John Leonard Coakley v. Carolyn W. Colvin
Filing
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MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER AFFIRMING DECISION OF COMMISSIONER by Magistrate Judge Alexander F. MacKinnon. (ib)
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
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CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
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JOHN LEONARD COAKLEY,
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Plaintiff,
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v.
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Case No. ED CV 16-01724 AFM
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND
ORDER AFFIRMING DECISION
OF COMMISSIONER
NANCY A. BERRYHILL, Acting
Commissioner of Social Security,
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Defendant.
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I.
BACKGROUND
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Plaintiff John Leonard Coakley filed his application for disability insurance
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benefits under Title II of the Social Security Act on December 10, 2014, alleging
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disability beginning January 1, 2014.
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reconsideration, a hearing took place before an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) on
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February 4, 2016. In a decision dated March 2, 2016, the ALJ found that Plaintiff
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was not disabled within the meaning of the Social Security Act for the period from
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January 1, 2014, through the date of the decision. The Appeals Council declined to
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set aside the ALJ’s unfavorable decision in a notice dated June 10, 2016. Plaintiff
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After denial on initial review and on
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filed a Complaint herein on August 11, 2016, seeking review of the
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Commissioner’s denial of his application for benefits.
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In accordance with the Court’s Order Re: Procedures in Social Security
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Appeal, the Plaintiff filed a memorandum in support of the complaint on July 11,
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2017.
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August 15, 2017. Plaintiff did not file a reply. This matter now is ready for
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decision.
The Commissioner filed a memorandum in support of her answer on
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II.
Whether the ALJ improperly evaluated Plaintiff’s credibility and subjective
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DISPUTED ISSUE
complaints.
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III.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
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Under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), this Court reviews the Commissioner’s decision to
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determine whether the Commissioner’s findings are supported by substantial
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evidence and whether the proper legal standards were applied. See Treichler v.
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Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 775 F.3d 1090, 1098 (9th Cir. 2014). Substantial
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evidence means “more than a mere scintilla” but less than a preponderance. See
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Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971); Lingenfelter v. Astrue, 504 F.3d
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1028, 1035 (9th Cir. 2007). Substantial evidence is “such relevant evidence as a
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reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Richardson,
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402 U.S. at 401. This Court must review the record as a whole, weighing both the
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evidence that supports and the evidence that detracts from the Commissioner’s
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conclusion. Lingenfelter, 504 F.3d at 1035. Where evidence is susceptible of more
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than one rational interpretation, the Commissioner’s decision must be upheld. See
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Orn v. Astrue, 495 F.3d 625, 630 (9th Cir. 2007).
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Error in a social security determination is subject to harmless error analysis.
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Ludwig v. Astrue, 681 F.3d 1047, 1054 (9th Cir. 2012). Reversal “is not automatic,
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but requires a determination of prejudice.” Id. A reviewing federal court must
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consider case-specific factors, including “an estimation of the likelihood that the
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result would have been different, as well as the impact of the error on the public
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perception of such proceedings.” Id. (footnote and citation omitted).
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IV.
FIVE-STEP EVALUATION PROCESS
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The Commissioner (or ALJ) follows a five-step sequential evaluation process
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in assessing whether a claimant is disabled. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920;
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Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 828 n.5 (9th Cir. 1995), as amended April 9, 1996.
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In the first step, the Commissioner must determine whether the claimant is
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currently engaged in substantial gainful activity; if so, the claimant is not disabled
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and the claim is denied. Id. If the claimant is not currently engaged in substantial
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gainful activity, the second step requires the Commissioner to determine whether
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the claimant has a “severe” impairment or combination of impairments significantly
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limiting his ability to do basic work activities; if not, a finding of nondisability is
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made and the claim is denied. Id. If the claimant has a “severe” impairment or
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combination of impairments, the third step requires the Commissioner to determine
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whether the impairment or combination of impairments meets or equals an
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impairment in the Listing of Impairments (“Listing”) set forth at 20 C.F.R. part
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404, subpart P, appendix 1; if so, disability is conclusively presumed and benefits
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are awarded. Id. If the claimant’s impairment or combination of impairments does
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not meet or equal an impairment in the Listing, the fourth step requires the
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Commissioner to determine whether the claimant has sufficient “residual functional
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capacity” to perform his past work; if so, the claimant is not disabled and the claim
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is denied. Id. The claimant has the burden of proving that he is unable to perform
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past relevant work. Drouin v. Sullivan, 966 F.2d 1255, 1257 (9th Cir. 1992). If the
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claimant meets this burden, a prima facie case of disability is established. Id. The
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Commissioner then bears the burden of establishing that the claimant is not
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disabled, because he can perform other substantial gainful work available in the
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national economy. Id. The determination of this issue comprises the fifth and final
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step in the sequential analysis. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920; Lester, 81 F.3d at
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828 n.5; Drouin, 966 F.2d at 1257.
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V.
THE ALJ’S APPLICATION OF THE FIVE-STEP PROCESS
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At step one, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had not engaged in substantial
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gainful activity since January 1, 2014, the alleged onset date. (AR 20.) At step
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two, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had the following severe impairments:
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hypertension; obstructive sleep apnea syndrome with a continuous positive airway
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pressure usage; high blood pressure; major depression; post-traumatic stress
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disorder; anxiety; arthritis of the hips; degenerative joint disease of the knees;
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patellofemoral syndrome; lumbar facet syndrome; mild degenerative changes of the
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left shoulder; and fibromyalgia. (AR 20-21.) At step three, the ALJ found that
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Plaintiff did not have an impairment or combination of impairments that meets or
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medically equals the severity of one of the listed impairments. (AR 21-23.) The
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ALJ then found that Plaintiff had the residual functional capacity (RFC) to perform
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light work, except
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[Plaintiff] can lift and carry 20 pounds occasionally and 10 pounds
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frequently; can stand and walk for three hours in an eight-hour
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workday and sit for six hours in an eight-hour workday with normal
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breaks; can frequently push and pull with the bilateral upper
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extremities; can frequently operate foot control operations bilaterally;
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can never climb ladders, ropes or scaffolds; can occasionally climb
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ramps or stairs, balance, stoop, kneel, and crouch, but never crawl; can
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perform bilateral overhead reaching only occasionally, but reaching in
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all other directions are not limited; can only perform jobs that can be
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performed while using a hand-held assistive device for uneven terrain
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and prolonged ambulation; can occasionally have exposure to extreme
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cold, extreme heat, unprotected heights and excessive construction
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vibration; can have occasional use of moving machinery; can perform
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unskilled work at all reasoning levels appropriate for unskilled work;
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can only have occasional superficial interaction with the public. (AR
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23.)
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At step four, based on Plaintiff’s vocational background, testimony and
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testimony of the VE, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff is not capable of performing
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his past relevant work as a drill sergeant and trainer. (AR 29.) However, based on
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Plaintiff’s age, education, work experience, RFC and VE testimony, the ALJ
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determined at step five that there are jobs that exist in significant numbers in the
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national economy that the Plaintiff can perform, such as Inspector, Assembler and
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Sorter. Accordingly, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff was not disabled as defined
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under the Social Security Act from January 1, 2014, through March 2, 2016, the
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date of the decision. (AR 31.)
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VI.
THE ALJ’S ASSESSMENT OF PLAINTIFF’S CREDIBILITY AND
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SUBJECTIVE COMPLAINTS
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An ALJ’s assessment of pain severity and claimant credibility is entitled to
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“great weight.” Weetman v. Sullivan, 877 F.2d 20, 22 (9th Cir. 1989). Where the
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claimant has produced objective medical evidence of an impairment which could
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reasonably be expected to produce some degree of pain and/or other symptoms, and
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the record is devoid of any affirmative evidence of malingering, the ALJ may reject
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the claimant’s testimony regarding the severity of the claimant’s pain and/or other
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symptoms only if the ALJ makes specific findings stating clear and convincing
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reasons for doing so. See Cotton v. Bowen, 799 F.2d 1403, 1407 (9th Cir. 1986);
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see also Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d 1273, 1281 (9th Cir. 1996). Here, since the
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Commissioner has not argued that there was evidence of malingering and that a
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lesser standard consequently should apply, the Court will apply the “clear and
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convincing” standard to the ALJ’s adverse credibility determination. See Burrell v.
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Colvin, 775 F.3d 1133, 1136 (9th Cir. 2014) (applying “clear and convincing”
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standard where the government did not argue that a lesser standard should apply
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based on evidence of malingering).
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“General findings are insufficient; rather, the ALJ must identify what
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testimony is not credible and what evidence undermines the claimant’s complaints.”
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Burrell, 775 F.3d at 1138. An ALJ’s findings “‘must be sufficiently specific to
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allow a reviewing court to conclude the adjudicator rejected the claimant’s
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testimony on permissible grounds and did not arbitrarily discredit a claimant’s
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testimony regarding pain.’” Brown-Hunter v. Colvin, 806 F.3d 487, 493 (9th Cir.
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2015) (quoting Bunnell v. Sullivan, 947 F.2d 341, 345-46 (9th Cir. 1991). An ALJ
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may consider a variety of factors ordinarily used in assessing credibility. See
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Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 958-59 (9th Cir. 2002); Light v. Soc. Sec.
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Admin., 119 F.3d 789, 792 (9th Cir. 1997) (an ALJ may consider inconsistencies
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within testimony or between testimony and conduct in weighing credibility);
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Smolen, 80 F.3d at 1284 (in determining credibility, the ALJ may consider
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“ordinary techniques of credibility evaluation”).
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Here, the ALJ provided several reasons in support of her adverse credibility
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determination. First, the ALJ found that Plaintiff’s ability to participate in his daily
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activities “diminishes the credibility of his functional limitations.” (AR 25.) As
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summarized by the ALJ, Plaintiff testified that “he is unable to work due to
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fibromyalgia, hip issues, left shoulder pain, knee pain, bilateral fasciitis, and mental
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health issues. He asserted that he has difficulty standing, walking sitting, bending
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and sleeping.” (AR 24.) However, as also discussed by the ALJ, Plaintiff reported
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that “his activities of daily living included performing personal care tasks,
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preparing simple meals, helping with the laundry, driving, going outside on a daily
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basis, shopping in stores, playing games, using the computer, paying bills, handling
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the finances and spending time with his wife and others.” (AR 25, citing AR 181-
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88 and Plaintiff’s testimony.) The ALJ further referred to Plaintiff’s testimony that
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he does some walking and exercising. (AR 24.) The inconsistency between the
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impairments claimed by Plaintiff and his “somewhat normal level of daily activity
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and interaction” (AR 25) is a valid basis for a negative credibility finding and is
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supported by substantial evidence in this case. See Molina v. Astrue, 674 F.3d
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1104, 1112 (9th Cir. 2012) (ALJ may discredit claimant’s testimony when
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“claimant engages in daily activities inconsistent with the alleged symptoms”); see
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also Bray v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 554 F.3d 1219, 1227 (9th Cir. 2009)
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(ALJ properly discounted claimant’s testimony because “she leads an active
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lifestyle, including cleaning, cooking, walking her dogs, and driving to
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appointments”).
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pointed to specific testimony and compared it to the specific limitations claimed by
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Plaintiff. As the Commissioner points out, Plaintiff’s credibility may be properly
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discounted even if the level of his admitted daily activities was not wholly
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commensurate with full-time work. See Molina, 674 F.3d at 1113. In this case,
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Plaintiff’s ability to, inter alia, use the computer, pay bills, take responsibility for
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handling finances, drive, and walk are functions that are transferrable to a work
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setting.
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program. Accordingly, the ALJ specifically found that “[s]ome of the physical and
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mental abilities and social interactions required in order to perform these activities
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are the same as those necessary for obtaining and maintaining employment.” (AR
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25.) That provides a further ground for the credibility determination. See Orn v.
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Astrue, 495 F.3d 625, 639 (9th Cir. 2007) (adverse credibility finding may be based
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on the fact claimant engages in “‘pursuits involving the performance of physical
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functions that are transferable to a work setting’”).
In making these findings regarding daily activities the ALJ
Plaintiff also testified that he had nearly completed an on-line MBA
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Second, the ALJ found that “the claimant has made inconsistent statements
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regarding matters relevant to the issue of disability.” (AR 25.) She provided two
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examples of these inconsistencies. As one instance, the ALJ referred to a claim by
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Plaintiff in a function report that he had difficulty concentrating and completing
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tasks (AR 25, referring to AR 186) and contrasted that with Plaintiff’s testimony at
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the hearing that he had completed 14 of 16 classes necessary to earn an online
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MBA (AR 25 citing testimony at AR 42-43). Plaintiff further testified that he
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would take one of his final classes in the next term, when that class became
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available. (AR 43.) The ALJ also compared Plaintiff’s claim that he had difficulty
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walking and bending (AR 54), with his testimony that he was a strong person who
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did some pushups and extended stretching for exercise (AR 53). The inconsistency
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of Plaintiff’s statements concerning concentration and completing tasks is strongly
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supported in the record; taken together with the varied testimony concerning
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Plaintiff’s physical capabilities, substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s finding that
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there were inconsistencies in Plaintiff’s subjective symptom testimony and
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allegations. See Burch v. Barnhart, 400 F.3d 676, 679 (9th Cir. 2005) (“Where
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evidence is susceptible to more than one rational interpretation, it is the ALJ’s
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conclusion that must be upheld.”). These inconsistencies provide another legally
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sufficient reason on which the ALJ could properly rely in making an adverse
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credibility determination. See id., at 680 (“In determining credibility, an ALJ may
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engage in ordinary techniques of credibility evaluation, such as considering . . .
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inconsistencies in claimant’s testimony.”); Molina, 674 F.3d at 1113 (ALJ properly
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rejected claimant’s testimony in part because it was inconsistent with other
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evidence in the record); Morgan, v. Comm’r of Social Sec. Admin., 169 F.3d 595,
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600 (9th Cir. 1999) (ALJ may properly consider conflict between claimant’s
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testimony of subjective complaints and other evidence in the record).
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As a final reason, the ALJ found that Plaintiff’s subjective testimony was not
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substantiated by objective medical evidence in the record. (AR 25.) Although this
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may not be the sole reason to support an adverse credibility finding, “it is a factor
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that the ALJ can consider in his credibility analysis.” Burch, 400 F.3d at 681;
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Morgan, 169 F.3d at 600 (ALJ may properly consider conflict between claimant’s
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testimony of subjective complaints and objective medical evidence in the record);
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see also Tidwell v. Apfel, 161 F.3d 599, 602 (9th Cir. 1999) (ALJ may properly rely
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on weak objective support for the claimant’s subjective complaints); Orteza v.
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Shalala, 50 F.3d 748, 750 (9th Cir. 1995) (ALJ may properly rely on lack of
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objective evidence to support claimant’s subjective complaints). In the present
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case, the ALJ’s assessment of the objective medical evidence was supported by
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substantial evidence.
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Accordingly, the Court concludes that the ALJ did not err in her adverse
credibility determination.
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IT THEREFORE IS ORDERED that Judgment be entered affirming the
decision of the Commissioner and dismissing this action with prejudice.
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DATED: September 14, 2017
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ALEXANDER F. MacKINNON
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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