Victor Manuel Meza Noyola v. Department of Homeland Security

Filing 9

ORDER DISMISSING CASE AND LIFTING STAY OF REMOVAL by Judge Jesus G. Bernal, Case Terminated. Made JS-6. As the Court lacks jurisdiction to reach the merits of Plaintiffs habeas claims, the Court DISMISSES Mezas petition for writ of habeas corpus. The temporary stay of removal is LIFTED. IT IS SO ORDERED. (See order for details) (mga)

O

JS-6

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
CIVIL MINUTES—GENERAL
Case No.

Date

SACV 15-183-JGB (KKx)

February 17, 2015

Title Victor Manuel Meza Noyola v. Department of Homeland Security, et al.

Present: The Honorable

JESUS G. BERNAL, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

MAYNOR GALVEZ

Not Reported

Deputy Clerk

Court Reporter

Attorney(s) Present for Plaintiff(s):

Attorney(s) Present for Defendant(s):

None Present

None Present

Proceedings: 

Order: (1) DISMISSING Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Doc. No. 1);
(2) LIFTING the Stay of Removal (Doc. No. 5)

On February 4, 2015, Petitioner Victor Manuel Meza Noyola (“Meza”) filed a request for
an emergency stay of removal (“Stay Request,” Doc. No. 4). The Stay Request asserted that
Meza’s removal was imminent and asked that the Court grant an emergency stay in order to: (1)
give Petitioner time to have a separate stay of removal application considered by United States
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) and (2) allow time for the to Court review the
appropriateness of his removal “during the rule making stage of the Obama Program which
would cover the Petitioner”. (Stay Request at 1.) Meza’s underlying habeas petition – filed on
the same day as the Stay Request – asserts that his due process rights were violated by the BIA
and that his Fourth Amendment rights were violated when ICE withdrew his bond on January 29,
2015. (Stay Request at 5-6.)
On Febrary 5, 2015, the Court granted the Stay Request and issued a temporary
restraining order barring the deportation of Meza. (Doc. No. 5.) On February 11, 2015,
respondents Department of Homeland Security and ICE (“Respondents”) filed an opposition to
the Stay Request. (“Opposition,” Doc. No. 7.) The Opposition contends that the Court lacks
subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to the Real ID Act of 2005, codified at 8 U.S.C § 1252(a)(5).
On February 12, 2015, Meza filed a Reply in support of his Stay Request. (“Reply,” Doc. No. 8)
The Court held a hearing on the matter on February 13, 2015.
For the reasons discussed below, the court LIFTS the emergency stay of removal and
DISMISSES the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

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I. BACKGROUND
Meza is a native and citizen of Mexico. On June 14, 2005, Meza was found to be
removable by an Immigration Judge (“IJ”). The record does not disclose the basis for the
determination, although Exhibit 1 to the Stay Request suggests that Meza was ordered removed
for being an “alien present without admission or parole.” (Doc. No. 4-1, Exh. 1 at 4.) Meza
apparently requested cancellation of removal based on the hardship his removal would cause to
his son – a United States citizen – who is mentally disabled.1
Meza appealed the IJ’s decision to the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”). (Stay
Request at 4.) Meza argued that the IJ erred in finding that his son would not suffer the requisite
“exceptional and extremely unusual” hardship if Meza were removed to Mexico. (Id.) Meza
also argued that his due process rights had been violated by the IJ’s failure to consider all the
relevant factors relating to his son’s hardship. (Id.) The BIA dismissed Meza’s appeal on
January 11, 2007. (Id.) Meza filed a motion to reopen with the BIA, premised on an ineffective
assistance of counsel argument; Meza argued that his previous counsel had not sufficiently
explained to the BIA the extent of his son’s disability. It appears that the BIA rejected Meza’s
argument and denied the motion to reopen.2
After the denials from the BIA, Meza filed multiple petitions for review with the Ninth
Circuit. All have been denied.3
II. LEGAL STANDARD
The REAL ID Act of 2005 stripped district courts of habeas jurisdiction over final orders
of removal and vested jurisdiction to review such orders exclusively in the courts of appeals. 8
U.S.C. § 1252. Section 1252(a)(5) provides in relevant part that “a petition for review filed with
an appropriate court of appeals in accordance with this section shall be the sole and exclusive
means for judicial review of an order of removal entered or issued under any provision” of the
Act. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(5). In addition, section 1252(g) states that “no court shall have
jurisdiction to hear any cause or claim by or on behalf of any alien arising from the decision or
action by the Attorney General to commence proceedings, adjudicate cases, or execute removal
orders against any alien under this chapter.” 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g) (emphasis added). District
courts thus lack jurisdiction over habeas petitions that seek judicial review of “any ‘questions of
law and fact’ arising from an order of removal.” Morales–Izquierdo v. Dep't of Homeland Sec.,
1

8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1)(d) allows the Attorney General to cancel removal of an alien
who establishes that his or her removal would result in “exceptional and extremely unusual
hardship” to a qualifying United States citizen relative.
2

Meza provided a very limited background of the procedural history in this case, so the
Court has attempted to reconstruct it as well as possible given the limited record.
3

See CA 10-72776 (order dated Jan. 19, 2011); CA 11-71561 (Feb. 23, 2012); CA 1271398 (July 11, 2012); CA 13-71231 (Apr. 25, 2013); CA 13-71947 (Sep. 11, 2013); CA 1374362 (Sept. 18, 2014); CA 15-70294 (Feb. 3, 2015).

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600 F.3d 1076, 1080 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(9)). However, these provisions
do not prohibit “the ability of a court to review claims that are independent of challenges to
removal orders.” Martinez v. Napolitano, 704 F.3d 620, 622 (9th Cir. 2012)
III. DISCUSSION
The analysis here is complicated by the muddled nature of Meza’s claims for relief.
Nevertheless, clarity is important on this issue, as it affects the jurisdictional analysis. If Meza’s
habeas petition seeks judicial review of any question of law and fact arising from his removal
order, then the Court lacks jurisdiction – including that necessary to enter a stay of removal. In
other words, the habeas petition claims are what matter; the reasons asserted in the Stay Request
(allowing time for ICE to review a separate stay application and the Court to review the
possibility of Plaintiff obtaining relief under Deferred Action for Parental Accountability) cannot
provide a jurisdictional hook for Plaintiff’s claims.
Here, Meza’s habeas petition raises two grounds for relief: (1) a due process claim arising
from the BIA’s alleged failure to adequately consider the hardship posed to Meza’s son; and (2)
a Fourth Amendment claim arising from ICE taking Meza into custody on January 29, 2015,
even though ICE had granted Meza supervised release in 2013. (Doc. No. 1 at 3.)4
The first claim clearly arises from the removal order, and thus cannot confer jurisdiction.
See Martinez, 704 F.3d at 623 (9th Cir. 2012) (finding the district court lacked jurisdiction where
petitioner challenged the “procedure and substance of the BIA’s determination that [petitioner]
was ineligible for . . . withholding of removal.”) The second claim is a closer call. However, the
Court is guided by the statutory language of Section 1252(g), which states that “no court shall
have jurisdiction to hear any cause or claim by or on behalf of any alien arising from the decision
or action by the Attorney General to . . . execute removal orders against any alien under this
chapter.” 8 U.S.C. 1252(g) (emphasis added). ICE’s decision in 2013 to grant Meza supervised
release did not nullify the underlying removal order. Thus, when ICE took Plaintiff back into
custody on January 29, 2015, it made a decision to execute a valid removal order.5 Accordingly,
the Court does not have jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s habeas claims.
4

Meza’s habeas petition states:

“5th Amendment due process: Petitioner appealed an immigration judge’s deportation
order on grounds of hardship to his US citizen child. Board of Immigration Appeals did not take
all the hardship into consideration. Petitioner has not had his day in court.” (Doc No. 1 at 3.)
“4th Amendment violation: On October 23, 2013, Immigration and Customs Enforcement
ordered Petitioner to be placed under supervision and permitted [sic] to be at large. Without
reason, Petitioner has been incarcerated.” (Id.)
5

At the hearing, Meza cited repeatedly to Casas-Castrillon v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec.,
535 F.3d 942 (9th Cir. 2008). However, Casas-Castrillon is not applicable here. In that case, the
Ninth Circuit held that even though the detention of an alien pending removal may be authorized,
the Government could not detain a legal permanent resident without providing him a neutral
forum in which to contest the necessity of his continued detention. 535 F.3d at 949. Here, Meza
(continued . . . )
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Here, the relief Plaintiff seeks must come, if it all, from the Ninth Circuit. Lopez v. Dep't
of Homeland Sec., 2010 WL 4279314, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 21, 2010) (“The [REAL ID] Act
made the circuit courts the “sole” judicial body able to review challenges to final orders of
deportation, exclusion, or removal.”)
IV. CONCLUSION
As the Court lacks jurisdiction to reach the merits of Plaintiff’s habeas claims, the Court
DISMISSES Meza’s petition for writ of habeas corpus. The temporary stay of removal is
LIFTED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.

( . . . continued)
was granted supervised release pending a petition to the Ninth Circuit. However, when that
petition was dismissed, Meza was taken back into custody to effectuate his removal. CasasCastrillon does not address the termination of a bond due to the execution of a valid removal
order.

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