Fred Erin Dennison v. Sheriff John McMahon

Filing 4

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER Dismissing Complaint with Leave to Amend by Magistrate Judge John D. Early. The Complaint as currently alleged fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted and is subject to dismissal. Because it appears that the defic iency can be cured by amendment, dismissal will be with leave to amend. Accordingly, if Plaintiff still desires to pursue his claim, he must file a First Amended Complaint ("FAC") within thirty (30) days of the date of this Order, remedying the deficiency discussed. Plaintiff is admonished that if he fails to timely file a timely FAC this action may be dismissed with prejudice for failure to diligently prosecute and for the reasons discussed in this Order. (Attachments: # 1 blank First Amended Complaint form, # 2 blank Dismissal form) (ig)

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

9

CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

10

EASTERN DIVISION

11

FRED ERIN DENNISON,
Plaintiff,

12
13
14
15
16

Case No. EDCV 17-02032-PSG (JDE)
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
DIMISSING COMPLAINT WITH
LEAVE TO AMEND

v.
SHERIFF JOHN McMAHON,
Defendants.

17
18

I.

19

BACKGROUND

20

On October 3, 2017, Plaintiff Fred Erin Dennison (“Plaintiff”), who is

21

apparently in pre-trial detention at the West Valley Detention Center located in

22

Rancho Cucamonga, California (the “Jail”), filed this pro se civil rights action

23

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (“Section 1983). Dkt. 1 (“Complaint”). The

24

Complaint alleges that Plaintiff’s cell lacked a functioning light fixture for

25

more than 50 days, and as a result, Plaintiff, who is representing himself on

26

state court charges and has documented vision problems, has been forced to

27

delay his criminal case. See Complaint at p. 5 (CM/ECF pagination). Plaintiff

28

alleges that defendant Sheriff John McMahon (“Defendant McMahon”) was

1

personally aware of the problem and “refused to have Jail staff repair [the] cell

2

light even though [Plaintiff] informed him that [Plaintiff is] a certified pro per

3

inmate and . . . [has] serious vision problems.” Id. Plaintiff sues Defendant

4

McMahon solely in his “official capacity.” Id. at p. 3. Plaintiff seeks

5

“monetary compensation” as a result of the alleged civil rights violation. Id. at

6

p. 6.

7

In accordance with 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A, the Court must

8

screen the Complaint to determine whether the action is frivolous or malicious,

9

fails to state a claim on which relief might be granted, or seeks money damages

10

against a defendant who is immune from such relief.

11

II.

12

STANDARD OF REVIEW

13

A complaint may be dismissed as a matter of law for failure to state a

14

claim for two reasons: (1) lack of a cognizable legal theory; or (2) insufficient

15

facts under a cognizable legal theory. See Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t,

16

901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990). In determining whether the complaint states

17

a claim on which relief may be granted, its allegations of material fact must be

18

taken as true and construed in the light most favorable to Plaintiff. See Love v.

19

United States, 915 F.2d 1242, 1245 (9th Cir. 1989). Further, since Plaintiff is

20

appearing pro se, the Court must construe the allegations of the complaint

21

liberally and afford him the benefit of any doubt. See Karim-Panahi v. Los

22

Angeles Police Dep’t, 839 F.2d 621, 623 (9th Cir. 1988). However, “the liberal

23

pleading standard . . . applies only to a plaintiff’s factual allegations.” Neitzke

24

v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 330 n.9 (1989). “[A] liberal interpretation of a civil

25

rights complaint may not supply essential elements of the claim that were not

26

initially pled.” Bruns v. Nat’l Credit Union Admin., 122 F.3d 1251, 1257 (9th

27

Cir. 1997) (quoting Ivey v. Bd. of Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982)).

28

Moreover, with respect to Plaintiff’s pleading burden, the Supreme Court has
2

1

held that “a plaintiff’s obligation to provide the ‘grounds’ of his ‘entitlement to

2

relief’ requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of

3

the elements of a cause of action will not do. . . . Factual allegations must be

4

enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level . . . on the

5

assumption that all the allegations in the complaint are true (even if doubtful in

6

fact).” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (citations

7

omitted, alteration in original); see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678

8

(2009) (to avoid dismissal for failure to state a claim, “a complaint must

9

contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that

10

is plausible on its face.’ A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads

11

factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the

12

defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” (internal citation omitted)).

13

If the Court finds that a complaint should be dismissed for failure to state

14

a claim, the Court has discretion to dismiss with or without leave to amend.

15

Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126-30 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc). Leave to

16

amend should be granted if it appears possible that the defects in the complaint

17

could be corrected, especially if a plaintiff is pro se. Id. at 1130-31; see also

18

Cato v. United States, 70 F.3d 1103, 1106 (9th Cir. 1995) (noting that “[a] pro

19

se litigant must be given leave to amend his or her complaint, and some notice

20

of its deficiencies, unless it is absolutely clear that the deficiencies of the

21

complaint could not be cured by amendment”) (citing Noll v. Carlson, 809

22

F.2d 1446, 1448 (9th Cir. 1987)). However, if, after careful consideration, it is

23

clear that a complaint cannot be cured by amendment, the Court may dismiss

24

without leave to amend. Cato, 70 F.3d at 1105-06; see, e.g., Chaset v.

25

Fleer/Skybox Int’l, 300 F.3d 1083, 1088 (9th Cir. 2002) (holding that “there is

26

no need to prolong the litigation by permitting further amendment” where the

27

“basic flaw” in the pleading cannot be cured by amendment); Lipton v.

28

Pathogenesis Corp., 284 F.3d 1027, 1039 (9th Cir. 2002) (holding that
3

1

“[b]ecause any amendment would be futile, there was no need to prolong the

2

litigation by permitting further amendment.”).

3

III.

4

DISCUSSION

5

Section 1983 provides a method by which individuals can sue for

6

violations of their federal rights. Cortez v. County of Los Angeles, 294 F.3d

7

1186, 1188 (9th Cir. 2002). To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must

8

allege that the violation was committed by a “person” acting under the color of

9

State law. Will v. Michigan Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989). The

10

other requisite element is that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the

11

United States was violated. Long v. County of Los Angeles, 442 F.3d 1178,

12

1185 (9th Cir. 2006) (citing West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988)).

13

An “official-capacity suit is, in all respects other than name, to be treated

14

as a suit against the entity.” Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 166 (1985);

15

see also Brandon v. Holt, 469 U.S. 464, 471-72 (1985); Larez v. City of Los

16

Angeles, 946 F.2d 630, 646 (9th Cir. 1991). Such a suit “is not a suit against

17

the official personally, for the real party in interest is the entity.” Graham,

18

473 U.S. at 166 (emphasis in original).

19

In Payne v. McDermott, 683 F. App’x 643, 645 (9th Cir. 2017), the

20

Ninth Circuit affirmed a summary judgment of an official capacity claim

21

against a sheriff-jailer by a pretrial detainee, finding that the official capacity

22

suit was in reality an action against the government entity, and the plaintiff

23

had not demonstrated that the challenged conduct resulted from a government

24

policy or practice. Id. (citing Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694

25

(1978) (municipalities are liable for violations of civil rights under Section 1983

26

if violations result from the execution of a government's policy or custom)).

27

Based upon the foregoing authorities, Plaintiff’s claims against

28

Defendant McMahon in his official capacity is properly treated as a claim
4

1

against the government entity he represents. Plaintiff has not alleged sufficient

2

facts to state a claim for municipality liability under Monell; as a result, the

3

Complaint, as it alleges only an official capacity suit against Defendant

4

McMahon, fails to state a claim and is subject to dismissal.

5

With respect to whether the Complaint otherwise substantively states a

6

claim, the Court notes that the Ninth Circuit has held that “[a]dequate lighting

7

is one of the fundamental attributes of ‘adequate shelter’ required by the Eighth

8

Amendment.” Hoptowit v. Spellman, 753 F.2d 779, 784 (9th Cir. 1985).

9

Although a pretrial detainee’s claim for unconstitutional conditions of

10

confinement are analyzed under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth

11

Amendment rather than the Eighth Amendment, the same standards apply.

12

Simmons v. Navajo County, 609 F.3d 1011, 1017 (9th Cir. 2010).

13

IV.

14

CONCLUSION

15

The Complaint as currently alleged fails to state a claim upon which

16

relief may be granted and is subject to dismissal. Because it appears that the

17

deficiency can be cured by amendment, dismissal will be with leave to amend.

18

Accordingly, if Plaintiff still desires to pursue his claim, he must file a

19

First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) within thirty (30) days of the date of this

20

Order, remedying the deficiency discussed above. Specifically, if Plaintiff

21

wishes to pursue a claim for damages against Defendant John McMahon

22

individually, he must specify that the action is brought against the defendant in

23

his individual capacity.

24

The FAC should bear the docket number assigned in this case; be labeled

25

“First Amended Complaint”; and be complete in and of itself without

26

reference to the prior complaints or any other pleading, attachment or

27

document. The Clerk is directed to send Plaintiff a blank Central District civil

28

rights complaint form, which Plaintiff is encouraged to use. In the event
5

1

Plaintiff no longer wishes to pursue this action, the Clerk is also directed to

2

send Plaintiff a blank Central District Request for Dismissal form, which

3

Plaintiff may use to dismiss the action if he wishes.

4

Plaintiff is admonished that if he fails to timely file a timely FAC this

5

action may be dismissed with prejudice for failure to diligently prosecute

6

and for the reasons discussed in this Order.

7
8

Dated:

October 18, 2017 __

9
10

______________________________
JOHN D. EARLY
United States Magistrate Judge

11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
6