Jennifer Kent v. Director, California Office of Administrative Hearings, et al

Filing 21

MINUTES (IN CHAMBERS) ORDER GRANTING PETITIONER'S MOTION TO REMAND 12 by Judge S. James Otero: The Court GRANTS Petitioner's Motion to Remand the action to the Superior Court of California for Orange County. This action shall close. MD JS-6. Case Terminated. (vv)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL

CASE NO.: SA CV 15-01926 SJO (JCGx)
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Jennifer Kent v. Director, California Office of Administrative Hearings, et al.

========================================================================
PRESENT: THE HONORABLE S. JAMES OTERO, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Victor Paul Cruz
Courtroom Clerk

Not Present
Court Reporter

COUNSEL PRESENT FOR PETITIONER:

COUNSEL PRESENT FOR RESPONDENT:

Not Present

Not Present

========================================================================
PROCEEDINGS (in chambers): ORDER GRANTING PETITIONER'S MOTION TO REMAND
[Docket No. 12]
This matter is before the Court on the Motion to Remand the action to the Superior Court of
California, Orange County ("Motion"), filed by Petitioner Jennifer Kent, in her official capacity as
Director of the California Department of Health Care Services ("Petitioner" or "DHCS"), on
December 17, 2015. Real parties in interest Placentia-Yorba Linda Unified School District
("PYLUSD") and Parents on Behalf of Student ("Parents") filed their oppositions on January 4,
2016 ("PYLUSD Opposition" and "Parents Opposition," respectively).1 Real party in interest
Orange County Department of Education ("OCDE") did not file an opposition.2 Petitioner filed a
Reply on January 12, 2016. The Court found this matter suitable for disposition without oral
argument and vacated the hearing set for January 25, 2016. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 78(b). For the
following reasons, the Court GRANTS the Motion.
I.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A.

Statutory/Regulatory Background

In 1975, and as amended in 2004, Congress passed the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act
("IDEA"), 20 U.S.C.A sections 1400, et seq., 34 C.F.R. sections 3001, et seq., which makes
federal grants available to states that establish a policy to ensure all handicapped children are
provided with the right to a free appropriate public education ("FAPE"). 20 U.S.C.A. § 1412. A
condition for funding is that the state education agency be held responsible for compliance with
IDEA and supervision of all programs related to the education of children with disabilities. 20
U.S.C.A. § 1412(a)(11). California adopted legislation to participate in IDEA, codified in California

1

For confidentiality reasons, Student is not named in the proceedings.

2

OCDE is incorrectly referred to as Orange County Office of Education in the state court
pleadings.
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Education Code sections 56000, et seq., Cal. Code Regs., tit. 5, sections 3000, et seq. ("Section
56000").
The DHCS finances and administers various individual health care service delivery programs and
"ensures the appropriate and effective expenditure of public resources to serve those with the
greatest health care needs." (Compl. ¶ 6.) The California Children's Services Program ("CCS")
is a state and county program administered by DHCS that provides services based on a medical
diagnosis and established need and when those services are contained in a student's
individualized education program ("IEP"). (Compl. ¶ 7.) To eligible disabled children, CCS
provides medically necessary physical therapy services, and the school district is responsible for
educationally necessary physical therapy services. (Mot., ECF No. 12, Ex. A Decision of the
Office of Administrative Hearings ("OAH Decision") 9.) If the medically necessary and
educationally necessary physical therapy services overlap, CCS was obligated to provide the
services. (OAH Decision 9.) It is the primary responsibility of the public education agency to
provide to qualifying students a FAPE and the services designated in the student's IEP. (Compl.
¶ 16.) If the services designated in a student's IEP are not honored by an agency deemed
responsible for providing and paying for these services, the local education agency, after providing
services to the pupil, may pursue payment from the other government agency through appropriate
channels. (Compl. ¶ 16 (citing 20 U.S.C.A § 1412(a)(12).)
B.

Factual Background

The DCHS alleges the following in its complaint. At the time relevant to the facts in this case,
Student was a seven-year-old pupil at a public school within PYLUSD, which is an agency under
the auspices of OCDE. (See generally Notice of Removal ("Removal"), ECF No. 1, Ex. A Petition
for Writ of Mandate & Compl. for Declaratory Relief ("Compl.") ¶¶ 9, 11.) Student suffers from
muscular dystrophy, resulting in severely impacted motor balance and coordination. (Compl.
¶ 11.) Pursuant to his IEP, Student receives physical therapy services from CCS and PYLUSD.
(Compl. ¶ 4.) The PYLUSD is Student's local education agency and is responsible for the
development, initiation, review, and revision of the services designated in Student's IEP. (Compl.
¶ 4; Mot. 5.)
In 2014, a dispute arose between Parents (on behalf of Student), PYLUSD, and CCS concerning
PYLUSD's refusal to include the physical therapy services provided by CCS in Student's IEP.
(Compl. ¶ 4; OAH Decision 8.) Although Parents were satisfied with the physical therapy services
provided to Student, they were concerned that if they moved Student out-of-state, the new state's
IEP team could be uninformed about what therapy Student required because the services were
not specified in his IEP. (Compl. ¶ 4.)
///
///
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CASE NO.: SA CV 15-01926 SJO (JCGx)

C.

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Procedural Background

On December 17, 2014, Parents on behalf of Student filed a due process hearing request with the
California Office of Administrative Hearings ("Respondent" or the "OAH"). On April 27 and 28,
2015, a hearing on the matter was held before Administrative Law Judge Paul H. Kamoroff of the
OAH.3 On July 2, 2015, the OAH issued a decision (the "OAH Decision"), finding that CCS was
"obligated to provide Student IEP based physical therapy services that were both medically and
educationally necessary," such that the IEP's failure to include these services denied Student a
FAPE. (OAH Decision 17.) The OAH Decision concluded that Parents were the prevailing party,
entitling them to recover attorneys' fees from CCS, (Compl. ¶¶ 5, 48), and required CCS to request
PYLUSD to hold an IEP meeting for Student specifically to add CCS as the physical therapy
provider in Student's IEP. (Compl. ¶ 48.)
On September 30, 2015, DHCS filed a petition for writ of mandate and complaint for declaratory
relief ("Complaint") in the Superior Court of California, Orange County, Case No. 30-201500812467-CU-WM-CJC, seeking to set aside the OAH Decision. (Removal ¶ 3.) At issue in the
Complaint is whether the OAH exceeded its jurisdiction and committed prejudicial abuse of
discretion. The Complaint alleged three causes of action: (1) writ of administrative mandate, Cal.
Code Civ. P. § 1094.5; (2) writ of ordinary mandamus, Cal. Code Civ. P. § 1085; and (3)
declaratory relief, Cal. Cod Civ. P. § 1060. (Compl. ¶¶ 49-70.)
Real Parties in Interest PYLUSD, Parents, and the OCDE (collectively, "Real Parties") removed
the action to this Court on November 18, 2015 based on federal question jurisdiction under 28
U.S.C. section 1331 and supplemental jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. section 1367.4 (Removal ¶¶ 910.) The DHCS now seeks to remand the action. For the following reasons, the Court concludes
that it lacks subject matter jurisdiction and that remand is proper.
II.

DISCUSSION
A.

Meet and Confer Requirement

As a threshold matter, PYLUSD argues that DHCS' failure to comply with the Local Rules renders
its Motion defective. Pursuant to Local Rule 7-3, counsel are required to meet and confer prior
to the filing of a motion, and to include a statement indicating that the motion is made following a
conference of counsel. See L.R. 7-3. Notwithstanding this defect, the Court exercises its
discretion and accepts the Motion. See, e.g., Prince-Weithorn v. GMAC Mortg., LLC, No. CV 113

The hearing request named PYLUSD and CCS. On April 30, 2015, Student withdrew his
complaint against PYLUSD pursuant to a settlement agreement. (Compl. ¶ 5.)
4

The parties do not address diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. section 1332.

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00816 SJO, 2011 WL 11651984, at *1 n.1 (C.D. Cal. May 5, 2011). Alternatively, the Court "may
raise the question of subject matter jurisdiction, sua sponte, at any time during the pendency of
the action," see Snell v. Cleveland, Inc., 316 F.3d 822, 826 (9th Cir. 2002), and does so here.
B.

Legal Standard

"It is a fundamental precept that federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction." Owen Equip. &
Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365, 374 (1978). "If at any time before final judgment it appears
that the district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, the case shall be remanded." See 28 U.S.C.
§ 1447(c). Courts must "strictly construe the removal statute against removal jurisdiction" and
reject federal jurisdiction "if there is any doubt as to the right of removal in the first instance."
Gaus v. Miles, Inc., 980 F.2d 564, 566 (9th Cir. 1992) (citations omitted). "The strong presumption
against removal jurisdiction means that the defendant always has the burden of establishing that
removal is proper." Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
Under the removal statute, an action is removable to federal court only if it might have been
brought there originally. See 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). Federal question jurisdiction exists when a
plaintiff asserts a claim or right "arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United
States." 28 U.S.C. § 1331. A case "arises under" federal law if a plaintiff's "well-pleaded
complaint establishes either that federal law creates the cause of action or that the plaintiff's right
to relief necessarily depends on resolution of a substantial question of federal law." Empire
Healthchoice Assurance, Inc. v. McVeigh, 547 U.S. 677, 690 (2006) (citation and internal quotation
marks omitted). As the "master of the claim," the plaintiff "may avoid federal jurisdiction by
exclusive reliance on state law." See Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392 (1987)
(footnote omitted). A defendant may not remove a case to federal court on the basis of a federal
counterclaim or a federal defense to a state law claim. See, e.g., Vaden v. Discover Bank , 556
U.S. 49, 60 (2009).
There are "[r]are situations where a well-pleaded state law cause of action will be deemed to arise
under federal law and support removal": "(1) where federal law completely preempts state law,
(2) where the claim is necessarily federal in character, or (3) where the right to relief depends on
the resolution of a substantial, disputed federal question." Nero v. BAE Sys., Inc., No. CV 1304271 PJH, 2013 WL 6188762, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 25, 2013) (citing ARCO Envtl. Remediation
L.L.C. v. Dep't of Health & Envtl. Quality of Mont., 213 F.3d 1108, 1114 (9th Cir. 2000)).
The DHCS argues that the action should be remanded because: (1) removal was procedurally
defective; (2) the Complaint alleges only state law claims and seeks judicial review of a decision

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of a state administrative law judge on state law grounds; and (3) supplemental jurisdiction would
be improper. (See generally Mot.) The Court discusses each argument in turn.5
C.

The Court Lacks Federal Question Jurisdiction Over the Action

The Court finds that it lacks federal question jurisdiction over the matter, which warrants remand.
The Real Parties argue that because the OAH Decision was based on the OAH's interpretation
of federal and state laws, including the IDEA, the claims arise under federal law. (See Removal
2.) The Court disagrees.
1.

The Court Lacks Jurisdiction Over the Mandamus and Declaratory Relief
Claims

In its introduction, the OAH Decision states that the hearing "was held under the [IDEA], its
regulations, and California statutes and regulations intended to implement it." (OAH Decision 10.)
Despite this language, and the language in the Complaint reciting the legislative purpose and
history of the IDEA, "the actual causes of actions stated in the complaint all sound in state law."
See Rains v. Criterion Sys. Inc., 80 F.3d 339, 344 (9th Cir. 1996) ("The direct and indirect
references to Title VII in those two state law causes of action do not make those claims into
federal causes of action. Rather, the complaint merely incorporates Title VII as one of several
similar sources of public policy supporting defendant's state law claims."). On the face of the
Complaint, DHCS alleges three causes of action–administrative mandamus, ordinary mandamus,
and declaratory relief–none of which arise under federal law. As the master of the Complaint,
DHCS may defeat removal by choosing not to plead independent federal claims. See Williams,
482 U.S. at 399.
First, review of administrative decisions by means of mandamus is governed by California Code
of Civil Procedure section 1094.5 ("Section 1094.5"). Boren v. State Personnel Bd., 37 Cal. 2d
634, 638 (1951) (en banc). Mandamus proceedings are a "state remedy," and federal courts have
no jurisdiction to hear them.6 See Clemes v. Del Norte Cnty. Unified Sch. Dist., 843 F. Supp. 583,
5

In light of the jurisdictional defect, as discussed below, the Court need not discuss
whether removal was procedurally proper.

6

The PYLUSD contends that mandamus is not an appropriate procedure to appeal
administrative decisions arising under the IDEA, relying on S.F. Unified Sch. Dist. v. State
of Cal., 131 Cal. App. 3d 54 (1982). (PYLUSD Opp'n 6.) This argument is unpersuasive,
as the S.F. Unified court ultimately found it "unnecessary to decide which method of appeal
is proper." See 131 Cal. App. 3d at 65. Further, as DHCS points out, whether or not
Section 1094.5 is the appropriate method is a state law issue, and does not confer federal
question jurisdiction over this action. (See Reply of DHCS in Supp. of Mot. ("Reply") 4,

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596 (N.D. Cal. 1994), overruled on other grounds, Maynard v. City of San Jose, 37 F.3d 1396 (9th
Cir. 1994). The Complaint's first two causes of action are for review of the OAH Decision by
mandamus and are brought pursuant to the California Code of Civil Procedure. Accordingly, the
Court has no jurisdiction to hear the mandamus claims.
As to the remaining cause of action–declaratory relief–it is also a state law claim brought under
the California Code of Civil Procedure. Proceedings for declaratory judgment under California law
cannot be brought within a federal court's original jurisdiction by removal, "[u]nless this proceeding
was within the original jurisdiction of the District Court." See S. Pac. Co. v. McAdoo, 82 F.2d 121,
121 (9th Cir. 1936) (citation omitted). Here, the declaratory relief claim–which seeks a declaration
of the parties' respective rights and duties regarding the administration and application of
CCS–does not arise under the Court's original jurisdiction. (See Compl. ¶¶ 69-70.) The claim
centers around the parties' allocation of responsibilities with respect to Student's IEP, and
"Congress has left it to each state to determine which public entity within the state is responsible
for providing special education and related services." See L.A. Unified Sch. Dist. v. Garcia, 741
F.3d 922, 923 (9th Cir. 2011). The Court fully discusses the issue of whether DHCS' right to relief
depends on a substantial question of federal law in Section II.C.3., infra. In sum, the Court lacks
jurisdiction over the mandamus and declaratory relief claims.
2.

DHCS' Claims Are Not "Necessarily Federal in Character"

Notwithstanding the Court's conclusion that it lacks jurisdiction over mandamus and declaratory
relief claims, it turns to the Real Parties' argument that the action should remain in this Court
because the Complaint's claims are "necessarily federal in character" and must be recharacterized as arising under federal law. (PYLUSD Opp'n 4-5.)
Under the artful pleading doctrine, a plaintiff may not avoid federal jurisdiction by "omitting from
the complaint federal law essential to his claim, or by casting in state law terms a claim that can
be made only under federal law." See Olguin v. Inspiration Consol. Copper Co., 740 F.2d 1468,
1472 (9th Cir. 1984). An artfully pleaded state law claim may be re-characterized as a federal
claim by the court to which it is removed. Rains, 80 F.3d at 344.
The Court disagrees with the Real Parties' argument that DHCS brought an artfully pleaded
complaint to avoid federal jurisdiction. The DHCS cited the IDEA as the statutory and regulatory
backdrop to Section 56000, but such a citation did not mean that the claims "can be made only
under federal law." See id. at 344. The rights surrounding whether Student was denied a FAPE
and which entities were responsible for providing that right were also provided by state statutes.
See Evergreen, 393 F. Supp. 2d at 1074 (rejecting allegation of "artful pleading" because plaintiff

ECF No. 18.)
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chose to plead only state claims and "Washington's special education laws and administrative
rights of review has concurrent jurisdiction to the Federal IDEA").
Further, "[c]onclusions by courts to which a claim is removed that state claims are actually federal
in character have generally been confined to instances in which the state law claim was
preempted by the federal one." See id. at 345 n.6 (citing Williams, 482 U.S. at 396 n.11); see also
Arco, 213 F.3d at 1114 (citations omitted) ("A state-created cause of action can be deemed to
arise under federal law [ ] where federal law completely preempts state law."). Here, "it is well
settled that the IDEA does not preempt state law." Delgado v. Edison Township Bd. of Educ., No.
CV 14-01757 KM, 2014 WL 5761412, at *4 n.3 (citing Evergreen, 393 F. Supp. 2d at 1075) (noting
that "the IDEA specifically contemplates an elaborate interrelation of state and federal regulation").
Additionally, the regulation of health and safety of disabled children is generally an exercise of the
state's traditional police power, which triggers a presumption against preemption. See Medtronic,
Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 475 (1996) (regulation of health and safety is traditionally occupied by
states). The Real Parties do not address preemption.
Accordingly, the claims are not necessarily federal in character because the IDEA does not
preempt Section 56000, and the Complaint was not artfully pleaded to avoid federal jurisdiction.
See Rains, 80 F.3d at 345 ("The independent corollary to the artful pleading doctrine [known as
the complete preemption doctrine] is not a valid basis for finding federal jurisdiction in this case.").
3.

DHCS' Right to Relief Does Not Depend on a Substantial Question of
Federal Law

Even where state law creates the cause of action, federal jurisdiction may still lie "'if it appears that
some substantial, disputed question of federal law is a necessary element of one of the
well-pleaded state claims.'" See Rains, 80 F.3d at 345 (quoting Franchise Tax Bd. of State of Cal.
v. Construction Laborers Vacation Trust for S. Cal., 463 U.S. 1, 13 (1983) (emphasis added)).
Here, the parties essentially disagree on the fundamental question presented in this lawsuit. The
Real Parties argue that DCHS' right to relief depends on a substantial question of federal law:
whether DHCS, through CCS, denied Student a FAPE by failing to document physical therapy
services in Student's IEP. (PYLUSD Opp'n 2.) In contrast, DHCS argues that the dispute is about
the state law issue of "allocation of responsibilities between state and local entities" regarding the
implementation and enforcement of Student's IEP. (Mot. 3.)
The Court agrees with DHCS, as the underlying dispute concerns the delegation of responsibilities
as to Student's IEP. At the OAH hearing, DHCS/CCS averred that it was "not responsible for
offering IEP based physical therapy, or for delivering IEP services," and the OAH concluded that
"CCS was obligated to provide Student IEP based physical therapy services." (OAH Decision 2.)
In its Complaint, DHCS alleged that OAH abused its discretion "when it ordered DHCS/CCS to
modify Student's IEP, which is the legal responsibility of [PYLUSD]." (Compl. ¶ 52.)
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As the Ninth Circuit explained, states must specify which public agency is responsible for providing
special education services under the IDEA. See Garcia, 669 F.3d at 960, 963 (citing 20 U.S.C.
§ 1412(a)) (states are generally responsible for ensuring IDEA's requirements are met)). The
OAH Decision echoed that the IDEA "allows states to determine for themselves whether
responsibilities for the provision of a FAPE shall be delegated to public agencies other than
education agencies and how those agencies shall collaborate to ensure the delivery of a FAPE
to eligible pupils," by way of interagency agreements or otherwise. (OAH Decision 11) (citing 20
U.S.C. § 1412(a)(12)(A).) "Thus, questions of which agency is responsible for providing a student
with a FAPE are determined under state law." Garcia, 669 F.3d at 963 (citation omitted)
(requesting California Supreme Court to decide the "novel question of California law" as to which
agency is responsible for providing special education services to incarcerated student). As such,
DHCS' right to relief depends on a question of state, not federal, law. See, e.g., Evergreen, 393
F. Supp. 2d at 1075 (remanding action upon finding that whether disabled student was denied a
FAPE was also provided by state statute, such that complaint did not arise under federal law).
Additionally, DHCS relies on a Ninth Circuit case, Rains, 80 F.3d 339, for the proposition that
invoking federal law "does not confer federal question jurisdiction when the plaintiff also invokes
a state constitutional provision or state statute than [sic] can and does serve the same purpose."
(Mot. 8) (citing Rains, 80 F.3d at 345-46) (noting that the "purpose" of the state and federal
statutes is "demonstrating that there is a public policy against employment discrimination on the
basis of religious belief"). Because the Complaint refers to both the IDEA and Sections 56000 as
bases for the public policy ensuring that every handicapped child is entitled to a FAPE, DHCS
contends that, "even the question as posed by Real Parties In Interest–'whether the Department
denied Student a FAPE'–could be addressed under California law should it be relevant or
necessary." (Mot. 8) (citing Cal. Educ. Code § 56040(a).) The Rains court held, "When a claim
can be supported by alternative and independent theories–one of which is a state law theory and
one of which is a federal law theory–federal question jurisdiction does not attach because federal
law is not a necessary element of the claim." 80 F.3d at 346. To the extent that Section 56000
constitutes an independent theory that can and does serve the same purpose as the IDEA, no
federal question jurisdiction would attach. Cf. Nero, 2013 WL 6188762, at *6 (concluding that
absent a "California counterpart" to the federal statute supporting plaintiff's claim, the claim
necessarily depends on substantial question of federal law).
However, to the extent Section 56000 is not an independent theory and is interpreted in
accordance with the IDEA, Rains' relevance would be minimized because the court expressly
declined to discuss "whether or under what circumstances reliance on a state statute that
incorporates or is interpreted in accordance with federal law is sufficient to avoid federal

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DATE: January 29, 2016

jurisdiction."7 80 F.3d at 345 n.7. However, in dicta, the court noted a Supreme Court case that
held that "the violation of the federal standard as an element of state tort recovery did not
fundamentally change the state tort nature of the action." Id. (citing Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals
Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804, 814 n.12 (1986)). Further, the court "emphasize[d] that we do
not suggest that the mere fact that a state statute is construed in accordance with a federal statute
gives rise to federal question jurisdiction. We simply find it unnecessary to discuss that question
here." 80 F.3d at 347 n.9.
In sum, it is unclear whether Rains supports a conclusion that DHCS' reliance on Section 56000
is sufficient to avoid federal jurisdiction, and the Real Parties fail to address or offer clarifying case
law. Alternatively, given that the dispute is regarding the parties' allocation of responsibilities, the
resolution of a substantial federal question is not a necessary element of DHCS' claims. Under
either ground, the Court rejects federal jurisdiction, as it must "if there is any doubt as to the right
of removal in the first instance." See Gaus, 980 F.2d at 566.
D.

The Court Declines to Exercise Supplemental Jurisdiction

Finally, the Real Parties contend that the Court has supplemental jurisdiction over the Complaint's
issues of state law and regulations because they form part of the same case and controversy
regarding DHCS' obligations under the IDEA. (Removal ¶ 10.) The Court disagrees.
The statute conferring supplemental jurisdiction provides: "[T]he district courts shall have
supplemental jurisdiction over all other claims that are so related to claims in the action within such
original jurisdiction that they form part of the same case or controversy under Article III of the
United States Constitution." 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). In determining supplemental jurisdiction, a
court considers the interests of "economy, convenience, fairness, and comity," and may decline
to exercise jurisdiction if: "(1) the claim raises a novel or complex issue of State law, (2) the claim
substantially predominates over the claim or claims over which the district court has original
jurisdiction, (3) the district court has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction, or

7

See, e.g., Cal. Educ. Code § 56040(a) ("A free appropriate public education shall be
available to individuals with exceptional needs in accordance with [the IDEA]".); Cal.
Educ. Code § 56000(d) (noting that the state legislature intended "to ensure that all
individuals with exceptional needs are provided their rights to appropriate programs and
services which are designed to meet their unique needs under the federal [IDEA]"); Cal.
Educ. Code § 56000(e) ("It is the further intent of the Legislature that this part does not
abrogate any rights provided to individuals with exceptional needs and their parents or
guardians under the federal [IDEA]. It is also the intent of the Legislature that this part
does not set a higher standard of educating individuals with exceptional needs than that
established by Congress under the [IDEA].") (emphases added).
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(4) in exceptional circumstances, there are other compelling reasons for declining jurisdiction."
See Acri v. Varian Assocs., Inc., 114 F.3d 999, 1000-01 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)).
Here, none of the claims arise under federal law. Even assuming the Court had original
jurisdiction over some of the claims, and they formed part of the same case or controversy as the
remaining claims, the Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction because the interests
of "federalism and comity . . . loom especially large here." See Mory v. City of Chula Vista, No.
CV 10-00252 JLS, 2011 WL 777914, at *2 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 1, 2011). DHCS is a California state
entity seeking, inter alia, a declaration that the OAH, a state quasi-judicial tribunal, abused its
discretion. See id. (finding that "California has an overwhelming interest in adjudicating these
claims in its state courts" where California citizen sued California government entity under
California law and sought declaration that state commission abused its discretion). As to the
mandamus causes of action in particular, "because writs of mandate are exclusively state
procedural remedies, they involve complex issues of state law. Thus, district courts routinely deny
supplemental jurisdiction over California writ of mandate claims." Id. (citation omitted); see
Clemes, 843 F. Supp. at 596 (finding it "entirely inappropriate" to exercise supplemental
jurisdiction over mandamus proceeding). As such, the Court declines to exercise supplemental
jurisdiction over any of the claims.
III.

RULING

For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS Petitioner's Motion to Remand the action to the
Superior Court of California for Orange County. This action shall close.
IT IS SO ORDERED.

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