Donald Okada v. Mark Whitehead

Filing 270

FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW signed by Judge Josephine L. Staton. (twdb)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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DONALD OKADA,

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Plaintiff and CounterDefendant,

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CASE NO. 8:15-cv-01449-JLS-KES

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

v.

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16 MARK WHITEHEAD,
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Defendant and CounterClaimant.

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I.

INTRODUCTION

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Following a four-day jury trial in this matter, the Court issues the following findings

3 of fact and conclusions of law pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52. To the
4 extent that any findings of fact are included in the Conclusions of Law section, they shall
5 be deemed findings of fact, and to the extent that any conclusions of law are included in
6 the Findings of Fact section, they shall be deemed conclusions of law.
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FINDINGS OF FACT

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A.

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1.

Background

Plaintiff Donald Okada and Defendant Mark Whitehead were business partners

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who formed Beverly Hillbillys, LLC to acquire a piece of land located in Beverly

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Hills, California. (Stip. ¶ 5.1, Doc. 226.)

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2.

Okada and Whitehead also formed an entity called Cheap as Chips LLC for the

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purpose of buying and selling real estate and/or investing in real estate

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development. (Stip. ¶ 5.5, Doc. 226; 12/5 Tr. Vol. 1 at 92:1-3, Doc. 255.)

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3.

Okada and Whitehead also jointly purchased a property located in Newport Beach,

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California (“Ocean Ridge”). Both Whitehead and Okada had a 50% share in

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Ocean Ridge. (12/5 Tr. Vol. 1 at 92:7-9, 93:2-5, Doc. 255; Stip. ¶ 5.2, Doc. 226.)

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Okada and Whitehead agreed that Whitehead and his family could reside in Ocean

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Ridge so long as Whitehead was responsible for the monthly mortgage and

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homeowners’ association dues payments. (12/7 Tr. Vol. 2 at 21:23-22:4, Doc.

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257.)

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4.

Around Spring 2014, Okada brought two separate lawsuits against Whitehead.

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One lawsuit was over the breach of a promissory note (the “Whitehead Action”)

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while the other lawsuit concerned Cheap as Chips, LLC (the “CAC Action”).

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(Stip. ¶ 5.6, Doc. 226; Tr. Vol. 1 at 101:4-15, Doc. 255; 12/7 Tr. Vol. 2 at 22:17-

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23:21; 23:22-24:21, Doc. 257.)

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5.

Beginning in late 2013, a group of international investors called Kamprad Venture

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Capital, LP and Premium Invest, Limited (collectively, “Kamprad”) offered to

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purchase Beverly Hillbillys LLC in exchange for $1.2 million, a promissory note

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in the amount of $2,319,110 and a 100% equity ownership interest in Rockford

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Investment, Inc. (“Rockford”), a Belizean real estate holding company. (Stip. ¶

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5.7, Doc. 226; 12/5 Vol. 1, 101:21-102:19.)

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Rockford owned five Dominican Republic corporate entities called SHR SOLAR

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137 (collectively, the “SHR SOLAR Companies”). (Stip. ¶ 5.8, Doc. 226; 12/5 Tr.

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Vol. 1 at 102:20-25, Doc. 255.) The SHR SOLAR Companies, in turn, owned a

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series of real property lots in the Dominican Republic that were collectively called

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the Lions Gate Mansion (“Lions Gate”). (Stip. ¶ 5.8, Doc. 226; 12/5 Tr. Vol. 1 at

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103:1-4, Doc. 255.)

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7.

Okada was not initially interested in the terms offered by Kamprad, but Whitehead

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repeatedly attempted in January through March 2014 to persuade Okada to accept

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that deal. (Stip. ¶ 5.9, Doc. 226; 12/5 Tr. Vol. 1 at 103:12-19, Doc. 255.)

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8.

Okada and Whitehead engaged in settlement discussions to resolve all outstanding

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issues between the parties, including the sale of Beverly Hillbillys LLC to

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Kamprad in exchange for cash, a promissory note and ownership of Rockford.

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(Stip. ¶ 5.10, Doc. 226; 12/5 Tr. Vol. 1 at 107:13-19, Doc. 255.)

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Kamprad used the services of a Dominican Republic attorney named Guido

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Perdomo and his law firm Perdomo Law for Lions Gate and the SHR SOLAR

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Companies. (Stip. ¶ 5.11, Doc. 226; Trial Exh. 200 ¶ 13; 12/5 Tr. Vol. 2 at 8:12-

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9:7; Perdomo Tr. at 14:18-16:15.)

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10. Whitehead reached out to Perdomo to obtain information about Lions Gate. (Stip.
¶ 5.13, Doc. 226; Perdomo Tr. 17:08-18:14.)

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11. During the parties’ negotiations over the Settlement Agreement, the parties agreed

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that Rockford would be managed by a third party administrator, mutually agreed

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upon to be Perdomo, pursuant to written instructions jointly provided by Okada

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and Whitehead until the $950,000 obligation was paid off. (Stip. ¶¶ 5.28-5.29,

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Doc. 226.)

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12. On July 31, 2014, Okada and Whitehead entered into a Settlement Agreement and

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General Release (“Settlement Agreement”). (Stip. ¶ 5.28, Doc. 226.) The Court

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incorporates by reference the terms of the Settlement Agreement (Trial Exh. 5).

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13. Under the Settlement Agreement, Whitehead was to record Okada’s first priority

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lien against Lions Gate within 24 hours after the closing of the Beverly Hillbillys

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LLC-Kamprad transaction. (Summary Judgment Order at 9-13, Doc. 183.)

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14. On August 13, 2014, Okada and Whitehead executed the First Amendment to

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Settlement Agreement (“First Amendment”). The Court incorporates by reference

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the terms of the First Amendment (Trial Exh. 12).

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15. The Beverly Hillbillys LLC-Kamprad transaction closed on August 15, 2014.
(Stip. ¶ 5.33, Doc. 226.)
16. On or around August 15, 2014, Okada and Whitehead each received their

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monetary consideration from the Beverly Hillbillys LLC-Kamprad transaction,

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and their respective ownership interests in Rockford were conveyed by Kamprad

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to Perdomo to be held in trust for Okada and Whitehead. (Stip. ¶ 5.34, Doc. 226.)

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17. Okada fully performed all of his obligations under the Settlement Agreement.

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Specifically, (1) Okada filed a Notice of Conditional Settlement of Entire Case in

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the CAC Action and that lawsuit was suspended; (2) Okada has never sought to

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enforce his Stipulated Judgment in the Whitehead Action; (3) on August 15, 2014,

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Okada transferred all legal and ownership interest in Ocean Ridge to Whitehead

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and Whitehead’s wife through a grant deed; (4) Whitehead has never presented a

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claim for indemnification to Okada, nor is Okada aware of any action pending

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against Whitehead for acts committed by Okada; (5) Okada and Whitehead evenly

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split the costs regarding various tax liabilities and expenses relating to Beverly

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Hillbillys LLC and Cheap As Chips, LLC; and (6) Okada filed all the tax returns

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for Cheap as Chips, LLC, despite the Settlement Agreement not obligating Okada

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to do so. (Stip. ¶ 5.35, Doc. 226; 12/5 Tr. Vol. 2 at 18:11-21, Doc. 264; 12/7 Tr.

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Vol. 2 at 26:20-27:4, Doc. 257.)

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18. Following the close of the Beverly Hillbillys LLC-Kamprad transaction,

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Whitehead moved to the Dominican Republic and took control of the SHR

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SOLAR Companies and Lions Gate. (Stip. ¶ 5.37, Doc. 226.)

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19. About a week after the close of the Beverly Hillbillys LLC-Kamprad transaction,

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Okada’s counsel repeatedly began asking Whitehead’s counsel about the status of

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the lien on Lions Gate. (Trial Exhs. 43, 44; 12/6 Tr. Vol. 1 at 39:7-41:14, Doc.

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265; 12/6 Tr. Vol. 1 at 41:15-42:15, Doc. 265.) Whitehead’s counsel indicated

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there were misunderstandings and that he was very busy. (Trial Exhs. 43, 44.)

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Eventually, a conference call with Perdomo was proposed and accepted. (Stip. ¶

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5.38, Doc. 226.)

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20. On October 3, 2014, Perdomo sent another reminder to Whitehead that Perdomo

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was waiting for the $10,000 in funds needed to update the SHR SOLAR

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Companies. (Stip. ¶ 5.40, Doc. 226; Trial Exh. 73; 12/6 Tr. Vol. 1 at 32:18-33:12,

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Doc. 265.)

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21. By mid-day on October 8, 2014, Whitehead still had not sent the $10,000 needed

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to start updating the SHR SOLAR Companies, let alone record a lien in favor of

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Okada on Lions Gate. (Trial Exhs. 77, 78; Perdomo Tr. 87:4-7; 12/7 Tr. Vol. 1 at

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68:11-24, Doc. 266.)

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22. As of the trial, Whitehead had not paid off the $950,000 promissory note to
Okada. (12/6 Tr. Vol. 1 at 44:14-16, Doc. 265.)

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23. On October 8, 2014, Okada issued to Perdomo and Whitehead a formal notice of

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Whitehead’s default under the Settlement Agreement and requested a transfer of

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all of Rockford’s shares to him pursuant to the Settlement Agreement. (Stip. ¶

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5.45, Doc. 226; Trial Exh. 76; 2/8 Tr. Vol. 2 at 41:2-7, Doc. 267.)

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24. Under Dominican law, Okada had no secured interest in Lions Gate due to

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Whitehead’s failure to record the lien. If Whitehead were to sell the property,

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Okada would have none of the remedies reserved for secured creditors. (Order at

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2, Doc. 222.)

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25. Okada had no other non-judicial remedies available to him other than requesting a

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transfer of Rockford’s shares, because Whitehead had failed to record a lien on

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Lions Gate. (12/8 Tr. Vol. 1 at 17:2-9, Doc. 258; 12/8 Tr. Vol. 2 at 82:17-19, Doc.

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267.)

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26. In October 2014, Whitehead was attempting to install himself as President of the

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SHR SOLAR Companies following his termination of Jose Lantigua’s

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employment. (Trial Exh. 73.)

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27. Only after Okada issued the notice of default did Whitehead issue the $10,000 to

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Perdomo to begin the process of transforming the SHR SOLAR Companies. (Stip.

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¶ 5.47, Doc. 226; Trial Exhs. 77, 78; 12/7 Tr. Vol. 1 at 63:6-16, 68:11-24, Doc.

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266.)

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28. On October 9, 2014, Perdomo sent an e-mail to Whitehead to notify him that there

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was an additional $19,000 that needed to be paid in fees in order to record a lien

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on Lions Gate for Okada. Perdomo also confirmed that this registration process

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could not take place until the SHR SOLAR Companies had been transformed,

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which could take around 30 days. (Stip. ¶ 5.49, Doc. 226; Trial Exh. 80; Perdomo

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Tr. at 99:9-101:16.)

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29. On October 13, 2014, Perdomo transferred all shares of Rockford to Okada. (Trial
Exh. 82; Perdomo Tr. at 104:3-105:23.)

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30. To prevent Lantigua from having any claims upon Lions Gate, Okada paid

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Lantigua his requested $8,500 severance on or around November 14, 2014.

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Lantigua signed a full release at that time. (Trial Exh. 87; Perdomo Tr. at 118:6-

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119:20; 12/7 Tr. Vol. 2 at 52:18-53:1.)

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31. On or around December 2, 2014, Okada was named as a defendant in the Rogers

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v. Whitehead Action. This lawsuit alleged that Whitehead and Okada had breached

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an oral agreement with Rogers regarding the disposition of Beverly Hillbillys

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LLC. (Stip. ¶ 5.54, Doc. 226; 12/7 Tr. Vol. 2 at 57:2-22, Doc. 257.)

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32. In December 2014, Whitehead filed a lawsuit against Okada in the Dominican

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Republic. (12/8 Tr. Vol. 1 at 10:17-12:10, Doc. 258.) Whitehead filed a second

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related lawsuit in the Dominican Republic against Okada. (12/8 Tr. Vol. 1 at

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10:17-12:10, Doc. 258.)

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33. On January 6, 2015, Okada made a demand for indemnification to Whitehead in

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connection with the Rogers v. Whitehead lawsuit. (Stip. ¶ 5.55, Doc. 226; 12/5 Tr.

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Vol. 2 at 31:23-32:7, Doc. 264; 12/7 Tr. Vol. 2 at 58:17-59:13, Doc. 257.)

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34. Whitehead has not indemnified Okada for the Rogers v. Whitehead lawsuit. (Stip.
¶ 5.55, Doc. 226.)
35. Okada completed the process of transforming the SHR SOLAR Companies so that

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a lien could be placed upon them or so that Lions Gate could be sold. He

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succeeded at considerable difficulty, because Whitehead raised legal challenges to

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the transformations in the Dominican Republic. (12/6 Tr. Vol. 1 at 86:16-89:21,

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Doc. 265; Trial Exh. 396.)

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36. Okada has been paying all the taxes for Rockford, the SHR SOLAR Companies

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and Lions Gate since October 13, 2014. (Trial Exh. 135; 12/8 Tr. Vol. 1 at 15:10-

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37. Okada has not attempted to sell Rockford, the SHR SOLAR Companies, or Lions

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Gate nor has he attempted to live in Lions Gate. (12/8 Tr. Vol. 1 at 10:13-16, 19:7-

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38. Okada requested the appointment of a receiver over Lions Gate so that an

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impartial third party could take over the property, sell it, and appropriately handle

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distribution of the proceeds of that sale. (12/8 Tr. Vol. 2 at 42:14-44:11, Doc.

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267.)

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39. Whitehead has continued to live at Lions Gate, with Okada having paid for its

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various taxes and registration fees, and has rented out the property to tourists,

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collecting $399,691 to date. (12/6 Tr. Vol. 1 at 89:25-92:8; 12/7 Tr. Vol. 1 at 34:3-

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40. Based on Whitehead’s testimony in court, the Court finds him to lack credibility.

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To provide a few examples of Whitehead’s testimony and conduct that raised

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questions about his truthfulness:

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a. In attempting to dismiss this suit for lack of subject matter jurisdiction,

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Whitehead falsely stated under penalty of perjury: “Both my wife and I have

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driver’s licenses that are issued by the State of California, and we do not

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have nor do we intend to obtain a driver’s license with the State of Florida.”

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(Trial Exh. 145.) In fact, Whitehead had already obtained a Florida license.

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(12/5 Tr. Vol. 1 at 87:23-90:2, Doc. 255; see also Order at 4, Doc. 24.)

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Whitehead’s explanation on the stand about how he “made a mistake” was

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totally unbelievable. (See 12/5 Tr. Vol. 1 at 87:23-90:2, Doc. 255.)

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b. Whitehead falsely testified that he was not negotiating a lease agreement for

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Ocean Ridge in April 2014 before being impeached with a copy of the lease

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agreement signed by “Mark Whitehead, Broker” on April 29, 2014 and Mr.

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Ralfa and Ms. Farid on April 30, 2014. (12/5 Vol. 2 Tr. at 21:3-23:19, Doc.

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264; Exh. 201.)

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c. In a cross-complaint where he represented himself, Whitehead falsely stated

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that Okada was at all times a 50 percent owner of Ocean Ridge. (Trial Exh.

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202 ¶ 5.) Whitehead’s explanation for why he failed to omit that Okada’s

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ownership interest was transferred as part of the Settlement Agreement was

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farfetched. (12/5 Vol. 2 Tr. at 25:13-28:7, Doc. 264.)

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d. Whitehead has failed to file tax returns for the past three years despite

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earning substantial income. (12/5 Vol. 2 Tr. at 29:2-31:4, Doc. 264.)

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CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

41. The elements of a claim for breach of contract are: “(1) the contract, (2) plaintiff’s

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performance or excuse for nonperformance, (3) defendant’s breach, and (4)

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damages to the plaintiff.” Wall St. Network, Ltd. v. New York Times Co., 164 Cal.

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App. 4th 1171, 1178 (Ct. App. 2008) (citing Regan Roofing Co. v. Superior Court,

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24 Cal. App. 4th 425, 434-35 (Ct. App. 1994)).

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42. Whitehead dedicates much of his proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law

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to relitigating issues that the jury has already conclusively resolved. The jury

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determined that Whitehead breached the Settlement Agreement by (1) failing to

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record the lien within twenty-four fours, (2) failing to pay Lantigua’s severance

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payment, (3) making false and/or misleading statements to Okada, and (4) failing

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to indemnify Okada. (Jury Verdict Form, Docs. 247, 249.) In addition, the jury

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concluded that Whitehead did not prove his affirmative defense of waiver. (Id.)

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43. Whitehead explicitly abandoned his mutual mistake defense on the record at trial;

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thus, this defense has been waived. (12/8 Tr. Vol. 2 at 3:6-19, Doc. 259.)

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44. Any argument that any of Whitehead’s breaches of the Settlement Agreement

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were not material was waived in Whitehead’s proposed jury verdict form. (Jury

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Verdict Form (“Defendant’s Proposed Version”) at 13, Doc. 237; Jury Verdict

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Form (“Defendant’s Proposed Version”) at 15, Doc. 240.) Further, as a matter of

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law, the failure to record the lien within nine weeks of closing of the Beverly

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Hillbillys-Kamprad transaction was a material breach of the agreement because

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Okada was left without any of the protections that a secured creditor held under

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Dominican law. Without a lien, Whitehead could have sold the property and

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Okada would have no way to prevent the sale. As the last two-and-half-years of

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litigation across two countries demonstrates, an unsecured interest is much harder

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to enforce in the Dominican Republic than a secured interest.

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A. Whitehead’s Equitable Defenses Fail
45. Excuse of Performance: Under the doctrine of excuse of performance, “Where a
party’s breach by non-performance contributes materially to the non-occurrence of
a condition of one of his duties, the non-occurrence is excused.” Jacobs v.
Tenneco W., Inc., 231 Cal. Rptr. 351, 353 (Ct. App. 1986). Whitehead’s defense
rests on the premise that Okada waived his right to have Whitehead record the lien
within twenty-four hours. But the jury has already determined that Whitehead
failed to prove his affirmative defense of waiver (Jury Verdict Form, Docs. 247,
249), and Okada did not breach the Settlement Agreement. Thus, Whitehead’s
excuse of performance defense fails.
46. Unjust Enrichment: Whitehead raises the affirmative defense of “unjust
enrichment,” but he provides no authorities holding that unjust enrichment is an
affirmative defense under California law. Even if it were, it would fail for the
reasons provided in subsection B below.
47. Offset: “[A] court of equity will compel a set-off when mutual demands are held
under such circumstances that one of them should be applied against the other and
only the balance recovered.” Margott v. Gem Properties, Inc., 111 Cal. Rptr. 1, 4
(Ct. App. 1973). In his proposed findings of fact and conclusion of law,
Whitehead did not mention his affirmative defense of offset, and the Court can see
no possible way this defense would apply to this case. Thus, Whitehead’s defense

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of offset fails.
48. Equitable Estoppel: “A valid claim of equitable estoppel consists of the

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following elements: [1] a representation or concealment of material facts [2] made

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with knowledge, actual or virtual, of the facts [3] to a party ignorant, actually and

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permissibly, of the truth [4] with the intention, actual or virtual, that the ignorant

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party act on it, and [5] that party was induced to act on it.” Transp. Ins. Co. v. TIG

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Ins. Co., 136 Cal. Rptr. 3d 315, 338 (Ct. App. 2012). Whitehead has adduced no

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credible evidence that Whitehead relied on any statement that Okada made or that

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Okada acted with the intent—actual or virtual—that Whitehead would act upon a

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statement Okada made or failed to make. In any event, because Okada waited nine

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weeks before declaring a default, Whitehead would have suffered no loss as a

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result of any statement Okada made.

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B. Whitehead’s Quasi-Contract Claim Fails
49. Considering Whitehead’s failure to engage in any meaningful progress to record
the lien within nine weeks of closing of the Beverly Hillbillys-Kamprad
transaction and Okada’s lack of any security interest in Lions Gate protecting him
from a potential sale of the property, Okada properly declared a default.
50. Although Okada currently holds the Rockford shares, he has been unable to obtain
any of the value of the property because Whitehead filed two lawsuits in the
Dominican Republic in December 2014 and resisted Okada’s efforts to update the
SHR Solar Companies. Okada has been paying all the taxes on the property and
has not sold Rockford. Whitehead has spent the last two years residing on the
property and leasing it out (collecting at least $399,691) but still shows no
inclination of ever repaying Okada the $950,000 (plus interest) Whitehead owes
Okada. Thus, Okada has not been unjustly enriched by the transfer of the shares of
Rockford to him and Whitehead’s counterclaim for unjust enrichment fails.

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C. Whitehead’s Has No Right to Seek Specific Performance

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51. The jury has determined the Whitehead breached the Settlement Agreement by (1)

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failing to record the lien within twenty-four fours, (2) failing to pay Lantigua’s

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severance payment, (3) failing to indemnify Okada, and (4) making false and/or

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misleading statements to Okada. (Jury Verdict Form, Docs. 247, 249.)

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52. Because Whitehead materially breached the Settlement Agreement, he is not
entitled to specific performance of the agreement.
D. Whitehead’s Request for Declaratory Relief is Denied
53. The jury has determined the Whitehead breached the Settlement Agreement by (1)
failing to record the lien within twenty-four fours, (2) failing to pay Lantigua’s
severance payment, (3) failing to indemnify Okada, and (4) making false and/or
misleading statements to Okada.
54. Due to his numerous breaches of the parties’ Settlement Agreement, Whitehead is
not the rightful owner of Rockford or any of its assets. To the contrary, Okada is
the owner of a $950,000 interest in Rockford (and its assets), and Whitehead is the
owner of the remaining interest.
55. For these reasons, Whitehead is not entitled to declaratory relief.

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E. Appointment of a Receiver

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56. “[A] federal court sitting in diversity may exercise equitable powers independent

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of state law.” Canada Life Assur. Co. v. LaPeter, 563 F.3d 837, 843 (9th Cir.

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2009). Thus, “federal law governs the issue of whether to appoint a receiver in a

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diversity action.” Id.

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57. In determining whether to grant a receivership the Ninth Circuit has identified

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seven non-exhaustive factors: “(1) whether [the party] seeking the appointment

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has a valid claim; (2) whether there is fraudulent conduct or the probability of

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fraudulent conduct[] by the defendant; (3) whether the property is in imminent

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danger of being lost, concealed, injured, diminished in value, or squandered; (4)

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whether legal remedies are inadequate; (5) whether the harm to plaintiff by denial

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of the appointment would outweigh injury to the party opposing appointment; (6)

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the plaintiff’s probable success in the action and the possibility of irreparable

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injury to plaintiff’s interest in the property; and, (7) whether [the] plaintiff's

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interests sought to be protected will in fact be well-served by receivership.”

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Canada Life Assur. Co., 563 F.3d at 844 (citation omitted).

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58. These factors strongly favor the appointment of a receiver: First, Okada has
already proven his claims at a four-day jury trial. (Jury Verdict Form, Docs. 247,

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249.) Second, Okada has proven at trial that Whitehead engaged in fraudulent

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conduct directly related to the Settlement Agreement. Specifically, the jury agreed

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with Okada that Whitehead concealed his rental property income from Ocean

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Ridge and made false statements about the ability to place a lien on Lions Gate

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before the SHR Solar Companies were updated. (See id.) Third, Whitehead’s

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actions in the Dominican Republic continue to threaten Okada’s ownership

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interest in Lions Gate. Before Okada declared a default, Whitehead sought to

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appoint himself as president of the SHR Solar Companies, he continues to raise

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obstacles against Okada in Dominican courts (despite the forum selection clause

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requiring the parties to resolve any disputes here (Trial Exh. 5 ¶ 15)), and he

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refuses to vacate Lions Gate. (See Trial Exh. 73; 12/6 Tr. Vol. 1 at 86:16-89:21,

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Doc. 265; 12/6 Tr. Vol. 1 at 44:14-16, Doc. 265; Trial Exh. 396.) Fourth, Okada’s

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legal remedies are entirely inadequate. Whitehead has shown no interest in ever

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repaying Okada the $950,000 plus interest that Whitehead owes Okada, and it is

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highly unlikely that Okada will ever be compensated for his stake in Lions Gate

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unless a receiver is appointed and the property is sold. (See 12/6 Tr. Vol. 1 at

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44:14-16, Doc. 265.) Fifth, the harm Okada would suffer if this court were to deny

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his request for a receivership would greatly outweigh any legitimate loss

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Whitehead may face by the appointment of a receiver. As a result of his multiple

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breaches of the Settlement Agreement, Whitehead is no longer a rightful owner of

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Lions Gate, so the appointment of a receiver would not substantially impair a

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legitimate property interest Whitehead holds. The only property interest

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Whitehead has in Lions Gate is any potential equity, which he cannot access

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unless the property is sold. Sixth, as noted already under the earlier factors, Okada

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has by this point succeeded in proving his claims at trial and will suffer irreparable

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harm unless a receiver is appointed. Seventh, both Okada and Whitehead will be

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well served by the appointment of a receiver because a receiver would be best able

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to fairly and transparently sell the property and apportion the proceeds. Okada and

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Whitehead had a decade-long relationship that devolved into multiple lawsuits in

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this country and in the Dominican Republic, and the parties do not trust each

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other. As such, it is highly unlikely they will be able to sell Lions Gate and unwind

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their business relationship unless a receiver is appointed.

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59. Besides the factors articulated by the Ninth Circuit, Whitehead’s consent to the

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appointment of a receiver in case of default in the Settlement Agreement, which

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was a mutually bargained-for agreement, deserves “great weight.” LPP Mortg.

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Ltd. v. Ondyn Herschelle, No. 13-CV-04330-JSC, 2014 WL 3568577, at *3 (N.D.

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Cal. July 17, 2014); N.Y. Life Ins. Co. v. Watt W. Inv. Corp., 755 F. Supp. 287, 292

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(E.D. Cal. 1991).

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60. In sum, after considering the balance of interests, Plaintiff’s success on the merits,

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and the high likelihood of irreparable harm, the Court GRANTS Okada’s request

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for the appointment of a receiver. The receiver will have the ability to seek an

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ancillary appointment or employ other legal processes in the Dominican Republic

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as necessary and appropriate to carry out his or her duties.

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IV.

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS Okada’s request for judgment

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1 against Whitehead on Whitehead’s equitable defenses, claims, and request for declaratory
2 relief. The Court further GRANTS Okada’s request for the appointment of a receiver.
3 Okada shall submit a proposed order appointing a receiver as well as any motion for
4 attorneys’ fees and costs forthwith.
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7 DATED: April 04, 2017

_________________________________
JOSEPHINE L. STATON
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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