David Matuguina v. Ford Motor Company

Filing 8

MINUTES (IN CHAMBERS) ORDER REMANDING ACTION by Judge Fernando M. Olguin. The above-captioned action shall be remanded to the Superior Court of the State of California for the County of San Bernardino for lack of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1447(c). Case Terminated. Made JS-6 (iv)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL
Case No.

ED CV 20-1842 FMO (SHKx)

Title

David Matuguina v. Ford Motor Company

Present: The Honorable

Date

October 16, 2020

Fernando M. Olguin, United States District Judge

Vanessa Figueroa

None

None

Deputy Clerk

Court Reporter / Recorder

Tape No.

Attorney Present for Plaintiff:

Attorney Present for Defendants:

None Present

None Present

Proceedings:

(In Chambers) Order Remanding Action

On July 15, 2020, David Matuguina (“plaintiff”) filed a complaint (“Complaint”) in the San
Bernardino County Superior Court (“state court”) against Ford Motor Company (“Ford”) asserting
state law claims under California’s Song-Beverly Act, Cal. Civ. Code §§ 1790 et seq., arising from
his purchase of a Ford vehicle. (See Dkt. 1, Notice of Removal (“NOR”) at ¶ 3; Dkt. 1-1,
Complaint). Ford removed the action on diversity jurisdiction grounds pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
1332. (See Dkt. 1, NOR at ¶ 3).
Unless otherwise expressly provided by Congress, “any civil action brought in a State court
of which the district courts of the United States have original jurisdiction, may be removed by the
defendant or the defendants, to the district court[.]” 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). “The right of removal
is entirely a creature of statute and a suit commenced in a state court must remain there until
cause is shown for its transfer under some act of Congress.” Syngenta Crop Prot., Inc. v. Henson,
537 U.S. 28, 32, 123 S.Ct. 366, 369 (2002) (internal quotation marks omitted). Where Congress
has acted to create a right of removal, those statutes, unless otherwise stated, are strictly
construed against removal jurisdiction.1 See id. “The strong presumption against removal
jurisdiction means that the defendant always has the burden of establishing that removal is
proper.” Gaus v. Miles, Inc., 980 F.2d 564, 566 (9th Cir. 1992) (per curiam) (internal quotation
marks omitted); Abrego Abrego v. The Dow Chem. Co., 443 F.3d 676, 684 (9th Cir. 2006) (per
curiam) (noting the “longstanding, near-canonical rule that the burden on removal rests with the
removing defendant”). Moreover, if there is any doubt regarding the existence of subject matter
jurisdiction, the court must resolve those doubts in favor of remanding the action to state court.
See Gaus, 980 F.2d at 566 (“Federal jurisdiction must be rejected if there is any doubt as to the
right of removal in the first instance.”).
The court’s review of the NOR and state court Complaint makes clear that this court does

1

For example, an “antiremoval presumption” does not exist in cases removed pursuant to the
Class Action Fairness Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d). See Dart Cherokee Basin Operating Co., LLC
v. Owens, 574 U.S. 81, 89, 135 S.Ct. 547, 554 (2014).
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL
Case No.

ED CV 20-1842 FMO (SHKx)

Title

Date

David Matuguina v. Ford Motor Company

October 16, 2020

not have subject matter jurisdiction over the instant matter. See 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a); Caterpillar,
Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392, 107 S.Ct. 2425, 2429 (1987) (“Only state-court actions that
originally could have been filed in federal court may be removed to federal court by the
defendant.”) (footnote omitted). In other words, plaintiff could not have originally brought this
action in federal court, as plaintiff does not competently allege facts supplying diversity jurisdiction.
Therefore, removal was improper. See 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a).
Ford contends that the amount in controversy threshold is met based on the amount of the
subject vehicle and plaintiff’s request for civil penalties.2 (See Dkt. 1, NOR at ¶¶ 8-9). However,
Ford has failed to take into account any reduction for the use of the vehicle, (see, generally, id.),
and thus has failed to show that the amount in controversy exceeds the jurisdictional threshold.
See Schneider v. Ford Motor Co., 756 F.Appx. 699, 701 n. 3 (9th Cir. 2018) (“Consideration of the
[u]se [o]ffset [is] appropriate” in determining the amount in controversy as the circuit has
“recognized that an estimate of the amount in controversy must be reduced if a specific rule of law
or measure of damages limits the amount of damages recoverable.”) (internal quotation marks
omitted); see, e.g., Mullin v. FCA US, LLC, 2020 WL 2509081, *3 (C.D. Cal. 2020) (“Because
Defendants neglected to take the mileage offset into account, they failed to meet their burden of
showing Plaintiff's actual damages based on the purchase price of the vehicle.”); Maciel v. BMW
of N. Am., LLC, 2017 WL 8185859, *2 (C.D. Cal. 2017) (finding amount in controversy not satisfied
given defendant’s failure to consider set-off amount); Chavez v. FCA US LLC, 2020 WL 468909,
*2 (C.D. Cal. 2020) (“If the amount of actual damages is speculative, however, an attempt to
determine the civil penalty is equally uncertain.”).3
Given that any doubt regarding the existence of subject matter jurisdiction must be resolved
in favor of remanding the action to state court, see Gaus, 980 F.2d at 566, the court is not
persuaded, under the circumstances here, that Ford has met its burden. Thus, there is no basis
for diversity jurisdiction.
This order is not intended for publication. Nor is it intended to be included in or
submitted to any online service such as Westlaw or Lexis.
Based on the foregoing, IT IS ORDERED THAT:
1. The above-captioned action shall be remanded to the Superior Court of the State of
California for the County of San Bernardino for lack of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to 28

2

Under the Song-Beverly Act, a plaintiff is entitled to restitution “in an amount equal to the
actual price paid or payable by the buyer” less the reduction in value “directly attributable to use
by the buyer.” Cal. Civ. Code § 1793.2(d)(2)(B)-(C)
3

Given the above, Ford has failed to show that plaintiff’s other requests for relief satisfy the
amount in controversy
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL
Case No.

ED CV 20-1842 FMO (SHKx)

Date

Title

David Matuguina v. Ford Motor Company

October 16, 2020

U.S.C. § 1447(c).
2. The Clerk shall send a certified copy of this Order to the state court.
3. Any pending motion is denied as moot.

Initials of Preparer

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vdr

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