Phyllis Vaughan Family Trust v. Michelle Thomas et al

Filing 9

MINUTE ORDER (IN CHAMBERS): ORDER REMANDING ACTION TO STATE COURT by Judge George H. Wu. The Court remands this matter because Defendants have not demonstrated that the Court has subject matter jurisdiction over this case. Cae remanded to Superior Court of California, Case number MVC1601031 Case Terminated. Made JS-6 (lom) Modified on 6/17/2016 (lom). (mailed 6/17/16)

REMAND/JS-6
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL
Case No.

CV 16-995-GW (SPx)

Title

Phyllis Vaughan Family Trust v. Michelle Thomas, et al.

Present: The Honorable

Date

June 16, 2016

GEORGE H. WU, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Kamilla Sali-Suleyman

None Present

Deputy Clerk

Court Reporter / Recorder

Tape No.

Attorneys Present for Plaintiffs:

Attorneys Present for Defendants:

None Present

None Present

PROCEEDINGS (IN CHAMBERS):

ORDER REMANDING ACTION TO STATE COURT

Phyllis Vaughan Family Trust (“Plaintiff”) sues Michelle and Michael Thomas (“Defendants”)
for a claim of unlawful detainer. See Complaint ¶¶ 1, 6. Michael Thomas, in pro per, removed this
action from Riverside County Superior Court to this Court on May 12, 2016, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
1441. See Notice of Removal ¶¶ 1, 8. Defendants claim that federal question jurisdiction exists because
the Plaintiff’s lawsuit violates federal anti-discrimination laws, “including but not limited to the Section
1983 of the federal Civil Rights Acts of 1964.” See Notice of Removal ¶ 4. The Court remands this
matter because Defendants have not demonstrated that the Court has subject matter jurisdiction over this
case.
Federal courts possess limited jurisdiction, having subject matter jurisdiction only over matters
authorized by the Constitution and Congressional statute. See, e.g., Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co.,
511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994). Federal courts operate under the presumption that they do not have
jurisdiction, and the party claiming federal jurisdiction bears the responsibility of proving otherwise. See
id. (citing Tuner v. Bank of North-America, 4 U.S. 8, 4 (1799); McNutt v. General Motors Acceptance
Corp., 298 U.S. 178, 182-83 (1936)). Additionally, “[t]he defendant bears the burden of establishing
that removal is proper” and “[t]he removal statute is strictly construed against removal jurisdiction,”
making this responsibility a substantial one. Provincial Gov’t of Marinduque v. Placer Dome, Inc., 582
F.3d 1083, 1087 (9th Cir. 2009) (citing Syngenta Crop Prot., Inc. v. Henson, 537 U.S. 28, 32 (2002);
California ex rel. Lockyer v. Dynegy, Inc., 375 F.3d 831, 838 (9th Cir. 2004)); see also Gaus v. Miles,
Inc., 980 F.2d 564, 566 (9th Cir. 1992) (“[J]urisdiction must be rejected if there is any doubt as to the
right of removal in the first instance.”) (omitting internal citations).
Furthermore, federal courts have an independent duty to analyze whether subject matter
:
Initials of Preparer
CV-90 (06/04)

CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL

KSS
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REMAND/JS-6
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL
Case No.

CV 15-995-GW (SPx)

Date

Title

June 16, 2016

Phyllis Vaughan Family Trust v. Michelle Thomas, et al.

jurisdiction exists, regardless of whether a party raises the issue. See Arbaugh v. Y&H Corp., 546 U.S.
500, 514 (2006) (citing Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co., 526 U.S. 574, 583 (1999), United Investors
Life Ins. Co. v. Waddell & Reed, Inc., 360 F.3d 960, 967 (9th Cir. 2004) (citing Feidt v. Owens Corning
Fiberglas Corp., 153 F.3d 124, 128 (3d Cir. 1998)). Moreover, a court may remand a case summarily
on jurisdictional grounds, without giving the parties an opportunity to address the issue. See Scholastic
Entm’t, Inc. v. Fox Entm’t Grp., Inc., 336 F.3d 982, 985 (9th Cir. 2003) (“While a party is entitled to
notice and an opportunity to respond when a court contemplates dismissing a claim on the merits, it is
not so when the dismissal is for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.”) (omitting internal citations).
Subject matter jurisdiction exists over claims “arising under” federal law. See 28 U.S.C. § 1331.
A claim arises under federal law if it satisfies the “well-pleaded complaint rule . . . [where] a federal
question is presented on the face of plaintiff’s properly pleaded complaint.” Caterpillar, Inc. v.
Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392 (1987). As such, “a case may not be removed to federal court on the basis
of a federal defense.” Id. at 393; see also Vaden v. Discover Bank, 556 U.S. 49, 60 (2009) (holding that
federal jurisdiction also cannot “rest upon an actual or anticipated counterclaim”).
Here, Plaintiff filed the Complaint in Riverside County Superior Court, asserting a single claim
of unlawful detainer that falls exclusively under California law and therefore presents no federal
question on its face. Defendants’ argument that Plaintiff is in violation of federal anti-discrimination
statutes constitutes a defense (or perhaps a counterclaim), which does not arise from the Complaint and
therefore cannot provide a convincing basis for federal question jurisdiction. As such, this case cannot
meet the standard for federal jurisdiction.
Nor is diversity jurisdiction present (and Thomas has not claimed that it is), considering that
Defendants’ Notice of Removal identifies both Plaintiff and Defendants as citizens of the State of
California. See Notice of Removal ¶¶ 2-3. Moreover, the amount in controversy falls far short of the
required $75,000 required to permit diversity jurisdiction; requested damages amount to $2150 in unpaid
rent, in addition to attorneys’ fees and damages in the amount of the fair rental value of $71.67/day, from
April 1, 2016 through every day that Defendants remain in possession of the premises until entry of
judgment. See Compl. ¶¶ 11, 17.

:
Initials of Preparer
CV-90 (06/04)

CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL

KSS
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