Ronaldus E.J. Evers v. Losahn Robbins Staley et al

Filing 5

MINUTES (IN CHAMBERS) by Judge Dolly M. Gee: DENYING PLAINTIFFS EX PARTE MOTION FOR PERMANENT AND PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION AND TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER AND DISMISSING ACTION WITHOUT PREJUDICE 1 (kr)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
CIVIL MINUTES—GENERAL
Case No.

Date

CV 17-968-DMG (DTBx)

May 17, 2017

Title Ronaldus F.J. Evers v. Losahn Robbins Staley Testamentary Trust
Dated July 25, 1974
Present: The Honorable

Page

1 of 4

DOLLY M. GEE, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

KANE TIEN
Deputy Clerk

NOT REPORTED
Court Reporter

Attorneys Present for Plaintiff(s)
None Present

Attorneys Present for Defendant(s)
None Present

Proceedings: IN CHAMBERS—ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S EX PARTE MOTION
FOR PERMANENT AND PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION AND
TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER [1]
Plaintiff Ronaldus F.J. Evers filed the instant Motion for Permanent and Preliminary
Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order (the “Motion”) against Defendant Losahn Robbins
Staley Testamentary Trust Dated July 25, 1974 (the “Trust”).1 [Doc. # 1.] Evers alleges that he
is one of two owners of the property central to this action (the “Property”), located at 1474 Old
Woman Springs Rd., Landers, CA 92285, and subject to an unlawful detainer action and eviction
order. Motion at 4, 5. A lock-out of the Property is scheduled for May 18, 2017. Id. at 5.
Everts asserts that he will sustain irreparable damages absent the issuance of a TRO. See id. at
5–6.
For the reasons discussed below, the Court DISMISSES the action without prejudice and
DENIES the Motion as moot.
I.
SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION 
“[F]ederal courts have an independent obligation to ensure that they do not exceed the
scope of their jurisdiction, and therefore they must raise and decide jurisdictional questions that
the parties either overlook or elect not to press.” Henderson ex rel. Henderson v. Shinseki, 131
S.Ct. 1197, 1202 (2011) (citing Arbaugh v. Y&H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 514, 126 S.Ct. 1235, 163
L.Ed.2d 1097 (2006)). It is presumed that causes of action lie outside federal courts’ limited
subject matter jurisdiction, and it is the party asserting the court’s subject matter jurisdiction who
1 The docket lists two defendants, but the Motion and attached documents indicate that the intended
Defendant is the testamentary trust of now-deceased Losahn Robbins Staley. See Doc. # 1 at 28 (notice of lodging
of Staley’s will).

CV-90

CIVIL MINUTES—GENERAL

Initials of Deputy Clerk KT

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
CIVIL MINUTES—GENERAL
Case No.

CV 17-968-DMG (DTBx)

Date

May 17, 2017

Title Ronaldus F.J. Evers v. Losahn Robbins Staley Testamentary Trust
Dated July 25, 1974

Page

2 of 4

bears the burden of establishing the contrary. E.g., Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am.,
511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994).
The district court’s subject matter jurisdiction may be based on diversity of citizenship or
federal question. District courts have diversity jurisdiction “where the matter in controversy
exceeds the sum or value of $75,000” and “is between[] citizens of different states.” 28 U.S.C.
§ 1332(a)(1). The party asserting subject matter jurisdiction based on diversity of citizenship
must present “summary-judgement-type evidence” relevant to the amount in controversy and the
citizenship of the parties. Valdez v. Allstate Ins. Co., 372 F.3d 1115, 1117 (9th Cir. 2004);
Kanter v. Warner-Lambert Co., 265 F.3d 853, 857 (9th Cir. 2001) (“[A] party seeking to invoke
diversity jurisdiction should be able to allege affirmatively the actual citizenship of the relevant
parties.”). Federal question jurisdiction occurs when the action “aris[es] under the Constitution,
laws, or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 1331. “The presence or absence of federalquestion jurisdiction is governed by the ‘well-pleaded complaint rule,’ which provides that
federal jurisdiction exists only when a federal question is presented on the face of the plaintiff’s
properly pleaded complaint.” Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392 (1987).
Evers did not submit a complaint. According to the civil cover sheet in this action, he
invokes this Court’s subject matter jurisdiction on the basis of diversity of citizenship. See Doc.
# 1-3. Evers is a California citizen. See, e.g., Motion at 3. The Trust’s citizenship is
unknown—neither the civil cover sheet, the Motion, nor the 80 pages attached thereto provide
that information. In fact, all events related to the Property and Evers’ alleged ownership interest
in the Property appear to have occurred in California. “Since the party asserting diversity
jurisdiction bears the burden of proof, [Evers’] failure to specify [the Trust’s] state citizenship
[i]s fatal to [his] assertion of diversity jurisdiction.” Kanter, 265 F.3d at 857–58 (citation
omitted).
Moreover, Evers has not proven by a preponderance of the evidence that the amount in
controversy exceeds $75,000. The Motion states that, at first, the unlawful detainer action
indicated that less than $10,000 was at stake but was later changed to the designation of an
“unlimited” action with “over $25,000” at stake. Motion at 4. This is a far cry from a showing,
by a preponderance of the evidence, that more than $75,000 is at issue.
To the extent Evers bases the action on a federal question, the Motion—even when
liberally construed as a complaint—raises none. The Motion mentions two statutes in passing:
15 U.S.C. section 1692 and 18 U.S.C. section 1623. See Motion at 5. Section 1623 is a criminal
statute that does not give Evers a right of action. Section 1692 is a provision of the Fair Debt
CV-90

CIVIL MINUTES—GENERAL

Initials of Deputy Clerk KT

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
CIVIL MINUTES—GENERAL
Case No.

Date

CV 17-968-DMG (DTBx)

May 17, 2017

Title Ronaldus F.J. Evers v. Losahn Robbins Staley Testamentary Trust
Dated July 25, 1974

Page

3 of 4

Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA”) that, although appearing on the face of the Motion, does not
apply here. Specifically, Evers alleges that he paid $150 when he filed an unlawful detainer
action. Id. When his action never went to trial, “the courts . . . violate[d] [his] rights under 15
U.S.C. [section] 1692 by taking monies from [him] for something that was never produced
and/or delivered.” Id. These allegations, even if true, do not give rise to a cause of action under
the FDCPA such that Evers’ case arises under federal law.
In sum, Evers has failed to establish this Court’s subject matter jurisdiction. The Court
therefore may not review the merits of his claim for the issuance of a TRO.
II.
CONCLUSION
Because this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the matter, the action is
DISMISSED without prejudice. Evers’ ex parte Motion for a TRO is DENIED as moot.
IT IS SO ORDERED.

CV-90

CIVIL MINUTES—GENERAL

Initials of Deputy Clerk KT