Patrick E. Runyon and Terri E. Runyon, et al v. Bostik, Inc. et al

Filing 58

(IN CHAMBERS) Order re: Motion to Remand (DE 20 ) by Judge R. Gary Klausner: Plaintiff's Motion to Remand is DENIED. (ah)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL
Case No.

5:16-cv-02413-RGK-SP

Title

Patrick E. Runyon et al v. Bostik, Inc. et al

Present: The Honorable

Date

January 24, 2017

R. GARY KLAUSNER, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Charles A. Rojas

Not Reported

N/A

Deputy Clerk

Court Reporter / Recorder

Tape No.

Attorneys Present for Plaintiffs:

Attorneys Present for Defendants:

Not Present

Not Present

Proceedings:

(IN CHAMBERS) Order re: Motion to Remand (DE 20)

Presently before the Court is Plaintiffs’ Motion to Remand, filed on December 23, 2016.
Plaintiffs argue that the case should be remanded for lack of subject matter jurisdiction because an
identical case that Plaintiffs had previously filed in the Southern District of California was remanded.
Contrary to Plaintiffs’ characterization, however, the prior action was not remanded because the
court determined it lacked subject matter jurisdiction. Rather, the court remanded the case because
Plaintiffs had failed to comply with Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(1)’s requirement that the complaint contain “a
short and plain statement of the grounds for the court’s jurisdiction.” This is an important distinction.
Here, Defendant’s Notice of Removal includes such a statement. After reviewing the facts, the
Court finds that it has subject matter jurisdiction under the Class Action Fairness Act (“CAFA”), 28
U.S.C. 1332(d), because at least one named plaintiff is a citizen of a state different than at least one
Defendant, the amount in controversy exceeds $5,000,000, and the number of putative class members is
greater than 100.
Plaintiffs alternatively argue that the case should be remanded based on issue preclusion,
notwithstanding the Court’s finding that it has subject matter jurisdiction in the instant case. But issue
preclusion would thus constitute a procedural defect in the case’s removal, and courts have no authority
to remand a case on the basis of a procedural defect in removal if the defect was raised for the first time
more than 30 days after the notice of removal was filed. See N. California Dist. Council of Laborers v.
Pittsburg-Des Moines Steel Co., 69 F.3d 1034, 1038 (9th Cir. 1995). Here, Plaintiffs filed the instant
Motion more than 30 days after it was removed.
For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiffs’ Motion to Remand is DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.

Initials of Preparer
CV-90 (06/04)

CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL

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