 101–02 (1998). “Standing is a threshold matter central to our subject matter
jurisdiction.” Bates v. United Parcel Service. Inc., 511 F.3d 974, 985 (9th Cir. 2007).
“[F]ederal courts are required sua sponte to examine jurisdictional issues such as
standing.” Bernhardt v. Cty. of Los Angeles, 279 F.3d 862, 868 (9th Cir. 2002)
(quotation marks omitted); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3) ( “Whenever it appears by
suggestion of the parties or otherwise that the court lacks jurisdiction of the subject
matter, the court shall dismiss the action.”).
A plaintiff must demonstrate three elements that constitute the “irreducible
minimum” of Article III standing:
First, the plaintiff must have suffered an “injury in fact”—an invasion of a
legally protected interest which is (a) concrete and particularized, and (b)
actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical. Second, there must be a
causal connection between the injury and the conduct complained of—the
injury has to be fairly ... trace[able] to the challenged action of the
defendant, and not ... th[e] result [of] the independent action of some third
party not before the court. Third, it must be likely, as opposed to merely
speculative, that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision.
Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992) (citations and quotation marks
omitted). “Past exposure to harmful or illegal conduct does not necessarily confer
standing to seek injunctive relief if the plaintiff does not continue to suffer adverse
effects.” Mayfield v. United States, 599 F.3d 964, 970 (9th Cir. 2010). A plaintiff is
only entitled to injunctive relief if she can demonstrate a “real or immediate threat” that
she will be subject to the alleged illegal conduct again. City of Los Angeles v. Lyons,
461 U.S. 95, 96 (1983).
Defendants argue that: (1) plaintiff did not suffer an injury in fact, because
defendants dispute that plaintiff ever visited the Market; (2) plaintiff has failed to show a
threat of repeated injury that would have entitled him to injunctive relief under the ADA
because plaintiff has not demonstrated the requisite intent to return to the Market; and
(3) injunctive relief would not have redressed plaintiff’s injuries because he visited the
Market solely for litigation purposes. Opp’n at 16–19. The Court addresses defendants’
arguments in turn.

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

Case No. 
Title 

CIVIL MINUTES – GENERAL
5:15-cv-02004-CAS(SPx)
Date
SAMUEL LOVE v. JESUS GARCIA ET AL.

‘O’
February 7, 2017

First, as described above, the Court cannot determine whether plaintiff actually
attempted to visit the Market on the basis of the current record. Therefore, the Court
declines to find that plaintiff has failed to demonstrate an injury in fact.
Second, plaintiff need not articulate a specific intent to return to the Market to
demonstrate a likelihood of future injury. The Ninth Circuit has held:
Demonstrating an intent to return to a noncompliant accommodation is but
one way for an injured plaintiff to establish Article III standing to pursue
injunctive relief. A disabled individual also suffers a cognizable injury if he
is deterred from visiting a noncompliant public accommodation because he
has encountered barriers related to his disability there.
Chapman v. Pier 1 Imports (U.S.) Inc., 631 F.3d 939, 949 (emphasis added). In other
words, there are two paths toward demonstrating a likelihood of future injury under the
ADA: (1) a showing that plaintiff “intends to return to a noncompliant accommodation
and is therefore likely to reencounter a discriminatory architectural barrier[;]” or, (2) a
showing that “discriminatory architectural barriers deter [plaintiff] from returning to a
noncompliant accommodation.” Id. at 950. Here, plaintiff alleges that he “would like to
return and patronize the Market[,]” and that, “[g]iven its location and options, the Market
is a business that [he] will continue to desire to patronize” but he is “deterred from
visiting until the defendants cure the violations.” Compl. ¶¶ 19, 33. In support of his
motion for summary judgment, plaintiff states that he “would very much like the ability
to safely and independently park and patronize the Market.” Love Decl. ¶ 16. However,
plaintiff contends that he was deterred from visiting the Market on two occasions as a
result of defendants’ non-compliant parking facilities. Id. ¶¶ 8, 13. Because plaintiff has
pleaded and declared that the noncompliant accommodation had a deterrent effect, the
Court concludes that—at the time of filing—plaintiff had a sufficient likelihood of
imminent injury for the purposes of standing under the ADA. See Pickern v. Holiday
Quality Foods Inc., 293 F.3d 1133, 1138 (9th Cir. 2002) (“Doran has visited Holiday’s
Paradise store in the past and states that he has actual knowledge of the barriers to access
at that store. Doran also states that he prefers to shop at Holiday markets and that he
would shop at the Paradise market if it were accessible. This is sufficient to establish
actual or imminent injury for purposes of standing.”).
Third, the Court notes that district courts disagree as to whether a plaintiff’s
motivation for visiting an accommodation is relevant to determining whether the plaintiff

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

Case No. 
Title 

CIVIL MINUTES – GENERAL
5:15-cv-02004-CAS(SPx)
Date
SAMUEL LOVE v. JESUS GARCIA ET AL.

‘O’
February 7, 2017

has standing. Compare Molski v. Arby’s Huntington Beach, 359 F. Supp. 2d 938, 947
(C.D. Cal. 2005) (“Mr. Molski’s motivation for visiting Arby’s again is not relevant to
the legal issue before the Court. What is critical to the Court’s inquiry is whether he has
alleged he suffered discrimination and because of his intention to return, will suffer
discrimination again in the future.”); Molski v. Price, 224 F.R.D. 479, 483 (C.D. Cal.
2004) (“The Court can find no authority that suggests that, in order to have standing to
assert an ADA Title III claim for injunctive relief, a plaintiff must possess an intention to
return to the inaccessible public accommodation that is not motivated in any way by
advancing his litigation against that public accommodation.”); with Harris v. Stonecrest
Care Auto Ctr., LLC, 472 F. Supp. 2d 1208, 1219 (S.D. Cal. 2007) (“A plaintiff who
visits a local business solely in order to bring a Title III claim (to which supplemental
state claims may be joined) fails to meet the redressability requirement for Article III
standing. Where litigation is the only reason for a plaintiff’s visit to a particular local
establishment, once litigation is complete it is unlikely such a plaintiff will return to avail
himself of the business’ goods or services, or to visit the local business for any other
reason.” (citation omitted)). Nonetheless, construing factual disputes in favor of plaintiff,
the Court cannot conclude that the only reason plaintiff visited the Market was to bring
his ADA claim. Therefore, the Court declines to find that plaintiff has failed to
demonstrate redressability.
Accordingly, the Court DENIES defendants’ request that the Court dismiss
plaintiff’s claim for lack of standing.
V.

CONCLUSION

In accordance with the foregoing, the Court DENIES plaintiff’s motion for partial
summary judgment and DENIES defendants’ request that the Court dismiss plaintiff’s
claim for lack of standing.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
00 
Initials of Preparer

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CMJ 

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