Josefina Avila Pacheco v. Carolyn W. Colvin

Filing 18

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER OF REMAND by Magistrate Judge Alka Sagar. The decision of the Administrative Law Judge is VACATED, and the matter is REMANDED, without benefits, for further proceedings pursuant to Sentence 4 of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). (See Order for complete details) (afe)

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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 10 CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA – EASTERN DIVISION 11 12 JOSEFINA AVILA PACHECO, 13 Plaintiff, v. 14 15 16 CAROLYN W. COLVIN, Acting Commissioner of Social Security Administration, Defendant. 17 ) No. EDCV 15-2501 AS ) ) MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ) ) ORDER OF REMAND ) ) ) ) ) ) ) 18 19 Pursuant to Sentence 4 of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), IT IS HEREBY 20 ORDERED that this matter is remanded 21 for further administrative action consistent with this Opinion. 22 PROCEEDINGS 23 24 25 On January 17, 2012, Plaintiff Josefina Avila Pacheco 26 (“Plaintiff”) applied for disability insurance benefits alleging a 27 disabling 28 December 3, 2013, Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) Mark B. Greenberg condition beginning August 1 25, 2010. (AR 192). On 1 examined records and heard testimony from Plaintiff and vocational 2 expert (“V.E.”) Carlen Stock. 3 ALJ denied Plaintiff benefits in a written decision. (AR 15-28). 4 The Appeals Council denied review of the ALJ’s decision. (AR 1-3). (AR 35-71). On August 7, 2014, the 5 6 On December 9, 2015, Plaintiff filed a Complaint pursuant to 7 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) alleging that the Social Security Administration 8 erred in denying benefits. 9 Defendant filed an Answer to the Complaint, (Docket Entry No. 13), 10 and the Certified Administrative Record (“AR”), (Docket Entry No. 11 14). 12 Magistrate Judge. 13 parties filed a Joint Stipulation (“Joint Stip.”) setting forth their 14 respective positions on Plaintiff’s claims. (Docket Entry No. 1). On April 12, 2016, The parties have consented to proceed before a United States (Docket Entry Nos. 8, 9). On July 28, 2016, the (Docket Entry No. 17). 15 SUMMARY OF ALJ’S DECISION 16 17 The ALJ applied the five-step process in evaluating Plaintiff’s 18 19 case. (AR 16-17). At step one, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff 20 had not engaged in substantial gainful activity after the alleged 21 onset date. 22 severe 23 degenerative 24 upper extremity, chronic pain, impingement syndrome, cubital tunnel 25 syndrome, carpal tunnel syndrome, and depression. 26 three, the ALJ found that Plaintiff’s impairments did not meet or 27 equal a listing found in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. 28 (AR 17-18). (AR 17). impairments joint At step two, the ALJ found that Plaintiff’s included disease, obesity, repetitive 2 degenerative use injuries disc of disease, the (AR 17). right At step 1 Before proceeding to step four, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had 2 the residual functional capacity (“RFC”) to perform light work with 3 the following further limitations: “with respect to [Plaintiff’s] 4 sitting for six hours out of an eight-hour workday she would require 5 hourly breaks of five minutes to change position, and during that 6 five minutes she could either stand at the workstation or walk around 7 the workstation close enough to remain on task. 8 push and pull with the dominant right upper extremity. 9 occasionally climb ramps and stairs, stoop, crouch and crawl. She can frequently She can She 10 can frequently balance and kneel. She is precluded from climbing 11 ladders, ropes, and scaffolds. 12 hazards. 13 upper 14 handling, fingering and feeling with the right upper extremity. 15 is limited to nonpublic work that is unskilled and involves simple 16 and repetitive tasks.” 17 stated that Plaintiff’s subjective complaints were “less than fully 18 credible” and inconsistent with objective medical evidence. 19 24, 26). She is precluded from exposure to She is precluded from overhead reaching with the right extremity but can otherwise (AR 19). perform frequent reaching, She In making his RFC finding, the ALJ (AR 21, 20 21 At steps four and five, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff was 22 unable to perform past relevant work but that she could seek work as 23 a packager, inspector, or assembler, which were all jobs existing in 24 significant 25 Accordingly, 26 within the meaning of the Social Security Act. numbers the ALJ in the national determined that 27 28 3 economy. Plaintiff (See was (AR 28). AR not 27-28). disabled 1 STANDARD OF REVIEW 2 3 This court reviews the Administration’s decision to determine if 4 the decision is free of legal error and supported by substantial 5 evidence. 6 1157, 1161 (9th Cir. 2012). 7 mere scintilla, but less than a preponderance. 8 759 F.3d 995, 1009 (9th Cir. 2014). 9 evidence supports a finding, “a court must consider the record as a See Brewes v. Commissioner of Soc. Sec. Admin., 682 F.3d weighing both “Substantial evidence” is more than a To determine whether substantial 10 whole, 11 detracts 12 Massanari, 257 F.3d 1033, 1035 (9th Cir. 2001) (internal quotation 13 omitted). 14 affirming 15 substitute [its] judgment for that of the ALJ.” 16 Admin., 466 F.3d 880, 882 (9th Cir. 2006). from the As or a evidence Garrison v. Colvin, that supports [Commissioner’s] result, reversing “[i]f the the ALJ’s and evidence conclusion.” evidence can conclusion, [a that Aukland support court] v. either may not Robbins v. Soc. Sec. 17 18 PLAINTIFF’S CONTENTIONS 19 20 Plaintiff raises two grounds for relief. First, Plaintiff 21 claims 22 subjective complaints. 23 claims that the ALJ erred at step five by selecting alternative 24 occupations that Plaintiff is not able to perform and relying on an 25 inaccurate 26 alternative occupations available in the national economy. 27 13-17). that the ALJ improperly calculation assessed the (Joint Stip. at 3-7). of the numbers 28 4 of credibility of her Second, Plaintiff positions in these (Id. at 1 DISCUSSION 2 3 After reviewing the record, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s 4 first claim warrants remand for further consideration. 5 The Court declines to address Plaintiff’s other claim. 6 7 A. The ALJ Erred In Rejecting Plaintiff’s Subjective Complaints 8 9 A claimant initially must produce objective medical evidence 10 establishing a medical impairment reasonably likely to be the cause 11 of his subjective symptoms. 12 (9th Cir. 1996); Bunnell v. Sullivan, 947 F.2d 341, 345 (9th Cir. 13 1991). Once a claimant produces objective medical evidence of an 14 underlying impairment that could reasonably be expected to produce 15 pain 16 malingering, the ALJ may reject the claimant’s testimony regarding 17 the severity of his pain and symptoms only by articulating specific, 18 clear and convincing reasons for doing so. 19 806 F.3d 487, 492-93 (9th Cir. 2015) (citing Lingenfelter v. Astrue, 20 504 F.3d 1028, 1036 (9th Cir. 2007)). 21 no 22 standard applies. or other evidence of symptoms Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d 1273, 1281 alleged, malingering, the and there is no evidence of Brown-Hunter v. Colvin, In this case, because there is “clear and convincing reasons” 23 24 During the hearing, Plaintiff testified that she had last worked 25 in August 2010. (AR 42). Plaintiff noted that she had surgery on 26 her right shoulder and right elbow and that doctors had recommended 27 surgery on her right hand. 28 did not want to undergo another operation because she did not believe (AR 44-45). 5 Plaintiff stated that she 1 that previous surgeries had helped her. 2 noted that she had epidural injections in her back and neck, but 3 those had not helped either. 4 was unable to use her right hand to grip, pick up small things or 5 button a shirt “quickly” or “for a long time,” or lift a gallon of 6 milk. (AR 45-46). 7 tried physical 8 acupuncture. (AR 45). (AR 45). Plaintiff also Plaintiff testified that she Plaintiff further testified that she had also therapy, unspecified “pain management,” and (AR 46-47). 9 Plaintiff stated that she could walk for about an hour at a 10 11 time, although she sometimes fell 12 concentration problems. 13 be unable to work a job where she would have to sit or stand for a 14 long time, and she sometimes needed to lie down for thirty to sixty 15 minutes due to her pain. 16 would be unable to perform full time work that involved moving her 17 right hand repetitively. 18 that, with assistance, she could shop at a nearby store and perform 19 household chores. (AR 47). down, and she had memory and Plaintiff testified that she would (AR 48). Plaintiff also stated that she (See AR 48). Plaintiff further testified (AR 49). 20 Several portions of the administrative record are also relevant 21 22 to Plaintiff’s 23 testimony. 24 Plaintiff reported that “her last injection” in January 2011 had been 25 “of 26 shoulder, neck, and back pain that caused difficulty sleeping. 27 321). 28 reported that pain in her right shoulder had decreased in the week some claim During help,” During a that a ALJ February although March the she 2011 erroneously 2011 was orthopedic still postoperative 6 rejected her pain re-evaluation, experiencing evaluation, “severe” (AR Plaintiff 1 following her surgery on that shoulder. 2 2011 postoperative evaluation, Plaintiff again reported “improving 3 right shoulder pain, status-post arthroscopic repair of her right 4 shoulder as of 3/1/11.” 5 cervical and lumbar spine pain. (AR 330). (AR 327). During an April Plaintiff still reported chronic (AR 330). 6 7 In November 2011 and April 2012, Plaintiff underwent physical 8 examinations, and her grip strength in her right hand improved during 9 this period. (Compare AR 339 (testing at “5, 5, 5 pounds” in 10 November 2011) with AR 695 (testing at “20, 20, 15 pounds” in April 11 2012)). 12 In an April 2012 Adult Function Report, Plaintiff reported that 13 14 she was unable to 15 difficulty bathing and grooming herself due to pain. 16 Plaintiff 17 housework, and preparing meals. 18 she left the house once or twice a day to pick up her son from school 19 and 20 Plaintiff reported that she could walk for up to thirty minutes 21 before needing to rest for fifteen minutes and that her ailments also 22 affected 23 kneel, climb stairs, concentrate, understand, follow instructions, 24 and use her hands. 25 made substantially similar allegations. stated visited her with sleep that because family friends ability to (AR 225). her members once lift, of helped (AR 222). or twice stand, pain and her that with she had (AR 221). grooming, Plaintiff claimed that a squat, week. bend, (AR 223-24). stand, reach, A December 2012 Adult Function Report (AR 258-66). 26 27 In an October 2012 Progress Note, Dr. Joseph Fujun Liu observed 28 that Plaintiff reported “improved mood and sleeping” but also “a lot 7 1 of anxiety” and that her mood during the examination was “stable and 2 cooperative.” 3 Buspar dosage and otherwise did not modify Plaintiff’s course of 4 treatment. (AR 610). Dr. Liu recommended increasing Plaintiff’s (AR 611). 5 In 6 a November Progress Plaintiff’s mood Report, had Dr. improved Nelson 8 psychotropic medication, although she was anxious, irritable, and 9 suffered from heart palpitations. no changes to Plaintiff’s treatment regimen. the Flores observed (AR 423). with J. 7 10 that 2012 use of Dr. Flores recommended (AR 424). 11 12 In a second November 2012 Progress Note, Dr. Liu observed that 13 Plaintiff reported improved sleep and mood due to her medication 14 regimen but still reported anxiety. 15 Plaintiff’s 16 increasing her Buspar dosage. mood was “stable (AR 420). [and] Dr. Liu reported that cooperative” and recommended (AR 420-21). 17 In 18 a December 2012 Progress Note, Dr. Liu observed that 19 Plaintiff reported “a lot of crying” and “depressed mood,” although 20 her mood during the examination was stable and cooperative. (AR 21 613). and 22 Remeron dosages but otherwise did not modify Plaintiff’s course of 23 treatment. Dr. Liu recommended increasing Plaintiff’s Wellbutrin (AR 613-14). 24 25 In a January 2013 Progress Note, Dr. Liu reported that Plaintiff 26 felt “better” following the increase of her Wellbutrin dosage and was 27 “cooperative and engaged” during the examination. 28 did not modify Plaintiff’s treatment regimen. 8 (AR 619). (AR 620). Dr. Liu 1 The ALJ summarized Plaintiff’s testimony and the aforementioned 2 evidence, determining that: 3 her grip and motor strength following surgery on her right upper 4 extremity; 5 degenerative 6 (3) Plaintiff had not been treated for physical impairments after 7 2013; (4) Plaintiff’s treatment for her depression had generally been 8 successful, requiring “very little treatment” after February 2013, 9 and her mood disorder was “stable” since October 2012; (5) Plaintiff 10 had never been psychiatrically hospitalized; and (6) Plaintiff had 11 received “routine, conservative, and non-emergency treatment” since 12 the 13 additional 14 medical evidence of record suggests that [Plaintiff’s] impairments 15 are not as limiting as alleged by [Plaintiff].” 16 id. at 24 (“The [ALJ] finds that objective clinical findings and the 17 treatment 18 disabling symptoms and limitations; thus, [Plaintiff’s] allegations 19 are 20 concluded that his RFC assessment was “supported by the evidence as a 21 whole” and that Plaintiff’s complaints were “less than fully credible 22 and the objective medical evidence [did] not support the alleged 23 severity of symptoms.” (2) alleged not no disc onset medical record fully doctor (1) Plaintiff had “some improvement” in had disease date. of the (AR evidence do recommended not and The assessments, support credible.”)). lumbar 19-21). and surgery ALJ these Plaintiff’s cervical then opining spine; summarized that “[t]he (AR 21-26; see also [Plaintiff’s] Following for allegations summaries, the of ALJ (AR 26). 24 25 Remand is warranted. Preliminarily, the ALJ’s summary of 26 Plaintiff’s testimony, summary of the medical evidence, assignment of 27 weight to medical assessments, and ruling on Plaintiff’s credibility 28 are intermingled over several pages. 9 (AR 19-26). Although the ALJ 1 intersperses 2 relevant to assessing Plaintiff’s credibility, e.g., her treatment 3 regimen and improvement with treatment, the ALJ’s clearest findings 4 regarding 5 inconsistent 6 findings,” 7 objective medical support cannot be the sole basis for finding a 8 claimant not credible, and the ALJ’s other reasons are not presented 9 with the degree of specificity required by case law. references Plaintiff’s with and to facts credibility the or conclusions were evidence “treatment the medical that record.” of that her complaints record, (AR might 21, the 24). be were “clinical Lack of See Burrell v. 10 Colvin, 775 F.3d 1133, 1138-39 (9th Cir. 2014); Brown-Hunter, 806 11 F.3d at 494 (“Because the ALJ failed to identify the testimony she 12 found not credible, she did not link that testimony to the particular 13 parts 14 This was legal error.”); see also Burch v. Barnhart, 400 F.3d 676, 15 681 (9th Cir. 2005) (“lack of medical evidence” can be “a factor” in 16 rejecting credibility, but cannot “form the sole basis”). of the record supporting her non-credibility determination. 17 18 Moreover, to the extent that the Court can identify the ALJ’s 19 other reasons for discrediting Plaintiff’s testimony, these reasons 20 are suspect. 21 and Adult Function Report and concluded that her “daily activities 22 . . . do not comport with additional limitations beyond those found 23 herein.” 24 administrative 25 daily activities are consistent with the ability to perform full time 26 work or inconsistent with her excess pain testimony. 27 Halter, 28 scintilla” of evidence supporting ALJ’s adverse credibility finding For example, the ALJ referenced Plaintiff’s testimony (AR 20). 260 Having reviewed Plaintiff’s testimony and the record, F.3d the 1044, Court 1050 is (9th 10 unconvinced Cir. 2001) that Plaintiff’s See Vertigan v. (finding “only a 1 where claimant was able to go grocery shopping with assistance, walk 2 approximately an hour in the mall, get together with friends, play 3 cards, swim, watch television, read, undergo physical therapy, and 4 exercise at home); see also Reddick v. Chater, 157 F.3d 715, 722-23 5 (9th 6 credibility “[o]nly if the level of activity [is] inconsistent with 7 [the 8 accounting for the context of materials or all parts of the testimony 9 and reports,” resulting in paraphrasing of record material that was 10 Cir. 1998) (activities claimant’s] claimed of daily limitations”; living ALJ affect erred by a claimant’s “not fully “not entirely accurate regarding the content or tone of the record”). 11 12 Moreover, according to the ALJ, “[t]he treatment records reveal 13 [that Plaintiff] received routine, conservative, and non-emergency 14 treatment since the alleged onset date,” (AR 21), and the ALJ also 15 noted 16 degenerative 17 psychiatrically hospitalized. 18 hospitalization and surgery for several conditions after the alleged 19 onset date, and the Ninth Circuit has expressed doubt as to whether a 20 treatment regimen including epidural steroid injections qualifies as 21 “conservative.” 22 45, 318, 321 (Plaintiff received epidural steroid injections)). that no physician disc had disease recommended and that (AR 20). surgery Plaintiff for had Plaintiff’s never been However, Plaintiff underwent See Garrison, 759 F.3d at 1015 n.20; (see also AR 23 24 Relatedly, to the extent that the ALJ discredited Plaintiff’s 25 testimony because she did not seek surgery or other specific 26 treatments, the ALJ was required, and failed, to consider Plaintiff’s 27 explanation for not doing so. 28 claimant provides evidence of a good reason for not taking medication See Smolen, 80 F.3d at 1284 (“Where a 11 1 for her symptoms, her symptom testimony cannot be rejected for not 2 doing so.”); Molina v. Astrue, 674 F.3d 1104, 1113 (9th Cir. 2012) 3 (unexplained or inadequately explained failure to seek treatment or 4 follow prescribed course of treatment can support adverse credibility 5 finding). 6 undergo 7 surgeries had provided meaningful pain relief, (AR 45), which is 8 consistent 9 pain one month or less after surgery in March 2011. Here, Plaintiff reported in 2013 that she was reluctant to further with surgery because Plaintiff’s she reports did of not believe “decreased” or her prior “improving” (AR 327, 330). 10 In any event, even a brief pain-free period or temporary improvement 11 is consistent with a claim of disability. 12 F.3d 821, 833 (9th Cir. 1995) (“Occasional symptom-free periods – and 13 even 14 disability.”). the sporadic ability to work – See Lester v. Chater, 81 are not inconsistent with 15 In light of the foregoing, the Court concludes that the ALJ 16 17 provided insufficient support 18 for his decision to discount Plaintiff’s pain testimony. 19 20 B. The Court Cannot Conclude That The ALJ’s Error Was Harmless 21 22 “[H]armless error principles apply in the Social Security . . . 23 context.” Molina v. Astrue, 674 F.3d 1104, 1115 (9th Cir. 2012) 24 (citing Stout v. Comm’r, Soc. Sec. Admin., 454 F.3d 1050, 1054 (9th 25 Cir. 2006)). 26 ‘inconsequential to the ultimate nondisability determination.’” 27 (citing Carmickle v. Comm’r, Soc. Sec. Admin., 533 F.3d 1155, 1162 28 (9th Cir. 2008)). Generally, “an ALJ’s error is harmless where it is 12 Id. 1 The Court cannot conclude that the ALJ’s errors were harmless. 2 The limiting effects of Plaintiff’s pain are directly relevant to 3 assessing 4 finding contributing to the final . . . decision about disability.” 5 See 6 (quoting SSR 96—5p). 7 determination that there was work that she could perform despite her 8 limitations. 9 the ALJ’s errors were “inconsequential to the ultimate nondisability her McCawley RFC. v. A claimant’s Astrue, 423 F. RFC “may App’x 687, be the 689 most (9th critical Cir. 2011) Here, Plaintiff’s RFC was central to the ALJ’s (AR 27-28). Because the Court cannot determine that 10 determination,” the errors cannot be deemed harmless. 11 See Carmickle, 533 F.3d at 1162. 12 13 C. Remand Is Warranted 14 The decision whether to remand or order an immediate award of 15 16 benefits is within the district court’s discretion. 17 211 F.3d 1172, 1175-78 (9th Cir. 2000). 18 would be served by further administrative proceedings, or where the 19 record is fully developed, it is appropriate to direct an immediate 20 award of benefits. 21 for 22 proceedings.”). 23 that further administrative review could remedy the Commissioner’s 24 errors, remand is appropriate. 25 (9th Cir. 2011); Harman, 211 F.3d at 1179-81. 26 further Harman v. Apfel, Where no useful purpose Id. at 1179 (“[T]he decision of whether to remand proceedings turns upon the likely utility of such However, where the circumstances of the case suggest McLeod v. Astrue, 640 F.3d 881, 888 Here, the Court remands because the ALJ provided insufficient 27 support for his decision to discount Plaintiff’s pain testimony. 28 record does not affirmatively establish that the ALJ could not have 13 The 1 found Plaintiff not fully credible for other reasons, nor does it 2 establish 3 Plaintiff disabled if these deficiencies were remedied. 4 therefore appropriate. that the ALJ would necessarily be required to find Remand is 5 6 The Court has not reached issues not discussed supra except to 7 determine that reversal with a directive for the immediate payment of 8 benefits would be inappropriate at this time. 9 issues addressed in this order, the ALJ should consider on remand any 10 In addition to the other issues raised by Plaintiff, if necessary. 11 CONCLUSION 12 13 14 For the foregoing reasons, the decision of the Administrative 15 Law Judge is VACATED, and the matter is REMANDED, without benefits, 16 for further proceedings pursuant to Sentence 4 of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). 17 18 LET JUDGMENT BE ENTERED ACCORDINGLY. 19 20 21 22 Dated: February 28, 2017. _____________/s/______________ ALKA SAGAR UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 23 24 25 26 27 28 14

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