Erica Wheatley v. MasterBrand Cabinets, Inc. et al

Filing 9

MINUTE ORDER (In Chambers) Order Remanding Action by Judge Fernando M. Olguin. ORDER by Judge Fernando M. Olguin. Based on the foregoing, IT IS ORDERED that: The above-captioned action shall be remanded to the Superior Court of the State of California for the County of San Bernardino for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Case remanded to Superior Court of California Los Angeles County, Case number CIVDS 1621269 Case Terminated. Made JS-6 (mailed 2/16/17) (lom)

JS-6

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL
Case No.

ED CV 17-0133 FMO (SPx)

Title

Erica Wheatley v. MasterBrand Cabinets, Inc

Present: The Honorable

Date

February 16, 2017

Fernando M. Olguin, United States District Judge

Vanessa Figueroa

None

None

Deputy Clerk

Court Reporter / Recorder

Tape No.

Attorney Present for Plaintiff:

Attorney Present for Defendant:

None Present

None Present

Proceedings:

(In Chambers) Order Remanding Action

On December 15, 2016, Erica Wheatley (“plaintiff”) filed a Complaint in the San Bernardino
County Superior Court against MasterBrand Cabinets, LLC (“defendant”). (See Dkt. 1, Notice of
Removal (“NOR”) at ¶ 1; Dkt. 1-1, Exhibit 1 (“Complaint”)). On January 26, 2017, defendant
removed that action on diversity jurisdiction grounds pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332 and 1441.
(See Dkt. 1, NOR at ¶ 5). Having reviewed the pleadings, the court hereby remands this action
to state court for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c).
LEGAL STANDARD
“Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. They possess only that power authorized
by Constitution and statute[.]” Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377, 114
S.Ct. 1673, 1675 (1994). The courts are presumed to lack jurisdiction unless the contrary appears
affirmatively from the record. See DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 342 n. 3, 126
S.Ct. 1854, 1861 (2006). Federal courts have a duty to examine jurisdiction sua sponte before
proceeding to the merits of a case, see Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co., 526 U.S. 574, 583, 119
S.Ct. 1563, 1569 (1999), “even in the absence of a challenge from any party.” Arbaugh v. Y&H
Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 514, 126 S.Ct. 1235, 1244 (2006).
“The right of removal is entirely a creature of statute and a suit commenced in a state court
must remain there until cause is shown for its transfer under some act of Congress.” Syngenta
Crop Protection, Inc. v. Henson, 537 U.S. 28, 32, 123 S.Ct. 366, 369 (2002) (internal quotation
marks omitted). Where Congress has acted to create a right of removal, those statutes, unless
otherwise stated, are strictly construed against removal jurisdiction.1 See id. Unless otherwise
expressly provided by Congress, “any civil action brought in a State court of which the district
courts of the United States have original jurisdiction, may be removed by the defendant or the

1

For example, an “antiremoval presumption” does not exist in cases removed pursuant
to the Class Action Fairness Act (“CAFA”), 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d). See Dart Cherokee Basin
Operating Co., LLC v. Owens, 135 S.Ct. 547, 554 (2014).
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL
Case No.

ED CV 17-0133 FMO (SPx)

Title

Date

Erica Wheatley v. MasterBrand Cabinets, Inc

February 16, 2017

defendants, to the district court[.]” 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a); see Dennis v. Hart, 724 F.3d 1249, 1252
(9th Cir. 2013) (same). A removing defendant bears the burden of establishing that removal is
proper. See Abrego Abrego v. The Dow Chem. Co., 443 F.3d 676, 684 (9th Cir. 2006) (per
curiam) (noting the “longstanding, near-canonical rule that the burden on removal rests with the
removing defendant”); Gaus v. Miles, Inc., 980 F.2d 564, 566 (9th Cir. 1992) (“The strong
presumption against removal jurisdiction means that the defendant always has the burden of
establishing that removal is proper.”) (internal quotation marks omitted). Moreover, if there is any
doubt regarding the existence of subject matter jurisdiction, the court must resolve those doubts
in favor of remanding the action to state court. See Gaus, 980 F.2d at 566 (“Federal jurisdiction
must be rejected if there is any doubt as to the right of removal in the first instance.”).
“Under the plain terms of § 1441(a), in order properly to remove [an] action pursuant to that
provision, [the removing defendant] must demonstrate that original subject-matter jurisdiction lies
in the federal courts.” Syngenta Crop Protection, 537 U.S. at 33, 123 S.Ct. at 370. Failure to do
so requires that the case be remanded, as “[s]ubject matter jurisdiction may not be waived, and.
. . the district court must remand if it lacks jurisdiction.” Kelton Arms Condo. Owners Ass’n, Inc.
v. Homestead Ins. Co., 346 F.3d 1190, 1192 (9th Cir. 2003). Indeed, “[i]f at any time before final
judgment it appears that the district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, the case shall be
remanded.” 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c); see Emrich v. Touche Ross & Co., 846 F.2d 1190, 1194 n. 2
(9th Cir. 1988) (“It is elementary that the subject matter jurisdiction of the district court is not a
waivable matter and may be raised at anytime by one of the parties, by motion or in the
responsive pleadings, or sua sponte by the trial or reviewing court.”); Washington v. United Parcel
Serv., Inc., 2009 WL 1519894, *1 (C.D. Cal. 2009) (a district court may remand an action where
the court finds that it lacks subject matter jurisdiction either by motion or sua sponte).
DISCUSSION
The court’s review of the NOR and the attached state court Complaint makes clear that this
court does not have subject matter jurisdiction over the instant matter.2 In other words, plaintiff
could not have originally brought this action in federal court, as plaintiff does not competently
allege facts supplying diversity jurisdiction. Therefore, removal was improper. See 28 U.S.C. §
1441(a); Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392, 107 S.Ct. 2425, 2429 (1987) (“Only
state-court actions that originally could have been filed in federal court may be removed to federal
court by the defendant.”) (footnote omitted).
Defendant bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the amount
in controversy meets the jurisdictional threshold. See Valdez v. Allstate Ins. Co., 372 F.3d 1115,
1117 (9th Cir. 2004); Matheson v. Progressive Specialty Ins. Co., 319 F.3d 1089, 1090 (9th Cir.
2003) (per curiam) (“Where it is not facially evident from the complaint that more than $75,000 is

2

Defendant seeks only to invoke the court’s diversity jurisdiction. (See, generally, Dkt. 1,

NOR).
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL
Case No.

ED CV 17-0133 FMO (SPx)

Title

Date

Erica Wheatley v. MasterBrand Cabinets, Inc

February 16, 2017

in controversy, the removing party must prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the
amount in controversy meets the jurisdictional threshold. Where doubt regarding the right to
removal exists, a case should be remanded to state court.”) (footnotes omitted). Here, there is
no basis for diversity jurisdiction because the amount in controversy does not appear to exceed
the diversity jurisdiction threshold of $75,000. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332.3 The amount of damages
plaintiff seeks cannot be determined from the Complaint, as the Complaint does not set forth a
specific amount. (See Dkt. 1-1, Complaint at 16-17, “Prayer for Relief”).
Defendant contends that the amount in controversy threshold is met “[b]ased upon the
damages sought in the Complaint[.]” (See Dkt. 1, NOR at ¶ 9). However, defendant proffers no
evidence that might help the court determine whether plaintiff’s claims would fulfill the amount in
controversy requirement. (See, generally, id.). Defendant merely cites to plaintiff’s alleged injuries
and requested forms of relief as proof, ipso facto, that the amount plaintiff seeks would meet the
amount in controversy requirement. (See id. at ¶ 9). Such an unsubstantiated assertion,
untethered to any evidence, cannot satisfy the amount in controversy requirement of § 1332(a).
See Gaus, 980 F.2d at 567 (remanding for lack of diversity jurisdiction where defendant “offered
no facts whatsoever . . . [to] overcome[ ] the strong presumption against removal jurisdiction, [and
did not] satisf[y] [defendant’s] burden of setting forth . . . the underlying facts supporting its
assertion that the amount in controversy exceeds [$75,000].”) (internal quotations omitted)
(emphasis in the original).
Defendant’s reliance on plaintiff’s request for emotional distress damages, (see Dkt. 1, NOR
at ¶ 9), is similarly unpersuasive. Even if emotional distress damages are recoverable, plaintiff’s
Complaint does not allege any specific amount for her emotional distress claims (or as general
damages), (see, generally, Dkt. 1-1, Complaint), and therefore it would be speculative to include
these damages in the total amount in controversy. See Cable v. Merit Life Ins. Co., 2006 WL
1991664, *3 (E.D. Cal. 2006) (Defendant’s argument that emotional distress damages exceeded
the jurisdictional threshold was insufficient when “[d]efendant provide[d] no reliable basis for
determining the amount of emotional distress damages likely to be recovered in this case.”).
Further, defendant fails to provide any analogous cases with substantially similar factual scenarios
to guide the court as to the amount of emotional distress damages that might be recovered in this
case. (See, generally, Dkt. 1, NOR at ¶ 9); see also Mireles v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 845
F.Supp.2d 1034, 1055 (C.D. Cal. 2012) (remanding where defendants “proffer[ed] no evidence
that the lawsuits and settlements alleged in the complaint are factually or legally similar to
plaintiffs’ claims.”); Dawson v. Richmond Am. Homes of Nevada, Inc., 2013 WL 1405338, *3 (D.
Nev. 2013) (remanding where defendant “offered no facts to demonstrate that the [proffered
analogous] suit is factually identical [to plaintiffs’ suit.]”).

3

In relevant part, 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) provides that a district court has diversity jurisdiction
“where the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $75,000, . . . and is between . . .
citizens of different States” or “citizens of a State and citizens or subjects of a foreign state[.]” 28
U.S.C. §§ 1332(a)(1)-(2).
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL
Case No.

ED CV 17-0133 FMO (SPx)

Title

Date

Erica Wheatley v. MasterBrand Cabinets, Inc

February 16, 2017

Defendant also refers to the fact that plaintiff seeks punitive damages, which it suggests
should be considered in the amount in controversy determination. (See Dkt. 1, NOR at ¶ 9).
While punitive damages may be included in the amount in controversy calculation, see Gibson v.
Chrysler Corp., 261 F.3d 927, 945 (9th Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1104 (2002), plaintiff’s
request for such damages does not aid defendant. “[T]he mere possibility of a punitive damages
award is insufficient to prove that the amount in controversy requirement has been met.” Burk v.
Med. Savs. Ins. Co., 348 F.Supp.2d 1063, 1069 (D. Ariz. 2004); accord Geller v. Hai Ngoc Duong,
2010 WL 5089018, *2 (S.D. Cal. 2010); J. Marymount, Inc. v. Bayer Healthcare, LLC, 2009 WL
4510126, *4 (N.D. Cal. 2009). Rather, a defendant “must present evidence that punitive damages
will more likely than not exceed the amount needed to increase the amount in controversy to
$75,000.” Burk, 348 F.Supp.2d at 1069. A removing defendant may establish “probable punitive
damages, for example, by introducing evidence of jury verdicts in analogous cases.” Id.
Here, because defendant has not provided evidence of punitive damages awards in
factually similar cases, (see, generally, Dkt. 1, NOR at ¶ 9), inclusion of punitive damages in the
amount in controversy would be improper. See Burk, 348 F.Supp.2d at 1070 (defendant “failed
to compare the facts of Plaintiff’s case with the facts of other cases where punitive damages have
been awarded in excess of the jurisdictional amount”); Killion v. AutoZone Stores Inc., 2011 WL
590292, *2 (C.D. Cal. 2011) (“Defendants cite two cases . . . in which punitive damages were
awarded, but make no attempt to analogize or explain how these cases are similar to the instant
action. . . . Simply citing these cases merely illustrate[s] that punitive damages are possible, but
in no way shows that it is likely or probable in this case. Therefore, Defendants’ inclusion of
punitive damages in the calculation of the jurisdictional amount is speculative and unsupported.”)
(citation omitted)).
In sum, given that any doubt regarding the existence of subject matter jurisdiction must be
resolved in favor of remanding the action to state court, see Gaus, 980 F.2d at 566, the court is
not persuaded, under the circumstances here, that defendant has met its burden of proving by a
preponderance of the evidence that the amount in controversy meets the jurisdictional threshold.
See Matheson, 319 F.3d at 1090 (“Where it is not facially evident from the complaint that more
than $75,000 is in controversy, the removing party must prove, by a preponderance of the
evidence, that the amount in controversy meets the jurisdictional threshold. Where doubt
regarding the right to removal exists, a case should be remanded to state court.”) (footnotes
omitted); Valdez, 372 F.3d at 1118 (same). Therefore, there is no basis for diversity jurisdiction.
This order is not intended for publication. Nor is it intended to be included in or
submitted to any online service such as Westlaw or Lexis.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, IT IS ORDERED that:
1. The above-captioned action shall be remanded to the Superior Court of the State of
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL
Case No.

ED CV 17-0133 FMO (SPx)

Date

Title

Erica Wheatley v. MasterBrand Cabinets, Inc

February 16, 2017

California for the County of San Bernardino, 247 West Third Street, San Bernardino, CA 92415,
for lack of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c).
2. The Clerk shall send a certified copy of this Order to the state court.

Initials of Preparer

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vdr

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