Stacy Lynn Hatfield v. Carolyn W. Colvin
Filing
20
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER by Magistrate Judge Suzanne H. Segal. IT IS ORDERED that Judgment be entered AFFIRMING the decision of the Commissioner and dismissing this action with prejudice. (mz)
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
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CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
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STACY LYNN HATFIELD,
Plaintiff,
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Case No. EDCV 17-0287 SS
v.
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER
NANCY A. BERRYHILl,
Commissioner
of
the
Social
Security Administration,
Defendant.
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I.
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INTRODUCTION
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Stacy Lynn Hatfield (“Plaintiff”) brings this action seeking
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to overturn the decision of the Commissioner of the Social Security
24
Administration (the “Commissioner”) denying her application for
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Disability Insurance Benefits (“DIB”).
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for a remand.
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(the “Complaint”) commencing the instant action.
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Defendant filed an Answer to the Complaint (the “Answer”).
Alternatively, she asks
On February 16, 2017, Plaintiff filed a complaint
On July 11, 2017,
The
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parties have consented to the jurisdiction of the undersigned
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United States Magistrate Judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c).
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the reasons stated below, the decision of the Commissioner is
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AFFIRMED.
For
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II.
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PROCEDURAL HISTORY
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On January 16, 2013, Plaintiff filed an application for DIB
10
under
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Plaintiff’s application alleges disability beginning on December
12
27, 2011 due to a left arm injury and residual pain, headaches,
13
anxiety, depression, and suicidal thoughts.
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DIB application was denied both initially on August 23, 2013 and
15
upon reconsideration on January 6, 2014.
Title
II.
(Administrative
Record
(“AR”)
(AR 173).
144-51).
Plaintiff’s
(AR 92-95, 99-102).
16
17
On January 15, 2014, Plaintiff requested a hearing by an
18
Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”).
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place in San Bernardino, California on February 3, 2015 with ALJ
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Nancy Stewart presiding.
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Stewart issued an unfavorable decision, finding Plaintiff able to
22
perform light work but with some additional limitations.
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33).
24
decision before the Appeals Council.
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2016, the Appeals Council denied Plaintiff’s request for review
26
and
27
Commissioner.
(AR 103-04).
(AR 34-58).
The hearing took
On April 24, 2015, ALJ
(AR 12-
On June 2, 2015, Plaintiff requested review of the ALJ’s
the
ALJ’s
decision
became
(AR 1-7).
28
2
the
(AR 11).
final
On December 23,
decision
of
the
1
III.
2
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
3
4
Plaintiff was born on April 7, 1962 and was 50 years old at
5
the time she filed her application for DIB.
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27, 2011, Plaintiff suffered a work injury.
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fell off a ladder from a height of approximately two ladder rungs
8
and struck her left elbow.
9
room (“ER”) and had surgery on her left elbow the following morning.
10
(AR 266).
(AR 59).
On December
(AR 266).
Plaintiff
She went to the emergency
(AR 259, 266).
11
12
A.
Plaintiff’s Medical History
13
14
When
applying
for
DIB,
Plaintiff
alleged
suffering
from
15
“depression, headaches, suicidal, injured left arm, anxiety and
16
constant pain from the arm injury.”
(AR 173).
17
18
1.
Physical Health History
19
20
a.
Left Elbow Condition
21
22
On December 28, 2011, Plaintiff had surgery on her left elbow.
23
(AR 259).
24
where she was diagnosed with “a displaced olecranon fracture and a
25
nondisplaced distal humeral fracture.
26
Dhalla performed surgery on Plaintiff’s left elbow at Riverside
27
Community Hospital.
28
reduction
After falling at work, Plaintiff went to the hospital
internal
(AR 259).
fixation
of
3
(AR 266, 267).
Dr. Raja
The procedure involved “open
left
elbow
olecranon
process
1
fracture
2
interpretation of fluoroscopy.”
3
procedure, Dr. Dhalla found Plaintiff’s left elbow had “good range
4
of motion” and that there was “no block to the range of motion.”
5
(AR 260).
with
Acumed
plates
and
screws”
(AR 259).
with
the
“use
of
At the end of the
6
7
On April 3, 2012, Plaintiff underwent an MRI of her left
8
shoulder at SimonMed.
9
and concluded that Plaintiff had “mild bursal sided fraying of the
10
far anterior insertion of the supraspinatus tendon” and “associated
11
tendinopathy” but no “full-thickness tear.”
(AR 249).
12
found
but
13
fracture, or muscle atrophy.”
14
“degenerative changes as described, mild impingement and mild
15
subacromial/subdeltoid bursitis.”
“mild
proximal
(AR 249).
biceps
Dr. Jeffrey Dym reviewed the MRI
tendinopathy,”
(AR 249).
no
He also
“effusion,
Additionally, he found
(AR 249).
16
17
On June 18, 2012, Plaintiff underwent a series of x-rays of
18
her left elbow.
19
the olecranon fracture had healed.
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alignment was good with no apparent dislocation or sublaxation.
21
(AR 289).
22
found to still be in place and were not bent, broken, or loose.
23
(AR 289).
(AR 289).
Dr. Raja Dhalla reviewed them and found
(AR 289, 290).
The elbow
The plates and screws that had been attached were also
24
25
On July 24, 2012, Plaintiff had surgery on her left elbow and
26
shoulder. (AR 251). Dr. Raja Dhalla also performed this outpatient
27
surgery at Riverside Community Hospital.
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diagnosed with “status post left elbow open reduction internal
4
(AR 251).
Plaintiff was
1
fixation of olecranon with Acumed plate and screws” and “frozen
2
shoulder syndrome.”
3
of the Acumed plate and screws from the left elbow, arthroscopic
4
synovectomy
5
superior labrum with arthroscopic capsule release and bursectomy
6
with subacromial decompression.”
7
shoulder were also manipulated during the surgery.
8
During the procedure, the surgeon saw the rotator cuff tendon and
9
there was no rotator cuff tear.
of
the
(AR 251).
left
The surgery involved the removal
shoulder,
“debridement
(AR 251).
of
posterior
Plaintiff’s elbow and
(AR 251).
(AR 252).
10
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On November 18, 2013, Plaintiff had a follow-up appointment
12
with Dr. Dhalla for her left shoulder.
13
Plaintiff had 170 degrees of elevation with her left shoulder and
14
did not have pain or weakness during rotator cuff testing.
15
363).
16
and has done very well.” (AR 636). Part of that treatment included
17
physical therapy which Plaintiff also completed.
(AR 635).
Dr. Dhalla found
(AR
Dr. Dhalla also reported Plaintiff “has completed treatment
(AR 292-338).
18
19
On February 27, 2014, Dr. Christopher Fleming completed an
20
examination
21
compensation
22
physically examining Plaintiff and reviewing her records.
23
669).
24
connected to her left elbow injury because she was compensating
25
with her right arm.
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unreasonable” for her to develop pain in her right shoulder despite
27
being right-handed.
28
not just her left shoulder but also her left elbow after her work
of
Plaintiff
calim.
(AR
in
connection
648).
This
with
her
workers’
examination
included
(AR
Dr. Fleming opined that Plaintiff’s right shoulder pain was
(AR 669).
He explained that it was “not
(AR 668-69).
5
Because she experienced pain in
1
injury, she would have used her right arm for everything which
2
could have resulted in injury to her right shoulder.
3
Dr. Fleming listed work restrictions for Plaintiff:
(AR 668-69).
4
5
6
7
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For the shoulders, the patient has precluded from
repetitive use of the upper extremities at or above
shoulder level.
For left upper extremity, she has
precluded from repetitive heavy lifting, pushing,
pulling, gripping, grasping, or other repetitive tasks
more than 10 pounds. (AR 666).
9
10
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Dr. Fleming recommended an MRI scan for the right shoulder to
determine if further treatment was required.
(AR 666).
He stated
Plaintiff should continue to exercise her left shoulder at home.
(AR 666).
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Plaintiff’s
treatments
prior
medical
to
records
her
alleged
also
indicate
onset
date
a
of
history
of
disability.
Plaintiff had a past cervical spine fusion of the C6 and C7
vertebrae. (AR 283). She also had a previous left shoulder rotator
cuff repair.
(AR 283).
are also listed.
Previous right shoulder and arm fractures
(AR 283).
21
b.
22
Heart Condition
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On December 29, 2012, Plaintiff had an echocardiogram (“ECG”)
performed
at
Riverside
Community
Hospital.
(AR
258).
When
Plaintiff went to the ER after her work injury, the ER doctor noted
a history of cardiac arrhythmia which required Plaintiff to receive
medical clearance for surgery by an internal medicine specialist.
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1
(AR 266-67).
2
surgery but requested an ECG and recommended Plaintiff receive
3
further evaluation.
4
Sivanandan Vasudevan who found that Plaintiff’s cardiac valves were
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normal. In addition, Plaintiff had normal intracardiac dimensions,
6
her left ventrical wall motion was normal, her Doppler study was
7
within normal limits, there was no pericardial effusion and her RV
8
function was normal.
The internal medicine specialist cleared her for
(AR 269).
The ECG was reviewed by Dr.
(AR 258).
9
10
On
September
11,
2013,
Plaintiff
saw
Dr.
Andrew
Ho
at
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Riverside Cardiology Associates.
12
experiencing heart palpitations.
13
Plaintiff
has
paroxysmal
14
regurgitation.
(AR 679).
15
regurgitation as remaining “overall stable” and noted she had an
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ablation scheduled for the tachycardia.
atrial
(AR 678).
Plaintiff reported
(AR 678).
tachycardia
Dr. Ho indicated
and
mitral
valve
Dr. Ho listed Plaintiff’s mitral valve
(AR 678).
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18
On October 28, 2013, Plaintiff had an ablation procedure for
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supraventricular
20
performed the procedure.
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November 6, 2013, Plaintiff said she had not had a rapid heartbeat
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after the ablation “but it feels different.”
23
requested a stress test and informed Plaintiff she may need to have
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another ablation or she may need a permanent pacemaker.
tachycardia.
(AR
(AR 694).
694).
Dr.
Vilma
Torres
At her follow-up visit on
(AR 694).
Dr. Torres
(AR 694).
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26
On November 6, 2013, Plaintiff underwent a treadmill test at
27
Loma Linda University Health System at the request of Dr. Vilma
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Torres.
(AR 687).
Plaintiff’s diagnosis was cardiac arrhythmias,
7
1
unspecified.
2
resting ECG revealed normal sinus rhythm and first degree AV block.
3
(AR
4
premature ventricular contractions.
5
response was negative for ischemia.
687).
(AR 687).
With
her
During the stress test, Plaintiff’s
arrhythmias,
she
also
showed
(AR 687).
occasional
Her stress ECG
(AR 687).
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2. Mental Health History
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On April 15, 2013, Riverside Center for Behavioral Medicine
10
admitted
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dependence, sedative hypnotic dependence, opioid abuse, bipolar
12
disorder, depressed versus mood disorder secondary to alcohol
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dependence.
14
on April 17, 2013.
15
(AR 452).
16
413-14).
17
(AR 414).
18
discharged.
19
being suicidal.
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by the death of her mother in September 2012.
Plaintiff,
with
several
(AR 413, 452).
(AR 413).
diagnoses
including
alcohol
The Riverside Center discharged her
Dr. Mekund Deshmukh treated her.
She received treatment for alcohol detoxification.
(AR
When she was admitted, she received a GAF score of 25.
Her GAF score improved to 40 by the time she was
(AR 413).
She claimed she was depressed but denied
(AR 414).
Her depression appeared to be affected
(AR 418).
21
22
On
April
24,
2013,
Plaintiff
was
admitted
to
a
partial
23
hospitalization program at Riverside Center for Behavioral Medicine
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with the same doctor to receive supportive care.
(AR 462).
25
26
On February 12, 2014, Plaintiff started receiving treatment
27
from Riverside Psychiatric Medical Group.
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treated by Nurse Practitioner (“NP”) Kathleen Comer.
8
(AR 646).
She was
(AR 646-47).
1
NP Comer listed alcohol dependence, anxiety - unspecified, bipolar
2
disorder – mixed unspecified, and adjustment disorder as problems
3
experienced by Plaintiff.
4
Plaintiff had not followed her medication regimen.
(AR 646).
NP Comer also noted that
(AR 646).
5
6
Plaintiff’s next visit with NP Comer was not until June 5,
7
2014. (AR 645). At that time, NP Comer noted Plaintiff had stopped
8
taking her medications for roughly three months.
9
Comer found Plaintiff had no orientation, cognitive, or memory
10
impairments.
(AR 645).
NP
(AR 645).
11
12
On July 22, 2014, Dr. Robin Campbell performed a complete
13
psychological evaluation of Plaintiff.
14
herself to the appointment.
15
552).
16
any trouble walking or standing. (AR 552). She was neatly groomed.
17
(AR 552).
18
Center for Behavioral Medicine but did not have access to any other
19
records. (AR 553). Plaintiff reported the ability to “do household
20
chores, run errands, shop, cook, dress and bathe herself.”
21
554).
22
reported that she likes to watch television and play games.
(AR
23
554).
She does not need physical assistance to get around.
(AR
24
554).
She also “gets along fairly well with those people she comes
25
into contact with on a daily basis.”
26
established “a rapport” with Dr. Campbell.
27
reported two prior arrests for DUI as well as methamphetamine and
28
cocaine use in the past.
(AR 552).
(AR 552).
Plaintiff drove
She arrived on time.
(AR
She was wearing a left arm brace but did not appear to have
Dr. Campbell reviewed Plaintiff’s records from Riverside
Plaintiff manages her own finances.
(AR 554).
9
(AR 554).
(AR 554).
(AR
Plaintiff
Plaintiff also
(AR 554).
Plaintiff
1
2
Dr.
Campbell
ultimately
found
Plaintiff
capable
of
3
“understanding, remembering, and carrying out” both simple and
4
detailed instructions.
5
Plaintiff can “make judgments on simple, work-related decisions.”
6
(AR 557).
7
with the public and people at work.
8
“moderately impaired” in dealing with work-related changes and
9
stressors.
10
(AR 557).
According to Dr. Campbell,
Plaintiff would have “moderate difficulty” interacting
(AR 557).
(AR 557).
She would also be
Dr. Campbell also believed Plaintiff is
capable of managing her finances.
(AR 557).
11
12
B.
Treating Physician Opinion
13
14
On March 21, 2014, Plaintiff’s treating physician, Dr. Allen
15
Felix, filled out a medical opinion form related to Plaintiff’s
16
ability to do work-related tasks.
17
can lift and carry less than ten pounds on an occasional basis,
18
meaning no more than one third of an eight-hour day.
19
He indicated Plaintiff can only stand and walk for about three
20
hours and only sit for about two hours during an eight-hour day
21
with normal breaks.
22
Plaintiff can only stand for ten minutes and sit for thirty minutes
23
before needing to alter position.
24
needs to walk around every twenty minutes for five minutes and that
25
she needs to be able to alternate freely between sitting and
26
standing.
27
to lie down once per day during working hours. (AR 676). Plaintiff
28
can only occasionally twist, stoop, crouch and climb stairs and
(AR 676).
(AR 675).
(AR 675).
He stated Plaintiff
(AR 675).
This was further qualified that
(AR 675).
He stated Plaintiff
Dr. Felix also indicated Plaintiff would need
10
1
can never climb ladders.
2
handle, finger, feel, and push/pull are impaired.
3
needs to avoid concentrated exposure to extreme heat, wetness,
4
humidity and noise.
5
ventilation, etc., she needs to avoid even moderate exposure.
6
677).
7
all exposure to extreme cold and hazards such as machinery and
8
heights.
(AR 676).
(AR 677).
Plaintiff’s ability to reach,
(AR 676).
She
Fumes, odors, dusts, gases, poor
(AR
Finally, according to Dr. Felix, Plaintiff needs to avoid
(AR 677).
9
10
Dr. Felix found all of these restrictions were based on
11
Plaintiff’s degenerative joint disease in both knees, cervical
12
fusion, chronic low back pain and limited use of left arm because
13
of the elbow fracture and rotator cuff tendonitis.
14
Additionally, Dr. Felix listed Plaintiff has trouble with dizziness
15
and balancing and that she has auditory hallucinations.
(AR 676).
(AR 677).
16
17
C.
State Agency Doctors
18
19
Two
Physical
20
Assessments
21
conducted.
and
(“Residual
Mental
Residual
Assessment”)
of
Functional
the
Capacity
Plaintiff
were
(AR 59-72, 74-90).
22
23
1.
Initial Level Residual Assessment
24
25
Dr. Paxton completed the Residual Assessment of the Plaintiff
26
at the initial level on August 23, 2013.
27
physical
28
exertional
limitations
assessment,
limitations,
Dr.
concerning
Paxton
11
(AR 59-72).
found
the
the
For the
Plaintiff’s
Plaintiff
can
1
occasionally lift twenty pounds and can frequently lift ten pounds.
2
(AR 67).
3
about six hours in an eight-hour work day and can sit for about
4
six hours in an eight-hour workday.
5
Plaintiff could push and/or pull (including operation of hand and
6
foot controls) subject to the lifting limitations.
7
Plaintiff’s
8
occasionally climb ramps and stairs, balance, stoop, kneel, crouch
9
and crawl.
Dr. Paxton also found the Plaintiff can stand and/or walk
postural
(AR 67). Dr. Paxton found the
limitations
(AR 67).
were
such
that
(AR 67).
she
could
However, Dr. Paxton found the Plaintiff can
10
never
11
manipulative limitations, Dr. Paxton found that Plaintiff’s left
12
overhead
13
manipulation, and skin receptors were not limited.
14
Regarding environmental limitations, Dr. Paxton found Plaintiff
15
should avoid concentrated exposure to vibration and hazards such
16
as heights and machinery.
17
visual or communicative limitations.
climb
ladders,
reach
was
ropes,
limited
or
but
scaffolds.
her
(AR 68).
gross
(AR
67).
For
manipulation,
fine
(AR 68).
Dr. Paxton did not find any
(AR 68).
18
19
Dr. Paxton also assessed Plaintiff’s mental limitations.
20
Paxton found Plaintiff’s concentration and persistence limitations
21
are not significantly limited except she is moderately limited in
22
carrying out detailed instructions.
23
social
24
moderately limited in her ability to appropriately interact with
25
the public.
26
any understanding and memory limitations or adaptation limitations.
27
(AR 69, 70).
28
but was limited to unskilled, light work.
interaction
limitations,
(AR 70).
(AR 69).
Plaintiff
Dr.
In relation to
was
found
to
be
Dr. Paxton did not find Plaintiff to have
Overall, Dr. Paxton found Plaintiff was not disabled
12
(AR 71).
1
2.
Reconsideration Level Residual Assessment
2
3
Dr. DeBorja completed the Residual Assessment of Plaintiff at
4
the reconsideration level on January 2, 2014. (AR 74-90). Starting
5
with
6
Plaintiff had the same exertional limitations as the initial level
7
Residual Assessment except she was also limited in her left upper
8
extremity when pushing and pulling.
9
postural limitations, Dr. DeBorja found the same limitations except
the
physical
limitations
assessment,
Dr.
(AR 84).
DeBorja
found
For Plaintiff’s
10
that Plaintiff could frequently stoop, kneel, and crouch.
11
Dr. DeBorja found the same manipulative limitations but specified
12
that left overhead reaching was limited to occasionally.
13
The environmental limitations were found to be the same with the
14
added statement that “moderate exposure to machineries that require
15
more
16
avoided.
than
occasional
postural
activity
to
operate”
(AR 84).
(AR 85).
should
be
(AR 86).
17
18
Dr. DeBorja also addressed some of Plaintiff’s allegations
19
regarding her physical limitations, finding them only partially
20
credible.
21
with Plaintiff’s right shoulder or elbow, the pain in her left
22
shoulder and elbow should not prevent her from being able to lift
23
more than 6 pounds.
24
Plaintiff to be experiencing any problems with ambulation such that
25
she would need to rest before walking a quarter of a mile.
26
86).
27
that Plaintiff suffered from headaches.
(AR 86).
Dr. DeBorja stated because there is no problem
(AR 86).
Dr. DeBorja found no reason for
(AR
The doctor also noted that the medical evidence did not show
28
13
(AR 86).
1
The mental limitations of Plaintiff were assessed during the
2
reconsideration
3
performed by a psychological consultant, Dr. Waranch.
4
Dr.
5
limitations to be the same with one addition. (AR 87). Dr. Waranch
6
found that Plaintiff was moderately limited in her ability to both
7
finish
8
psychological impairments interrupting and to maintain a consistent
9
work pace without unreasonable rest periods.
Waranch
a
level
found
normal
Residual
Assessment,
Plaintiff’s
work
however
concentration
schedule
without
they
were
(AR 81, 88).
and
persistence
symptoms
rooted
(AR 87).
in
However,
10
Dr.
11
maintaining attendance and completing a workweek” but that she
12
would have difficulty “carrying out detailed tasks and maintaining
13
attention and concentration for such tasks on a regular basis.”
14
(AR 87).
15
capable
16
maintaining attention and concentration when doing so.”
17
Dr.
18
included moderate limitations to her ability to take directions
19
and correction from supervisors and to get along with coworkers
20
without distracting them or displaying extreme behaviors.
21
Dr. Waranch explained that Plaintiff can interact with the public
22
and get along with both supervisors and coworkers but only if the
23
contacts are short and intermittent.
(AR 87).
For adaptation
24
limitations,
Plaintiff
was
25
limited
26
environment and travel in new places or use public transportation.
27
(AR 88).
28
pressures in the work setting if they are not constant.
Waranch
explained
that
Plaintiff
would
be
“capable
of
Additionally, Dr. Waranch stated that Plaintiff is
of
Waranch
in
completing
found
Dr.
both
“simple,
Plaintiff’s
Waranch
her
social
found
ability
2-3
that
to
step
instructions
interaction
handle
changes
and
(AR 87).
limitations
in
(AR 87).
moderately
the
work
Dr. Waranch explained Plaintiff can adapt to changes and
14
(AR 88).
1
Dr. Waranch did not find any understanding and memory limitations.
2
(AR 86).
3
4
IV.
5
THE FIVE-STEP SEQUENTIAL EVALUATION PROCESS
6
7
To
qualify
for
disability
benefits,
a
claimant
must
8
demonstrate a medically determinable physical or mental impairment
9
that prevents him from engaging in substantial gainful activity1
10
and that is expected to result in death or to last for a continuous
11
period of at least twelve months.
Reddick v. Chater, 157 F.3d 715,
12
721
U.S.C.
13
impairment must render the claimant incapable of performing the
14
work he previously performed and incapable of performing any other
15
substantial gainful employment that exists in the national economy.
16
Tackett v. Apfel, 180 F.3d 1094, 1098 (9th Cir. 1999)(citing 42
17
U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(A)).
(9th
Cir.
1998)(citing
42
§
423(d)(1)(A)).
The
18
19
To decide if a claimant is entitled to benefits, an ALJ
20
conducts a five-step inquiry.
21
steps are:
20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920.
The
22
23
(1)
Is the claimant presently engaged in substantial gainful
24
activity? If so, the claimant is found not disabled.
25
not, proceed to step two.
If
26
27
28
Substantial gainful activity means work that involves doing
significant and productive physical or mental duties and is done
for pay or profit. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1510, 416.910.
1
15
1
(2)
2
Is the claimant’s impairment severe?
is found not disabled.
3
(3)
If not, the claimant
If so, proceed to step three.
Does the claimant’s impairment meet or equal one of a list
4
of specific impairments described in 20 C.F.R. Part 404,
5
Subpart P, Appendix 1?
6
disabled.
7
(4)
If so, the claimant is found
If not, proceed to step four.
Is the claimant capable of performing his past work?
8
so, the claimant is found not disabled.
9
If
step five.
10
(5)
If not, proceed to
Is the claimant able to do any other work?
11
claimant is found disabled.
12
If not, the
not disabled.
If so, the claimant is found
13
14
Tackett, 180 F.3d at 1098-99; see also Bustamante v. Massanari,
15
262 F.3d 949, 953-54 (9th Cir. 2001)(citing Tackett); 20 C.F.R. §§
16
404.1520(b) – 404.1520(f)(1) & 416.920(b) – 416.920(f)(1).
17
18
The claimant has the burden of proof at steps one through
19
four, and the Commissioner has the burden of proof at step five.
20
Bustamante, 262 F.3d at 953-54 (citing Tackett).
21
the ALJ has an affirmative duty to assist the claimant in developing
22
the record at every step of the inquiry.
23
four, the claimant meets his burden of establishing an inability
24
to perform past work, the Commissioner must show that the claimant
25
can perform some other work that exists in “significant numbers”
26
in
the
national
economy,
taking
27
28
16
into
Additionally,
Id. at 954.
account
the
If, at step
claimant’s
1
residual functional capacity,2 age, education, and work experience.
2
Tackett, 180 F.3d at 1098, 1100; Reddick, 157 F.3d at 721; 20
3
C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(f)(1), 416.920(f)(1).
4
so by the testimony of a vocational expert or by reference to the
5
Medical-Vocational Guidelines appearing in 20 C.F.R. Part 404,
6
Subpart P, Appendix 2 (commonly known as “the Grids”).
7
v. Apfel, 240 F.3d 1157, 1162 (9th Cir. 2001)(citing Tackett).
8
When
9
nonexertional limitations, the Grids are inapplicable and the ALJ
a
claimant
has
both
exertional
The Commissioner may do
Osenbrock
(strength-related)
and
10
must take the testimony of a vocational expert.
11
216 F.3d 864, 869 (9th Cir. 2000)(citing Burkhart v. Bowen, 856
12
F.2d 1335, 1340 (9th Cir. 1988)).
13
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17
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18
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19
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20
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21
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22
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23
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Moore v. Apfel,
24
25
26
27
28
Residual functional capacity is “what [one] can still do despite
[his] limitations” and represents an “assessment based upon all of
the relevant evidence.” 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1545(a), 416.945(a).
2
17
1
V.
2
THE ALJ’S DECISION
3
4
The ALJ used the above five-step process and found Plaintiff
5
was not disabled according to the Social Security Act.
6
28).
7
by the Social Security Act through December 31, 2016.
8
At step one, the ALJ found Plaintiff had not engaged in
9
substantial gainful activity from the alleged disability onset
(AR 15-
Initially, the ALJ found Plaintiff was insured as required
10
date.
11
(AR 17).
multiple severe impairments:
(AR 17).
At step two, the ALJ found Plaintiff had
12
13
14
15
16
17
“degenerative joint disease of the bilateral
knees; cervical fusion with chronic low back
pain; disorder of the left elbow secondary to
fracture; left shoulder rotator cuff tear; cardio
disorder, history of tachycardia, status post
ablation of supraventricular tachycardia; bipolar
disorder; and a history of alcohol abuse.” (AR
17).
18
The ALJ considered all of Plaintiff’s found impairments for the
19
remaining steps of the evaluation process.
20
three, the ALJ found Plaintiff’s impairments did not meet or
21
medically equal in whole or in part any of the specific impairments
22
as required under this step of the process.
23
ALJ determined Plaintiff’s residual functional capacity for use in
24
steps four and five.
25
functional capacity allows her to perform light work with certain
26
exceptions:
(AR 20).
(AR 17-28).
(AR 17).
At step
Next, the
The ALJ found Plaintiff’s residual
27
28
18
1
2
“occasional pushing and pulling with the upper
left extremity and bilateral lower extremities;
no operation of foot pedals; standing and/or
walking for 6 hours in an 8-hour day, with no
prolonged walking greater than an hour at a time;
sitting for 6 hours in an 8-hour day, with the
ability to stand and stretch as needed, but not
to exceed 10% of the day; no climbing ladders,
ropes, or scaffolds; no kneeling or crawling;
frequent use of left upper non dominant extremity
for fine and gross manipulation; no limits to the
right extremity; no exposure to work hazards,
such as working at unprotected heights or
operating fast or dangerous machinery; noncomplex
routine tasks; and the claimant can perform jobs
that do not require hypervigilance.” (AR 20).
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
In reaching this residual functional capacity, the ALJ gave
no weight to the opinion of Plaintiff’s treating doctor, Dr. Felix.
(AR 22).
Based on this residual functional capacity, at step four
the ALJ found Plaintiff is unable to perform her previous work.
(AR 26).
Finally, at step five the ALJ found there are other jobs
in the national economy in significant numbers that Plaintiff could
perform.
(AR 27).
Thus, the ALJ found Plaintiff was not disabled
under the Social Security Act from the alleged onset date through
the date of the decision.
(AR 28).
22
23
24
VI.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
25
26
27
28
Under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), a district court may review the
Commissioner’s decision to deny benefits.
The court may set aside
the Commissioner’s decision when the ALJ’s findings are based on
19
1
legal error or are not supported by substantial evidence in the
2
record as a whole.
3
2014)(citing Stout v. Comm’r, Soc. Sec. Admin., 454 F.3d 1050, 1052
4
(9th Cir. 2006); Auckland v. Massanari, 257 F.3d 1033, 1035 (9th
5
Cir. 2001)(citing Tackett, 180 F.3d at 1097); Smolen v. Chater, 80
6
F.3d 1273, 1279 (9th Cir. 1996)(citing Fair v. Bowen, 885 F.2d 597,
7
601 (9th Cir. 1989)).
Garrison v. Colvin, 759 F.3d 995 (9th Cir.
8
9
“Substantial evidence is more than a scintilla, but less than
10
a preponderance.”
11
Chater, 112 F.3d 1064, 1066 (9th Cir. 1997)).
12
evidence which a reasonable person might accept as adequate to
13
support a conclusion.”
14
Smolen,
15
evidence supports a finding, the court must “‘consider the record
16
as a whole, weighing both evidence that supports and evidence that
17
detracts from the [Commissioner’s] conclusion.’” Auckland, 257 F.3d
18
at 1035 (citing Penny v. Sullivan, 2 F.3d 953, 956 (9th Cir. 1993)).
19
If
20
reversing
21
judgment for that of the Commissioner.
22
21 (citing Flaten v. Sec’y, 44 F.3d 1453, 1457 (9th Cir. 1995)).
the
80
F.3d
at
evidence
that
Reddick, 157 F.3d at 720 (citing Jamerson v.
Id. (citing Jamerson, 112 F.3d at 1066;
1279).
can
It is “relevant
To
determine
reasonably
conclusion,
the
support
court
whether
either
may
not
substantial
affirming
substitute
or
its
Reddick, 157 F.3d at 720-
23
24
VII.
25
DISCUSSION
26
27
28
Plaintiff contends the ALJ failed to properly consider and
weigh
her
treating
physician’s
20
medical
opinion
regarding
her
1
physical conditions and limitations.3
2
ALJ did not give sufficiently specific and legitimate reasons that
3
were supported by substantial evidence in her decision to give no
4
weight to Dr. Felix’s opinion.
5
erred in failing to request clarification from Dr. Felix regarding
6
his opinion because there are no records from him in Plaintiff’s
7
record other than his Medical Opinion form.
First, Plaintiff argues the
Second, Plaintiff claims the ALJ
8
9
The ALJ Provided Specific And Legitimate Reasons To Reject
10
Plaintiff’s Treating Doctor’s Opinion
11
12
Although a treating physician’s opinion is usually entitled
13
to great deference, it is “not necessarily conclusive as to either
14
the
15
Morgan v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 169 F.3d 595, 600 (9th Cir.
16
1999).
17
opinion of another doctor, the ALJ may properly reject the treating
18
doctor’s opinion by providing “specific and legitimate reasons
19
supported by substantial evidence in the record for so doing.”
20
Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 830 (9th Cir. 1995).
21
an examining doctor’s opinion is contradicted by another doctor,
22
it too can only be rejected based on the specific and legitimate
23
reasons standard.
physical
condition
or
the
ultimate
issue
of
disability.”
When the treating doctor’s opinion is contradicted by the
Similarly, if
Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 830-31 (9th Cir.
24
25
26
27
28
While Plaintiff was also diagnosed with mental impairments. In a
communication to the Appeals Council, Plaintiff argued that her
mental impairments should have been the focus of the ALJ’s
decision. However, she failed to raise this issue in her brief
before this Court. Accordingly, it is waived. Even if Plaintiff
had raised it, the Court finds that the ALJ appropriately
considered the evidence regarding mental impairments.
3
21
1
1995).
2
facts and conflicting medical evidence and stating her conclusions.
3
Magallanes v. Bowen, 881 F.2d 747, 751 (9th Cir. 1989); Garrison
4
v. Colvin, 759 F.3d 995, 1012 (9th Cir. 2014).
This standard can be met by the ALJ detailing all of the
5
6
“Where the opinion of the claimant’s treating physician is
7
contradicted, and the opinion of a nontreating source is based on
8
independent
9
treating physician, the opinion of the nontreating source may
clinical
findings
that
differ
from
those
of
the
10
itself be substantial evidence."
11
1041 (9th Cir. 1995).
12
opinions, the ALJ decides how to resolve them based on how credible
13
they are.
14
2008)(citing Andrews, 53 F.3d at 1039-40); Batson v. Comm’r of Soc.
15
Sec. Admin., 359 F.3d 1190, 1195 (9th Cir. 2004) (citing Matney v.
16
Sullivan, 981 F.2d 1016, 1019 (9th Cir. 1992)).
Andrews v. Shalala, 53 F.3d 1035,
If there are conflicts between the medical
Tommasetti v. Astrue, 533 F.3d 1035, 1041-42 (9th Cir.
17
18
Here, the ALJ noted conflicts between Plaintiff’s treating
19
physician’s medical opinion and the state agency doctors’ medical
20
opinions and found that the treating doctor’s opinion was too
21
limiting.
22
opinion was not consistent with Plaintiff’s medical records and
23
reported daily activities.
24
the state agency doctors’ opinions were “generally consistent with
25
the medical record as a whole and with the claimant’s reported
26
activities of daily living.”
27
noted between different doctors’ opinions, the ALJ needed to
(AR 22-23).
The ALJ found the treating doctor’s medical
(AR 22).
In contrast, the ALJ found
(AR 22).
28
22
Because conflicts were
1
2
provide specific and legitimate reasons supported by substantial
3
evidence in the record to reject Plaintiff’s treating physician’s
4
opinion.
Lester, 81 F.3d at 830.
5
6
Dr. Felix gave more severe restrictions than did the State
7
agency doctors regarding Plaintiff’s limitations in using her upper
8
extremities.
9
the ALJ noted the medical evidence of Plaintiff’s surgeon, Dr.
10
Dhalla, which stated Plaintiff had healed well following her left
11
shoulder and elbow treatment, supported the state agency doctors’
12
view of Plaintiff’s abilities.
13
had 170 degrees of elevation in her left shoulder and had no pain
14
or weakness during her left rotator cuff test.
15
an
16
surgeon, and is itself substantial evidence for the ALJ’s decision.
17
The ALJ also noted that x-rays of Plaintiff’s shoulders taken in
18
2014 showed no significant findings.
19
undermined Plaintiff’s allegations of disabling pain.
20
The surgeon’s report as well as the x-rays provide specific and
21
legitimate reasons to reject Dr. Felix’s opinion that Plaintiff is
22
severely limited in her use of her upper extremities.
In evaluating the state agency doctors’ opinions,
independent
clinical
(AR 22).
finding
by
a
Specifically, Plaintiff
(AR 22).
treating
This is
physician,
her
This objective evidence also
(AR 22).
(AR 23).
23
24
The ALJ next addressed Plaintiff’s knee and back pain.
25
ALJ noted that Plaintiff was diagnosed with bilateral degenerative
26
joint disease of the knees and chronic low back pain resulting from
27
a previous cervical spine fusion.
28
noted Plaintiff was not receiving treatment for these symptoms.
23
(AR 22).
The
However, the ALJ also
1
Instead, these conditions were only being “monitored”.
2
This lack of treatment conflicts with Dr. Felix’s opinion that
3
Plaintiff can only stand or walk for three hours in an eight-hour
4
day and only stand for 10 minutes at a time.
5
conflicts with Dr. Felix’s opinion that Plaintiff can only sit for
6
two hours in an eight-hour day and only for thirty minutes at a
7
time.
8
legitimate reason to reject Dr. Felix’s opinion.
(AR 23).
(AR 22).
(AR 23).
It also
As such, it also serves as a specific and
9
10
The ALJ also considered Plaintiff’s heart condition.
The ALJ
11
observed Plaintiff was diagnosed with atrial tachycardia and had
12
an ablation performed in November 2013.
13
ALJ again noted that Plaintiff received no further documented
14
treatment for this condition.
15
mentioned Plaintiff’s cardiac testing returned normal results. (AR
16
22). Accordingly, the ALJ provided specific and legitimate reasons
17
for rejecting limitations based upon Plaintiff’s heart condition.
(AR 22).
(AR 22).
However, the
Additionally, the ALJ
18
19
The ALJ also properly relied upon Plaintiff’s self-reported
20
daily activities as a reason to reject the degree of limitation
21
set forth by Dr. Felix.
22
included
23
cooking, playing games, watching TV, and going to her appointments.
24
(AR
25
independent, able to take care of herself and not as physically
26
limited as Dr. Felix claims.
27
have to cease all daily activities before she can be found to be
28
disabled.
23).
doing
All
The ALJ found Plaintiff’s daily activities
household
of
chores,
these
She is correct.
running
activities
errands,
indicate
shopping,
Plaintiff
is
Plaintiff argues that she does not
However, the ALJ did not look at
24
1
Plaintiff’s daily activities in isolation.
2
them along with the medical evidence and found that Dr. Felix’s
3
opinion regarding Plaintiff’s limitations was further undermined
4
by Plaintiff’s daily activities.
Rather, she considered
5
6
The ALJ also considered the opinions of the State agency
7
medical consultants.
8
record and so gave them the most weight.
9
reviewed Plaintiff’s medical record and reached medical opinions
10
regarding her limitations that the ALJ found was consistent with
11
the medical record.
12
medical opinions on clinical findings independent of the treating
13
physician’s findings, their opinions can serve as substantial
14
evidence.
She found them to be supported by the medical
(AR 22).
These doctors
Because the State agency doctors based their
Andrews, 53 F.3d at 1041.
15
16
Plaintiff’s assertion that the ALJ should have contacted Dr.
17
Felix for clarification on his medical opinion and records is
18
without merit.
19
However, but that duty is only triggered if there is “ambiguous
20
evidence or when the record is inadequate to allow for proper
21
evaluation of the evidence.”
22
460 (9th Cir. 2001)(citing Tonapetyan v. Halter, 242 F.3d 1144,
23
1150 (9th Cir. 2001)).
24
was ambiguous or inadequate.
An ALJ does have a duty to develop the record.
Mayes v. Massanari, 276 F.3d 453,
Here, there is no showing that the record
25 \\
26 \\
27 \\
28
25
1
VIII.
2
CONCLUSION
3
4
Consistent with the foregoing, IT IS ORDERED that Judgment be
5
entered AFFIRMING the decision of the Commissioner and dismissing
6
this action with prejudice.
7
of the Court serve copies of this Order and the Judgment on counsel
8
for both parties.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk
9
10
DATED:
October 30, 2017
11
/S/
12
SUZANNE H. SEGAL
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
13
14
15
THIS DECISION IS NOT INTENDED FOR PUBLICATION IN WESTLAW,
LEXIS OR ANY OTHER LEGAL DATABASE.
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17
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19
20
21
22
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25
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