Carlos Moreno v. JCT Logistics, Inc et al

Filing 35

MINUTES (IN CHAMBERS) by Judge Jesus G. Bernal Order (1) DENYING Plaintiffs Motion to Remand to San Bernardino County Superior Court 20 ; and (2) DENYING Defendants Motion to Transfer 21 : (see document image for further details). In summary, De fendants have sufficiently established the amount in controversy for this case includes $1,869,600.00 for Plaintiffs waiting time claim, $158,213.00 for Plaintiffs minimum wage claim, $464,350.00 for Plaintiffs wage statement claim, & #036;0 for Plaintiffs meal break claim, $791,265.00 for Plaintiffs rest break claim, $2,401,433.80 for Plaintiffs business reimbursement claim, and $0 for Plaintiffs attorneys fees. In total, Defendants have established there is � 36;5,684,661.80 in controversy for this litigation, which exceeds the $5,000,000 jurisdictional threshold. Accordingly, the Court DENIES Plaintiffs Motion to remand. Additionally, as indicated at oral argument, the Court DENIES Defendants Motion to Transfer. IT IS SO ORDERED. (ad)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
CIVIL MINUTES—GENERAL
Case No.

EDCV 17-02489 JGB (KKx)

Date March 21, 2018

Title Carlos Moreno v. JCT Logistics, Inc. et al.
Present: The Honorable

JESUS G. BERNAL, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

MAYNOR GALVEZ

Not Reported

Deputy Clerk

Court Reporter

Attorney(s) Present for Plaintiff(s):

Attorney(s) Present for Defendant(s):

None Present

None Present

Proceedings:

Order (1) DENYING Plaintiff’s Motion to Remand to San Bernardino
County Superior Court (Dkt. No. 20); and (2) DENYING Defendants’
Motion to Transfer (Dkt. No. 21)

Two motions are before the Court. On January 12, 2018, Plaintiff Carlos Moreno
(“Plaintiff,”) filed a Motion to Remand Case to San Bernardino Superior Court. (“Motion to
Remand,” Dkt. No. 20.) Defendants John Christner Trucking, LLC and John Christner
Trucking, Inc. (collectively, “Defendants”) filed an opposition on February 12, 2018.
(“Defendants’ Opposition,” Dkt. No. 22.) Plaintiff filed a reply on February 20, 2018.
(“Plaintiff’s Reply,” Dkt. No. 25.) Additionally, Defendants filed a Motion to Transfer Case to
the Northern District of Oklahoma. (“Motion to Transfer,” Dkt. No. 21.) Plaintiff filed an
opposition on February 12, 2018. (“Plaintiff’s Opposition,” Dkt. No. 23.) Defendants filed a
reply on February 16, 2018. (“Defendants’ Reply,” Dkt. No. 24.) The Court held a hearing on
this matter on March 5, 2018. Upon consideration of the papers filed in support of and in
opposition to these motions, as well as the oral argument by the parties, the Court DENIES
Plaintiff’s Motion to Remand and DENIES Defendants’ Motion to Transfer.
I.

BACKGROUND

On July 14, 2017, Plaintiff filed an amended class action complaint against Defendants in
the Superior Court of the State of California County of San Bernardino. (“FAC,” Dkt. No. 3-1.)
Plaintiff’s case centers on alleged wage and labor violations arising out of Defendants’ alleged
misclassification of its truck drivers as independent contractors. (Id. ¶ 1.) In his FAC, Plaintiff
alleged seven causes of action: (1) failure to provide meal periods; (2) failure to provide rest
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breaks; (3) failure to pay minimum wages; (4) failure to furnish timely and accurate wage
statements; (5) failure to pay all wages owed every pay period; (6) failure to reimburse business
expenses; and (7) violation of California’s Unfair Competition Act (“UCL”). (See generally,
id.) Plaintiff seeks to represent the following Class: All current or former drivers for Defendants,
who were California residents and were classified as “independent contractors,” at any time
beginning four (4) years prior to the filing of the Complaint through the date notice is mailed to
the Class (the “Class Period”). (Id. ¶ 2.) Defendants removed to this Court on December 13,
2017. (“Notice,” Dkt. No. 3.)
II.

PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO REMAND

A. Legal Standard
“Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, possessing only that power authorized
by the Constitution and statute.” Gunn v. Minton, 568 U.S. 251, 257 (2013). The Class Action
Fairness Act (“CAFA”) vests federal courts with original jurisdiction over class actions
involving at least 100 class members, minimal diversity, and an amount in controversy that
exceeds $5,000,000. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d).
Generally, courts must “strictly construe the removal statute against removal
jurisdiction.” Gaus v. Miles, Inc., 980 F.2d 564, 566 (9th Cir. 1992). “However, ‘no antiremoval presumption attends cases invoking CAFA.’” Garcia v. Wal–Mart Stores, Inc., No. CV
16–01645–BRO (RAO), 2016 WL 6068104, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 14, 2016) (quoting Dart
Cherokee Basin Operating Co., LLC v. Owens, 135 S. Ct. 547, 553 (2014)). Instead, Congress
intended CAFA to be interpreted expansively. Ibarra v. Manheim Investments, Inc., 775 F. 3d
1193, 1197 (9th Cir. 2015).
A defendant seeking removal of an action to federal district court need only offer a “short
and plain statement of the grounds for removal” in its notice of removal. 28 U.S.C § 1446(a).
To meet CAFA's diversity requirement, a removing defendant must show “any member of a
class of plaintiffs is a citizen of a State different from any defendant.” 28 U.S.C.
§ 1332(d)(2)(A). “Thus, under CAFA complete diversity is not required; ‘minimal diversity’
suffices.” Serrano v. 180 Connect, Inc., 478 F.3d 1018, 1021 (9th Cir. 2007) (citations omitted).
To satisfy CAFA's amount-in-controversy requirement, “a removing defendant must
plausibly assert that the amount in controversy exceeds $5,000,000.” Garcia 2016 WL 6068104,
at *3 (citing Ibarra, 775 F. 3d at 1197). A removing “defendant's amount-in-controversy
allegation should be accepted when not contested by the plaintiff or questioned by the court.”
Dart, 135 S. Ct. at 553. Where a plaintiff questions the amount in controversy asserted, further
evidence establishing that the amount alleged meets the jurisdictional minimum is required. Id.
at 554. “In such a case, both sides submit proof and the court decides, by a preponderance of the
evidence, whether the amount-in-controversy requirement has been satisfied.” Id.

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“The parties may submit evidence outside the complaint, including affidavits or
declarations, or other ‘summary-judgment-type evidence relevant to the amount in controversy
at the time of removal.’” Ibarra, 775 F.3d at 1197 (quoting Singer v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins.
Co., 116 F.3d 373, 377 (9th Cir. 1997)). “Under this system, CAFA's requirements are to be
tested by consideration of real evidence and the reality of what is at stake in the litigation, using
reasonable assumptions underlying the defendant's theory of damages exposure.” Id. at 1198.
B. Discussion
Plaintiff makes two arguments in his Motion to Remand. First, Plaintiff argues
Defendants failed to meet their evidentiary burden regarding the amount in controversy.
(Motion to Remand at 4.) Second, Plaintiff argues Defendants untimely removed this action to
federal court. (Id. at 7.) The Court will review each argument, starting with the issue of
timeliness.
1. Timeliness
Plaintiff notes Defendants failed to remove this case within thirty days of being served
with the FAC. (Id. at 7.) Defendants must file for removal within thirty days of receiving a copy
of the initial pleading upon which the removal is based. See 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(1). Plaintiff
cites authority which states that a “pleading need not identify a specific amount in controversy in
order to trigger the thirty-day removal period . . . [t]he time for removal commences when a
defendant is able to intelligently ascertain it exceeds the jurisdictional minimum.” (Motion to
Remand at 7 (citing Jones v. CLP Resources, Inc., 2016 WL 8950063, *5 (C.D. Cal. 2016)
(internal quotations omitted).) Plaintiff states Defendants knew or had access to all the
information upon which they base their removal when the FAC was filed in July 2017, therefore,
that is when the thirty-day period began running. (Id. at 8.) Additionally, Plaintiff cites authority
which holds that, when the complaint is indeterminate regarding the amount in controversy, the
thirty-day period begins to run if the defendant was provided sufficient information to ascertain
the amount in controversy. (Plaintiff’s Reply at 7–8 (citing Banta v. Am. Med. Response Inc.,
2011 WL 2837642, at *7 (C.D. Cal. July 15, 2011)).)
Defendants argue Ninth Circuit precedent does not require removal within thirty days if
the complaint is indeterminate with respect to removability. (Defendants’ Opposition at 16–17.)
Defendants state the complaint in Jones contained specific figures which could be added together
to determine the amount in controversy. (Id. (citing Jones, 2016 WL 8950063, at *6).) In
contrast, Defendants here argue Plaintiff’s FAC contained no figures which Defendants could
easily multiply or add across the class. (Defendants’ Opposition at 17.) The Court agrees with
Defendants. Moreover, a recent Ninth Circuit case supports Defendants’ position. In Kenny v.
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 881 F.3d 786 (9th Cir. 2018), the Ninth Circuit recently reaffirmed that
defendants are not charged with notice of removability until they receive a document which
provides them sufficient information to remove. Kenny, 881 F.3d at 791. Additionally, “a
defendant does not have a duty of inquiry if the initial pleading or other document is
indeterminate with respect to removability.” Id. (quoting Roth v. CHA Hollywood Med. Ctr.,
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L.P., 720 F.3d 1121, 1125 (9th Cir. 2013)). “Accordingly, even if a defendant could have
discovered grounds for removability through investigation, it does not lose the right to remove
because it did not conduct such an investigation and then file a notice of removal within thirty
days of receiving the indeterminate document.” Id. (quoting Roth, 720 F.3d at 1125). This
reasoning appears to apply even when the “FAC is indeterminate as to the amount in
controversy.” Id. at 790. In Roth, the Ninth Circuit considered whether this rule might lead to
gamesmanship by defendants in CAFA cases, and stated that “plaintiffs are in a position to
protect themselves. If plaintiffs think that their action may be removable and think, further, that
the defendant might delay filing a notice of removal until a strategically advantageous moment,
they need only provide to the defendant a document from which removability may be
ascertained.” Roth, 720 F.3d at 1126. Under Kenny, Defendants have not run afoul of their 30day window and, as a consequence, timely removed this case. Accordingly, the Court rejects
Plaintiff’s timeliness argument.
2. The Amount in Controversy
Plaintiff also argues Defendants failed to meet their evidentiary burden regarding the
amount in controversy. (Motion to Remand at 4.) Defendants bear the burden of establishing
the amount in controversy exceeds $5,000,000. Ibarra, 775 F.3d at 1197.
a. Waiting Time
Plaintiff seeks to represent the following Class: All current or former drivers for
Defendants, who were California residents and were classified as “independent contractors,” at
any time beginning four (4) years prior to the filing of the Complaint through the date notice is
mailed to the Class (the “Class Period”). (FAC ¶ 2.) Defendants state they entered into
Broker/Carrier Agreements with 1,419 individuals and businesses (“Contract Carriers”) who
were classified as independent contractors and had California addresses between July 6, 2013,
and November 15, 2017. (Defendants’ Opposition at 4.) November 15, 2017 was the date
Defendants’ information was collected for the Notice of Removal. (Id.) For purposes of
determining who, among those Contract Carriers, might be considered terminated in connection
with Plaintiff’s fifth cause of action, Defendants considered anyone who had executed a
Broker/Carrier Agreement but who did not receive a settlement statement after June 1, 2017,
which was 35 days before the filing of Plaintiff’s FAC. (Id.) Defendants’ records show there
were 820 former Contract Carriers who may be eligible for Plaintiff’s class action. (Id.)
Defendants claim Plaintiff transported their products for sixty of the seventy days
between May 11, 2017 and July 20, 2017. (Defendants’ Opposition at 3; “Crowley Declaration,”
Dkt. No. 22-1 ¶¶ 12, 14, 15.) During that time, Defendants paid Plaintiff a total of $31,843.50 in
what Defendants characterize as “net revenue.” (Defendants’ Opposition at 3; Crowley
Declaration ¶¶ 10, 11.) Defendants calculated this net revenue by deducting $236.50 in fees from
Plaintiff’s gross revenue of $32,080. (Defendants’ Opposition at 3.) Defendants then divided
the net revenue by sixty, and determined that Plaintiff was paid a daily rate of $530.72. (Id. at
10.) This led Defendants to conclude Plaintiff was paid an hourly wage of $66.34 based on an 8Page 4 of 9

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hour day, or $33.17 based on a 16-hour day. (Id.) Plaintiff disputes Defendants’ calculation of
his net revenue, arguing Defendants failed to reduce the gross amount by other business expenses
such as “taxes, insurance, and fuel.” (Plaintiff’s Reply at 3.) Defendants admit their figure may
be inaccurate, noting that they “cannot account for or estimate the total amount of Plaintiff’s
business expenses at issue to the extent they were not deducted from [Plaintiff’s] settlement
statements.” (Defendants’ Opposition at 7.) But at oral argument, Plaintiff was unable to
specify what further deductions Defendants should have made. Defendants anticipated there
might be issues with their hourly wage figure of $66.34, and therefore provided reasonable
calculations demonstrating the amount in controversy exceeds $5,000,000 even when they
assume Plaintiff made only minimum wage. Thus, Defendants performed this calculation: $9.50
x 8hrs/day x 30 days x 820 Former Carriers = $1,869,600.00. The Court finds this calculation
reasonable. Accordingly, Defendants have appropriately established there is $1,869,600.00 in
controversy for this claim.
b. Minimum Wage
Plaintiff seeks compensation for Defendants’ failure to pay Plaintiff a minimum wage
during inspections and other on-duty time. (FAC ¶ 53.) Defendants calculated this amount as
$158,213.00. (Defendants’ Opposition at 11.) To determine that number, Defendants estimated
the class members took about half an hour per week to do a proper inspection. (Id. (citing Notice
at 6–7).) Defendants then performed this calculation: $9.50 (minimum wage) x 0.5 (half an hour)
x 16,654 (weeks) = $79,106.50 x 2 (liquidated damages) = $158,213.00. (Id.) The Court accepts
this calculation as reasonable. Accordingly, Defendants have appropriately established there is
$158,213.00 in controversy for this claim.
c. Wage Statement
Plaintiff seeks compensation for Defendants’ failure to furnish timely and accurate wage
statements. (FAC ¶¶ 60–66.) Defendant has presented evidence that there were 4,975
settlement statements that could be considered in determining the amount at issue under this
claim. (Defendants’ Opposition at 12; Crowley Declaration ¶ 20.) Defendants state there is a
$50 penalty for the first alleged violation, then a $100 penalty for each alleged subsequent
violation, with a cap of $4,000 in penalties per putative class driver. (Defendants’ Opposition at
12.) Defendants reasonably interpret Plaintiff’s FAC as alleging a violation for each and every
wage statement provided to Plaintiff and the class. (Notice at 7.) As a result, Defendants state
Plaintiffs appear to seek $464,350 in penalties for their wage statement claims. (Defendants’
Opposition at 12.) This calculation appears reasonable to the Court. Thus, Defendants have
adequately established there is $464,350.00 in controversy regarding this claim.
d. Meal and Rest Breaks
Plaintiff seeks compensation for Defendants’ failure to provide meal breaks and rest
breaks during the class period. (FAC ¶¶ 12, 35, 42). Plaintiff, citing Letuligasenoa v. Int’l Paper
Co., 2014 WL 2115246, *6 (N.D. Cal. 2014), erroneously states Defendants are only allowed to
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calculate compensation for meal periods or rest periods, but not both. (Plaintiff’s Reply at 5.)
However, the law clearly allows for compensation of both meal and rest periods. See Al-Najjar v.
Kindred Healthcare Operating, Inc., 2017 WL 4862067, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 26, 2017) (citing
United Parcel Serv., Inc. v. Superior Court, 196 Cal. App. 4th 57, 69, (2011)). Defendants note
Plaintiff alleges he was never compensated for his rest breaks. (Defendants’ Opposition at 12.)
Consequently, Defendants assumed there were five rest break violations per week, and 16,654
total weekly settlement statements. (Id.) Thus Defendants believe the appropriate calculation is
as follows: 5 (violations per week) x $9.50 (hourly rate) x 16,654 (total weeks) = $791,265.00. (Id.
at 12, 15.) This calculation appears reasonable to the Court. Thus, Defendants have adequately
established there is $791,265.00 in controversy regarding this claim. Defendants performed no
parallel calculation to establish an amount in controversy regarding meal break violations using
the minimum wage figure.
e. Failure to Reimburse Business Expenses
Plaintiff seeks compensation for Defendants’ failure to reimburse business expenses
incurred by class members in the discharge of their employment obligations. (FAC ¶ 73.) Here,
Defendants submitted a declaration stating Plaintiff would be owed $2,401,433.80 in
compensation. (Defendants’ Opposition at 12–13; Crowley Declaration ¶ 21.) Plaintiff does not
dispute these figures. Thus, Defendants have submitted sufficient evidence to establish this
amount, and the Court recognizes $2,401,433.80 in controversy for this claim.
f. Attorneys’ Fees
Defendants seek to add a 25% attorneys’ fees award to the total amount in controversy.
(Defendants’ Opposition at 15.) However, this Court takes the position that when calculating
attorneys’ fees to establish jurisdiction, “the only fees that can be considered are those incurred
as of the date of removal.” See Faulkner v. Astro-Med, Inc., 1999 U.S. Dist. WL 820198, *9
(N.D. Cal. Oct. 4, 1999), citing Miranti v. Lee, 3 F.3d 925, 928 (5th Cir. 1993); see also Conrad,
994 F. Supp. at 1200; Reames v. AB Car Rental Servs., 899 F. Supp. 2d 1012, 1020–21 (D. Or.
2012). Defendants have not provided the Court with any evidence to support their argument
concerning Plaintiff’s attorneys’ fees up until the date of removal. Without “summary
judgement-type evidence” to support their contentions, Defendants have failed to establish any
amount of attorneys’ fees to be included in the amount in controversy. See Ibarra, 775 F.3d at
1197.
III. DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO TRANSFER
Defendants ask the Court to transfer this case to the Northern District of Oklahoma
pursuant to a forum selection clause in the Broker/Carrier Agreement (“Agreement”)
Defendants signed with Plaintiff. (Motion to Transfer at 1.) Defendants signed this agreement
with Brown & Cross Trucking, the company through which Plaintiff did business. (Id.)
Defendant John Christner Trucking, LLC (“JCT”) is an Oklahoma limited liability company
headquartered in Sapulpa, Oklahoma. (Id.) JCT’s officers maintain their offices in Oklahoma,
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and all company records are stored in Oklahoma. (Id. at 2.) No member of JCT is a resident of
California. (Id.) To deliver its customers’ freight, JCT contracts with independent contractor
owner-operators who operate commercial motor vehicles under JCT’s federal operating
authority, or it brokers the freight to independent third-party motor carriers that haul the freight
under their own federal authority. JCT entered into the Agreement with Carlos Moreno d/b/a
Brown & Cross Trucking on April 26, 2017. (Id.) Brown & Cross Trucking is a for-hire,
interstate motor carrier based in California. (Id.)
A. Legal Standard
A district court may transfer a civil action “to any other district or division where it might
have been brought,” if it is “[f]or the convenience of parties and witnesses” and “in the interests
of justice.” 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a)–(b). Whether a transfer is warranted under § 1404(a) turns on a
two-fold analysis. First, the defendant must establish that the matter “might have been brought”
in the district to which transfer is sought. 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). To do this, defendants must
show that personal jurisdiction, subject matter jurisdiction, and venue would have been proper
had the action been filed in the desired district. Metz v. U.S. Life Ins. Co. in City of New York,
674 F. Supp. 2d 1141, 1145 (C.D. Cal. 2009). Second, the court must balance three factors: (1)
convenience of the parties; (2) convenience of the witnesses; and (3) the interests of justice. 28
U.S.C. § 1404(a); Pfeiffer v. Himax Technologies, Inc., 530 F. Supp. 2d 1121, 1123 (C.D. Cal
2008).
“In analyzing the third factor, the ‘interests of justice,’ a number of factors may be
relevant, including: (1) the location where the relevant agreements were negotiated and executed,
(2) the state that is most familiar with the governing law, (3) the plaintiff's choice of forum, (4)
the respective parties' contacts with the forum, (5) the contacts relating to the plaintiff's cause of
action in the chosen forum, (6) the differences in the costs of litigation in the two forums, (7) the
availability of compulsory process to compel attendance of unwilling non-party witnesses, and (8)
the ease of access to sources of proof.” CXA Corp. v. Mazal Investments LLC, No.
CV1208269JGBJEMX, 2013 WL 12191835, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 14, 2013) (internal quotations
omitted) (citing Jones v. GNC Franchising, Inc., 211 F.3d 495, 498–99 (9th Cir. 2000)).
B. Discussion
1. The Forum Selection Clause
JCT relies on the following provision within its contract with Plaintiff: “This written
Agreement, together with any load confirmation, contains the entire agreement between the
parties and may only be modified by signed written agreement. Oklahoma law, venue, and
jurisdiction shall apply.” (“Forum Selection Clause,” Exhibit 1-A, Dkt. No. 21-1 ¶ 9.)
Defendants argue this Forum Selection Clause applies to “any disputes related to the
agreement,” including a dispute over whether Brown & Cross Trucking is correctly classified as
an independent contractor. (Motion to Transfer at 4–5.) JCT cites two cases to support its
position: Huddleston v. John Christner Trucking, LLC, No. 1:17-cv-00925-LJO-SAB, 2017 WL
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4310348 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 28, 2017) and LaCross v. Knight Transportation, Inc., 95 F. Supp 3d
1199, 1202–03 (C.D. Cal. 2015). (Id. at 4–5.)
Plaintiff argues the Forum Selection Clause does not explicitly state whether it applies to
a disagreement between the parties, let alone address the breadth of disagreements which it
covers. (Plaintiff’s Opposition at 2.) Plaintiff argues that, at its broadest, the Forum Selection
Clause could be interpreted to mean “Oklahoma law, venue, and jurisdiction shall apply to issues
under this Agreement.” (Id. (internal quotations omitted).) Plaintiff notes he is not bringing any
claims under the Agreement and no issues of breach of contract were alleged in the complaint.
(Id. at 2–3.) Plaintiff distinguishes Huddleston and LaCross by noting that the forum selection
clauses in those cases are broader than the one here. In Huddleston, the forum selection clause
read as follows:
THE PARTIES AGREE THAT ANY CLAIM OR DISPUTE ARISING FROM
OR IN CONNECTION WITH THIS AGREEMENT, WHETHER UNDER
FEDERAL, STATE, LOCAL, OR FOREIGN LAW . . . SHALL BE BROUGHT
EXCLUSIVELY IN THE STATE OR FEDERAL COURTS SERVING CREEK
COUNTY, OKLAHOMA.
CARRIER AND CONTRACTOR HEREBY
CONSENT TO THE JURISDICTION AND VENUE OF SUCH COURTS.
Huddleston, 2017 WL 4310348, at *1 (emphasis added) (capitalization in original). In LaCross,
the forum selection clause read as follows: “The parties agree that any legal proceedings between the
parties arising under, arising out of, or relating to the relationship created by this Agreement . . . shall
be filed and/or maintained in Phoenix, Arizona.” LaCross, 95 F. Supp at 1202 (emphasis added).
Plaintiff argues, and the Court agrees, these forum selection clauses utilize language
sufficiently broad to encompass a dispute over whether a party is appropriately classified as an
independent contractor. Here, however, the Forum Selection Clause lacks language defining its
scope, and therefore cannot be interpreted as equivalent to the forum selection clauses in
Huddleston or LaCross. The ambiguous language in the Forum Selection Clause must be
construed against JCT, the drafter of the Agreement. See Hunt Wesson Foods, Inc. v. Supreme
Oil Co., 817 F.2d 75, 78 (9th Cir. 1987). Accordingly, the Court finds the Forum Selection
Clause is insufficient to bind the parties to litigate this dispute in the Northern District of
Oklahoma.
2. Transfer under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a)
A motion to transfer brought under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) requires a two-step analysis.
First, the defendant must establish that the matter “might have been brought” in the district to
which transfer is sought. 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). To do this, the defendant must show that
personal jurisdiction, subject matter jurisdiction, and venue would have been proper had the
action been filed in the desired district. Metz, 674 F. Supp. 2d at 1145. Only after the defendant
has made this showing does the Court examine whether the motion to transfer is beneficial for (1)
convenience of the parties, (2) convenience of the witnesses, and (3) the interests of justice. Id.
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Here, JCT has not attempted to show that personal jurisdiction, subject matter
jurisdiction, and venue would be proper in the Northern District of Oklahoma. JCT’s Motion to
Transfer is singularly concerned with whether the Court should transfer the case in order to
consolidate it with Huddleston, an ongoing class action which also concerns a dispute over
whether workers should be classified as independent contractors or employees. (Motion to
Transfer at 6–11.) Because JCT failed to carry its burden, the Court DENIES its Motion to
Transfer. However, assuming arguendo JCT had met this burden, its Motion to Transfer would
still be denied because JCT failed to establish the transfer would be beneficial for the convenience
of the parties, the convenience of the witnesses, and the interests of justice. Indeed, this transfer
would only serve to shift the inconvenience onto Plaintiff. This class action law suit has an allCalifornia class membership and will apply only California state law. The Central District of
California is certainly more familiar with California wage and hour law than the Northern District
of Oklahoma. JCT states that Oklahoma would be more convenient for its witnesses, but does
state how many witnesses it intends to utilize. Moreover, the Huddleston case is a class action
which contains a national class as well as an Oklahoma-only subclass. (Plaintiff’s Opposition at
14–15.) Thus, adjudicating that dispute in Oklahoma better serves the interests of the parties.
IV. CONCLUSION
In summary, Defendants have sufficiently established the amount in controversy for this
case includes $1,869,600.00 for Plaintiff’s waiting time claim, $158,213.00 for Plaintiff’s
minimum wage claim, $464,350.00 for Plaintiff’s wage statement claim, $0 for Plaintiff’s meal
break claim, $791,265.00 for Plaintiff’s rest break claim, $2,401,433.80 for Plaintiff’s business
reimbursement claim, and $0 for Plaintiff’s attorneys’ fees. In total, Defendants have established
there is $5,684,661.80 in controversy for this litigation, which exceeds the $5,000,000
jurisdictional threshold. Accordingly, the Court DENIES Plaintiff’s Motion to remand.
Additionally, as indicated at oral argument, the Court DENIES Defendants’ Motion to Transfer.
IT IS SO ORDERED.

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