Eugenia Mancera-Celestin et al v. The Bank of New York Mellon et al

Filing 7

ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE by Judge John F. Walter. Plaintiffs are ordered to show cause in writing, no later than September 14, 2016, why Defendants should not be dismissed from this action based on the doctrines of judicial immunity and quasi judicial im munity. If Plaintiffs file a First Amended Complaint which drops Defendants from this action on or before September 14, 2016, the Court will consider that a satisfactory response to the Order to Show Cause. Failure to respond to the Order to Show Cau se will result in the dismissal of Defendants from this action. No oral argument on this matter will be heard unless otherwise ordered by the Court. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 78; Local Rule 7-15. The Order will stand submitted upon the filing of the response to the Order to Show Cause. IT IS SO ORDERED. See order for details. (jy)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
CIVIL MINUTES -- GENERAL
Case No.

ED CV 16-1845-JFW (KKx)

Title:

Eugenia Mancera-Celestin, et al. -v- The Bank of New York Mellon, et al.

Date: September 1, 2016

PRESENT:
HONORABLE JOHN F. WALTER, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Shannon Reilly
Courtroom Deputy

None Present
Court Reporter

ATTORNEYS PRESENT FOR PLAINTIFFS:
None
PROCEEDINGS (IN CHAMBERS):

ATTORNEYS PRESENT FOR DEFENDANTS:
None

ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE

On August 26, 2016, Plaintiffs Eugenia Mancera-Celestin and Sedrick Celestin (collectively,
“Plaintiffs”), proceeding pro se, filed a Complaint against, inter alia, defendants United States
District Judge Percy Anderson and deputy courtroom clerk, Stephen Montes Kerr (collectively,
“Defendants”).
In their Complaint, Plaintiffs generally allege a scheme in which banks “run a massive
lawsuit mill that abuses the United States judicial process to obtain default judgments.” Complaint
at ¶ 1. Plaintiffs allege that they fell victim to this scheme when a default judgment was entered
against them in Case No. 5:15-cv-02564-PA (KKx). They allege that Judge Anderson violated his
oath of office by denying Plaintiffs their day in court and entering a default judgment. Id. at ¶¶
32-33. The role of Judge Anderson’s courtroom clerk appears limited to receiving documents
evidencing that a default judgment had been improperly issued. Id. at ¶¶ 45-46.
Judicial immunity provides an immunity from suit, not just from an ultimate assessment of
damages. Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 11 (1991). A judge may not be deprived of immunity even
if “the action he took was in error, was done maliciously, or was in excess of his authority.” Stump
v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 356 (1978). “Accordingly, judicial immunity is not overcome by
allegations of bad faith or malice, the existence of which ordinarily cannot be resolved without
engaging in discovery and eventual trial.” Mireles, 502 U.S. 9, 11 (1991); see also Dennis v.
Sparks, 449 U.S. 24, 28 (1980) (affirming applicability of judicial immunity even where “the
allegations were that an official act of the defendant judge was the product of a corrupt conspiracy
involving bribery of the judge.”). Additionally, a plaintiff seeking prospective injunctive relief against
a judicial officer must demonstrate that a declaratory decree was violated or that declaratory relief
was unavailable. See Hiramanek v. Clark, 2013 WL 3803613, at *5 (N.D. Cal. July 19, 2013)
(citing 42 U.S.C. § 1983).

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Judicial immunity may be overcome in two scenarios. “First, a judge is not immune from
liability for nonjudicial actions, i.e., actions not taken in the judge’s judicial capacity. Second, a
judge is not immune for actions, though judicial in nature, taken in the complete absence of all
jurisdiction.” Harvey v. Waldron, 210 F.3d 1008, 1012 (9th Cir. 2000). Similarly, “[c]ourt clerks
have absolute quasi-judicial immunity from damages for civil rights violations when they perform
tasks that are an integral part of the judicial process.” Mullis v. U.S. Bankr. Court for Dist. of
Nevada, 828 F.2d 1385, 1390 (9th Cir. 1987). Plaintiffs’ Complaint fails to demonstrate that Judge
Anderson acted outside of his judicial capacity or in the absence of all jurisdiction, or that Stephen
Montes Kerr performed tasks which were not an integral part of the judicial process.
Accordingly, Plaintiffs are ordered to show cause in writing, no later than September 14,
2016, why Defendants should not be dismissed from this action based on the doctrines of judicial
immunity and quasi judicial immunity. If Plaintiffs file a First Amended Complaint which drops
Defendants from this action on or before September 14, 2016, the Court will consider that a
satisfactory response to the Order to Show Cause. Failure to respond to the Order to Show Cause
will result in the dismissal of Defendants from this action.
No oral argument on this matter will be heard unless otherwise ordered by the Court. See
Fed. R. Civ. P. 78; Local Rule 7-15. The Order will stand submitted upon the filing of the response
to the Order to Show Cause.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

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