Nasir Uddin v. RadioShack Corporation et al

Filing 119

MINUTES OF Motion Hearing held before Judge Christina A. Snyder: The Court GRANTS Plaintiff's Motion for Leave to File his Proposed Third Amended Complaint and to Extend the Discovery Cut-off 113 . The Court ORDERS the parties to meet and confer on a proposed amended scheduling order. Court Reporter: Laura Elias. (gk)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL
Case No.

SACV 11-0398-CAS (JCGx)

Title

NASIR UDDIN V. RADIO SHACK, INC.

Present: The Honorable

Date

April 22, 2013

CHRISTINA A. SNYDER

Catherine Jeang
Deputy Clerk

Laura Elias
Court Reporter / Recorder

N/A
Tape No.

Attorneys Present for Plaintiffs:

Attorneys Present for Defendants

Katherine Odenbreit

Robert Cocchia

Proceedings:

I.

PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE A THIRD
AMENDED COMPLAINT AND REQUEST TO VACATE OR
EXTEND DISCOVERY CUT-OFF DATE (filed March 15,
2013) [Dkt. No. 113]

INTRODUCTION

On January 18, 2011, plaintiff Nasir Uddin filed a putative class action against
defendant RadioShack Corporation (“RadioShack”) in Orange County Superior Court
asserting multiple claims for defendant’s alleged failure to pay regular and overtime
wages, provide meal and rest breaks, provide accurate wage-and-hour statements, and
pay timely compensation due upon termination. Plaintiff sought to represent a class of
former and current Assistant Managers, Managers in Training, Sales Associate
Keyholders, or any other job position with similar duties employed by RadioShack in
California at any time from January 18, 2007, to the present. Upon defendant’s removal
of the action, the case was assigned to the Hon. Judge Josephine Staton Tucker.
On June 15, 2011, plaintiff filed the operative second amended complaint (“SAC”).
The SAC alleges the following eight claims for relief: (1) failure to pay regular, overtime,
and minimum wages pursuant to Cal. Labor Code §§ 510, 558, 1194, and 1198;
(2) failure to provide required meal breaks pursuant to Cal. Labor Code §§ 226.7, 512
and Wage Order 7-2001 § 11; (3) failure to provide required rest breaks pursuant to Cal.
Labor Code § 226.7 and Wage Order 7-2001 § 12; (4) failure to pay all wages when due
in a timely manner pursuant to Cal. Labor Code §§ 201 and 202; (5) failure to provide
and maintain accurate wage statements pursuant to Cal. Labor Code §§ 226, 226.3, 1174,
and 1174.5; (6) unfair business practices pursuant to Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code §§ 17200 et
seq. (“UCL”); (7) civil penalties pursuant to the Private Attorney General Act, Cal. Labor
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL
Case No.

SACV 11-0398-CAS (JCGx)

Title

Date

April 22, 2013

NASIR UDDIN V. RADIO SHACK, INC.

Code §§ 2698 et seq. (“PAGA”); and (8) failure to pay overtime wages pursuant to the
Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201 et seq. (“FLSA”).
On June 20, 2011, Judge Tucker issued the first scheduling order in this case,
setting the last day for hearing on a motion to add parties and amend pleadings as
September 19, 2011, and a discovery cut-off date of February 27, 2012, among other
dates. Dkt. No. 29. On October 14, 2011, Judge Tucker amended the scheduling order
pursuant to the parties stipulation, extending the discovery cut-off until May 28, 2012 and
setting the hearing date on plaintiff’s motion for class certification as March 26, 2012.
Dkt. No. 45. The date for bringing a motion for class certification was subsequently
moved to the date thirty days after the California Supreme Court handed down its
decision in Brinker v. Superior Court, No.SI66350 (“Brinker”). The parties’ joint
stipulation to amend the scheduling order a further time was denied. Dkt. No. 58.
On May 14, 2012, plaintiff filed his motion for class certification. Dkt. No. 61.
Thereafter, this case was transferred to this Court as related to Ordonez v. Radio Shack,
10-7060 CAS (JCGx). On July 2, 2012, the Court denied plaintiff’s motion for class
certification without prejudice, on the grounds that plaintiff had failed to demonstrate that
defendant had implemented uniform policies denying meal and rest breaks to enable the
Court to conclude that plaintiff could present a class-wide method of proof of liability.
Dkt. No. 96. Pursuant to the parties’ stipulation, the Court vacated the Court’s October
14, 2011 Amended Scheduling Order, as further amended by the Court on May 30, 2012,
and stayed this case pending resolution by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals of
plaintiff’s appeal of the denial of class certification. Dkt. No. 103.
On October 18, 2012, the Ninth Circuit denied plaintiff’s request for permission to
appeal. Dkt. No. 106. On November 6, 2012, the Court granted plaintiff’s request to
reopen discovery until January 14, 2013, limited to “the issue of whether defendant
implemented uniform policies denying meal and rest breaks and encouraging employees
to not record time worked.” Dkt. No. 108 at 2. The Court ordered the parties to meet and
confer to set a briefing schedule for this motion, but did not set any further dates. The
Court subsequently continued this discovery deadline until March 15, 2013. Dkt. No.
110. On January 17, 2013, the Court denied plaintiff’s motion for class certification in
the Ordonez action, and plaintiff in this case determined that he would not proceed with
his class claims here.
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL
Case No.

SACV 11-0398-CAS (JCGx)

Title

Date

April 22, 2013

NASIR UDDIN V. RADIO SHACK, INC.

On March 15, 2013, plaintiff filed the instant motion for leave to file a third
amended complaint naming additional individuals as plaintiffs. Dkt. No. 113.1
Defendant opposed the motion on April 1, 2013, and plaintiff replied on April 8. The
Court held a hearing on April 22, 2013. After considering the parties’ arguments, the
Court finds and concludes as follows.
II.

LEGAL STANDARD

Generally, a court considers a motion for leave to amend pleadings pursuant to the
permissive standard of Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a). Martinez v. Newport Beach City, 125 F.3d
777, 785 (9th Cir. 1997). However, once the district court enters a scheduling order
establishing a deadline for amending pleadings, Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(b) applies. Coleman
v. Quaker Oats Co., 232 F.3d 1271, 1294 (9th Cir. 2000). This is because once a
scheduling order is in place, the court must consider whether to modify the scheduling
order to permit an amendment. W. Schwarzer, A. Tashima & M. Wagstaffe, Federal
Civil Procedure Before Trial (2006) § 8:405.1 (citing Johnson v. Mammoth Recreations,
Inc., 975 F.2d 604, 607 (9th Cir. 1992)).
A.

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 16

Rule 16(b)(4) provides that a scheduling order shall be modified “only for good
cause.” “Unlike Rule 15(a)’s liberal amendment policy which focuses on the bad faith of
the party seeking to interpose an amendment and the prejudice to the opposing party,
Rule 16(b)’s ‘good cause’ standard primarily considers the diligence of the party seeking
the amendment.” Johnson, 975 F.2d at 609. Accordingly, while the court may consider
the “existence or degree of prejudice” to the opposing party, the focus of the court’s
inquiry is upon the moving party’s explanation for failure to timely move for leave to
amend. Id. “The pretrial schedule may be modified ‘if it cannot reasonably be met
despite the diligence of the party seeking the extension.’” Zivkovic v. S. Cal. Edison Co.,
302 F.3d 1080, 1087 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting Johnson, 975 F.2d at 609).

1

Plaintiff informed defendant of his intention to forgo pursuing certification of a
class on February 15, 2013. Decl. of Katherine Odennreit ¶ 3.
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL
Case No.

SACV 11-0398-CAS (JCGx)

Title

NASIR UDDIN V. RADIO SHACK, INC.
B.

Date

April 22, 2013

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15

Rule 15 provides that after a responsive pleading has been filed, “a party may
amend its pleading only with the opposing party’s written consent or the court’s leave.
The court should freely give leave when justice so requires.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a).
Where leave to amend is required, the decision whether to grant leave to amend “is
entrusted to the sound discretion of the trial court.” Jordan v. County of Los Angeles,
669 F.2d 1311, 1324 (9th Cir. 1982), vacated on other grounds, 459 U.S. 810 (1982).
“Five factors are taken into account to assess the propriety of a motion for leave to
amend: bad faith, undue delay, prejudice to the opposing party, futility of amendment,
and whether the plaintiff has previously amended the complaint.” Johnson v. Buckley,
356 F.3d 1067, 1077 (9th Cir. 2004) (citing Nunes v. Ashcroft, 348 F.3d 815, 818 (9th
Cir. 2003)). “Some courts have stressed prejudice to the opposing party as the key
factor.” Texaco v. Ponsoldt, 939 F.2d 794, 798 (9th Cir. 1991). However, “[u]ndue
delay is a valid reason for denying leave to amend.” Id. (internal quotation marks and
citation omitted); but see Bowles v. Reade, 198 F.3d 752, 758 (9th Cir. 1999) (“Undue
delay by itself, however, is insufficient to justify denying a motion to amend.”). Further,
“the liberality of Rule 15(a) does not mean that amendment will be allowed regardless of
the diligence of the moving party. Where the party seeking amendment knows or should
know of the facts upon which the proposed amendment is based but fails to include them
in the original complaint, the motion to amend may be denied.” Jordan, 669 F.3d at
1324. “Late amendments to assert new theories are not reviewed favorably when the
facts and the theory have been known to the party seeking amendment since the inception
of the cause of action.” Kaplan, 49 F.3d at 1370 (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted). Delay can contribute to a finding of prejudice, for “expense, delay, and wear
and tear on individuals and companies count toward prejudice.” Id. (internal quotation
marks and citation omitted).
III.

ANALYSIS
A.

Application of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15 versus 16

Plaintiff seeks two forms of relief by way of his motion. First, plaintiff seeks an
order granting him leave to file his proposed third amended complaint (“TAC”) naming
additional plaintiffs, or alternatively permitting intervention under Fed. R. Civ. P. 24.
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL
Case No.

SACV 11-0398-CAS (JCGx)

Title

Date

April 22, 2013

NASIR UDDIN V. RADIO SHACK, INC.

Second, if the Court is inclined to grant plaintiff’s first request, plaintiff seeks an order
amending the Court’s scheduling order to allow the reopening of discovery, permitting
plaintiff to conduct discovery related to the individual claims of the additional plaintiffs
and setting a new discovery cut-off date. Plaintiff argues that only for his second
request—to reopen discovery—need he demonstrate good cause under Rule 16.
As an initial matter, the Court concludes that plaintiff must satisfy the “good
cause” standard of Rule 16 to obtain both forms of relief that he seeks. Judge Tucker’s
initial scheduling order set September 19, 2011 as the final date for a hearing on a motion
to add parties and amend pleadings. Judge Tucker then entered the Amended
Scheduling Order on October 14, 2011—after the deadline for amending pleadings or
adding parties had already passed. The Amended Scheduling Order did not modify the
date for amending pleadings or adding parties.
On August 10, 2012, the Court vacated the Amended Scheduling Order pursuant to
the parties’ stipulation. Nothing in the Court’s August 10 order modified the original
deadline for adding parties or amending pleadings, however, as the Amended Scheduling
Order did not address this deadline. Accordingly, because the Court must amend its
scheduling order to permit plaintiff to (1) reopen discovery and (2) to amend his
complaint to add additional parties, the Court finds that Rule 16 applies.
B.

Leave to Amend

First, the Court concludes that plaintiff demonstrates good cause for amending the
Court’s original scheduling order to allow him to file an amended complaint. Defendant
argues that plaintiff’s request is untimely, because the deadline for adding parties or
amending pleadings—September 19, 2011—has long passed. Despite this deadline long
having passed, and multiple amended scheduling orders having been entered, defendant
maintains that plaintiff never alerted the Court or defendant of his intention to add
additional plaintiffs until this motion. Nor does plaintiff explain, in defendant’s view,
why he waited until the Court’s ruling denying class certification in the Ordonez action
before abandoning his attempt to bring a renewed motion for class certification.
Defendant’s arguments are unpersuasive, in light of the fact that plaintiff has been
diligently pursuing certification of this action as a class action until recently. As such,
plaintiff had no reason until to seek to add additional individuals as named plaintiffs.
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL
Case No.

SACV 11-0398-CAS (JCGx)

Title

Date

April 22, 2013

NASIR UDDIN V. RADIO SHACK, INC.

Although plaintiff could have sought to add such parties as plaintiffs immediately after
the Court’s order denying class certification and the Ninth Circuit’s denial of plaintiff’s
request to appeal, plaintiff did not act in a dilatory fashion by first considering whether to
pursue an renewed motion for class certification. Plaintiff then informed defendant of his
intention to forgo a renewed motion for class certification on February 15, 2013, shortly
after the Court denied plaintiff’s motion for class certification in the Ordonez case, and
noticed the instant motion shortly thereafter. Accordingly, the Court finds that plaintiff
has demonstrated good cause for modifying the original scheduling order to add
additional parties as named plaintiffs.
Next, the Court considers the five factors for determining whether leave to amend
should be granted under Rule 15(a). Johnson, 356 F.3d at 1077. Plaintiff argues that all
five factors support plaintiff’s request for leave here. First, plaintiff argues that there has
been no undue delay or bad faith on his part, for the same reasons articulated above with
respect to the Rule 16 analysis. Moreover, defendant will suffer no undue prejudice,
because plaintiff’s amended complaint only names additional individuals as plaintiffs, but
does not otherwise assert new claims or theories of relief against defendant. Finally,
plaintiff’s contends that its proposed amendment is not futile, as plaintiff has already
successfully pleaded the same claims that the additional proposed plaintiffs seek to assert.

Defendant argues that leave to amend should be denied for three reasons: futility,
undue prejudice, and undue delay. Undue delay would result, defendant argues, because
the Court will be forced to reopen discovery, reset deadlines, and postpone resolution of
plaintiff’s claims “indefinitely.” As to prejudice, defendant maintains that the need to
reopen discovery, particularly discovery directed towards a new line of inquiry than
before, is a “typical” source of prejudice that is sufficient to defeat a plaintiff’s request
for leave to amend. Moreover, defendant contends that it opposition to plaintiff’s motion
for class certification was not a concession that joinder of multiple plaintiffs was
appropriate.
The Court finds defendant’s contentions of undue delay unpersuasive. Certainly
further delay will result from plaintiff amending his complaint to add additional parties,
as additional discovery will be required. Defendant fails, however, to demonstrate why
plaintiff may be found to have unduly delayed in bringing this motion given the
procedural history of this action and the Ordonez case set forth above.
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL
Case No.

SACV 11-0398-CAS (JCGx)

Title

Date

April 22, 2013

NASIR UDDIN V. RADIO SHACK, INC.

Nor, broadly speaking, would defendant suffer undue prejudice as a result of
having to defend against individual wage and hour claims. While plaintiff’s argument
that defendant is “estopped” from arguing prejudice reaches too far, plaintiff is well
within his rights to seek to bring an individual action after defendant successfully
defeated plaintiff’s motion for class certification. As the Supreme Court has noted, the
filing of a class complaint “notifies the defendants not only of the substantive claims
being brought against them, but also of the number and generic identities of the potential
plaintiffs who may participate in the judgment.” Crown, Cork & Seal v. Parker, 462 U.S.
345, 352–53 (1983). From the date this action commenced, defendant was aware of the
nature and scope of plaintiff’s allegations, as well as the likely composition of the class
that plaintiff sought to represent. Plaintiff’s proposed TAC does nothing to alter the
nature of plaintiff’s substantive allegations, as the claims and theories of relief remain the
same. Thus, defendant cannot argue that it suffered any unfair surprise as a result of
plaintiff seeking to amend its complaint to name former putative class members as named
plaintiffs. Moreover, each of the sixteen new proposed plaintiffs could file a separate
case that would likely be transferred to this Court, creating a multiplicity of actions which
would be far less manageable.
However, defendant’s contentions of futility also require consideration (and by
extension, prejudice). The Court is not convinced that joinder of these potential plaintiffs
in a single action is warranted under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 20(a)(1)(A) and (B),
at least for all purposes. For individuals to join in one action as plaintiffs, they must:
(A) . . . assert any right to relief jointly, severally, or in the alternative with respect
to or arising out of the same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or
occurrences; and
(B) any question of law or fact common to all plaintiffs will arise in the action.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 20(a)(1). In addition to the foregoing, “a district court must examine
whether permissive joinder would comport with the principles of fundamental fairness or
would result in prejudice to either side.” Coleman v. Quaker Oats Co., 232 F.3d 1271,
1296 (9th Cir. 2000) (citations omitted). “[W]hen making a decision whether to allow
the permissive joinder of a party, a court should consider such factors as the possible
prejudice that may result to any of the parties in the litigation, the delay of the moving
party in seeking an amendment to his pleadings, the motive that the moving party has in
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL
Case No.

SACV 11-0398-CAS (JCGx)

Title

Date

April 22, 2013

NASIR UDDIN V. RADIO SHACK, INC.

seeking such amendment, [and] the closeness of the relationship between the new and the
old parties . . . .” Desert Empire Bank v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 623 F.2d 1371, 1375 (9th
Cir. 1980).
Reviewing plaintiff’s proposed TAC reveals that each proposed plaintiff worked at
a different store, many of which are not even located within the Central District. See
TAC ¶ 9 (University of Southern California and Wilshire/Vermont stores); ¶ 10 (Terra
Nova, Chula Vista, and La Mesa stores in San Diego County); ¶ 11 (Orangeburg/
Oakdale store in Stanislaus County); ¶ 12 (Rialto store, San Bernardino County); ¶ 13
(“retail store locations in California”); ¶ 14 (16th/Market Street, San Francisco retail
store); ¶ 15 (Ming Avenue and Main Street stores in Bakersfield, Kern County); ¶ 16
(Chico Mall and Mangrove-Chico stores in Chico, Trinity County); ¶ 17 (Paramount,
Whittier, Linwood and “other retail store locations”); ¶ 18 (New Park and Great Mall
stores in Alameda County); ¶ 19 (San Dimas store); ¶ 20 (Morgan Hill and San Jose
stores); ¶ 21 (Lancaster and Canyon Country stores); ¶ 22 (Glendora and La Puente
stores); ¶ 23 (Wilmington and Harbor City stores); ¶ 24 (San Dimas-West Arrow
Highway store); ¶ 25 (Camarillo store). Moreover, plaintiff does not allege when each
individual worked at their respective store locations, other than his blanket assertion that
all these individuals worked at a Radio Shack store during the “Relevant Period,” which
is defined as January 18, 2007, until the filing of the original complaint on January 18,
2011.
As such, the evidence related to the merits of many of these individual’s claims
will differ, based upon the working conditions and actual policies carried out at their
individual stores by the managers who oversaw these stores. See Acevedo v. Allsup’s
Convenience Stores, Inc., 600 F.3d 516, 522 (5th Cir. 2010) (upholding district court’s
denial of joinder of 800 individuals where the “plaintiffs work or have worked across a
network of more than 300 stores, each with its own manager responsible for
implementing Allsup’s policies . . . certain plaintiffs stated in their depositions that they
were told by their managers that working off the clock was forbidden, while others
indicated that they were only asked to work off the clock by certain managers and not
others.”).
However, as the Court noted in its order denying class certification, plaintiff has
demonstrated that there is evidence that some common practices were followed across
defendant’s stores, including policies related to meal breaks, rest breaks, and unpaid
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL
Case No.

SACV 11-0398-CAS (JCGx)

Title

Date

April 22, 2013

NASIR UDDIN V. RADIO SHACK, INC.

wages. Dkt. No. 96 at 2–5. Defendant also argued that it had uniform policies, but that
these uniform policies were always followed and compliant with California law.
Although the commonality across these potential subclasses was insufficient for purposes
of class certification, much of this evidence that has been produced through discovery
thus far will be universal to all of the proposed plaintiffs’ claims. These alleged common
corporate policies are the type of pattern or practice sufficient to meet the “same
transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences” language in Rule
20(a)(1)(A), where plaintiffs bring the same claims for relief. See Bryant v. Serv. Corp.
Int’l, 801 F. Supp. 2d 898, 903 (N.D. Cal. 2011), as amended (Sept. 12, 2011) (permitting
joinder where plaintiffs asserted same claims under California law, and alleged that their
claims arose out of a systematic practice of denying them adequate compensation). And
relatedly, because all plaintiffs assert the same claims under California and federal law,
multiple common questions of law, and likely fact, will arise in this action as well. This
satisfies Rule 20(a)(1)(B). Because of this overlapping evidence and claims, joinder for
pretrial purposes is appropriate, including for motion practice and conducting discovery
into the claims of the individual plaintiffs. Such joinder will serve the interests of judicial
economy and avoid duplication of effort, at least prior to trial.
Defendant also contends that venue would be improper for at least seven proposed
plaintiffs who reside or worked outside of this judicial district. The Court finds this
argument unavailing, as venue is proper under the general venue statute, 28 U.S.C.
§ 1391. Under this section, a party may bring a civil action in “a judicial district in which
any defendant resides, if all defendants are residents of the State in which the district is
located.” 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(1). For purposes of establishing venue, a corporation is a
resident “in any judicial district in which such defendant is subject to the court’s personal
jurisdiction with respect to the civil action in question. . . .” 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c)(2).
Where a state has more than one judicial district, a “corporation shall be deemed to reside
in any district in that State within which its contacts would be sufficient to subject it to
personal jurisdiction if that district were a separate State.” 28 U.S.C. § 1391(d). Because
Radio Shack is the only defendant to this action and would be subject to personal
jurisdiction in this district, if the district were treated as a separate state, venue is proper
here for all plaintiffs.2

2

Defendant also contends that even if the claims of these proposed plaintiffs are
properly venued here, defendant would seek to transfer the claims of these individuals to
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL
Case No.

SACV 11-0398-CAS (JCGx)

Title

Date

April 22, 2013

NASIR UDDIN V. RADIO SHACK, INC.

Defendant further argues that a number of the putative plaintiffs no longer have
valid claims, as the statute of limitations has expired on all or some of their claims.3 The
Court agrees with plaintiff, however, that the filing of a class action complaint tolled the
running of the statute of limitations for all purported class members. See Crown, Cork, &
Seal, 462 U.S. at 352–53. In addition, the Court does not find that the period of tolling
ceased once the Court denied class certification without prejudice. In denying plaintiff’s
motion without prejudice, the Court expressly contemplated that plaintiff could bring a
renewed motion. It would be contrary to the principles governing class action tolling for
the statute of limitations to begin running anew while plaintiff was still seeking to
represent a class of individuals, after the Court’s denial of his first motion to certify a
class without prejudice. See Smith et al. v. City of Oakland, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
79469, at *8–9 (N.D. Cal. 2008) (concluding that only a denial of a motion for class
certification with prejudice would cease the tolling of the statute of limitations). This
same reasoning also supports the continued tolling of plaintiff and the proposed
plaintiffs’ FLSA claims. All of the proposed plaintiffs have filed a consent to join in this
action before the statute of limitations expired, as reflected on the docket.4 These claims

the respective judicial districts where they worked, where “a substantial part of the events
or omissions giving rise to the[ir] claim[s] occurred.” 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(2). The Court
is not convinced, however, that transfer would be warranted, at least at this stage of the
litigation. Plaintiff’s choice of forum is entitled to substantial deference in such an
analysis, and consolidation of this action may streamline the litigation going forward,
which weighs against transfer. See Amini Innovation Corp. v. JS Imports, Inc., 497 F.
Supp. 2d 1093, 1110 (C.D. Cal. 2007)
3

To the extent that defendant offers evidence by way of a declaration in attempt to
prove that certain proposed plaintiffs’ claims are time-barred, the Court finds that it is
inappropriate to consider such evidence on this motion.
4

In particular, plaintiff Uddin filed a notice of consent to join on July 19, 2011;
additional notices of consent to join were filed on April 23 and 27, 2012; May 1, 4, 11,
and 18, 2012; June 1, 8, and 29, 2012; August 14, 2012; and October 1, 2012. These
notices account for all of the plaintiffs named in the proposed TAC.
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL
Case No.

SACV 11-0398-CAS (JCGx)

Title

Date

April 22, 2013

NASIR UDDIN V. RADIO SHACK, INC.

were tolled from the date they filed a consent to join the action, and accordingly, are not
time-barred. Defendant’s arguments to the contrary are without merit.5
B.

Extension of the Discovery Deadline

In addition to seeking leave to amend his complaint, plaintiff also seeks to extend
and expand the scope of fact discovery so that the proposed plaintiffs may gather
evidence related to the merits of their individual claims. As with plaintiff’s motion for
leave to amend his complaint, the Court’s order setting a discovery cut-off of March 13,
2013, may only be modified upon a showing of “good cause” by plaintiff. Fed. R. Civ. P.
16(b)(4); Johnson, 975 F.2d at 609. As discussed above, plaintiff’s proposed discovery
for himself and the proposed class members will be tailored to the merits of their claims,
as opposed to the “class-based” discovery that has taken place to date.
For the same reasons set forth above with respect to plaintiff’s motion for leave to
amend, the Court finds that plaintiff has demonstrated good cause for extending the
discovery cut-off date and allowing plaintiff to conduct discovery into the merits of his
and the proposed plaintiffs’ claims. As discussed, there is no indication that plaintiff has
unduly delayed in bringing this motion, as plaintiff was within his rights to attempt to
certify a class of individuals. In addition, defendant fails to demonstrate how it will
suffer undue prejudice if plaintiff and defendant are permitted to conduct additional
discovery. While this discovery may involve different witnesses than those who have
been deposed to date, defendant would be subject to the same discovery demands if each
plaintiff proceeded individually against it. Thus, defendant will not be unduly prejudiced
by having to conduct discovery as to each individual plaintiff in this action. Accordingly,
the Court finds that plaintiff has shown good cause for extending the deadline and scope
for conducting fact discovery. The Court shall permit the parties to conduct fact

5

Defendant also challenges plaintiff and the proposed plaintiffs’ rights to bring
PAGA claims, noting that this Court has previously found that such claims must be
certified in accordance with Rule 23 when brought in federal court. See Fields v. QSP,
Inc. 2012 WL 2049528 (C.D. Cal. June 4, 2012). While this claim may ultimately be
futile given that plaintiff has chosen not to seek class certification, it is not necessary for
the Court to reach this issue and the Court declines to do so at this time.
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL
Case No.

SACV 11-0398-CAS (JCGx)

Date

Title

April 22, 2013

NASIR UDDIN V. RADIO SHACK, INC.

discovery regarding the individual plaintiffs’ claims until September 30, 2013, which
shall be the amended discovery cut-off date for both merit and expert discovery.
V.

CONCLUSION

In accordance with the foregoing, the Court GRANTS plaintiff’s motion for leave
to file his proposed Third Amended Complaint and to extend the discovery cut-off. The
Court ORDERS the parties to meet and confer on a proposed amended scheduling order.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
00
Initials of Preparer

CV-90 (06/04)

CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL

:

02

CMJ

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