Greg Sullivan v. American Express Publishing Corporation et al

Filing 63

ORDER by Judge Josephine Staton Tucker: granting 57 Motion for Settlement And Setting A Fairness Hearing for 10/24/11 at 10:00 A.M. (twdb)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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11 GREG SULLIVAN, individually and on
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CASE NO. SACV 09-142-JST (ANx)

behalf of all others similarly situated

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ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S
MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY
SETTLEMENT APPROVAL AND
SETTING A FAIRNESS HEARING
FOR OCTOBER 24, 2011, AT 10:00
A.M.

Plaintiffs,

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vs.

16 AMERICAN EXPRESS PUBLISHING
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CORPORATION, TIME, INC.
Defendants.

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I. INTRODUCTION
Before the Court is Plaintiff Greg Sullivan’s unopposed Motion for preliminary

3 settlement approval. (Doc. 57.) The Motion asks the Court to preliminarily approve the
4 proposed settlement, conditionally certify the settlement class, appoint Plaintiff as class
5 representative and Plaintiff’s counsel as class counsel, and approve the form and method of
6 class notice. Having reviewed the papers and taken the matter under submission, the Court
7 GRANTS Plaintiff’s Motion and sets a fairness hearing for October 24, 2011, at 10:00 a.m.
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II. BACKGROUND
On February 5, 2009, Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated,

11 filed a class-action complaint against Defendants American Express Publishing
12 Corporation (“AEPC”) and Time, Inc. alleging that Defendants engaged in illegal debt
13 collection when they sent subscribers of Travel+Leisure magazine envelopes containing
14 the phrase “OVERDUE INVOICE” on the outside. (Compl., Doc. 1, ¶ 13.) Based on
15 Defendants’ alleged action, Plaintiff asserts a single claim for unfair debt collection under
16 California’s Rosenthal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, California Civil Code sections
17 1788-1788.33. (See Second Amended Complaint, “SAC,” Doc. 33.)
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On December 20, 2010, Plaintiff filed a notice of settlement. (Doc. 53.) The

19 proposed Settlement Agreement is on behalf of “all persons in the State of California who,
20 between January 24, 2008 and December 31, 2010, were subscribers of Travel+Leisure
21 magazine and received from AEPC and/or Time a Qualifying Communication” (the
22 “class”). (Stipulation and Agreement of Settlement, “Settlement Agreement,” ¶ 2.25.) A
23 “Qualifying Communication” is defined as “an invoice for payment of a Travel+Leisure
24 magazine subscription sent by AEPC or Time to California residents . . . in the Settlement
25 Class in an envelope that reflected the words ‘OVERDUE INVOICE’ on the exterior of
26 the envelope.” (Id. ¶ 2.18.)
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Under the Settlement Agreement, the parties agreed that class members will have

28 the option to receive either a one-year subscription to their choice of three magazines,
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1 including Travel+Leisure, or a cash payment of up to $27.50. (Settlement Agreement ¶¶
2 2.3, 2.28, 4.1, 4.2.) The cash payment aggregate amount is capped at $180,000 and the
3 payments to each individual class member will be pro-rated accordingly. (Id. ¶ 4.2.) Class
4 members who do not exclude themselves will release all claims that were or could have
5 been brought in the Second Amended Complaint. (Id. ¶¶ 2.19-2.20.) For prospective class
6 members who want to opt-out, the Settlement Agreement allows them to send notice to the
7 Settlement Administrator within 60 days of a preliminary approval order. (Id. § IX, Exh.
8 A.) The Settlement Agreement further requires Defendants to refrain from engaging in the
9 challenged conduct for a year. (Id. ¶ 4.3.)
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III.

CONDITIONAL CERTIFICATION OF THE CLASS

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A. Legal Standard

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Plaintiff requests conditional certification of the class pursuant to Rule 23. “To

14 obtain class certification, a class plaintiff has the burden of showing that the requirements
15 of Rule 23(a) are met and that the class is maintainable pursuant to Rule 23(b).” Narouz v.
16 Charter Commc’ns, LLC, 591 F.3d 1261, 1266 (9th Cir. 2010). “Rule 23(a) ensures that
17 the named plaintiffs are appropriate representatives of the class whose claims they wish to
18 litigate.” Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, --- S. Ct. ----, 2011 WL 2437013, at *6 (June 20,
19 2011). “Under Rule 23(a), the party seeking certification must demonstrate, first, that”:
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(1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable; (2)

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there are questions of law or fact common to the class; (3) the claims or

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defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of

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the class; and (4) the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect

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the interests of the class.

25 Id. at *5 (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)). “Second, the proposed class must satisfy at least
26 one of the three requirements listed in Rule 23(b).” Id. Rule 23(b) is satisfied if:
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(1) prosecuting separate actions by or against individual class members

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would create a risk of:
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(A) inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect to individual

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class members that would establish incompatible standards of conduct

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for the party opposing the class; or

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(B) adjudications with respect to individual class members that, as a

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practical matter, would be dispositive of the interests of the other

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members not parties to the individual adjudications or would

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substantially impair or impede their ability to protect their interests;

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(2) the party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on grounds that

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apply generally to the class, so that final injunctive relief or corresponding

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declaratory relief is appropriate respecting the class as a whole; or

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(3) the court finds that the questions of law or fact common to class

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members predominate over any questions affecting only individual

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members, and that a class action is superior to other available methods for

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fairly and efficiently adjudicating the controversy.

19 Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b). “Rule 23 does not set forth a mere pleading standard,” thus “[a]
20 party seeking class certification must affirmatively demonstrate his compliance with the
21 Rule—that is, he must be prepared to prove that there are in fact sufficiently numerous
22 parties, common questions of law or fact, etc.” Id. at *7. This requires a district court to
23 conduct a “rigorous analysis” that frequently “will entail some overlap with the merits of
24 the plaintiff’s underlying claim.” Id.
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B. Requirements Under Rule 23(a)
1. Numerosity
Rule 23(a)(1) requires that the class be “so numerous that joinder of all members is

4 impracticable.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(1). “As a general rule, classes of forty or more are
5 considered sufficiently numerous.” Mazza v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 254 F.R.D. 610, 617
6 (C.D. Cal. 2008); see also Harris v. Palm Springs Alpine Estates, 329 F.2d 909, 913-914
7 (9th Cir. 1964) (“‘Impracticability’ does not mean ‘impossibility,’ but only the difficulty or
8 inconvenience of joining all members of the class.”) (internal quotation marks and citation
9 omitted). Plaintiff has submitted evidence that the proposed class has approximately 6,576
10 members throughout California. (Russell Decl., Doc. 57-2, ¶ 2.) Plaintiff has therefore
11 satisfied the numerosity requirement.
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2. Commonality
Rule 23(a)(2) requires that “there are questions of law or fact common to the class.”

15 Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(2). “Commonality requires the plaintiff to demonstrate that the class
16 members ‘have suffered the same injury.’” Dukes, 2011 WL 2437013 at *7 (quoting Gen.
17 Tel. Co. of Sw. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 157 (1982)). “This does not mean merely that
18 they have all suffered a violation of the same provision of law,” but instead that their
19 claim(s) “depend upon a common contention . . . of such a nature that is capable of
20 classwide resolution – which means that determination of its truth or falsity will resolve an
21 issue that is central to the validity of each one of the claims in one stroke.” Id. Although
22 “for purposes of Rule 23(a)(2) even a single common question will do,” id. at *11 (internal
23 citation and quotation marks omitted), “[w]hat matters to class certification is not the
24 raising of common ‘questions’ – even in droves – but, rather the capacity of a classwide
25 proceeding to generate common answers apt to drive the resolution of the litigation.” Id.
26 at *7 (emphasis included).
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Here, the class members have suffered the same injury – the receipt of a Qualifying

28 Communication as subscribers to the subject magazines. Furthermore, there exist
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1 numerous common questions that are capable of classwide resolution and that depend on
2 common answers: whether Defendants are debt collectors under the Rosenthal Act,
3 whether Defendants’ sending of the Qualifying Communication to class members qualified
4 as debt collection, and whether such alleged debt collection was intentional or occurred
5 notwithstanding procedures reasonably adapted to avoid such an alleged violation. See
6 Cal. Civ. Code § 1788.30(e). Thus, Plaintiff has satisfied the commonality requirement.
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3. Typicality
Rule 23(a)(3) requires “the claims or defenses of the representative parties [to be]

10 typical of the claims or defenses of the class.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(3). “Under the rule’s
11 permissive standards, representative claims are ‘typical’ if they are reasonably coextensive
12 with those of absent class members; they need not be substantially identical.” Dukes v.
13 Wal-Mart, 603 F.3d 571, 580 (9th Cir. 2010) (en banc) (quoting Hanlon,150 F.3d at 1020),
14 rev’d on other grounds, --- S. Ct. ----, 2011 WL 2437013 (June 20, 2011). As to the
15 representative, “[t]ypicality requires that the named plaintiffs be members of the class they
16 represent.” Id. at 613 (citing Falcon, 457 U.S. at 156). The commonality, typicality,
17 adequacy-of-representation requirements “tend to merge” with each other. Dukes, 2011
18 WL 2437013 at *7 at n.5 (citing Falcon, 457 U.S. at 157-58 n.13). As a subscriber of
19 Travel+Leisure magazine during the relevant period who received a Qualifying
20 Communication, Plaintiff is a member of the proposed class and has suffered the same
21 injury as his fellow class members. (See Russell Decl., Exh. 2, Sullivan Decl. ¶¶ 2-4.)
22 Plaintiff has therefore satisfied the typicality requirement.
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4. Representative Party
Rule 23(a)(4) permits certification of a class action only if “the representative

26 parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.” Fed. R. Civ. P.
27 23(a)(4). “This factor requires: (1) that the proposed representative plaintiffs do not have
28 conflicts of interest with the proposed class, and (2) that plaintiffs are represented by
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1 qualified and competent counsel.” Dukes, 603 F.3d at 614. As to Plaintiff, he declares
2 that he has “no known conflicts of interest with any other subscribers of Travel+Leisure
3 magazine” and promises to “fairly and adequately represent the interests of the class.” (Id.
4 ¶ 5.) Thus, the Court concludes that Plaintiff is an adequate representative of the class and
5 appoints him as class representative. As to the adequacy of Plaintiff’s counsel, the Court
6 must consider “(i) the work counsel has done in identifying or investigating potential
7 claims in the action; (ii) counsel’s experience in handling class actions, other complex
8 litigation, and the types of claims asserted in the action; (iii) counsel’s knowledge of the
9 applicable law; and (iv) the resources that counsel will commit to representing the class.”
10 Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(g)(1)(A). Plaintiff’s counsel Charles S. Russell and Robert W.
11 Thompson have both submitted declarations attesting to their own personal experience in
12 similar class action matters and their firm’s general experience in handling class action
13 suits. (Rusell Decl. ¶ 7; id., Exh. 3, Thompson Decl. ¶¶ 5-7.) Based on Plaintiff’s
14 counsels’ experience, and their work in the matter thus far, the Court concludes that
15 Plaintiff’s counsel has satisfied the adequacy requirements under Rule 23(g).1 Therefore,
16 the Court appoints Plaintiff’s counsel as class counsel in this matter.
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C. Requirements Under Rule 23(b)

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In addition to establishing the elements of Rule 23(a), Plaintiffs must also satisfy

20 one of the three elements of Rule 23(b). Plaintiff seeks certification under Rule 23(b)(3),
21 alleging that common questions predominate over any individual issues that may exist in
22 this case. (Pl.’s Mot. at 9.) Under Rule 23(b)(3), a class action may be maintained if: “[1]
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Plaintiff requests preliminary approval of attorney’s fees and costs, and a service award for
Plaintiff. (Pl.’s Mot. at 12-14; see Settlement Agreement ¶ 5.1.) Such requests are premature. If
25 and when final approval of the settlement occurs, the Court will address attorney’s fees, costs, and
26 Plaintiff’s service award at that time. Further, Plaintiff’s counsel has not made a sufficient
showing as to attorney’s fees and costs. Only one paragraph of Charles S. Russell’s declaration is
27 devoted to the subject, and that paragraph failed to provide adequate detail as to hours worked or
billing rates. (Russell Decl. ¶ 11.)

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1 the court finds that the questions of law or fact common to class members predominate
2 over any questions affecting only individual members, and [2] that a class action is
3 superior to other available methods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating the controversy.”
4 Fed. R. Civ. R. 23(b)(3) (emphasis added). The Court may consider:
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(a) the class members’ interests in individually controlling the prosecution or

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defense of separate actions; (b) the extent and nature of any litigation

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concerning the controversy already begun by or against class members; (c) the

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desirability or undesirability of concentrating the litigation of the claims in the

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particular forum; and (d) the likely difficulties in managing a class action.

10 Fed. R. Civ. R. 23(b)(3). Plaintiff’s claim satisfies both the predominance and superiority
11 requirements.
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As to the predominance factor, the Supreme Court has explained that it “tests

13 whether proposed classes are sufficiently cohesive to warrant adjudication by
14 representation.” Amchem, 521 U.S. at 623. “When common questions present a significant
15 aspect of the case and they can be resolved for all members of the class in a single
16 adjudication, there is clear justification for handling the dispute on a representative rather
17 than on an individual basis.” Hanlon, 150 F.3d at 1022 (quoting 7A Charles Alan Wright,
18 Arthur R. Miller & Mary Kay Kane, Federal Practice & Procedure § 1778 (2d ed.1986)).
19 Here, Plaintiff’s claim under the Rosenthal Act entails nothing but common questions and
20 issues for the class, namely whether Defendants qualify as debt collectors under the
21 statute, whether Defendants’ acts of sending the Qualifying Communications constituted
22 prohibited debt collection activities, and whether Defendants intentionally sent the
23 Qualifying Communications to the class members. Moreover, because the class seeks
24 statutory damages, variances involved in proving individual damages do not arise.
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The Court also finds that a class action would be a superior method of adjudicating

26 Plaintiff’s claim. “The superiority inquiry under Rule 23(b)(3) requires determination of
27 whether the objectives of the particular class action procedure will be achieved in the
28 particular case.” Hanlon, 150 F.3d at 1023. “This determination necessarily involves a
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1 comparative evaluation of alternative mechanisms of dispute resolution.” Id. Here, each
2 member of the class pursuing a claim individually would burden the judiciary and run
3 afoul of Rule 23’s focus on efficiency and judicial economy. See Vinole v. Countrywide
4 Home Loans, Inc., 571 F.3d 935, 946 (9th Cir. 2009) (“The overarching focus remains
5 whether trial by class representation would further the goals of efficiency and judicial
6 economy.”). Further, litigation costs would likely “dwarf potential recovery” if each class
7 member litigated individually. Hanlon, 150 F.3d at 1023. “[W]here the damages each
8 plaintiff suffered are not that great, this factor weighs in favor of certifying a class action.”
9 Zinser v. Accufix Research Inst., Inc., 253 F.3d 1180, 1199 n.2 (9th Cir. 2001) (quoting
10 Haley v. Medtronic, Inc., 169 F.R.D. 643, 652 (C.D. Cal. 1996)).
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Considering the non-exclusive factors under Rule 23(b)(3)(A)-(D), the Court finds

12 that class members’ potential interests in individually controlling the prosecution of
13 separate actions and the potential difficulties in managing the class action do not outweigh
14 the desirability in concentrating this matter in one litigation. See Fed. R. Civ. P.
15 23(b)(3)(A), (C). This particular forum is desirable because the class members worked in
16 California. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3)(C). The Court is not aware of any litigation
17 concerning the controversy that has already begun by or against class members. See Fed.
18 R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3)(B). Finally, the Court does not foresee any likely difficulties in
19 managing this case as a class action.
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IV. PRELIMINARY APPROVAL OF THE PROPOSED SETTLEMENT
To preliminarily approve a proposed class-action settlement, Rule 23(e)(2) requires

23 the Court to determine whether the proposed settlement is fair, reasonable, and adequate.
24 Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e)(2). “To determine whether a settlement agreement meets these
25 standards, a district court must consider a number of factors, including: the strength of
26 plaintiffs’ case; the risk, expense, complexity, and likely duration of further litigation; the
27 risk of maintaining class action status throughout the trial; the amount offered in
28 settlement; the extent of discovery completed, and the stage of the proceedings; the
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1 experience and views of counsel; the presence of a governmental participant; and the
2 reaction of the class members to the proposed settlement.” Staton v. Boeing Co., 327 F.3d
3 938, 959 (9th Cir. 2003) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted). “The relative
4 degree of importance to be attached to any particular factor will depend upon and be
5 dictated by the nature of the claim(s) advanced, the type(s) of relief sought, and the unique
6 facts and circumstances presented by each individual case.” Officers for Justice v. Civil
7 Serv. Comm’n, 688 F.2d 615, 625 (9th Cir. 1982). “It is the settlement taken as a whole,
8 rather than the individual component parts, that must be examined for overall fairness, and
9 the settlement must stand or fall in its entirety.” Staton, 327 F.3d at 960 (quoting Hanlon,
10 150 F.3d at 1026).
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A. Strength of Plaintiff’s Case

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Plaintiff notes that, although he believes his case has merit, issues of whether

14 Defendants qualify as debt collectors and whether their conduct qualified as debt collection
15 under the Rosenthal Act, as well as the strength of Defendants’ affirmative defenses, make
16 victory for Plaintiff less than certain. (Pl.’s Mot. at 11.) For example, Defendant denies
17 that it is subject to consumer debt collection laws. (See Russell Decl., Exh. 1, Responses
18 of Defendant AEPC to Pl.’s Interrogs., Resps. 7, 8.). Noting this, and because the
19 proposed settlement was reached through extensive, good faith arm’s-length negotiations
20 after more than two years of litigation, (Settlement Agreement ¶ 1.3; Russell Decl. ¶ 11,)
21 the Court concludes that the parties’ decision to reach a settlement in this matter was
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B. Likely Expense and Duration of Further Litigation

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Plaintiff’s Motion does not address this factor, but undoubtedly the expense

26 incurred by Plaintiff and the purported class will increase as the case progresses. This
27 action has ensued for two years, and neither side has brought dispositive motions. Thus, if
28 settlement were not reached, Plaintiff and potential class members would likely incur
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1 additional costs in conducting further discovery, defending or bringing dispositive
2 motions, and, if applicable, preparing for and participating in trial. Because Plaintiff fails
3 to set forth any information as to this factor, however, prior to the fairness hearing
4 Plaintiff’s counsel shall submit a declaration addressing the likely expense and duration of
5 further litigation.
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C. Extent of Discovery Completed

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Plaintiff represents that “sufficient discovery was completed” before the parties

9 reached a settlement, but the Motion fails to provide adequate detail in that regard. Other
10 than an unspecified amount of written discovery and production of documents and the
11 depositions of Plaintiff and AEPC’s Rule 30(b)(6) witnesses, (Pl.’s Mot. at 11; Settlement
12 Agreement ¶ 1.4,) the Court is unaware of what discovery has been conducted. Therefore,
13 before the fairness hearing, Plaintiff’s counsel shall outline in a declaration the nature and
14 scope of the discovery the parties have completed.
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D. Risk of Maintaining Class Certification

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The Court has not been made aware of any specific risks of maintaining class

18 certification were the case to go to trial. Accordingly, the Court need not consider this
19 factor for settlement purposes. See In re Veritas Software Corp. Sec. Litig., No. C-03-0283
20 MMC, 2005 WL 3096079, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 15, 2005) (favoring neither approval nor
21 disapproval of settlement where the court was “unaware of any risk involved in
22 maintaining class action status”), aff’d in relevant part, 496 F.3d 962 (9th Cir. 2007);
23 Murillo v. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co., No. CIV. 2:08-1974 WBS GGH, 2010 WL 2889728, at
24 *7 (E.D. Cal. July 21, 2010) (favoring neither approval nor disapproval of settlement
25 where the court was “unaware of any specific difficulty in maintaining class-action status
26 were [the] case to continue to trial”).
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E. Amount Offered in Settlement

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Because Plaintiff and the class seek statutory damages under the Rosenthal Act, the

4 total recovery is capped at $500,000 pursuant to 15 U.S.C. 1692k. See Cal. Civ. Code §
5 1788.17; 15 U.S.C. § 1692k. With a potential class size of 6,576 individuals, the total
6 individual award, if victorious, would thus be $76. The Settlement Agreement allows
7 class members to choose from between a cash award of $27.50 or a one-year magazine
8 subscription, valued between $29.95 and $59.88, subject to a cap on all cash payments of
9 $180,000. (Settlement Agreement ¶¶ 4.1, 4.2.) Additionally, Defendants have agreed to
10 cease using the challenged language, i.e., the Qualifying Communications, for one year.
11 Considering the risks of proceeding to trial and comparing the settlement payout with the
12 maximum payout that could be obtained through trial, the settlement amount is fair,
13 reasonable, and adequate.
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F. Experience and Views of Counsel

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As discussed above, Plaintiff’s counsel has experience serving as plaintiff’s counsel

17 in class actions, and, along with Defendants’ counsel, have fully endorsed the settlement
18 agreement as fair, reasonable, and adequate. (Settlement Agreement ¶¶ 1.3, 1.4.)
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G. Reaction of Class Members to Proposed Settlement
Plaintiff provides no evidence regarding class members’ reaction to the proposed

22 settlement. Prior to the fairness hearing, Plaintiff’s counsel shall submit a sufficient
23 number of declarations from class members, including Plaintiff, discussing their reactions
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V. PRELIMINARY APPROVAL OF CLASS NOTICE FORM AND METHOD
For a class certified under Rule 23(b)(3), “the court must direct to class members

28 the best notice that is practicable under the circumstances, including individual notice to all
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1 members who can be identified through reasonable effort.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(2)(B).
2 However, actual notice is not required. See Silber v. Mabon, 18 F.3d 1449, 1454 (9th Cir.
3 1994).
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The Settlement Agreement states that notice will be mailed to persons qualified to

5 be class members within 30 days of the entry of the preliminary approval order.
6 (Settlement Agreement ¶ 8.1.) The mail will be sent to the member’s last known address
7 as identified in Defendants’ records. (Id.) Notice by mail has been found by the Supreme
8 Court to be sufficient if the notice is “reasonably calculated . . . to apprise interested parties
9 of the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present their objections.”
10 Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950).
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Plaintiff has provided the Court with a copy of the proposed notice. (Settlement

12 Agreement, Exh. A.) Under Rule 23, the notice must include, in a manner that is
13 understandable to potential class members, “(i) the nature of the action; (ii) the definition
14 of the class certified; (iii) the class claims, issues, or defenses; (iv) that a class member
15 may enter an appearance through an attorney if the member so desires; (v) that the court
16 will exclude from the class any member who requests exclusion; (vi) the time and manner
17 for requesting exclusion; and (vii) the binding effect of a class judgment on members
18 under Rule 23(c)(3).” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(2)(B). The proposed notice includes this
19 necessary information. (See Settlement Agreement, Exh. A.) The Court notes, however,
20 that the Settlement Agreement provides that a class member seeking to object to the
21 Settlement Agreement shall file any objection no later than thirty days before the fairness
22 hearing. (Id. ¶ 10.2.) The proposed notice indicates that such objection should be filed
23 “60 days after Preliminary Approval.” (Id., Exh. A. at 1.) The proposed notice should
24 indicate, pursuant to the Settlement Agreement, that the members shall file any objection
25 no later than thirty days before the fairness hearing scheduled for October 24, 2011, at
26 10:00 a.m. With that change, the Court finds the notice to be the best notice that is
27 practicable under the circumstances, and approves the form and method of class notice.
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VI. CONCLUSION
Accordingly, the Court: (1) conditionally certifies the class, and appoints Greg

3 Sullivan as settlement class representative and Callahan, Thompson, Sherman & Caudill,
4 LLP as settlement class counsel; (2) preliminarily approves the Settlement Agreement; (3)
5 approves the form and method of class notice with the modification that, pursuant to the
6 Settlement Agreement, class members’ objections to the Settlement Agreement shall be
7 filed no later than thirty days before the fairness hearing.
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The Court sets a fairness hearing for October 24, 2011, at 10:00 a.m. to determine

9 whether the Settlement Agreement should be finally approved as fair, reasonable, and
10 adequate to class members. Plaintiff’s counsel shall file all additional supporting
11 documentation noted by the Court and brief(s) supporting final approval of the Settlement
12 Agreement, an award of reasonable attorney’s fees and costs, and an award of a reasonable
13 class representative service fee no later than twenty-eight days before the fairness hearing.
14 The Court expects that counsel will address all issues noted by the Court in this order. As
15 indicated above, the notice shall indicate that any class member seeking to object to the
16 Settlement Agreement shall file any objection no later than thirty days before the fairness
17 hearing. Plaintiff may file written replies to any of the class members’ written objections
18 no later than fourteen days before the fairness hearing.
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The Court reserves the right to continue the date of the fairness hearing without

20 further notice to class members. The Court retains jurisdiction to consider all further
21 applications arising out of or in connection with the Settlement Agreement.
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23 DATED: June 30, 2011
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JOSEPHINE STATON TUCKER
JOSEPHINE STATON TUCKER
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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