Josefina Avila Pacheco v. Carolyn W. Colvin
Filing
18
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER OF REMAND by Magistrate Judge Alka Sagar. The decision of the Administrative Law Judge is VACATED, and the matter is REMANDED, without benefits, for further proceedings pursuant to Sentence 4 of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). (See Order for complete details) (afe)
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
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CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA – EASTERN DIVISION
11
12
JOSEFINA AVILA PACHECO,
13
Plaintiff,
v.
14
15
16
CAROLYN W. COLVIN,
Acting Commissioner of Social
Security Administration,
Defendant.
17
) No. EDCV 15-2501 AS
)
) MEMORANDUM OPINION AND
)
) ORDER OF REMAND
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
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Pursuant to Sentence 4 of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), IT IS HEREBY
20
ORDERED
that
this
matter
is
remanded
21
for
further
administrative
action consistent with this Opinion.
22
PROCEEDINGS
23
24
25
On
January
17,
2012,
Plaintiff
Josefina
Avila
Pacheco
26
(“Plaintiff”) applied for disability insurance benefits alleging a
27
disabling
28
December 3, 2013, Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) Mark B. Greenberg
condition
beginning
August
1
25,
2010.
(AR
192).
On
1
examined records and heard testimony from Plaintiff and vocational
2
expert (“V.E.”) Carlen Stock.
3
ALJ denied Plaintiff benefits in a written decision.
(AR 15-28).
4
The Appeals Council denied review of the ALJ’s decision.
(AR 1-3).
(AR 35-71).
On August 7, 2014, the
5
6
On December 9, 2015, Plaintiff filed a Complaint pursuant to
7
42 U.S.C. § 405(g) alleging that the Social Security Administration
8
erred in denying benefits.
9
Defendant filed an Answer to the Complaint, (Docket Entry No. 13),
10
and the Certified Administrative Record (“AR”), (Docket Entry No.
11
14).
12
Magistrate Judge.
13
parties filed a Joint Stipulation (“Joint Stip.”) setting forth their
14
respective positions on Plaintiff’s claims.
(Docket Entry No. 1).
On April 12, 2016,
The parties have consented to proceed before a United States
(Docket Entry Nos. 8, 9).
On July 28, 2016, the
(Docket Entry No. 17).
15
SUMMARY OF ALJ’S DECISION
16
17
The ALJ applied the five-step process in evaluating Plaintiff’s
18
19
case.
(AR 16-17).
At step one, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff
20
had not engaged in substantial gainful activity after the alleged
21
onset date.
22
severe
23
degenerative
24
upper extremity, chronic pain, impingement syndrome, cubital tunnel
25
syndrome, carpal tunnel syndrome, and depression.
26
three, the ALJ found that Plaintiff’s impairments did not meet or
27
equal a listing found in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1.
28
(AR 17-18).
(AR 17).
impairments
joint
At step two, the ALJ found that Plaintiff’s
included
disease,
obesity,
repetitive
2
degenerative
use
injuries
disc
of
disease,
the
(AR 17).
right
At step
1
Before proceeding to step four, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had
2
the residual functional capacity (“RFC”) to perform light work with
3
the following further limitations: “with respect to [Plaintiff’s]
4
sitting for six hours out of an eight-hour workday she would require
5
hourly breaks of five minutes to change position, and during that
6
five minutes she could either stand at the workstation or walk around
7
the workstation close enough to remain on task.
8
push and pull with the dominant right upper extremity.
9
occasionally climb ramps and stairs, stoop, crouch and crawl.
She can frequently
She can
She
10
can frequently balance and kneel.
She is precluded from climbing
11
ladders, ropes, and scaffolds.
12
hazards.
13
upper
14
handling, fingering and feeling with the right upper extremity.
15
is limited to nonpublic work that is unskilled and involves simple
16
and repetitive tasks.”
17
stated that Plaintiff’s subjective complaints were “less than fully
18
credible” and inconsistent with objective medical evidence.
19
24, 26).
She is precluded from exposure to
She is precluded from overhead reaching with the right
extremity
but
can
otherwise
(AR 19).
perform
frequent
reaching,
She
In making his RFC finding, the ALJ
(AR 21,
20
21
At steps four and five, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff was
22
unable to perform past relevant work but that she could seek work as
23
a packager, inspector, or assembler, which were all jobs existing in
24
significant
25
Accordingly,
26
within the meaning of the Social Security Act.
numbers
the
ALJ
in
the
national
determined
that
27
28
3
economy.
Plaintiff
(See
was
(AR 28).
AR
not
27-28).
disabled
1
STANDARD OF REVIEW
2
3
This court reviews the Administration’s decision to determine if
4
the decision is free of legal error and supported by substantial
5
evidence.
6
1157, 1161 (9th Cir. 2012).
7
mere scintilla, but less than a preponderance.
8
759 F.3d 995, 1009 (9th Cir. 2014).
9
evidence supports a finding, “a court must consider the record as a
See Brewes v. Commissioner of Soc. Sec. Admin., 682 F.3d
weighing
both
“Substantial evidence” is more than a
To determine whether substantial
10
whole,
11
detracts
12
Massanari, 257 F.3d 1033, 1035 (9th Cir. 2001) (internal quotation
13
omitted).
14
affirming
15
substitute [its] judgment for that of the ALJ.”
16
Admin., 466 F.3d 880, 882 (9th Cir. 2006).
from
the
As
or
a
evidence
Garrison v. Colvin,
that
supports
[Commissioner’s]
result,
reversing
“[i]f
the
the
ALJ’s
and
evidence
conclusion.”
evidence
can
conclusion,
[a
that
Aukland
support
court]
v.
either
may
not
Robbins v. Soc. Sec.
17
18
PLAINTIFF’S CONTENTIONS
19
20
Plaintiff
raises
two
grounds
for
relief.
First,
Plaintiff
21
claims
22
subjective complaints.
23
claims that the ALJ erred at step five by selecting alternative
24
occupations that Plaintiff is not able to perform and relying on an
25
inaccurate
26
alternative occupations available in the national economy.
27
13-17).
that
the
ALJ
improperly
calculation
assessed
the
(Joint Stip. at 3-7).
of
the
numbers
28
4
of
credibility
of
her
Second, Plaintiff
positions
in
these
(Id. at
1
DISCUSSION
2
3
After reviewing the record, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s
4
first claim warrants remand for further consideration.
5
The Court
declines to address Plaintiff’s other claim.
6
7
A.
The ALJ Erred In Rejecting Plaintiff’s Subjective Complaints
8
9
A claimant initially must produce objective medical evidence
10
establishing a medical impairment reasonably likely to be the cause
11
of his subjective symptoms.
12
(9th Cir. 1996); Bunnell v. Sullivan, 947 F.2d 341, 345 (9th Cir.
13
1991). Once a claimant produces objective medical evidence of an
14
underlying impairment that could reasonably be expected to produce
15
pain
16
malingering, the ALJ may reject the claimant’s testimony regarding
17
the severity of his pain and symptoms only by articulating specific,
18
clear and convincing reasons for doing so.
19
806 F.3d 487, 492-93 (9th Cir. 2015) (citing Lingenfelter v. Astrue,
20
504 F.3d 1028, 1036 (9th Cir. 2007)).
21
no
22
standard applies.
or
other
evidence
of
symptoms
Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d 1273, 1281
alleged,
malingering,
the
and
there
is
no
evidence
of
Brown-Hunter v. Colvin,
In this case, because there is
“clear
and
convincing
reasons”
23
24
During the hearing, Plaintiff testified that she had last worked
25
in August 2010.
(AR 42).
Plaintiff noted that she had surgery on
26
her right shoulder and right elbow and that doctors had recommended
27
surgery on her right hand.
28
did not want to undergo another operation because she did not believe
(AR 44-45).
5
Plaintiff stated that she
1
that previous surgeries had helped her.
2
noted that she had epidural injections in her back and neck, but
3
those had not helped either.
4
was unable to use her right hand to grip, pick up small things or
5
button a shirt “quickly” or “for a long time,” or lift a gallon of
6
milk.
(AR 45-46).
7
tried
physical
8
acupuncture.
(AR 45).
(AR 45).
Plaintiff also
Plaintiff testified that she
Plaintiff further testified that she had also
therapy,
unspecified
“pain
management,”
and
(AR 46-47).
9
Plaintiff stated that she could walk for about an hour at a
10
11
time,
although
she
sometimes
fell
12
concentration problems.
13
be unable to work a job where she would have to sit or stand for a
14
long time, and she sometimes needed to lie down for thirty to sixty
15
minutes due to her pain.
16
would be unable to perform full time work that involved moving her
17
right hand repetitively.
18
that, with assistance, she could shop at a nearby store and perform
19
household chores.
(AR 47).
down,
and
she
had
memory
and
Plaintiff testified that she would
(AR 48).
Plaintiff also stated that she
(See AR 48).
Plaintiff further testified
(AR 49).
20
Several portions of the administrative record are also relevant
21
22
to
Plaintiff’s
23
testimony.
24
Plaintiff reported that “her last injection” in January 2011 had been
25
“of
26
shoulder, neck, and back pain that caused difficulty sleeping.
27
321).
28
reported that pain in her right shoulder had decreased in the week
some
claim
During
help,”
During
a
that
a
ALJ
February
although
March
the
she
2011
erroneously
2011
was
orthopedic
still
postoperative
6
rejected
her
pain
re-evaluation,
experiencing
evaluation,
“severe”
(AR
Plaintiff
1
following her surgery on that shoulder.
2
2011 postoperative evaluation, Plaintiff again reported “improving
3
right shoulder pain, status-post arthroscopic repair of her right
4
shoulder as of 3/1/11.”
5
cervical and lumbar spine pain.
(AR 330).
(AR 327).
During an April
Plaintiff still reported chronic
(AR 330).
6
7
In November 2011 and April 2012, Plaintiff underwent physical
8
examinations, and her grip strength in her right hand improved during
9
this
period.
(Compare
AR
339
(testing
at
“5,
5,
5
pounds”
in
10
November 2011) with AR 695 (testing at “20, 20, 15 pounds” in April
11
2012)).
12
In an April 2012 Adult Function Report, Plaintiff reported that
13
14
she
was
unable
to
15
difficulty bathing and grooming herself due to pain.
16
Plaintiff
17
housework, and preparing meals.
18
she left the house once or twice a day to pick up her son from school
19
and
20
Plaintiff reported that she could walk for up to thirty minutes
21
before needing to rest for fifteen minutes and that her ailments also
22
affected
23
kneel, climb stairs, concentrate, understand, follow instructions,
24
and use her hands.
25
made substantially similar allegations.
stated
visited
her
with
sleep
that
because
family
friends
ability
to
(AR 225).
her
members
once
lift,
of
helped
(AR 222).
or
twice
stand,
pain
and
her
that
with
she
had
(AR 221).
grooming,
Plaintiff claimed that
a
squat,
week.
bend,
(AR
223-24).
stand,
reach,
A December 2012 Adult Function Report
(AR 258-66).
26
27
In an October 2012 Progress Note, Dr. Joseph Fujun Liu observed
28
that Plaintiff reported “improved mood and sleeping” but also “a lot
7
1
of anxiety” and that her mood during the examination was “stable and
2
cooperative.”
3
Buspar dosage and otherwise did not modify Plaintiff’s course of
4
treatment.
(AR 610).
Dr. Liu recommended increasing Plaintiff’s
(AR 611).
5
In
6
a
November
Progress
Plaintiff’s
mood
Report,
had
Dr.
improved
Nelson
8
psychotropic medication, although she was anxious, irritable, and
9
suffered from heart palpitations.
no changes to Plaintiff’s treatment regimen.
the
Flores
observed
(AR 423).
with
J.
7
10
that
2012
use
of
Dr. Flores recommended
(AR 424).
11
12
In a second November 2012 Progress Note, Dr. Liu observed that
13
Plaintiff reported improved sleep and mood due to her medication
14
regimen but still reported anxiety.
15
Plaintiff’s
16
increasing her Buspar dosage.
mood
was
“stable
(AR 420).
[and]
Dr. Liu reported that
cooperative”
and
recommended
(AR 420-21).
17
In
18
a
December
2012
Progress
Note,
Dr.
Liu
observed
that
19
Plaintiff reported “a lot of crying” and “depressed mood,” although
20
her mood during the examination was stable and cooperative.
(AR
21
613).
and
22
Remeron dosages but otherwise did not modify Plaintiff’s course of
23
treatment.
Dr.
Liu
recommended
increasing
Plaintiff’s
Wellbutrin
(AR 613-14).
24
25
In a January 2013 Progress Note, Dr. Liu reported that Plaintiff
26
felt “better” following the increase of her Wellbutrin dosage and was
27
“cooperative and engaged” during the examination.
28
did not modify Plaintiff’s treatment regimen.
8
(AR 619).
(AR 620).
Dr. Liu
1
The ALJ summarized Plaintiff’s testimony and the aforementioned
2
evidence, determining that:
3
her grip and motor strength following surgery on her right upper
4
extremity;
5
degenerative
6
(3) Plaintiff had not been treated for physical impairments after
7
2013; (4) Plaintiff’s treatment for her depression had generally been
8
successful, requiring “very little treatment” after February 2013,
9
and her mood disorder was “stable” since October 2012; (5) Plaintiff
10
had never been psychiatrically hospitalized; and (6) Plaintiff had
11
received “routine, conservative, and non-emergency treatment” since
12
the
13
additional
14
medical evidence of record suggests that [Plaintiff’s] impairments
15
are not as limiting as alleged by [Plaintiff].”
16
id. at 24 (“The [ALJ] finds that objective clinical findings and the
17
treatment
18
disabling symptoms and limitations; thus, [Plaintiff’s] allegations
19
are
20
concluded that his RFC assessment was “supported by the evidence as a
21
whole” and that Plaintiff’s complaints were “less than fully credible
22
and the objective medical evidence [did] not support the alleged
23
severity of symptoms.”
(2)
alleged
not
no
disc
onset
medical
record
fully
doctor
(1) Plaintiff had “some improvement” in
had
disease
date.
of
the
(AR
evidence
do
recommended
not
and
The
assessments,
support
credible.”)).
lumbar
19-21).
and
surgery
ALJ
these
Plaintiff’s
cervical
then
opining
spine;
summarized
that
“[t]he
(AR 21-26; see also
[Plaintiff’s]
Following
for
allegations
summaries,
the
of
ALJ
(AR 26).
24
25
Remand
is
warranted.
Preliminarily,
the
ALJ’s
summary
of
26
Plaintiff’s testimony, summary of the medical evidence, assignment of
27
weight to medical assessments, and ruling on Plaintiff’s credibility
28
are intermingled over several pages.
9
(AR 19-26).
Although the ALJ
1
intersperses
2
relevant to assessing Plaintiff’s credibility, e.g., her treatment
3
regimen and improvement with treatment, the ALJ’s clearest findings
4
regarding
5
inconsistent
6
findings,”
7
objective medical support cannot be the sole basis for finding a
8
claimant not credible, and the ALJ’s other reasons are not presented
9
with the degree of specificity required by case law.
references
Plaintiff’s
with
and
to
facts
credibility
the
or
conclusions
were
evidence
“treatment
the
medical
that
record.”
of
that
her
complaints
record,
(AR
might
21,
the
24).
be
were
“clinical
Lack
of
See Burrell v.
10
Colvin, 775 F.3d 1133, 1138-39 (9th Cir. 2014); Brown-Hunter, 806
11
F.3d at 494 (“Because the ALJ failed to identify the testimony she
12
found not credible, she did not link that testimony to the particular
13
parts
14
This was legal error.”); see also Burch v. Barnhart, 400 F.3d 676,
15
681 (9th Cir. 2005) (“lack of medical evidence” can be “a factor” in
16
rejecting credibility, but cannot “form the sole basis”).
of
the
record
supporting
her
non-credibility
determination.
17
18
Moreover, to the extent that the Court can identify the ALJ’s
19
other reasons for discrediting Plaintiff’s testimony, these reasons
20
are suspect.
21
and Adult Function Report and concluded that her “daily activities
22
. . . do not comport with additional limitations beyond those found
23
herein.”
24
administrative
25
daily activities are consistent with the ability to perform full time
26
work or inconsistent with her excess pain testimony.
27
Halter,
28
scintilla” of evidence supporting ALJ’s adverse credibility finding
For example, the ALJ referenced Plaintiff’s testimony
(AR 20).
260
Having reviewed Plaintiff’s testimony and the
record,
F.3d
the
1044,
Court
1050
is
(9th
10
unconvinced
Cir.
2001)
that
Plaintiff’s
See Vertigan v.
(finding
“only
a
1
where claimant was able to go grocery shopping with assistance, walk
2
approximately an hour in the mall, get together with friends, play
3
cards, swim, watch television, read, undergo physical therapy, and
4
exercise at home); see also Reddick v. Chater, 157 F.3d 715, 722-23
5
(9th
6
credibility “[o]nly if the level of activity [is] inconsistent with
7
[the
8
accounting for the context of materials or all parts of the testimony
9
and reports,” resulting in paraphrasing of record material that was
10
Cir.
1998)
(activities
claimant’s]
claimed
of
daily
limitations”;
living
ALJ
affect
erred
by
a
claimant’s
“not
fully
“not entirely accurate regarding the content or tone of the record”).
11
12
Moreover, according to the ALJ, “[t]he treatment records reveal
13
[that Plaintiff] received routine, conservative, and non-emergency
14
treatment since the alleged onset date,” (AR 21), and the ALJ also
15
noted
16
degenerative
17
psychiatrically hospitalized.
18
hospitalization and surgery for several conditions after the alleged
19
onset date, and the Ninth Circuit has expressed doubt as to whether a
20
treatment regimen including epidural steroid injections qualifies as
21
“conservative.”
22
45, 318, 321 (Plaintiff received epidural steroid injections)).
that
no
physician
disc
had
disease
recommended
and
that
(AR 20).
surgery
Plaintiff
for
had
Plaintiff’s
never
been
However, Plaintiff underwent
See Garrison, 759 F.3d at 1015 n.20; (see also AR
23
24
Relatedly, to the extent that the ALJ discredited Plaintiff’s
25
testimony
because
she
did
not
seek
surgery
or
other
specific
26
treatments, the ALJ was required, and failed, to consider Plaintiff’s
27
explanation for not doing so.
28
claimant provides evidence of a good reason for not taking medication
See Smolen, 80 F.3d at 1284 (“Where a
11
1
for her symptoms, her symptom testimony cannot be rejected for not
2
doing so.”); Molina v. Astrue, 674 F.3d 1104, 1113 (9th Cir. 2012)
3
(unexplained or inadequately explained failure to seek treatment or
4
follow prescribed course of treatment can support adverse credibility
5
finding).
6
undergo
7
surgeries had provided meaningful pain relief, (AR 45), which is
8
consistent
9
pain one month or less after surgery in March 2011.
Here, Plaintiff reported in 2013 that she was reluctant to
further
with
surgery
because
Plaintiff’s
she
reports
did
of
not
believe
“decreased”
or
her
prior
“improving”
(AR 327, 330).
10
In any event, even a brief pain-free period or temporary improvement
11
is consistent with a claim of disability.
12
F.3d 821, 833 (9th Cir. 1995) (“Occasional symptom-free periods – and
13
even
14
disability.”).
the
sporadic
ability
to
work
–
See Lester v. Chater, 81
are
not
inconsistent
with
15
In light of the foregoing, the Court concludes that the ALJ
16
17
provided
insufficient
support
18
for
his
decision
to
discount
Plaintiff’s pain testimony.
19
20
B.
The Court Cannot Conclude That The ALJ’s Error Was Harmless
21
22
“[H]armless error principles apply in the Social Security . . .
23
context.”
Molina v. Astrue, 674 F.3d 1104, 1115 (9th Cir. 2012)
24
(citing Stout v. Comm’r, Soc. Sec. Admin., 454 F.3d 1050, 1054 (9th
25
Cir. 2006)).
26
‘inconsequential to the ultimate nondisability determination.’”
27
(citing Carmickle v. Comm’r, Soc. Sec. Admin., 533 F.3d 1155, 1162
28
(9th Cir. 2008)).
Generally, “an ALJ’s error is harmless where it is
12
Id.
1
The Court cannot conclude that the ALJ’s errors were harmless.
2
The limiting effects of Plaintiff’s pain are directly relevant to
3
assessing
4
finding contributing to the final . . . decision about disability.”
5
See
6
(quoting SSR 96—5p).
7
determination that there was work that she could perform despite her
8
limitations.
9
the ALJ’s errors were “inconsequential to the ultimate nondisability
her
McCawley
RFC.
v.
A
claimant’s
Astrue,
423
F.
RFC
“may
App’x
687,
be
the
689
most
(9th
critical
Cir.
2011)
Here, Plaintiff’s RFC was central to the ALJ’s
(AR 27-28).
Because the Court cannot determine that
10
determination,” the errors cannot be deemed harmless.
11
See Carmickle,
533 F.3d at 1162.
12
13
C.
Remand Is Warranted
14
The decision whether to remand or order an immediate award of
15
16
benefits is within the district court’s discretion.
17
211 F.3d 1172, 1175-78 (9th Cir. 2000).
18
would be served by further administrative proceedings, or where the
19
record is fully developed, it is appropriate to direct an immediate
20
award of benefits.
21
for
22
proceedings.”).
23
that further administrative review could remedy the Commissioner’s
24
errors, remand is appropriate.
25
(9th Cir. 2011); Harman, 211 F.3d at 1179-81.
26
further
Harman v. Apfel,
Where no useful purpose
Id. at 1179 (“[T]he decision of whether to remand
proceedings
turns
upon
the
likely
utility
of
such
However, where the circumstances of the case suggest
McLeod v. Astrue, 640 F.3d 881, 888
Here, the Court remands because the ALJ provided insufficient
27
support for his decision to discount Plaintiff’s pain testimony.
28
record does not affirmatively establish that the ALJ could not have
13
The
1
found Plaintiff not fully credible for other reasons, nor does it
2
establish
3
Plaintiff disabled if these deficiencies were remedied.
4
therefore appropriate.
that
the
ALJ
would
necessarily
be
required
to
find
Remand is
5
6
The Court has not reached issues not discussed supra except to
7
determine that reversal with a directive for the immediate payment of
8
benefits would be inappropriate at this time.
9
issues addressed in this order, the ALJ should consider on remand any
10
In addition to the
other issues raised by Plaintiff, if necessary.
11
CONCLUSION
12
13
14
For the foregoing reasons, the decision of the Administrative
15
Law Judge is VACATED, and the matter is REMANDED, without benefits,
16
for further proceedings pursuant to Sentence 4 of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).
17
18
LET JUDGMENT BE ENTERED ACCORDINGLY.
19
20
21
22
Dated: February 28, 2017.
_____________/s/______________
ALKA SAGAR
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
23
24
25
26
27
28
14
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