Stacy Lynn Hatfield v. Carolyn W. Colvin

Filing 20

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER by Magistrate Judge Suzanne H. Segal. IT IS ORDERED that Judgment be entered AFFIRMING the decision of the Commissioner and dismissing this action with prejudice. (mz)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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STACY LYNN HATFIELD,
Plaintiff,

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Case No. EDCV 17-0287 SS

v.

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER

NANCY A. BERRYHILl,
Commissioner
of
the
Social
Security Administration,
Defendant.

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I.

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INTRODUCTION

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Stacy Lynn Hatfield (“Plaintiff”) brings this action seeking

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to overturn the decision of the Commissioner of the Social Security

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Administration (the “Commissioner”) denying her application for

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Disability Insurance Benefits (“DIB”).

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for a remand.

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(the “Complaint”) commencing the instant action.

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Defendant filed an Answer to the Complaint (the “Answer”).

Alternatively, she asks

On February 16, 2017, Plaintiff filed a complaint
On July 11, 2017,
The

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parties have consented to the jurisdiction of the undersigned

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United States Magistrate Judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c).

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the reasons stated below, the decision of the Commissioner is

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AFFIRMED.

For

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II.

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PROCEDURAL HISTORY

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On January 16, 2013, Plaintiff filed an application for DIB

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under

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Plaintiff’s application alleges disability beginning on December

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27, 2011 due to a left arm injury and residual pain, headaches,

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anxiety, depression, and suicidal thoughts.

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DIB application was denied both initially on August 23, 2013 and

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upon reconsideration on January 6, 2014.

Title

II.

(Administrative

Record

(“AR”)

(AR 173).

144-51).

Plaintiff’s

(AR 92-95, 99-102).

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On January 15, 2014, Plaintiff requested a hearing by an

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Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”).

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place in San Bernardino, California on February 3, 2015 with ALJ

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Nancy Stewart presiding.

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Stewart issued an unfavorable decision, finding Plaintiff able to

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perform light work but with some additional limitations.

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33).

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decision before the Appeals Council.

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2016, the Appeals Council denied Plaintiff’s request for review

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and

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Commissioner.

(AR 103-04).

(AR 34-58).

The hearing took

On April 24, 2015, ALJ

(AR 12-

On June 2, 2015, Plaintiff requested review of the ALJ’s

the

ALJ’s

decision

became

(AR 1-7).

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2

the

(AR 11).

final

On December 23,

decision

of

the

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III.

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FACTUAL BACKGROUND

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Plaintiff was born on April 7, 1962 and was 50 years old at

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the time she filed her application for DIB.

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27, 2011, Plaintiff suffered a work injury.

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fell off a ladder from a height of approximately two ladder rungs

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and struck her left elbow.

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room (“ER”) and had surgery on her left elbow the following morning.

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(AR 266).

(AR 59).

On December

(AR 266).

Plaintiff

She went to the emergency

(AR 259, 266).

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12

A.

Plaintiff’s Medical History

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14

When

applying

for

DIB,

Plaintiff

alleged

suffering

from

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“depression, headaches, suicidal, injured left arm, anxiety and

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constant pain from the arm injury.”

(AR 173).

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18

1.

Physical Health History

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a.

Left Elbow Condition

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On December 28, 2011, Plaintiff had surgery on her left elbow.

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(AR 259).

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where she was diagnosed with “a displaced olecranon fracture and a

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nondisplaced distal humeral fracture.

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Dhalla performed surgery on Plaintiff’s left elbow at Riverside

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Community Hospital.

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reduction

After falling at work, Plaintiff went to the hospital

internal

(AR 259).
fixation

of
3

(AR 266, 267).

Dr. Raja

The procedure involved “open
left

elbow

olecranon

process

1

fracture

2

interpretation of fluoroscopy.”

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procedure, Dr. Dhalla found Plaintiff’s left elbow had “good range

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of motion” and that there was “no block to the range of motion.”

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(AR 260).

with

Acumed

plates

and

screws”

(AR 259).

with

the

“use

of

At the end of the

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On April 3, 2012, Plaintiff underwent an MRI of her left

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shoulder at SimonMed.

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and concluded that Plaintiff had “mild bursal sided fraying of the

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far anterior insertion of the supraspinatus tendon” and “associated

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tendinopathy” but no “full-thickness tear.”

(AR 249).

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found

but

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fracture, or muscle atrophy.”

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“degenerative changes as described, mild impingement and mild

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subacromial/subdeltoid bursitis.”

“mild

proximal

(AR 249).

biceps

Dr. Jeffrey Dym reviewed the MRI

tendinopathy,”
(AR 249).

no

He also

“effusion,

Additionally, he found

(AR 249).

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On June 18, 2012, Plaintiff underwent a series of x-rays of

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her left elbow.

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the olecranon fracture had healed.

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alignment was good with no apparent dislocation or sublaxation.

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(AR 289).

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found to still be in place and were not bent, broken, or loose.

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(AR 289).

(AR 289).

Dr. Raja Dhalla reviewed them and found
(AR 289, 290).

The elbow

The plates and screws that had been attached were also

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On July 24, 2012, Plaintiff had surgery on her left elbow and

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shoulder. (AR 251). Dr. Raja Dhalla also performed this outpatient

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surgery at Riverside Community Hospital.

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diagnosed with “status post left elbow open reduction internal
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(AR 251).

Plaintiff was

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fixation of olecranon with Acumed plate and screws” and “frozen

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shoulder syndrome.”

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of the Acumed plate and screws from the left elbow, arthroscopic

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synovectomy

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superior labrum with arthroscopic capsule release and bursectomy

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with subacromial decompression.”

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shoulder were also manipulated during the surgery.

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During the procedure, the surgeon saw the rotator cuff tendon and

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there was no rotator cuff tear.

of

the

(AR 251).

left

The surgery involved the removal

shoulder,

“debridement

(AR 251).

of

posterior

Plaintiff’s elbow and
(AR 251).

(AR 252).

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On November 18, 2013, Plaintiff had a follow-up appointment

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with Dr. Dhalla for her left shoulder.

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Plaintiff had 170 degrees of elevation with her left shoulder and

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did not have pain or weakness during rotator cuff testing.

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363).

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and has done very well.” (AR 636). Part of that treatment included

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physical therapy which Plaintiff also completed.

(AR 635).

Dr. Dhalla found

(AR

Dr. Dhalla also reported Plaintiff “has completed treatment

(AR 292-338).

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On February 27, 2014, Dr. Christopher Fleming completed an

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examination

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compensation

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physically examining Plaintiff and reviewing her records.

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669).

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connected to her left elbow injury because she was compensating

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with her right arm.

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unreasonable” for her to develop pain in her right shoulder despite

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being right-handed.

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not just her left shoulder but also her left elbow after her work

of

Plaintiff

calim.

(AR

in

connection

648).

This

with

her

workers’

examination

included
(AR

Dr. Fleming opined that Plaintiff’s right shoulder pain was

(AR 669).

He explained that it was “not

(AR 668-69).

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Because she experienced pain in

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injury, she would have used her right arm for everything which

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could have resulted in injury to her right shoulder.

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Dr. Fleming listed work restrictions for Plaintiff:

(AR 668-69).

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For the shoulders, the patient has precluded from
repetitive use of the upper extremities at or above
shoulder level.
For left upper extremity, she has
precluded from repetitive heavy lifting, pushing,
pulling, gripping, grasping, or other repetitive tasks
more than 10 pounds. (AR 666).

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Dr. Fleming recommended an MRI scan for the right shoulder to
determine if further treatment was required.

(AR 666).

He stated

Plaintiff should continue to exercise her left shoulder at home.
(AR 666).

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Plaintiff’s
treatments

prior

medical
to

records

her

alleged

also

indicate

onset

date

a
of

history

of

disability.

Plaintiff had a past cervical spine fusion of the C6 and C7
vertebrae. (AR 283). She also had a previous left shoulder rotator
cuff repair.

(AR 283).

are also listed.

Previous right shoulder and arm fractures

(AR 283).

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b.

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Heart Condition

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On December 29, 2012, Plaintiff had an echocardiogram (“ECG”)
performed

at

Riverside

Community

Hospital.

(AR

258).

When

Plaintiff went to the ER after her work injury, the ER doctor noted
a history of cardiac arrhythmia which required Plaintiff to receive
medical clearance for surgery by an internal medicine specialist.

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1

(AR 266-67).

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surgery but requested an ECG and recommended Plaintiff receive

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further evaluation.

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Sivanandan Vasudevan who found that Plaintiff’s cardiac valves were

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normal. In addition, Plaintiff had normal intracardiac dimensions,

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her left ventrical wall motion was normal, her Doppler study was

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within normal limits, there was no pericardial effusion and her RV

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function was normal.

The internal medicine specialist cleared her for

(AR 269).

The ECG was reviewed by Dr.

(AR 258).

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On

September

11,

2013,

Plaintiff

saw

Dr.

Andrew

Ho

at

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Riverside Cardiology Associates.

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experiencing heart palpitations.

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Plaintiff

has

paroxysmal

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regurgitation.

(AR 679).

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regurgitation as remaining “overall stable” and noted she had an

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ablation scheduled for the tachycardia.

atrial

(AR 678).

Plaintiff reported

(AR 678).
tachycardia

Dr. Ho indicated
and

mitral

valve

Dr. Ho listed Plaintiff’s mitral valve

(AR 678).

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On October 28, 2013, Plaintiff had an ablation procedure for

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supraventricular

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performed the procedure.

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November 6, 2013, Plaintiff said she had not had a rapid heartbeat

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after the ablation “but it feels different.”

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requested a stress test and informed Plaintiff she may need to have

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another ablation or she may need a permanent pacemaker.

tachycardia.

(AR

(AR 694).

694).

Dr.

Vilma

Torres

At her follow-up visit on

(AR 694).

Dr. Torres

(AR 694).

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On November 6, 2013, Plaintiff underwent a treadmill test at

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Loma Linda University Health System at the request of Dr. Vilma

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Torres.

(AR 687).

Plaintiff’s diagnosis was cardiac arrhythmias,
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1

unspecified.

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resting ECG revealed normal sinus rhythm and first degree AV block.

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(AR

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premature ventricular contractions.

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response was negative for ischemia.

687).

(AR 687).

With

her

During the stress test, Plaintiff’s

arrhythmias,

she

also

showed

(AR 687).

occasional

Her stress ECG

(AR 687).

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2. Mental Health History

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On April 15, 2013, Riverside Center for Behavioral Medicine

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admitted

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dependence, sedative hypnotic dependence, opioid abuse, bipolar

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disorder, depressed versus mood disorder secondary to alcohol

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dependence.

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on April 17, 2013.

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(AR 452).

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413-14).

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(AR 414).

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discharged.

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being suicidal.

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by the death of her mother in September 2012.

Plaintiff,

with

several

(AR 413, 452).
(AR 413).

diagnoses

including

alcohol

The Riverside Center discharged her
Dr. Mekund Deshmukh treated her.

She received treatment for alcohol detoxification.

(AR

When she was admitted, she received a GAF score of 25.
Her GAF score improved to 40 by the time she was
(AR 413).

She claimed she was depressed but denied

(AR 414).

Her depression appeared to be affected
(AR 418).

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On

April

24,

2013,

Plaintiff

was

admitted

to

a

partial

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hospitalization program at Riverside Center for Behavioral Medicine

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with the same doctor to receive supportive care.

(AR 462).

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26

On February 12, 2014, Plaintiff started receiving treatment

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from Riverside Psychiatric Medical Group.

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treated by Nurse Practitioner (“NP”) Kathleen Comer.
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(AR 646).

She was

(AR 646-47).

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NP Comer listed alcohol dependence, anxiety - unspecified, bipolar

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disorder – mixed unspecified, and adjustment disorder as problems

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experienced by Plaintiff.

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Plaintiff had not followed her medication regimen.

(AR 646).

NP Comer also noted that
(AR 646).

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6

Plaintiff’s next visit with NP Comer was not until June 5,

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2014. (AR 645). At that time, NP Comer noted Plaintiff had stopped

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taking her medications for roughly three months.

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Comer found Plaintiff had no orientation, cognitive, or memory

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impairments.

(AR 645).

NP

(AR 645).

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On July 22, 2014, Dr. Robin Campbell performed a complete

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psychological evaluation of Plaintiff.

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herself to the appointment.

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552).

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any trouble walking or standing. (AR 552). She was neatly groomed.

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(AR 552).

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Center for Behavioral Medicine but did not have access to any other

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records. (AR 553). Plaintiff reported the ability to “do household

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chores, run errands, shop, cook, dress and bathe herself.”

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554).

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reported that she likes to watch television and play games.

(AR

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554).

She does not need physical assistance to get around.

(AR

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554).

She also “gets along fairly well with those people she comes

25

into contact with on a daily basis.”

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established “a rapport” with Dr. Campbell.

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reported two prior arrests for DUI as well as methamphetamine and

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cocaine use in the past.

(AR 552).

(AR 552).

Plaintiff drove

She arrived on time.

(AR

She was wearing a left arm brace but did not appear to have

Dr. Campbell reviewed Plaintiff’s records from Riverside

Plaintiff manages her own finances.

(AR 554).
9

(AR 554).

(AR 554).

(AR

Plaintiff

Plaintiff also

(AR 554).

Plaintiff

1
2

Dr.

Campbell

ultimately

found

Plaintiff

capable

of

3

“understanding, remembering, and carrying out” both simple and

4

detailed instructions.

5

Plaintiff can “make judgments on simple, work-related decisions.”

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(AR 557).

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with the public and people at work.

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“moderately impaired” in dealing with work-related changes and

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stressors.

10

(AR 557).

According to Dr. Campbell,

Plaintiff would have “moderate difficulty” interacting

(AR 557).

(AR 557).

She would also be

Dr. Campbell also believed Plaintiff is

capable of managing her finances.

(AR 557).

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12

B.

Treating Physician Opinion

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14

On March 21, 2014, Plaintiff’s treating physician, Dr. Allen

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Felix, filled out a medical opinion form related to Plaintiff’s

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ability to do work-related tasks.

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can lift and carry less than ten pounds on an occasional basis,

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meaning no more than one third of an eight-hour day.

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He indicated Plaintiff can only stand and walk for about three

20

hours and only sit for about two hours during an eight-hour day

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with normal breaks.

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Plaintiff can only stand for ten minutes and sit for thirty minutes

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before needing to alter position.

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needs to walk around every twenty minutes for five minutes and that

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she needs to be able to alternate freely between sitting and

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standing.

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to lie down once per day during working hours. (AR 676). Plaintiff

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can only occasionally twist, stoop, crouch and climb stairs and

(AR 676).

(AR 675).

(AR 675).

He stated Plaintiff

(AR 675).

This was further qualified that

(AR 675).

He stated Plaintiff

Dr. Felix also indicated Plaintiff would need

10

1

can never climb ladders.

2

handle, finger, feel, and push/pull are impaired.

3

needs to avoid concentrated exposure to extreme heat, wetness,

4

humidity and noise.

5

ventilation, etc., she needs to avoid even moderate exposure.

6

677).

7

all exposure to extreme cold and hazards such as machinery and

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heights.

(AR 676).

(AR 677).

Plaintiff’s ability to reach,
(AR 676).

She

Fumes, odors, dusts, gases, poor
(AR

Finally, according to Dr. Felix, Plaintiff needs to avoid

(AR 677).

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10

Dr. Felix found all of these restrictions were based on

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Plaintiff’s degenerative joint disease in both knees, cervical

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fusion, chronic low back pain and limited use of left arm because

13

of the elbow fracture and rotator cuff tendonitis.

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Additionally, Dr. Felix listed Plaintiff has trouble with dizziness

15

and balancing and that she has auditory hallucinations.

(AR 676).

(AR 677).

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17

C.

State Agency Doctors

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19

Two

Physical

20

Assessments

21

conducted.

and

(“Residual

Mental

Residual

Assessment”)

of

Functional
the

Capacity

Plaintiff

were

(AR 59-72, 74-90).

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23

1.

Initial Level Residual Assessment

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25

Dr. Paxton completed the Residual Assessment of the Plaintiff

26

at the initial level on August 23, 2013.

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physical

28

exertional

limitations

assessment,

limitations,

Dr.

concerning

Paxton
11

(AR 59-72).

found

the

the

For the

Plaintiff’s

Plaintiff

can

1

occasionally lift twenty pounds and can frequently lift ten pounds.

2

(AR 67).

3

about six hours in an eight-hour work day and can sit for about

4

six hours in an eight-hour workday.

5

Plaintiff could push and/or pull (including operation of hand and

6

foot controls) subject to the lifting limitations.

7

Plaintiff’s

8

occasionally climb ramps and stairs, balance, stoop, kneel, crouch

9

and crawl.

Dr. Paxton also found the Plaintiff can stand and/or walk

postural

(AR 67). Dr. Paxton found the

limitations

(AR 67).

were

such

that

(AR 67).
she

could

However, Dr. Paxton found the Plaintiff can

10

never

11

manipulative limitations, Dr. Paxton found that Plaintiff’s left

12

overhead

13

manipulation, and skin receptors were not limited.

14

Regarding environmental limitations, Dr. Paxton found Plaintiff

15

should avoid concentrated exposure to vibration and hazards such

16

as heights and machinery.

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visual or communicative limitations.

climb

ladders,

reach

was

ropes,

limited

or

but

scaffolds.

her

(AR 68).

gross

(AR

67).

For

manipulation,

fine

(AR 68).

Dr. Paxton did not find any
(AR 68).

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19

Dr. Paxton also assessed Plaintiff’s mental limitations.

20

Paxton found Plaintiff’s concentration and persistence limitations

21

are not significantly limited except she is moderately limited in

22

carrying out detailed instructions.

23

social

24

moderately limited in her ability to appropriately interact with

25

the public.

26

any understanding and memory limitations or adaptation limitations.

27

(AR 69, 70).

28

but was limited to unskilled, light work.

interaction

limitations,

(AR 70).

(AR 69).

Plaintiff

Dr.

In relation to

was

found

to

be

Dr. Paxton did not find Plaintiff to have

Overall, Dr. Paxton found Plaintiff was not disabled

12

(AR 71).

1

2.

Reconsideration Level Residual Assessment

2
3

Dr. DeBorja completed the Residual Assessment of Plaintiff at

4

the reconsideration level on January 2, 2014. (AR 74-90). Starting

5

with

6

Plaintiff had the same exertional limitations as the initial level

7

Residual Assessment except she was also limited in her left upper

8

extremity when pushing and pulling.

9

postural limitations, Dr. DeBorja found the same limitations except

the

physical

limitations

assessment,

Dr.

(AR 84).

DeBorja

found

For Plaintiff’s

10

that Plaintiff could frequently stoop, kneel, and crouch.

11

Dr. DeBorja found the same manipulative limitations but specified

12

that left overhead reaching was limited to occasionally.

13

The environmental limitations were found to be the same with the

14

added statement that “moderate exposure to machineries that require

15

more

16

avoided.

than

occasional

postural

activity

to

operate”

(AR 84).

(AR 85).

should

be

(AR 86).

17
18

Dr. DeBorja also addressed some of Plaintiff’s allegations

19

regarding her physical limitations, finding them only partially

20

credible.

21

with Plaintiff’s right shoulder or elbow, the pain in her left

22

shoulder and elbow should not prevent her from being able to lift

23

more than 6 pounds.

24

Plaintiff to be experiencing any problems with ambulation such that

25

she would need to rest before walking a quarter of a mile.

26

86).

27

that Plaintiff suffered from headaches.

(AR 86).

Dr. DeBorja stated because there is no problem

(AR 86).

Dr. DeBorja found no reason for

(AR

The doctor also noted that the medical evidence did not show

28
13

(AR 86).

1

The mental limitations of Plaintiff were assessed during the

2

reconsideration

3

performed by a psychological consultant, Dr. Waranch.

4

Dr.

5

limitations to be the same with one addition. (AR 87). Dr. Waranch

6

found that Plaintiff was moderately limited in her ability to both

7

finish

8

psychological impairments interrupting and to maintain a consistent

9

work pace without unreasonable rest periods.

Waranch

a

level

found

normal

Residual

Assessment,

Plaintiff’s

work

however

concentration

schedule

without

they

were

(AR 81, 88).

and

persistence

symptoms

rooted

(AR 87).

in

However,

10

Dr.

11

maintaining attendance and completing a workweek” but that she

12

would have difficulty “carrying out detailed tasks and maintaining

13

attention and concentration for such tasks on a regular basis.”

14

(AR 87).

15

capable

16

maintaining attention and concentration when doing so.”

17

Dr.

18

included moderate limitations to her ability to take directions

19

and correction from supervisors and to get along with coworkers

20

without distracting them or displaying extreme behaviors.

21

Dr. Waranch explained that Plaintiff can interact with the public

22

and get along with both supervisors and coworkers but only if the

23

contacts are short and intermittent.

(AR 87).

For adaptation

24

limitations,

Plaintiff

was

25

limited

26

environment and travel in new places or use public transportation.

27

(AR 88).

28

pressures in the work setting if they are not constant.

Waranch

explained

that

Plaintiff

would

be

“capable

of

Additionally, Dr. Waranch stated that Plaintiff is
of

Waranch

in

completing

found

Dr.
both

“simple,

Plaintiff’s

Waranch
her

social

found

ability

2-3

that

to

step

instructions

interaction

handle

changes

and

(AR 87).

limitations

in

(AR 87).

moderately
the

work

Dr. Waranch explained Plaintiff can adapt to changes and

14

(AR 88).

1

Dr. Waranch did not find any understanding and memory limitations.

2

(AR 86).

3
4

IV.

5

THE FIVE-STEP SEQUENTIAL EVALUATION PROCESS

6
7

To

qualify

for

disability

benefits,

a

claimant

must

8

demonstrate a medically determinable physical or mental impairment

9

that prevents him from engaging in substantial gainful activity1

10

and that is expected to result in death or to last for a continuous

11

period of at least twelve months.

Reddick v. Chater, 157 F.3d 715,

12

721

U.S.C.

13

impairment must render the claimant incapable of performing the

14

work he previously performed and incapable of performing any other

15

substantial gainful employment that exists in the national economy.

16

Tackett v. Apfel, 180 F.3d 1094, 1098 (9th Cir. 1999)(citing 42

17

U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(A)).

(9th

Cir.

1998)(citing

42

§

423(d)(1)(A)).

The

18
19

To decide if a claimant is entitled to benefits, an ALJ

20

conducts a five-step inquiry.

21

steps are:

20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920.

The

22
23

(1)

Is the claimant presently engaged in substantial gainful

24

activity? If so, the claimant is found not disabled.

25

not, proceed to step two.

If

26
27
28

Substantial gainful activity means work that involves doing
significant and productive physical or mental duties and is done
for pay or profit. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1510, 416.910.
1

15

1

(2)

2

Is the claimant’s impairment severe?
is found not disabled.

3

(3)

If not, the claimant

If so, proceed to step three.

Does the claimant’s impairment meet or equal one of a list

4

of specific impairments described in 20 C.F.R. Part 404,

5

Subpart P, Appendix 1?

6

disabled.

7

(4)

If so, the claimant is found

If not, proceed to step four.

Is the claimant capable of performing his past work?

8

so, the claimant is found not disabled.

9

If

step five.

10

(5)

If not, proceed to

Is the claimant able to do any other work?

11

claimant is found disabled.

12

If not, the

not disabled.

If so, the claimant is found

13
14

Tackett, 180 F.3d at 1098-99; see also Bustamante v. Massanari,

15

262 F.3d 949, 953-54 (9th Cir. 2001)(citing Tackett); 20 C.F.R. §§

16

404.1520(b) – 404.1520(f)(1) & 416.920(b) – 416.920(f)(1).

17
18

The claimant has the burden of proof at steps one through

19

four, and the Commissioner has the burden of proof at step five.

20

Bustamante, 262 F.3d at 953-54 (citing Tackett).

21

the ALJ has an affirmative duty to assist the claimant in developing

22

the record at every step of the inquiry.

23

four, the claimant meets his burden of establishing an inability

24

to perform past work, the Commissioner must show that the claimant

25

can perform some other work that exists in “significant numbers”

26

in

the

national

economy,

taking

27
28
16

into

Additionally,

Id. at 954.

account

the

If, at step

claimant’s

1

residual functional capacity,2 age, education, and work experience.

2

Tackett, 180 F.3d at 1098, 1100; Reddick, 157 F.3d at 721; 20

3

C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(f)(1), 416.920(f)(1).

4

so by the testimony of a vocational expert or by reference to the

5

Medical-Vocational Guidelines appearing in 20 C.F.R. Part 404,

6

Subpart P, Appendix 2 (commonly known as “the Grids”).

7

v. Apfel, 240 F.3d 1157, 1162 (9th Cir. 2001)(citing Tackett).

8

When

9

nonexertional limitations, the Grids are inapplicable and the ALJ

a

claimant

has

both

exertional

The Commissioner may do

Osenbrock

(strength-related)

and

10

must take the testimony of a vocational expert.

11

216 F.3d 864, 869 (9th Cir. 2000)(citing Burkhart v. Bowen, 856

12

F.2d 1335, 1340 (9th Cir. 1988)).

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Moore v. Apfel,

24
25
26
27
28

Residual functional capacity is “what [one] can still do despite
[his] limitations” and represents an “assessment based upon all of
the relevant evidence.” 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1545(a), 416.945(a).
2

17

1

V.

2

THE ALJ’S DECISION

3
4

The ALJ used the above five-step process and found Plaintiff

5

was not disabled according to the Social Security Act.

6

28).

7

by the Social Security Act through December 31, 2016.

8

At step one, the ALJ found Plaintiff had not engaged in

9

substantial gainful activity from the alleged disability onset

(AR 15-

Initially, the ALJ found Plaintiff was insured as required

10

date.

11

(AR 17).

multiple severe impairments:

(AR 17).

At step two, the ALJ found Plaintiff had

12
13
14
15
16
17

“degenerative joint disease of the bilateral
knees; cervical fusion with chronic low back
pain; disorder of the left elbow secondary to
fracture; left shoulder rotator cuff tear; cardio
disorder, history of tachycardia, status post
ablation of supraventricular tachycardia; bipolar
disorder; and a history of alcohol abuse.” (AR
17).

18

The ALJ considered all of Plaintiff’s found impairments for the

19

remaining steps of the evaluation process.

20

three, the ALJ found Plaintiff’s impairments did not meet or

21

medically equal in whole or in part any of the specific impairments

22

as required under this step of the process.

23

ALJ determined Plaintiff’s residual functional capacity for use in

24

steps four and five.

25

functional capacity allows her to perform light work with certain

26

exceptions:

(AR 20).

(AR 17-28).

(AR 17).

At step

Next, the

The ALJ found Plaintiff’s residual

27
28
18

1
2

“occasional pushing and pulling with the upper
left extremity and bilateral lower extremities;
no operation of foot pedals; standing and/or
walking for 6 hours in an 8-hour day, with no
prolonged walking greater than an hour at a time;
sitting for 6 hours in an 8-hour day, with the
ability to stand and stretch as needed, but not
to exceed 10% of the day; no climbing ladders,
ropes, or scaffolds; no kneeling or crawling;
frequent use of left upper non dominant extremity
for fine and gross manipulation; no limits to the
right extremity; no exposure to work hazards,
such as working at unprotected heights or
operating fast or dangerous machinery; noncomplex
routine tasks; and the claimant can perform jobs
that do not require hypervigilance.” (AR 20).

3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21

In reaching this residual functional capacity, the ALJ gave
no weight to the opinion of Plaintiff’s treating doctor, Dr. Felix.
(AR 22).

Based on this residual functional capacity, at step four

the ALJ found Plaintiff is unable to perform her previous work.
(AR 26).

Finally, at step five the ALJ found there are other jobs

in the national economy in significant numbers that Plaintiff could
perform.

(AR 27).

Thus, the ALJ found Plaintiff was not disabled

under the Social Security Act from the alleged onset date through
the date of the decision.

(AR 28).

22
23
24

VI.
STANDARD OF REVIEW

25
26
27
28

Under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), a district court may review the
Commissioner’s decision to deny benefits.

The court may set aside

the Commissioner’s decision when the ALJ’s findings are based on

19

1

legal error or are not supported by substantial evidence in the

2

record as a whole.

3

2014)(citing Stout v. Comm’r, Soc. Sec. Admin., 454 F.3d 1050, 1052

4

(9th Cir. 2006); Auckland v. Massanari, 257 F.3d 1033, 1035 (9th

5

Cir. 2001)(citing Tackett, 180 F.3d at 1097); Smolen v. Chater, 80

6

F.3d 1273, 1279 (9th Cir. 1996)(citing Fair v. Bowen, 885 F.2d 597,

7

601 (9th Cir. 1989)).

Garrison v. Colvin, 759 F.3d 995 (9th Cir.

8
9

“Substantial evidence is more than a scintilla, but less than

10

a preponderance.”

11

Chater, 112 F.3d 1064, 1066 (9th Cir. 1997)).

12

evidence which a reasonable person might accept as adequate to

13

support a conclusion.”

14

Smolen,

15

evidence supports a finding, the court must “‘consider the record

16

as a whole, weighing both evidence that supports and evidence that

17

detracts from the [Commissioner’s] conclusion.’” Auckland, 257 F.3d

18

at 1035 (citing Penny v. Sullivan, 2 F.3d 953, 956 (9th Cir. 1993)).

19

If

20

reversing

21

judgment for that of the Commissioner.

22

21 (citing Flaten v. Sec’y, 44 F.3d 1453, 1457 (9th Cir. 1995)).

the

80

F.3d

at

evidence
that

Reddick, 157 F.3d at 720 (citing Jamerson v.

Id. (citing Jamerson, 112 F.3d at 1066;

1279).

can

It is “relevant

To

determine

reasonably

conclusion,

the

support
court

whether

either

may

not

substantial

affirming
substitute

or
its

Reddick, 157 F.3d at 720-

23
24

VII.

25

DISCUSSION

26
27
28

Plaintiff contends the ALJ failed to properly consider and
weigh

her

treating

physician’s
20

medical

opinion

regarding

her

1

physical conditions and limitations.3

2

ALJ did not give sufficiently specific and legitimate reasons that

3

were supported by substantial evidence in her decision to give no

4

weight to Dr. Felix’s opinion.

5

erred in failing to request clarification from Dr. Felix regarding

6

his opinion because there are no records from him in Plaintiff’s

7

record other than his Medical Opinion form.

First, Plaintiff argues the

Second, Plaintiff claims the ALJ

8
9

The ALJ Provided Specific And Legitimate Reasons To Reject

10

Plaintiff’s Treating Doctor’s Opinion

11
12

Although a treating physician’s opinion is usually entitled

13

to great deference, it is “not necessarily conclusive as to either

14

the

15

Morgan v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 169 F.3d 595, 600 (9th Cir.

16

1999).

17

opinion of another doctor, the ALJ may properly reject the treating

18

doctor’s opinion by providing “specific and legitimate reasons

19

supported by substantial evidence in the record for so doing.”

20

Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 830 (9th Cir. 1995).

21

an examining doctor’s opinion is contradicted by another doctor,

22

it too can only be rejected based on the specific and legitimate

23

reasons standard.

physical

condition

or

the

ultimate

issue

of

disability.”

When the treating doctor’s opinion is contradicted by the

Similarly, if

Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 830-31 (9th Cir.

24
25
26
27
28

While Plaintiff was also diagnosed with mental impairments. In a
communication to the Appeals Council, Plaintiff argued that her
mental impairments should have been the focus of the ALJ’s
decision. However, she failed to raise this issue in her brief
before this Court. Accordingly, it is waived. Even if Plaintiff
had raised it, the Court finds that the ALJ appropriately
considered the evidence regarding mental impairments.
3

21

1

1995).

2

facts and conflicting medical evidence and stating her conclusions.

3

Magallanes v. Bowen, 881 F.2d 747, 751 (9th Cir. 1989); Garrison

4

v. Colvin, 759 F.3d 995, 1012 (9th Cir. 2014).

This standard can be met by the ALJ detailing all of the

5
6

“Where the opinion of the claimant’s treating physician is

7

contradicted, and the opinion of a nontreating source is based on

8

independent

9

treating physician, the opinion of the nontreating source may

clinical

findings

that

differ

from

those

of

the

10

itself be substantial evidence."

11

1041 (9th Cir. 1995).

12

opinions, the ALJ decides how to resolve them based on how credible

13

they are.

14

2008)(citing Andrews, 53 F.3d at 1039-40); Batson v. Comm’r of Soc.

15

Sec. Admin., 359 F.3d 1190, 1195 (9th Cir. 2004) (citing Matney v.

16

Sullivan, 981 F.2d 1016, 1019 (9th Cir. 1992)).

Andrews v. Shalala, 53 F.3d 1035,

If there are conflicts between the medical

Tommasetti v. Astrue, 533 F.3d 1035, 1041-42 (9th Cir.

17
18

Here, the ALJ noted conflicts between Plaintiff’s treating

19

physician’s medical opinion and the state agency doctors’ medical

20

opinions and found that the treating doctor’s opinion was too

21

limiting.

22

opinion was not consistent with Plaintiff’s medical records and

23

reported daily activities.

24

the state agency doctors’ opinions were “generally consistent with

25

the medical record as a whole and with the claimant’s reported

26

activities of daily living.”

27

noted between different doctors’ opinions, the ALJ needed to

(AR 22-23).

The ALJ found the treating doctor’s medical

(AR 22).

In contrast, the ALJ found

(AR 22).

28
22

Because conflicts were

1
2

provide specific and legitimate reasons supported by substantial

3

evidence in the record to reject Plaintiff’s treating physician’s

4

opinion.

Lester, 81 F.3d at 830.

5
6

Dr. Felix gave more severe restrictions than did the State

7

agency doctors regarding Plaintiff’s limitations in using her upper

8

extremities.

9

the ALJ noted the medical evidence of Plaintiff’s surgeon, Dr.

10

Dhalla, which stated Plaintiff had healed well following her left

11

shoulder and elbow treatment, supported the state agency doctors’

12

view of Plaintiff’s abilities.

13

had 170 degrees of elevation in her left shoulder and had no pain

14

or weakness during her left rotator cuff test.

15

an

16

surgeon, and is itself substantial evidence for the ALJ’s decision.

17

The ALJ also noted that x-rays of Plaintiff’s shoulders taken in

18

2014 showed no significant findings.

19

undermined Plaintiff’s allegations of disabling pain.

20

The surgeon’s report as well as the x-rays provide specific and

21

legitimate reasons to reject Dr. Felix’s opinion that Plaintiff is

22

severely limited in her use of her upper extremities.

In evaluating the state agency doctors’ opinions,

independent

clinical

(AR 22).

finding

by

a

Specifically, Plaintiff

(AR 22).

treating

This is

physician,

her

This objective evidence also
(AR 22).

(AR 23).

23
24

The ALJ next addressed Plaintiff’s knee and back pain.

25

ALJ noted that Plaintiff was diagnosed with bilateral degenerative

26

joint disease of the knees and chronic low back pain resulting from

27

a previous cervical spine fusion.

28

noted Plaintiff was not receiving treatment for these symptoms.
23

(AR 22).

The

However, the ALJ also

1

Instead, these conditions were only being “monitored”.

2

This lack of treatment conflicts with Dr. Felix’s opinion that

3

Plaintiff can only stand or walk for three hours in an eight-hour

4

day and only stand for 10 minutes at a time.

5

conflicts with Dr. Felix’s opinion that Plaintiff can only sit for

6

two hours in an eight-hour day and only for thirty minutes at a

7

time.

8

legitimate reason to reject Dr. Felix’s opinion.

(AR 23).

(AR 22).

(AR 23).

It also

As such, it also serves as a specific and

9
10

The ALJ also considered Plaintiff’s heart condition.

The ALJ

11

observed Plaintiff was diagnosed with atrial tachycardia and had

12

an ablation performed in November 2013.

13

ALJ again noted that Plaintiff received no further documented

14

treatment for this condition.

15

mentioned Plaintiff’s cardiac testing returned normal results. (AR

16

22). Accordingly, the ALJ provided specific and legitimate reasons

17

for rejecting limitations based upon Plaintiff’s heart condition.

(AR 22).

(AR 22).

However, the

Additionally, the ALJ

18
19

The ALJ also properly relied upon Plaintiff’s self-reported

20

daily activities as a reason to reject the degree of limitation

21

set forth by Dr. Felix.

22

included

23

cooking, playing games, watching TV, and going to her appointments.

24

(AR

25

independent, able to take care of herself and not as physically

26

limited as Dr. Felix claims.

27

have to cease all daily activities before she can be found to be

28

disabled.

23).

doing

All

The ALJ found Plaintiff’s daily activities

household

of

chores,

these

She is correct.

running

activities

errands,

indicate

shopping,

Plaintiff

is

Plaintiff argues that she does not

However, the ALJ did not look at
24

1

Plaintiff’s daily activities in isolation.

2

them along with the medical evidence and found that Dr. Felix’s

3

opinion regarding Plaintiff’s limitations was further undermined

4

by Plaintiff’s daily activities.

Rather, she considered

5
6

The ALJ also considered the opinions of the State agency

7

medical consultants.

8

record and so gave them the most weight.

9

reviewed Plaintiff’s medical record and reached medical opinions

10

regarding her limitations that the ALJ found was consistent with

11

the medical record.

12

medical opinions on clinical findings independent of the treating

13

physician’s findings, their opinions can serve as substantial

14

evidence.

She found them to be supported by the medical
(AR 22).

These doctors

Because the State agency doctors based their

Andrews, 53 F.3d at 1041.

15
16

Plaintiff’s assertion that the ALJ should have contacted Dr.

17

Felix for clarification on his medical opinion and records is

18

without merit.

19

However, but that duty is only triggered if there is “ambiguous

20

evidence or when the record is inadequate to allow for proper

21

evaluation of the evidence.”

22

460 (9th Cir. 2001)(citing Tonapetyan v. Halter, 242 F.3d 1144,

23

1150 (9th Cir. 2001)).

24

was ambiguous or inadequate.

An ALJ does have a duty to develop the record.

Mayes v. Massanari, 276 F.3d 453,

Here, there is no showing that the record

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27 \\
28
25

1

VIII.

2

CONCLUSION

3
4

Consistent with the foregoing, IT IS ORDERED that Judgment be

5

entered AFFIRMING the decision of the Commissioner and dismissing

6

this action with prejudice.

7

of the Court serve copies of this Order and the Judgment on counsel

8

for both parties.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk

9
10

DATED:

October 30, 2017

11

/S/

12

SUZANNE H. SEGAL
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

13
14
15

THIS DECISION IS NOT INTENDED FOR PUBLICATION IN WESTLAW,
LEXIS OR ANY OTHER LEGAL DATABASE.

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17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
26