Deena Marie Callahan v. Carolyn W. Colvin

Filing 25

MEMORANDUM OPINION by Magistrate Judge Alka Sagar. The decision of the Administrative Law Judge is AFFIRMED. (See document for complete details) (afe)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA – SOUTHERN DIVISION

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) No. SA CV 16-00588-AS
)
) MEMORANDUM OPINION
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

DEENA MARIE CALLAHAN,

13

Plaintiff,
v.

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15
16

NANCY A. BERRYHILL,1
Acting Commissioner of Social
Security,
Defendant.

17
18

I. PROCEEDINGS

19
20
21

On March 30, 2016, Plaintiff Deena Marie Callahan (“Plaintiff”)

22

filed a Complaint seeking review of the Commissioner’s denial of

23

Plaintiff’s application for a period of disability and disability

24

insurance benefits.

25

Defendant

26

Administrative

27
28

filed

an

(Docket Entry No 1).
Answer

Record

to

(“AR”).

the

Complaint,

(Docket

1

On August 31, 2016,

Entry

and

the

Certified

Nos.

20-21).

The

Nancy A. Berryhill is now the Acting Commissioner of Social
Security and is substituted for Acting Commissioner Carolyn W.
Colvin in this case. See 42 U.S.C. § 205(g).
1

1

parties have consented to proceed before a United States Magistrate

2

Judge.

3

Stipulation

4

their respective positions on Plaintiff’s claims.

5

24).

(Docket

Entry

(“Joint

Nos.

Stip.”)

14-15).
on

The

December

parties

20,

2016,

filed

a

Joint

setting

forth

(Docket Entry No.

6
7

II. BACKGROUND AND SUMMARY OF ADMINISTRATIVE DECISION

8
9

On February 25, 2014, Plaintiff, formerly employed as a policy

10

holder information clerk (see AR 23, 51), filed an application for

11

disability

12

October 17, 2013.

13

Law Judge (“ALJ”), John Wojciechowski, examined the record and heard

14

testimony from Plaintiff and vocational expert (“VE”), Kelly Winn-

15

Boaitey.

16

benefits in a written decision.

insurance

benefits,

alleging

(AR 154-55).

(AR 31-54).

disability

beginning

on

On July 20, 2015, Administrative

On October 5, 2015, the ALJ denied Plaintiff
(AR 9-30).

17
18

The ALJ applied the five-step process in evaluating Plaintiff’s

19

case.

At

step

one,

20

engaged in substantial gainful activity after the alleged onset date

21

of October 17, 2013, and that Plaintiff’s date last insured was June

22

30, 2019.

23

the following severe impairments: degenerative disc disease of the

24

lumbar spine with neuropathy; tendon tears and osteoarthritis of the

25

ankles; ligament tears in the wrists; obesity; depressive

(AR 14).

the

ALJ

determined

that

Plaintiff

had

not

At step two, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had

26
27
28
2

disorder;

14-15).2

1

and

2

determined that Plaintiff’s impairments did not meet or equal a

3

Listing found in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1.

4

17).

anxiety

disorder.

(AR

At

step

three,

the

ALJ

(AR 15-

5
6

Before proceeding to step four, the ALJ found that, through the

7

date last insured, Plaintiff had the residual functional capacity

8

(“RFC”)3 to do the following: occasionally lift or carry ten pounds;

9

frequently carry less than ten pounds; stand or walk for two hours

10

and sit for six hours in an eight-hour workday; occasionally climb,

11

balance,

12

scaffolds;

13

occasionally have contact with co-workers and supervisors; never

14

have public contact; and limited to simple, repetitive tasks.

15

17).

stoop,

kneel,

avoid

or

moderate

crawl;

never

exposure

use
to

ladders,

ropes,

industrial

or

hazards;

(AR

16

After reviewing Plaintiff’s medical record (see AR 17-23),

the

17

ALJ found that there was no objective evidence to support a CTS or
18

upper-extremity diagnosis, noting that (1) electrodiagnostic tests
19

for Plaintiff’s upper extremities rendered normal results

(AR 19-

20

20); (2) a pain management specialist found that Plaintiff had “5/5
21

strength” in her upper-extremities with a somewhat reduced grip in
22

the right hand (AR 20); and (3) a MRI of Plaintiff’s wrists revealed
23
2

24
25
26
27
28

The ALJ found that Plaintiff’s alleged collapsed arches and
degenerative changes in the feet, carpel tunnel syndrome (“CTS”),
gout, hypertension, and obsessive compulsive disorder were not
severe impairments. (AR 14).
3

A Residual Functional Capacity is what a claimant can still
do despite existing exertional and nonexertional limitations.
See
20 C.F.R. § 404.1545(a)(1).
3

1

tears of the left and right scapholunate ligaments and ganglion

2

cysts.

3

limitations in her lower extremities because of a “mildly abnormal”

4

July 2014 electrodiagnostic test; an October 2014 MRI of the left

5

ankle showing a partial thickness tear; a July 2014 MRI of the

6

cervical spine revealing degenerative disc disease; and a December

7

2013 MRI of the lumbar spine showing a disc bulge in the L3-L4

8

facets,

9

neural foraminal narrowing, and a L5-S1 circumferential disc bulge.

(Id.).

L4-L5

The ALJ determined that Plaintiff suffered from

hypertrophy

of

the

facets

with

moderate

bilateral

10

(AR 18-21).

11

gait and used either a cane or walker during appointments.

12

The ALJ referenced physical therapy records stating that aquatic

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therapy “decrease[d] [Plaintiff’s] pain temporarily.”

14

ALJ found that Plaintiff suffered from mental limitations, noting

15

that

16

depressive disorder.

she

was

Plaintiff also appeared with an antalgic, shuffling

diagnosed

with

general

anxiety

(Id.).

(AR 20).

disorder

and

The

major

(AR 19).

17

The ALJ then addressed Plaintiff’s credibility and the opinions
18

of her treating, examining, and nonexamining physicians.

(See AR

19

20-23).

The

ALJ

found

Plaintiff’s

statements

regarding

the

20

intensity, persistence, and limiting effects of her symptoms not
21

credible because Plaintiff was not compliant with treatment orders
22

to attend regular physical therapy appointments.

(AR 21).

23
24

At step four, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff was not able
25

to perform her past relevant work as a policy holder information
26

clerk.

(AR 23).

At step five, the ALJ found Plaintiff was able to

27

perform

jobs

consistent

with

her

age,

education,

and

medical

28

limitations existing in significant numbers in the national economy.
4

1

At the hearing, the ALJ asked the VE whether a hypothetical person —

2

with the same age and educational background as Plaintiff, who could

3

occasionally lift at least 10 pounds; frequently lift and carry less

4

than 10 pounds; stand and walk for at least two hours in an eight-

5

hour workday; sit for at least six hours in an eight-hour workday;

6

and is limited to simple, repetitive tasks, no public contact, and

7

occasional contact with co-workers and supervisors — could perform

8

any work.

9

perform the requirements of assembler (Dictionary of Occupational

(AR 51-52).

(“DOT”)

No.

The VE testified that such a person could

734.687-0184

(sedentary

unskilled

Specific

10

Titles

11

Vocational

12

economy)) and final assembler5 (DOT 713.687-0186 (sedentary unskilled

13

SVP 21,000 positions in the national economy)).

Preparation

(“SVP”)

27,000

positions

in

the

(AR 52).

national

The ALJ

14
15
16
17
18
19

4

The DOT description for assembler requires “[e]xerting up to
10 pounds of force occasionally (Occasionally: activity or condition
exists up to 1/3 of the time) and/or a negligible amount of force
frequently (Frequently: activity or condition exists from 1/3 to 2/3
of the time) to lift, carry, push, pull, or otherwise move objects,
including the human body;” occasional “walking or standing for brief
periods of time;” and the “specific vocational preparation” to
reach, handle, and finger constantly. ASSEMBLER, DOT 734.687-018.

20
5

21
22

The VE referred to this position as “small final assembler,”
but the DOT description lists it as “final assembler.” (See AR 52;
DOT 713.687-018). For the sake of brevity, the Court refers to the
position as “final assembler.”

23
6

24
25
26
27
28

The DOT description for final assembler requires “[e]xerting
up to 10 pounds of force occasionally (Occasionally: activity or
condition exists up to 1/3 of the time) and/or a negligible amount
of force frequently (Frequently: activity or condition exists from
1/3 to 2/3 of the time) to lift, carry, push, pull, or otherwise
move objects, including the human body;” occasional “walking or
standing for brief periods of time;” and the “specific vocational
preparation” to reach, handle, and finger frequently.
FINAL
ASSEMBLER, DOT 713.687-018.
5

1

did

2

description for assembler and final assembler.

not

ask

the

VE

if

her

testimony

conflicted

with

the

DOT

(See AR 51-52).

3

The ALJ adopted the VE’s testimony in finding that, considering

4
5

the

Plaintiff’s

age,

6

functional

7

assembler and a final assembler.

8

concluded that Plaintiff was not disabled.

capacity,

education,
Plaintiff

work

was

experience,

able

to

(AR 24).

and

perform

residual

work

as

an

Accordingly, the ALJ

(AR 24-25).

9

On

10

October

22,

2015,

Plaintiff

requested

that

the

Appeals

11

Council review the ALJ’s Decision, which was denied on March 1,

12

2016.

13

of the Commissioner, allowing this Court to review the decision.

14

See 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g), 1383(c).

(AR 1-8).

The ALJ’s Decision then became the final decision

15

III. STANDARD OF REVIEW

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17
18

This court reviews the Administration’s decision to determine

19

if the decision is free of legal error and supported by substantial

20

evidence.

21

1161 (9th Cir. 2012).

22

scintilla, but less than a preponderance.

23

F.3d 995, 1009 (9th Cir. 2014).

24

evidence supports a finding, “a court must consider the record as a

25

whole,

26

detracts

27

Massanari, 257 F.3d 1033, 1035 (9th Cir. 2001).

28

the evidence can reasonably support either affirming or reversing

See Brewes v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 682 F.3d 1157,

weighing
from

both
the

“Substantial evidence” is more than a mere

evidence

Garrison v. Colvin, 759

To determine whether substantial

that

[Commissioner’s]

6

supports

and

conclusion.”

evidence
Aukland

that
v.

As a result, “[i]f

1

the ALJ’s conclusion, [a court] may not substitute [its] judgment

2

for that of the ALJ.”

3

882 (9th Cir. 2006).

Robbins v. Soc. Sec. Admin., 466 F.3d 880,

4
5

IV. PLAINTIFF’S CONTENTIONS

6
7

Plaintiff alleges that, at step five, the ALJ (1) did not

8

encompass Plaintiff’s assigned functional limitations in posing the

9

hypothetical

to

the

VE;

and

(2)

failed

to

reconcile

the

VE’s

10

testimony, that Plaintiff could perform the jobs of assembler (DOT

11

734.687-018) and final assembler (DOT 713.687-018), with the DOT.

12

(Joint Stip. at 3-14, 17-26).

13
14

V. DISCUSSION

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16

After consideration of the record as a whole, the Court finds

17

that

18

evidence and are free from material legal error.7

the

Commissioner’s

findings

are

supported

by

substantial

Of

Plaintiff’s

19
20

A.

21

The

ALJ’s

Hypothetical

Encompassed

All

Functional Limitations

22
23

Plaintiff contends that the ALJ’s hypothetical was inadequate

24

because it omitted limitations resulting from Plaintiff’s alleged

25

CTS

26
27
28

and

upper-extremity

neuropathy.

7

Plaintiff

contends

that

The harmless error rule applies to the review of
administrative decisions regarding disability.
See McLeod v.
Astrue, 640 F.3d 881, 886-88 (9th Cir. 2011); Burch v. Barnhart, 400
F.3d 676, 679 (9th Cir. 2005) (stating that an ALJ’s decision will
not be reversed for errors that are harmless).
7

1

orthopedic

2

that

3

that are supported by substantial evidence in the record.

4

Stip. at 8-14).

5

encompassed

6

substantial evidence in the record.

tests

Plaintiff

and

has

Plaintiff’s

handling,

subjective

fingering,

complaints

and

reaching

establish

limitations
(Joint

Defendant asserts that the ALJ’s hypothetical fully

Plaintiff’s

limitations

that

were

supported

by

(Joint Stip. at 14-17).

7

Hypothetical questions posed to the VE must include “all of the

8
9

claimant's

functional

limitations,

both

by

substantial

11

Barnhart,

278

F.3d

12

Shalala,

13

Barnhart, 427 F.3d 1211, 1218 (9th Cir. 2005) (citing Magallanes v.

14

Bowen, 881 F.2d 747, 756–57 (9th Cir. 1989) (ALJ's reliance on VE

15

testimony was proper where hypothetical contained all Plaintiff’s

16

limitations that were found credible and supported in record).

17

ALJ may properly omit an alleged impairment from a hypothetical if

18

the omission of the impairment is supported by substantial evidence

19

in the record.

20

2001).

49

F.3d

562,

(9th

570–71

the

Cir.

(9th

record.

mental”

supported

956

in

and

10

947,

evidence

physical

2002)

Cir.

(quoting

1995);

see

Thomas

v.

Flores

v.

Bayliss

v.

An

Osenbrock v. Apfel, 240 F.3d 1157, 1165 (9th Cir.

21

The ALJ found that Plaintiff was not functionally limited by

22
23

CTS

24

\\

25

\\

26

\\

27

\\

28

and

upper-extremity

neuropathy

\\
8

because

a

July

2,

2014,

(“EMG”)8

1

electromyography

test

2

electrodiagnostic

study

3

negative for both conditions.

4

clinical findings, Plaintiff maintains that positive Phalen’s9 and

5

median Tinel’s10 tests in the record constitute substantial evidence

6

that Plaintiff is functionally limited in handling, fingering, and

7

reaching

objects.

8

conflict

with

9

persuasive (see AR 19-20).

of

(Joint

objective

and

a

Plaintiff’s

December
upper

clinical

at

9).

that

were

Despite these

However,

findings

2014,

extremities

(AR 600-02, 1148).

Stip.

30,

the

these

tests

ALJ

found

Where the medical evidence in the record

10

is not conclusive, “resolution of conflicts” is solely the function

11

of the ALJ.

12

In such cases, “the ALJ's conclusion must be upheld.”

13

Comm'r,

14

Accordingly,

15

Plaintiff’s alleged CTS and upper-extremity neuropathy diagnoses in

16

the hypothetical is supported by substantial evidence in the record.

17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

Soc.

Sample v. Schweiker, 694 F.2d 639, 642 (9th Cir. 1982).

Sec.

Admin.,

the

ALJ’s

169

F.3d

omission

595,
of

601

(9th

limitations

Morgan v.
Cir.

1999).

related

to

8

“The diagnosis of [CTS] is made primarily by clinical
examination and the patient’s history of symptoms. It is important
to remember that not all wrist and finger pain is [CTS].
In
addition not all finger numbness or tingling is CTS.
Confirmation
of the diagnosis with the use of nerve electrodiagnostic testing is
useful. Electrodiagnostic testing, made up of nerve conduction and
[EMG] testing is used to confirm the diagnosis of [CTS] and other
nerve
disorders.”
https://www.hss.edu/conditions_carpal-tunnelsyndrome-myths-facts-diagnosis-treatment.asp.
9

A Phalen’s test is an orthopedic test used to diagnose CTS.
Positive signs of a Phalen’s test include upon compression,
complaints
of
pain,
tingling,
or
numbness
in
the
hands.
http://www.physio-pedia.com/Phalen's_Test.
10

A Tinel’s
test is an orthopedic test used to detect
irritated nerves.
Positive signs of a Tinel’s test is upon light
tapping over a nerve the patient complains of a tingling sensation.
http://www.physio-pedia.com/Tinel%E2%80%99s_Test.
9

1

Moreover,

Plaintiff

contends

that

the

ALJ

was

required

to

2

include

3

numbness in her hands in the hypothetical question to the VE or in

4

formulating

5

provided clear and convincing reasons to find Plaintiff’s testimony

6

regarding her symptoms and limitations not credible.

7

Brown-Hunter v. Colvin, 806 F.3d 487, 493 (9th Cir. 2015) (An ALJ

8

may

9

symptoms only by offering specific, clear and convincing reasons for

10

her

subjective

her

“reject

RFC.

the

complaints

(Joint

claimant's

regarding

Stip.

at

testimony

pain,

13).

about

tingling,

However,

the

the

and

ALJ

(AR 20-23).

severity

of

her

doing so.”).

11
12

The

ALJ

found

that

Plaintiff’s

statements

concerning

the

13

intensity, persistence, and limiting effects of her symptoms were

14

not entirely credible because they were not corroborated by the

15

record

16

course of treatment despite “improvement in symptomology.”

17

23). This was a clear and convincing reason to find Plaintiff’s

18

testimony

19

(affirming

20

neurological

21

evidence” of any significant disabling abnormality of the claimant’s

and

because

less

Plaintiff

credible.11

ALJ’s
and

decision

had

See

Osenbrock,

that

orthopedic

failed

relied

in

evaluations

to

follow

240
part

F.3d
on

revealed

a

at

prescribed
(AR 22-

1157-1166

finding
“very

that

little

22
11

23
24
25
26
27
28

Although a claimant’s credibility “cannot be rejected on the
sole ground that it is not fully corroborated by objective medical
evidence, the medical evidence is still a relevant factor . . .”
Rollins v. Massanari, 261 F.3d 853, 857 (9th Cir. 2001).
Lack of
supporting objective medical evidence is a key consideration for the
ALJ in evaluating credibility.
See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1529(c)(4);
416.929(c)(4) (in determining disability, an ALJ must evaluate a
claimant’s statements about the intensity, persistence and limiting
effects of her symptoms “in relation to the objective medical
evidence and other evidence”).
10

1

upper or lower extremities, or spine); Chaudhry v. Astrue, 688 F.3d

2

661, 672 (9th Cir. 2012) (quoting Orn v. Astrue, 495 F.3d 625, 638

3

(9th Cir. 2007) (“[I]f a claimant complains about disabling pain but

4

fails to seek treatment, or fails to follow prescribed treatment,

5

for the pain, an ALJ may use such failure as a basis for finding the

6

complaint unjustified or exaggerated . . . ”).

7
8
9

The record supports the ALJ’s finding that Plaintiff did not
follow

prescribed

physical

12

shoulder flexion and extension, wall push-ups, straight arm circles,

13

and various lower-extremity exercises.

14

2015, Plaintiff’s physical therapist, Shannon Walker, P.T., informed

15

treating physician, Abel Quesada, M.D., “that [Plaintiff] ha[d] not

16

been fully participating in MD prescribed PT visits,” missing eleven

17

appointments in the course of three months and attending only three

18

appointments over the course of four weeks.

19

2015, Chelsea Sobeich, D.P.T., noted that Plaintiff “demonstrate[d]

20

improved

21

therapy [and] would benefit from aquatic therapy if she was more

22

consistent with attendance.”

23

2013,

24

Plaintiff “showed up only once for evaluation” and did not attend

25

any further physical therapy visits.

26

periods, Plaintiff kept regular appointments with Suhasini Dushmukh,

27

M.D. (see 394-591), Charles Schwartz, M.D. (see AR 670-84), Nina

28

Barlevy Psy.D. (see 685), and Amir Pouradib, M.D. (see 856-71).

therapist

at

the

and

(AR 842-50).

strength

(AR 849).
Physical

11

physical

her

order to improve her range of motion and strength, which included

motion]

aquatic

alleviate

11

of

prescribed

to

symptoms.

[range

was

treatment

10

a

Plaintiff

therapy

(AR 850).

since

therapy

in

On March 26,

On April 20,

beginning

aquatic

Similarly, on June 18,

Therapy

Center

(AR 270).

noted

that

Throughout these

1

Plaintiff’s

2

therapy treatment is therefore a clear and convincing reason to

3

reject Plaintiff’s symptom testimony.

4

672.

unexplained

failure

to

follow

prescribed

physical

See Chaudhry, 688 F.3d at

5
6

B.

The VE’s Testimony Does Not Conflict With The DOT

7
8

Plaintiff contends that the ALJ improperly found that Plaintiff

9

is able to perform the occupations of assembler (DOT 734.687-018)

10

and final assembler (DOT 713.687-018) because there is a deviation

11

between Plaintiff’s RFC and the description of these positions in

12

the DOT.

(Joint Stip. at 5-8).

13

that

ALJ’s

14

“frequently”

15

conflicts with the DOT descriptions for these jobs, which require a

16

worker

17

abilities, and be able to perform “repetitive work, or perform[ ]

18

continuously the same work, according to set procedures, sequence,

19

or pace.”

20

hypothetical question included all of the limitations found by the

21

ALJ,

22

[Plaintiff] to frequent use of the hands.”

the

to

who,

finding

lifting

“have

and

that

Specifically, Plaintiff alleges
Plaintiff’s

carrying

constant

less

reaching,

(Joint Stip. at 5-6).

contrary

to

Plaintiff’s

than

RFC
10

handling,

limits
pounds

and

her
(AR

to
17),

fingering”

Defendant asserts that “[t]he

assertions,

did

not

limit

(Joint Stip. at 14).

23
24

The ALJ relies on the DOT and VE testimony to determine whether

25

— given the claimant’s RFC, age, education, and work experience —

26

the claimant “actually can find some work in the national economy.”

27

20 C.F.R. § 416.966(e); Zavalin v. Colvin, 778 F.3d 842, 846 (9th

28

Cir. 2015); Valentine v. Comm'r Soc. Sec. Admin., 574 F.3d 685, 689
12

1

(9th Cir. 2009).

2

[VE’s] testimony and the DOT — for example, expert testimony that a

3

claimant can perform an occupation involving DOT requirements that

4

appear to be more than the claimant can handle — the ALJ is required

5

to reconcile the inconsistency.”

6

Massachi v. Astrue, 486 F.3d 1149, 1153–54 (9th Cir. 2007).

7

ALJ's failure to inquire into an apparent conflict is harmless where

8

there is no actual conflict between the RFC and the DOT.

9

v. Colvin, 622 F. App'x 687, 689 (9th Cir. 2015) (citing Massachi,

10

“When there is an apparent conflict between the

Zavalin, 778 F.3d at 846 (citing
An

Ranstrom

486 F.3d at 1154 n. 19).

11
12

Here,

the

VE

testified

that

Plaintiff

can

perform

the

13

occupations of assembler (DOT 734.687-018) and final assembler (DOT

14

713.687-018).

15

position

16

occasionally;” a “negligible amount of force frequently . . . to

17

lift, carry, push, pull, or otherwise move objects;” and constant

18

handling,

19

734.687-018.

20

that of assembler, except that it requires frequent (exists 1/3 to

21

2/3 of the time) handling, fingering, and reaching.

22

FINAL ASSEMBLER, DOT 713.687-018.

(AR 51-52).

that

requires

fingering,

and

The DOT defines assembler as a sedentary
“[e]xerting

up

reaching.

to

10

pounds

734.687-018

of

force

ASSEMBLER,

DOT

The DOT description for final assembler is the same as

See 713.687-018

23
24

The

ALJ’s

RFC

determination

was

consistent

with

the

DOT

25

descriptions for the jobs identified by the VE.

Despite Plaintiff’s

26

assertions (see Joint Stip. at 5), the ALJ assigned no limitation

27

regarding Plaintiff’s ability to, handle, finger, or reach objects.

28

(AR 17).

Thus, the VE’s testimony that Plaintiff could perform the
13

1

jobs of assembler and final assembler did not deviate from the DOT.

2

See Reese v. Astrue, No. ED CV 11-540-PLA, 2012 WL 137567, at *7

3

(C.D. Cal. Jan. 17, 2012) (finding no conflict between the DOT and

4

Plaintiff’s limitations where ALJ’s RFC determination contained no

5

reaching limitations and VE testimony stated Plaintiff could perform

6

jobs that require constant reaching).

7

Moreover, the ALJ’s failure to question the VE regarding an

8
9

apparent

conflict

between

the

DOT

and

VE

testimony

is

harmless

10

error.

See Massachi, 486 F.3d at 1154 n. 19 (it is harmless error

11

for an ALJ to not inquire about an apparent conflict between the DOT

12

and

13

descriptions).

14

could perform the alternative work of assembler and final assembler.

RFC

when

there

is

no

actual

conflict

between

these

Accordingly, the ALJ properly found that Plaintiff

15

VI.

16

CONCLUSION

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18
19

For the foregoing reasons, the decision of the Administrative
Law Judge is AFFIRMED.

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21

LET JUDGMENT BE ENTERED ACCORDINGLY.

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23

Dated: February 8, 2017

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25
26
27

_____________/s/______________
ALKA SAGAR
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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