John Arnaud v. Little Caesar Enterprises Inc. et al

Filing 25

MINUTES (IN CHAMBERS) by Judge David O. Carter: Granting 14 Plaintiff's MOTION to Remand Case to State Court and Denying 11 MOTION to Dismiss as Moot. Case Remanded to San Bernardino Superior Court CIVDS1810080. (MD JS-6. Case Terminated); (twdb)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JS-6

CIVIL MINUTES – GENERAL
Case No. ED CV 18-01316-DOC (KKx)

Date: October 1, 2018

Title: JOHN ARNAUD v. LITTLE CAESAR ENTERPRISES, INC., ET AL.

PRESENT:
THE HONORABLE DAVID O. CARTER, JUDGE
Deborah Lewman
Courtroom Clerk

Not Present
Court Reporter

ATTORNEYS PRESENT FOR
PLAINTIFF:
None Present

ATTORNEYS PRESENT FOR
DEFENDANT:
None Present

PROCEEDINGS (IN CHAMBERS): ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S
MOTION TO REMAND AND
DENYING MOTION TO DISMISS
AS MOOT [14] [11]
Before the Court is Plaintiff John Arnaud’s (“Arnaud” or “Plaintiff”) Motion to
Remand (“Motion to Remand”) (Dkt. 14) and Defendants Little Caesar Enterprises, Inc.
(“Caesar”) and Sylvia Delos Santos’s (“Santos”) Motion to Dismiss Fourth and Fifth
Causes of Action (“Motion to Dismiss”) (Dkt. 11). The Court finds this matter
appropriate for resolution without oral argument. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 78; L.R. 7-15.
Having reviewed the moving papers and considered the parties’ arguments, the Court
GRANTS Plaintiff’s Motion to Remand and DENIES AS MOOT Defendants’ Motion to
Dismiss.
I.

Background
A.

Facts

The Court adopts the facts as set out in Plaintiff’s Complaint (“Compl.”) (Dkt. 11). In April 2009, Arnaud began working for Caesar as a general manager at a pizza store

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
CIVIL MINUTES – GENERAL
Case No. ED CV 18-01316-DOC (KKx)

Date: October 1, 2018
Page 2

in Ontario, California. Compl. ¶ 8. In November 2011, Arnaud was provided with a
management training booklet that contained racially insensitive depictions of AfricanAmericans. Id. ¶ 9. Arnaud found the depictions of African-American individuals to be
“racially insensitive caricatures that negatively accentuated false physical stereotypes that
have been improperly attributed to African-Americans in a racist manner.” Id. Arnaud
was alerted to these racially insensitive depictions after his non-African-American
coworkers began laughing at the depictions during a meeting. Id.
Arnaud made a complaint to his direct supervisor regarding the racially insensitive
imagery and the harassment he experienced at the meeting. Id. Nothing was done in
response and the booklet continued to be used and distributed to other general managers.
Id. Shortly thereafter Defendant moved Arnaud to a new store. Id.
In January 2012, Arnaud made a formal complaint to Defendant’s human
resources department regarding the imagery in the booklet and a secondary incident
where his new direct supervisor had referred to him by the racially derogatory term of
“blackie.” Id. ¶ 10. In July 2012, Arnaud received his first poor evaluation. Id. ¶ 11. The
performance evaluation was later changed and marked significantly higher. Id.
Arnaud suffered a workplace injury on August 28, 2014. Id. ¶ 14. From September
9, 2014 until April 25, 2015, Defendant allowed Arnaud to work with several restrictions
and accommodations. Id. ¶ 16.
On December 23, 2014, Arnaud filed a charge of race-based discrimination and
retaliation with the California Department of Fair Employment and Housing (“DFEH”)
and the United States Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) based on
what he had experienced as an African-American employee and the adverse employment
actions taken against him for making an internal complaint regarding racial harassment
and discrimination. Id. ¶ 17.
On June 9, 2015, Arnaud underwent surgical procedures and was unable to work
for several months thereafter. Id. ¶ 19. On September 28, 2015, Arnaud received a note
from his doctor allowing him to return to work subject to certain restrictions, which were
consistent with accommodations regularly made for non-African-American employees.
Id. ¶ 21. Defendant refused to let Arnaud return to work and insisted that he stay on
disability leave. Id. Defendant maintained this position through March 2016. See id. ¶¶
20–35.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
CIVIL MINUTES – GENERAL
Case No. ED CV 18-01316-DOC (KKx)

Date: October 1, 2018
Page 3

In April 2016, Arnuad provided Defendant with a report from a qualified medical
examiner. Id. ¶ 37. Defendant maintained its position and suggested Arnaud undergo
additional surgery despite the expiration of its medical insurance coverage. See id. ¶¶
38–43. On April 5, 2017, Defendant allowed Arnaud to return to work with restrictions
and accommodations that were essentially the same as those contained in a February 2,
2016 doctor’s note previously provided to Defendant. Id. ¶ 45.
On April 26, 2017, Arnaud was issued a Colleague Corrective Action Report
(“CCAR”) for “unsatisfactory” performance. Id. ¶ 46. Defendant Santos, a regional
human resources manager, signed and delivered the CCAR. Id. ¶¶ 3, 46. The CCAR
contained inaccurate information and directly contradicted high-performance reviews that
Arnaud had previously received. Id. The write-up stated that Arnaud was attempting to
provoke management and refusing to work. Id. Arnaud was written up for asking to use a
vacation day on his birthday, even though the request was granted, and for reporting that
he was being underpaid. Id. ¶ 47.
Following the write-up, Santos made additional oral defamatory statements
regarding Arnaud to other Caesar employees. Id. ¶ 48. Various supervisors and human
resource managers have also made false statements regarding Arnaud’s personal and
work activities to other Caesar employees. Id. ¶ 49.
B.

Procedural History

On April 26, 2018, Plaintiff filed the Complaint in the Superior Court of
California, County of San Bernardino. See Compl. Plaintiff brings five state-law claims:
(1) retaliation against Caesar; (2) race discrimination against Caesar; (3) failure to
accommodate against Caesar; (4) intentional infliction of emotional distress (“IIED”)
against Caesar and Santos; and (5) defamation against Caesar and Santos. Id. ¶¶ 53–89.
On June 19, 2018, Defendants removed the case to this Court based on diversity
jurisdiction. See Not. of Removal (Dkt. 1). On June 26, 2018, Defendants filed the
Motion to Dismiss. On August 6, 2018, Plaintiff opposed (“Opp’n to Mot. to Dismiss”)
(Dkt. 15), and on August 13, 2018, Defendants replied (“Reply ISO Mot. to Dismiss”)
(Dkt. 18).
On July 19, 2018, Plaintiff filed the Motion to Remand. On August 6, 2018,
Defendants opposed (“Opp’n to Mot. to Remand”) (Dkt. 16), and on August 13, 2018,
Plaintiff replied (“Reply ISO Mot. to Remand”) (Dkt. 17).

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
CIVIL MINUTES – GENERAL
Case No. ED CV 18-01316-DOC (KKx)

II.

Date: October 1, 2018
Page 4

Legal Standard
A.

Motion to Remand

“If at any time before final judgment it appears that the district court lacks subject
matter jurisdiction, the case shall be remanded.” 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c). Removal of a case
from state court to federal court is governed by 28 U.S.C. § 1441, which provides in
pertinent part that “any civil action brought in a State court of which the district courts of
the United States have original jurisdiction, may be removed . . . to the district court of
the United States for the district and division embracing the place where such action is
pending.” 28 U.S.C. § 1441. A federal court may order remand for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction or any defect in the removal procedure. 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c).
A federal court has diversity jurisdiction if: (1) the controversy is between
“citizens of different States,” and (2) the amount in controversy exceeds the sum or value
of $75,000. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a). Diversity jurisdiction requires complete diversity,
meaning that no plaintiff can be from the same state as a defendant. Abrego Abrego v.
The Dow Chem. Co., 443 F.3d 676, 679 (9th Cir. 2006). Thus, a case ordinarily cannot be
removed to the federal court if a plaintiff and a defendant are citizens of the same state.
See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a). However, removal is proper despite the presence of a nondiverse defendant where that defendant is fraudulently joined as a sham defendant. See
Caterpillar, Inc. v. Lewis, 519 U.S. 61, 68 (1996). In the Ninth Circuit, a non-diverse
defendant is deemed a sham defendant if, after all disputed questions of fact and all
ambiguities in the controlling state law are resolved in the plaintiff’s favor, the plaintiff
could not possibly recover against the party whose joinder is questioned. Kruso v. Int’l
Tel. & Tel. Corp., 872 F.2d 1416, 1426 (9th Cir. 1989). The failure to state a claim
against the non-diverse defendant must be “obvious according to the well-settled rules of
the state.” United Comp. Sys. v. AT&T Corp., 298 F.3d 756, 761 (9th Cir. 2002).
The “general presumption” is that the inclusion of a defendant residing in the same
state as the plaintiff is not for the sole purpose of defeating diversity jurisdiction.
Hamilton Materials, Inc. v. Dow Chem. Corp., 494 F.3d 1203, 1206 (9th Cir. 2007). This
presumption requires defendants to “do more than show that the complaint at the time of
removal fails to state a claim against the non-diverse defendant.” Padilla v. AT&T Corp.,
697 F. Supp. 2d 1156, 1159 (C.D. Cal. 2009) (internal citations omitted). Defendant must
also show that, even if a plaintiff’s claims do not meet the necessary pleading
requirements at the time of removal, he “could not re-allege at least one of them to do
so.” Suelen v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., No. C-13-002 MEJ, 2013 WL 1320697, at *4
(N.D. Cal. Apr. 1, 2013). “[R]emand must be granted unless the defendant shows that the

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
CIVIL MINUTES – GENERAL
Case No. ED CV 18-01316-DOC (KKx)

Date: October 1, 2018
Page 5

plaintiff would not be afforded leave to amend his complaint to cure [the] purported
deficiency.” Id. Lastly, a fraudulent joinder “must be proven by clear and convincing
evidence.” Hamilton Materials, Inc., 494 F.3d at 1206.
B.

Motion to Dismiss

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a complaint must be dismissed
when a plaintiff’s allegations fail to set forth a set of facts that, if true, would entitle the
complainant to relief. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007); Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009) (holding that a claim must be facially plausible in order
to survive a motion to dismiss). The pleadings must raise the right to relief beyond the
speculative level; a plaintiff must provide “more than labels and conclusions, and a
formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Twombly, 550 U.S.
at 555 (citing Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986)). On a motion to dismiss, a
court accepts as true a plaintiff’s well-pleaded factual allegations and construes all factual
inferences in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. See Manzarek v. St. Paul Fire &
Marine Ins. Co., 519 F.3d 1025, 1031 (9th Cir. 2008). A court is not required to accept as
true legal conclusions couched as factual allegations. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
In evaluating a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, review is ordinarily limited to the contents
of the complaint and material properly submitted with the complaint. Van Buskirk v.
Cable News Network, Inc., 284 F.3d 977, 980 (9th Cir. 2002); Hal Roach Studios, Inc. v.
Richard Feiner & Co., Inc., 896 F.2d 1542, 1555 n.19 (9th Cir. 1990). Under the
incorporation by reference doctrine, courts may also consider documents “whose contents
are alleged in a complaint and whose authenticity no party questions, but which are not
physically attached to the pleading.” Branch v. Tunnell, 14 F.3d 449, 454 (9th Cir. 1994),
overruled on other grounds by 307 F.3d 1119, 1121 (9th Cir. 2002). Courts may treat
such a document as “part of the complaint, and thus may assume that its contents are true
for purposes of a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6).” United States v. Ritchie, 342
F.3d 903, 908 (9th Cir. 2003).
Dismissal with leave to amend should be freely given “when justice so requires.”
Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2). This policy is applied with “extreme liberality.” Morongo Band
of Mission Indians v. Rose, 893 F.2d 1074, 1079 (9th Cir. 1990); Lopez v. Smith, 203
F.3d 1122, 1127 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding that dismissal with leave to amend should be
granted even if no request to amend was made). Dismissal without leave to amend is
appropriate only when the court is satisfied that the deficiencies in the complaint could
not possibly be cured by amendment. Jackson v. Carey, 353 F.3d 750, 758 (9th Cir.
2003).

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
CIVIL MINUTES – GENERAL
Case No. ED CV 18-01316-DOC (KKx)

III.

Date: October 1, 2018
Page 6

Discussion

The threshold issue in this case is whether the Court has subject matter
jurisdiction. Defendants removed the action to this Court on the grounds that non-diverse
Defendant Santos was fraudulently joined.1 See Not. Of Rem. at 3. According to
Defendant, Plaintiff cannot state a claim for defamation or IIED against Santos because
(1) the defamation claim is subject to the common interest privilege; (2) plaintiff pleads
no outrageous conduct and the IIED claim is superfluous; and (3) the California Workers’
Compensation Act provides the exclusive remedy for an IIED claim in this employment
context. Not. of Removal at 4–11; Mot. to Dismiss at 4–11. Plaintiff argues that Santos is
not a “sham defendant” and that the two causes of action asserted against her are viable
and adequately pled. Mot. to Remand at 1.
The Court begins by addressing whether Plaintiff could possibly recover against
non-diverse Defendant Santos on her defamation claim. See AT&T Corp., 298 F.3d at
761 (“If a plaintiff fails to state a cause of action against a resident defendant, and the
failure is obvious according to the well-settled rules of the state, the joinder is
fraudulent[.]”).
A.

Defamation

In his Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Santos made false oral and
written defamatory statements to other Caesar employees. See Compl. ¶¶ 48, 82. Plaintiff
also alleges that “various supervisors and human resource managers” falsely made
statements regarding Arnaud’s personal and work activities to other employees. Id. ¶ 84.
The allegedly defamatory statements included that Arnaud had unsatisfactory
performance, was attempting to provoke management, was refusing to work, and that his
conduct was “unacceptable.”2 Id. ¶ 82.
Defendants argue that Plaintiff fails to state a claim for defamation because the
statements are subject to the common interest privilege and are opinions as opposed to
defamatory facts.3 Opp’n to Mot. to Remand 1–10. According to Plaintiff, the statements
1

The parties do not dispute that both Arnaud and Santos are citizens of California. See Not. of Removal at 12.
Plaintiff also filed a declaration in support of the Motion to Remand (“Arnaud Decl.”) (Dkt. 14-4) stating that
Defendant Santos falsely told other employees that he had mistreated a pregnant coworker. Arnaud Decl. ¶ 6.
3
Defendants argued in their notice of removal that the defamation action may be time-barred. Not. of Removal at 8.
But Plaintiff filed the action on April 26, 2018, within the one-year statute of limitations. See Cal. Civ. Proc. Code §
340(c).
2

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
CIVIL MINUTES – GENERAL
Case No. ED CV 18-01316-DOC (KKx)

Date: October 1, 2018
Page 7

made to Caesar employees do not fall under the common interest privilege and even if
they do, the statements were made with malice and are thus exempted. Mot. to Remand at
6–7. Moreover, Plaintiff argues that the statements were factual and not merely opinions.
Id. at 8–9.
“Under California law, defamation is ‘the intentional publication of a statement of
fact which is false, unprivileged, and has a natural tendency to injure or which causes
special damages.’” Makaeff v. Trump University, LLC, 715 F.3d 254, 264 (9th Cir. 2013)
(quoting Ringler Assocs., Inc. v. Md. Cas. Co., 80 Cal. App. 4th 1165 (2000)). California
Civil Code § 47(c) renders privileged communications made without malice on subjects
of mutual interest. Cal. Civ. Code § 47(c). The common-interest privilege explicitly
applies to nonmalicious communications within a company concerning the job
performance of a current employee, see Rudwall v. Blackrock, Inc., 289 Fed. Appx. 240,
241 (9th Cir. 2008), and to managers’ communications to colleagues about employees.
See, e.g., Blount v. San Ramon Royal Vista Golf Courses, Inc., 1999 WL 300684, at *3-4
(N.D. Cal. May 7, 1999) (holding that the comment, “I think she’s stealing from us,”
made by a manager to a colleague about an employee “is paradigmatic . . . of the
manager’s privilege”). The malice necessary to defeat a qualified privilege is actual
malice, which is established by a showing that the publication was motivated by hatred or
ill will towards the plaintiff[.]” Tuas v. Loftus, 40 Cal.4th 683, 721 (2007) (citation
omitted).
First, Plaintiff argues that the statements at issue are not protected by the common
interest privilege because they were not reasonably calculated to promote the common
interest Santos shared with the recipients, which for most employees “is making and
selling pizzas[.]” Reply ISO Mot. to Remand at 2. According to Plaintiff, while it is
“arguable that some of the alleged statements could potentially fall under the conditional
common interest privilege, the statements made about Mr. Arnaud’s personal behavior
and overall conduct, particularly statements made to employees that were not Mr.
Arnaud’s supervisors or would have no need or reason to know such information as it
was unrelated to the business of selling pizzas, would not fall under this privilege.” Mot.
to Remand at 6. Defendants argue that the statements at issue are subject to the common
interest privilege because they were made in connection with the CCAR employee report.
Opp’n to Mot. to Remand at 2. Defendants point to Paragraph 48 of the Complaint, which
provides: “Following this write-up, and in connection with this write-up, Defendant
Santos made additional oral defamatory statements regarding Mr. Arnaud to Dave
Anderson and other employees of Defendant Caesar.” See id. Thus according to
Defendants, on the face of the Complaint Plaintiff admits that the alleged defamatory

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
CIVIL MINUTES – GENERAL
Case No. ED CV 18-01316-DOC (KKx)

Date: October 1, 2018
Page 8

statements were made in connection with the evaluation of Arnaud’s performance and are
therefore privileged. Id.
Second, Plaintiff argues that even if some of the alleged defamatory statements are
subject to the common interest privilege, Arnaud has properly pled that the statements
were made with malice, extinguishing the privilege’s applicability. Mot. to Remand at 7.
Plaintiff argues that Arnaud was subjected to a pattern of retaliatory behavior for a charge
of racial harassment and that Defendant Santos continued to engage in this pattern of
retaliation and discrimination when Arnaud returned to work. Id. (citing Compl. ¶¶ 9-45,
47, 49-51, 55-60, and 64-67). According to Plaintiff, Santos made the statements with the
knowledge that they were both without merit and would tend to injure Arnaud, falling
within a larger design of retaliation and harassment. Id. Defendant responds that Plaintiff
has failed to allege malice with specificity and only provides the conclusory statement
that Defendant Santos made the comments with malice.
The Court finds that several of the alleged defamatory statements clearly relate to
the CCAR and would be subject to the common interest privilege absent a showing of
actual malice. See Compl. ¶ 48 (acknowledging that statements were made in connection
with the CCAR). For example, an alleged defamatory statement concerning Arnaud’s job
performance by a human resources employee clearly falls within the statutory privilege.
See Compl. ¶ 82 (“Arnaud had unsatisfactory performance[.]”). But the Court need not
determine whether each alleged statement is protected by the common interest privilege
because Plaintiff has sufficiently pled actual malice. Plaintiff alleges that Arnaud was
subject to a pattern of retaliation. Defendant Santos’s alleged statements are a part of that
described retaliatory behavior. Thus regardless of whether the statements were made
within the scope of the statute’s privilege, Defendant cannot escape liability on the
defamation claim at this stage. Plaintiff has sufficiently pled a series of retaliatory actions
culminating with Santos’s allegedly defamatory statements.
The Court is also not persuaded by Defendants’ argument that the alleged
statements cannot be defamatory on the face of the complaint because they are merely
opinions as opposed to facts. As alleged, the statements can amount to an intentional
publication of a statement of fact that is false. See Jensen v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 14 Cal.
App. 4th 958, 965 (holding that an employer’s performance evaluation can support a
cause of action for libel where it falsely accuses an employee of lack of integrity,
dishonesty, incompetence, or reprehensible personal characteristics or behavior).
Whether Arnaud was refusing to work after returning to his employment after a medical
leave is a statement of fact capable of being provably false.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
CIVIL MINUTES – GENERAL
Case No. ED CV 18-01316-DOC (KKx)

B.

Date: October 1, 2018
Page 9

IIED

Having determined that Plaintiff has pled a valid claim against Defendant for
defamation, the Court briefly addresses the remaining arguments regarding IIED.
Plaintiff argues that Defendant Santos intentionally inflicted emotional distress
upon him by abusing their employer relationship with outrageous conduct. Compl. ¶ 77.
Defendant argues that Plaintiff has failed to sufficiently plead outrageous conduct, and
that even if Plaintiff could sustain a pleading of outrageous conduct, the exclusive
remedy is under the California’s Workers’ Compensation Act. Opp’n to Mot. to remand
at 10–14. Plaintiff responds that the retaliatory and discriminatory behavior removes this
remedy form the California Workers’ Compensation Act because it falls outside the
normal course of employment. Mot. to Remand at 13.
“[C]laims for negligent and intentional infliction of emotional distress made
within the context of the employment relationship are within the exclusive remedy
provisions of the California Workers’ Compensation Act.” Schaffer v. GTE, Inc., 40 F.
App’x 552, 557 (9th Cir. 2002). However, a “claim for [intentional infliction of
emotional] distress arising out of employment is ‘not barred where the distress is
engendered by an employer’s illegal discrimination practices.’” Nazir v. United Airlines,
Inc., 178 Cal. App. 4th 243, 288 (2009) (citation omitted). “Neither discrimination nor
harassment is a normal incident of employment.” Id. (citing Jones v. Los Angeles
Community College Dist., 198 Cal. App. 3d 794, 805 (1988)).
Plaintiff’s current iteration of the complaint does not contain sufficient
information to demonstrate outrageous conduct by Defendant Santos. However, based on
the information in the Arnaud Declaration and the pattern of discriminatory behavior
alleged against Defendant Caesar, Plaintiff has shown an ability to amend his complaint
in order to state a valid claim for IIED. The Court thus finds remand appropriate on this
ground alone.
IV.

Costs and Fees

Following remand of a case upon unsuccessful removal, the district court may, in
its discretion, award attorney’s fees “incurred as a result of the removal.” 28 U.S.C. §
1447(c). “Absent unusual circumstances, courts may award attorney’s fees under §
1447(c) only where the removing party lacked an objectively reasonable basis for seeking
removal. Conversely, when an objectively reasonable basis exists, fees should be

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
CIVIL MINUTES – GENERAL
Case No. ED CV 18-01316-DOC (KKx)

Date: October 1, 2018
Page 10

denied.” Martin v. Franklin Capital Corp., 546 U.S. 132, 141 (2005). The Court declines
to award attorney’s fees because Defendant’s removal was objectively reasonable.
V.

Motion to Dismiss

In light of the Court’s decision to grant Plaintiff’s Motion to Remand, the Court
lacks subject matter jurisdiction to decide Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss. The Court thus
DENIES AS MOOT the Motion to Dismiss.
VI.

Disposition

For the reasons set forth above, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s Motion to Remand
and REMANDS this action to the Superior Court of the State of California, County of
San Bernardino. The Court DENIES AS MOOT Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss.
The Clerk shall serve this minute order on the parties.
MINUTES FORM 11
CIVIL-GEN

Initials of Deputy Clerk: djl