Santa Ana Police Officers Association et al v. City of Santa Ana et al
Filing
127
MINUTES (IN CHAMBERS) ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS MOTION TO STRIKE 121 AND REMANDING ACTION TO SUPERIOR COURT by Judge David O. Carter. For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS Defendants' Motion. The Court STRIKES the first and third causes of action in Plaintiffs' Fourth Amended Complaint. In addition, the Court REMANDS this action, in which only Plaintiffs' state lawclaims for retaliation remain pending, to the Superior Court of California, County ofOrange. (see document for details). (Case Terminated. Made JS-6) (dro)
JS-6
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
CIVIL MINUTES – GENERAL
Case No. SA CV 15-1280-DOC (DFMx)
Date: June 14, 2018
Title: SANTA ANA POLICE OFFICERS ASSOCIATION ET AL V. CITY OF SANTA
ANA ET AL
PRESENT:
THE HONORABLE DAVID O. CARTER, JUDGE
Deborah Lewman
Courtroom Clerk
ATTORNEYS PRESENT FOR
PLAINTIFF:
None Present
Not Present
Court Reporter
ATTORNEYS PRESENT FOR
DEFENDANT:
None Present
PROCEEDINGS (IN CHAMBERS): ORDER GRANTING
DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO
STRIKE [121] AND REMANDING
ACTION TO SUPERIOR COURT
Before the Court is Defendants City of Santa Ana, Michael Claborn, Douglas
McGeachy, William Nimmo, Christopher Revere, Carlos Rojas, and Santa Ana Police
Department’s (collectively, “Defendants”) Motion to Strike the first and third causes of
action of Plaintiffs’ Fourth Amended Complaint (“Motion”) (Dkt. 121), which argues
that this Court, in its March 13, 2018 Order, only granted Plaintiffs leave to amend their
fourth and fifth causes of action, but that Plaintiffs nonetheless amended their first and
third causes of action as well. See generally Mot. The Court finds this matter suitable for
decision without oral argument. Fed. R. Civ. P. 78, Local Rule 7-15. Having reviewed the
moving papers and considered the parties’ arguments, the Court GRANTS Defendants’
Motion and REMANDS this action to the Superior Court of California, County of
Orange.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
CIVIL MINUTES – GENERAL
Case No. SA CV 15-1280-DOC (DFMx)
I.
Date: June 14, 2018
Page 2
Background & Procedural History
On January 22, 2014, Corey Slayton and the Santa Ana Police Officers
Association (collectively, “Plaintiffs”) filed suit against the City of Santa Ana (“the
City”), the Santa Ana Police Department, Police Chief Carlos Rojas, and DOES I-X in
Orange County Superior Court (“State Court”). See generally Compl. (Dkt. 1-1). On July
13, 2015, the State Court granted Plaintiffs’ Motion to Name Doe Defendants; thus,
Plaintiffs added Christopher Revere, William Nimmo, Michael Claborn, and Douglas
McGeachy as individual Defendants (Dkt. 1-6). Defendants removed the case to this
Court on August 11, 2015. Notice of Removal (Dkt. 1).
Plaintiffs filed their Second Amended Complaint (“SAC”) (Dkt. 18) on October
19, 2015. Defendants moved to dismiss parts of the SAC on November 2, 2015 (Dkt. 20).
The Court issued an Order Granting in Part and Denying in Part this motion on December
2, 2015 (“Second MTD Order”) (Dkt. 30). The Court dismissed with prejudice Plaintiffs’
Monell claims against the City and Police Department, and also determined that the
California Tort Claims Act claim presentation requirement1 under California Government
Code § 945.4 applied to Plaintiffs’ first cause of action. Second MTD Order at 5–7, 13.
Plaintiffs filed their Third Amended Complaint (“TAC”) (Dkt. 32) on December
15, 2015 (Dkt. 32). In the TAC, Plaintiff alleged: (1) violations of California Government
Code § 3300; (2) violations of California Government Code § 3500; (3) declaratory relief
based on the first and second causes of action; (4) retaliation in violation of Government
Code § 3304; (5) whistleblower retaliation under California Labor Code § 1102.5; and (6)
civil rights violations against all individual defendants under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See
generally TAC. On February 1, 2016, the Court issued an Order Granting Defendant’s
Motion to Dismiss Portions of Plaintiffs’ Third Amended Complaint (“Third MTD
Order”) (Dkt. 39). The Court dismissed Plaintiffs’ first, fourth, and fifth claims with
prejudice, leaving Plaintiffs with the following causes of action: their second cause of
action for a Writ of Mandate Pursuant to § 1085 for violation of Government Code §
3500, et seq.; their third cause of action for declaratory relief (based on their state law
claim); and their sixth cause of action for civil rights violations under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
against the Individual Defendants.
1
California Government Code § 945.4 provides that “no suit for money or damages may be
brought against a public entity . . . until a written claim therefor has been presented to the public
entity and has been acted upon by the board, or has been deemed to have been rejected by the
board . . . .” Cal. Gov’t Code § 945.4. This is commonly referred to as the claim presentation
requirement.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
CIVIL MINUTES – GENERAL
Case No. SA CV 15-1280-DOC (DFMx)
Date: June 14, 2018
Page 3
On February 1, 2016, Defendants moved for summary judgment as to each of
these remaining claims (Dkt. 41). On March 2, 2016, this Court granted Defendants’
Motion for Summary Judgment (“MSJ Order”) (Dkt. 83) as to Plaintiffs’ sixth cause of
action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 on the merits, and, choosing not to exercise supplemental
jurisdiction over the remaining state law claims, dismissed Plaintiffs’ second and third
causes of action “without prejudice subject to refiling in state court.” See MSJ Order at
45.
On March 31, 2016, Plaintiffs appealed to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals this
Court’s dismissal of Plaintiffs’ first, fourth, and fifth causes of action, as well as this
Court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Defendants on Plaintiffs’ 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 claim (Dkt. 92). On January 25, 2018, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals issued a
Memorandum affirming in part, reversing in part, and remanding to this Court (Dkt. 117).
The Ninth Circuit reversed only with respect to this Court’s prior dismissal with
prejudice of Plaintiffs’ fourth and fifth causes of action for retaliation. Mem. at 3. Thus,
the Ninth Circuit remanded to “allow Plaintiffs-Appellants an opportunity to file an
amended complaint as to their fourth and fifth causes of action only.” Id. The Ninth
Circuit’s formal Mandate (Dkt. 118) issued on February 16, 2018, at which point its
January 25, 2018 judgment took effect.
On March 13, 2018, this Court issued an order granting Plaintiffs leave to amend
(Dkt 19), but the Order echoed the express limitation of the Ninth Circuit’s Memorandum
that Plaintiffs’ permission to file a Fourth Amended Complaint was limited to amending
their “fourth and fifth causes of action for retaliation only.” On March 26, 2018, Plaintiffs
filed their Fourth Amended Complaint (Dkt. 120).
On April 6, 2018, Defendants filed the instant Motion to Strike the first and third
causes of action of Plaintiffs’ Fourth Amended Complaint. On April 16, 2018, Plaintiffs
opposed (“Opposition”) (Dkt. 124), and on April 23, 2018, Defendants replied (“Reply”)
(Dkt. 125).
II.
Legal Standard
Under Rule 12(f), a court may “strike from a pleading an insufficient defense or
any redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(f)(2).
“[T]he function of a 12(f) motion to strike is to avoid the expenditure of time and money
that must arise from litigating spurious issues by dispensing with those issues prior to
trial . . . .” Sidney-Vinstein v. A.H. Robins Co., 697 F.2d 880, 885 (9th Cir. 1983).
“‘Immaterial’ matter is that which has no essential or important relationship to the claim
for relief or the defenses being pleaded.” Fantasy, Inc. v. Fogerty, 984 F.2d 1524, 1527
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
CIVIL MINUTES – GENERAL
Case No. SA CV 15-1280-DOC (DFMx)
Date: June 14, 2018
Page 4
(9th Cir. 1993), rev’d on other grounds, 510 U.S. 517 (1994) (quoting 5 Charles A.
Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1382, at 706–07 (1990)).
“‘Impertinent’ matter consists of statements that do not pertain, and are not necessary, to
the issues in question.” Id. Moreover, where the scope of any amendment exceeds the
leave to amend granted, courts will strike the offending portions of the pleading under
Rule 12(f). See Gerritsen v. Warner Bros. Entm’t Inc., 112 F. Supp. 3d 1011, 1048 (C.D.
Cal. 2015) (citing Kennedy v. Full Tilt Poker, No. CV 09-07964 MMM (AGRx), 2010
WL 3984749, *1 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 12, 2010) (striking third amended complaint where
plaintiff’s claims “exceeded the authorization to amend the court granted”); Barker v.
Avila, No. 2:09-cv-0001- GEB-JFM, 2010 WL 3171067, *1-2 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 11, 2010)
(striking amendment to federal law claim where court had granted leave to amend only
state law claims)).
III.
Discussion
Defendants argue that the Court should strike the first and third causes of action in
Plaintiff’s Fourth Amended Complaint because, consistent with the mandate from the
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, this Court granted Plaintiffs leave to amend their fourth
and fifth causes of action for retaliation only, yet Plaintiffs exceeded the scope of this
leave to amend by also amending their first and third causes of action. Mot. at 1, 4.
Specifically, Defendants explain that Plaintiffs made the following “material amendments
to their first and third causes of action,” despite “the plain direction from both the Ninth
Circuit and this Court” regarding leave to amend the fourth and fifth causes of action
only:
Allegations in the first cause of action at paragraphs 74 and 75 were
materially modified from those previously stated in the Third
Amended Complaint. Rather than the previous allegations of alleged
wrongdoing on two specific occasions, the amended first cause of
action now charges that Defendants acted wrongfully on multiple
dates, including but not limited to those previously alleged. Plaintiffs
similarly added additional factual allegations to paragraph 83 and
additional grounds for recovery in paragraph 87. These amendments
were attempted notwithstanding the previous dismissal of the first
cause of action without leave to amend, which the Ninth Circuit
affirmed. The third cause of action, as now set forth in Plaintiffs’
Fourth Amended Complaint, purports to reallege and incorporate all
prior allegations set forth in that pleading, notwithstanding the
absence of any leave to so amend. The amended third cause of action
also seeks to incorporate the provisions of Government Tort Claim
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
CIVIL MINUTES – GENERAL
Case No. SA CV 15-1280-DOC (DFMx)
Date: June 14, 2018
Page 5
notices now attached as Exhibits A and B to the Fourth Amended
Complaint. The attempted resurrection of this previously dismissed
cause of action also finds no authority in any order of this Court.
Mot. at 2–3.
In response, Plaintiffs argue that: (1) this Court never dismissed Plaintiffs’ first
cause of action in its entirety, but rather dismissed with prejudice only the damages claim
in the first cause of action; and (2) the third cause of action was never dismissed with
prejudice. Opp’n at 2–3. In addition, Plaintiffs “request clarification of whether this Court
is accepting and/or assuming jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ remaining state law claims, even
though there is no longer any federal questions/claims [sic] pending in this action.”
Opp’n at 4. The Court will address each of these issues in turn.
A. Dismissal of Plaintiffs’ First Cause of Action
First, Plaintiffs argue that when the Court dismissed Plaintiffs’ first cause of action
in its Third MTD Order, the Court only dismissed the damages claim under that cause of
action. Opp’n at 4. Thus, Plaintiffs suggest that they may still pursue their first cause of
action to the extent they seek equitable relief rather than damages. See Opp’n at 3.
Plaintiffs explain that the Court’s dismissal of their first cause of action was limited to the
damages portion of the first cause of action, because dismissal of the damages portion
was the only relief requested by Defendants in their motion to dismiss the TAC—and
thus the relief granted by the Court was limited to that request. See Opp’n at 2
(“Defendants, in December 2015, filed a motion to dismiss the damages claims raised in
the First, Fourth and Fifth Causes of Action; the motion did not seek to dismiss the entire
First, Fourth, and Fifth Causes of Action, but moved to dismiss the damage claims to the
extent they failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted in the form of money
damages due to failure to comply with the California Tort Claim Act.”). Defendants
respond that the Court clearly dismissed the first cause of action in its entirety, and that,
in any case, Plaintiffs are not permitted to split their cause of action into damages and
non-damages contentions. Reply at 1–3.
A review of the record shows that the Court previously dismissed Plaintiffs’ first
cause of action in its entirety. In their Motion to Dismiss portions of the TAC,
Defendants requested that Plaintiffs’ first, fourth, and fifth causes of action be dismissed
with prejudice on the basis that they sought damages but failed to comply with the
California Tort Claims Act presentment requirement. See Not. Mot. at 2 (“No suit for
damages may be brought against a public entity on a cause of action for which claims are
required to be presented by the Government Code . . . . Therefore the First, Fourth, and
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
CIVIL MINUTES – GENERAL
Case No. SA CV 15-1280-DOC (DFMx)
Date: June 14, 2018
Page 6
Fifth Causes of Action seeking damages must be dismissed.”). The Court had previously,
in its Second MTD Order, dismissed those causes of action without prejudice on the same
basis—failure to comply with the claim presentation requirement. See Second MTD
Order. Significantly, in discussing whether the presentment requirement applied, the
Court noted that “even when a plaintiff seeks equitable relief, ‘[a] plaintiff may be
required to comply with the presentment requirement if the damages sought are
substantial in their amount.’” Id. at 6 (quoting Cuviello v. City of Stockton, No. CIV. S07-1625 LKK/KJM, 2009 WL 9156144, at *16 (E.D. Cal. 2009)). The Court then went
on to explain:
While Plaintiffs in this case are pursuing equitable relief, the Court
does not find they have “any transcendent interest in injunctive or
declaratory relief.” This is especially true because Slayton has
already been reinstated. See Eureka Teacher’s Assn. v. Bd. of Educ.,
202 Cal. App. 3d 469, 475 (2002) (back pay and fringe benefits were
incidental to mandamus action for reemployment). Further, in
connection with the first cause of action, Plaintiffs are seeking
significant statutory penalties—$25,000 per “each and every
violation” of POBRA—along with other damages and attorney fees.
SAC ¶ 71; id. at 38. Thus, for the same reasons articulated in
[Lozada v. City and County of San Francisco, 145 Cal. App. 4th
1139 (2009)], the Court is hard-pressed to classify the monetary
damages sought as merely incidental. Accordingly, the Court
determines the claims presentation requirement applies to Plaintiffs’
first cause of action.
Second MTD Order at 6–7. Thus, the Court determined that the claims presentation
requirement applied to Plaintiffs’ first cause of action in its entirety, and dismissed
without prejudice that cause of action in its entirety. See id. at 7. After Plaintiffs failed to
cure these deficiencies, the Court dismissed Plaintiff’s first cause of action with
prejudice. Third MTD Order at 11 (“Plaintiffs’ first, fourth, and fifth claims are
DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.”). The Court made clear that the first cause of action
was dismissed in its entirety, as the Court explicitly stated in the Third MTD Order that
“Plaintiffs’ remaining claims are: their second cause of action . . . their third cause of
action . . . and their sixth cause of action.” Id. No mention is made of any remaining
injunctive relief portion of Plaintiffs’ first cause of action. See id. Therefore, Plaintiffs’
inclusion of their first cause of action in their Fourth Amended Complaint is improper, as
this Court already dismissed that cause of action with prejudice. Moreover, the Ninth
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
CIVIL MINUTES – GENERAL
Case No. SA CV 15-1280-DOC (DFMx)
Date: June 14, 2018
Page 7
Circuit explicitly affirmed the dismissal of this cause of action. Mem. at 3 ([T]he district
court properly dismissed the first cause of action.”).
Accordingly, the Court STRIKES Plaintiffs’ first cause of action in the Fourth
Amended Complaint.
B. Dismissal of Plaintiffs’ Third Cause of Action
Next, Plaintiffs argue that the Court should not strike their third cause of action
because it was “[n]ever dismissed with prejudice by this Court (nor was it part of the
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals decision).” Opp’n at 5. Plaintiffs point out that, when this
Court decided to decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction, it dismissed Plaintiffs’
third cause of action without prejudice to refiling in state court. Id. Plaintiffs argue that
“[i]f this Court is now accepting supplemental jurisdiction, even though there are no
pending federal claims, then the Third Cause of Action, as well as all other state law
claims, would be reinstated.” Id. The Court appreciates that Plaintiffs are raising the issue
of supplemental jurisdiction. Nevertheless, Plaintiffs exceeded the scope of the leave to
amend granted by this Court when Plaintiffs included their third cause of action in the
Fourth Amended Complaint.
Accordingly, the Court STRIKES Plaintiffs’ third cause of action in the Fourth
Amended Complaint.
C. Supplemental Jurisdiction
Next, Plaintiffs argue that it would be proper for this Court to decline to exercise
supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ remaining state law claims, “as the primary
responsibility for developing and applying state law belongs to state court and as the
claims remanded by the Ninth Circuit for an opportunity to file an amended complaint
arise solely under state law.” Opp’n at 4. Defendants do not respond to this argument. See
generally Reply. As mentioned above, after granting summary judgment in Defendants’
favor on Plaintiffs’ federal claim, this Court previously declined to exercise supplemental
jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ remaining state law claims. See MSJ Order at 45. In the MSJ
Order, the Court noted that it had discretion to decline to exercise supplemental
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3) because it had dismissed all claims over which
it had original jurisdiction, explaining:
“[I]n the usual case in which all federal-law claims are eliminated
before trial, the balance of factors to be considered under the
pendent jurisdiction doctrine—judicial economy, convenience,
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
CIVIL MINUTES – GENERAL
Case No. SA CV 15-1280-DOC (DFMx)
Date: June 14, 2018
Page 8
fairness, and comity—will point toward declining to exercise
jurisdiction over the remaining state-law claims.” Carnegie–Mellon
Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 350 (1988). District courts enjoy
broad discretion in determining whether to retain jurisdiction over
pendent state law claims. See Acri v. Varian Associates, Inc., 114
F.3d 999, 1000, supplemented, 121 F.3d 714 (9th Cir. 1997) (“[A]
federal district court with power to hear state law claims has
discretion to keep, or decline to keep, them under the conditions set
out in § 1367(c).”). Here, Plaintiffs have asserted state law claims
and seek injunctive relief for various state law violations. After
reviewing § 1367(c) and the Cohill factors, the Court declines to
exercise supplemental jurisdiction in this case. As an initial matter,
the Court has dismissed all claims in which it had original
jurisdiction. Additionally, the Court notes the “primary
responsibility for developing and applying state law belongs to state
courts.” Kohler, 2013 WL 5315443, at *8.
MSJ Order at 43.
The Ninth Circuit affirmed this Court’s judgment in Defendants’ favor on
Plaintiffs’ federal law claim, and only reversed the dismissal of Plaintiffs fourth and fifth
causes of action, which are both state law claims. See generally Mem. Accordingly, only
state law claims remain in this action, and those claims are better decided by a state court.
Thus, for the same reasons as discussed in the MSJ Order, the Court declines to exercise
supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ state law claims and REMANDS this action to
the Superior Court of California, County of Orange.
IV.
Disposition
For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ Motion. The Court
STRIKES the first and third causes of action in Plaintiffs’ Fourth Amended Complaint.2
In addition, the Court REMANDS this action, in which only Plaintiffs’ state law
claims for retaliation remain pending, to the Superior Court of California, County of
Orange.
2
The Court notes that, in 2016, Plaintiffs refiled their third cause of action in state court, and that
case remains pending. See Opp’n at 3 n.1. This Court’s decision to strike the third cause of action
from Plaintiffs’ Fourth Amended Complaint in this action is not intended to preclude or have any
effect on the ongoing litigation of that claim in state court.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
CIVIL MINUTES – GENERAL
Case No. SA CV 15-1280-DOC (DFMx)
Date: June 14, 2018
Page 9
The Clerk shall serve this minute order on the parties.
MINUTES FORM 11
CIVIL-GEN
Initials of Deputy Clerk gga
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