Christine Smith v. Nancy A. Berryhill

Filing 23

MEMORANDUM OPINION by Magistrate Judge Charles F. Eick re: NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION for Summary Judgment 22 . Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment is denied and Defendant's motion for summary judgment is granted. LET JUDGMENT BE ENTERED ACCORDINGLY. (dml)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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CHRISTINE SMITH,

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Plaintiff,
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v.
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NANCY A. BERRYHILL, Acting
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Commissioner of Social Security,
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Defendant.
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____________________________________)

NO. SA CV 17-516-E

MEMORANDUM OPINION

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PROCEEDINGS

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Plaintiff filed a Complaint on March 21, 2017, seeking review of

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the Commissioner’s denial of benefits.

The parties filed a consent to

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proceed before a United States Magistrate Judge on April 20, 2017.

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Plaintiff filed a motion for summary judgment on August 18, 2017.

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Defendant filed a motion for summary judgment on October 23, 2017.

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The Court has taken both motions under submission without oral

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argument.

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See L.R. 7-15; “Order,” filed March 27, 2017.

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BACKGROUND

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Plaintiff asserted disability based on several alleged

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impairments (Administrative Record (“A.R.”) 167-76, 195).

The

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Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) examined the medical record and heard

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testimony from Plaintiff and a vocational expert (A.R. 14-681).

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ALJ found Plaintiff has several severe impairments but retains the

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residual functional capacity to perform a restricted range of light

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work (A.R. 19-25).

The

In accordance with the vocational expert’s

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testimony, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff can perform jobs existing

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in significant numbers in the national economy (A.R. 26, 42-43).

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Appeals Council denied review (A.R. 1-3).

The

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SUMMARY OF PLAINTIFF’S ARGUMENT

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Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred by rejecting a non-examining

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state agency physician’s opinion that Plaintiff assertedly is limited

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to sedentary work.

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STANDARD OF REVIEW

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Under 42 U.S.C. section 405(g), this Court reviews the

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Administration’s decision to determine if: (1) the Administration’s

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findings are supported by substantial evidence; and (2) the

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Administration used correct legal standards.

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Commissioner, 533 F.3d 1155, 1159 (9th Cir. 2008); Hoopai v. Astrue,

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499 F.3d 1071, 1074 (9th Cir. 2007); see also Brewes v. Commissioner,

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682 F.3d 1157, 1161 (9th Cir. 2012).
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See Carmickle v.

Substantial evidence is “such

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relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to

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support a conclusion.”

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(1971) (citation and quotations omitted); see also Widmark v.

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Barnhart, 454 F.3d 1063, 1066 (9th Cir. 2006).

Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401

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If the evidence can support either outcome, the court may

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not substitute its judgment for that of the ALJ.

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Commissioner’s decision cannot be affirmed simply by

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isolating a specific quantum of supporting evidence.

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Rather, a court must consider the record as a whole,

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weighing both evidence that supports and evidence that

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detracts from the [administrative] conclusion.

But the

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Tackett v. Apfel, 180 F.3d 1094, 1098 (9th Cir. 1999) (citations and

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quotations omitted).

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DISCUSSION

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After consideration of the record as a whole, Defendant’s motion

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is granted and Plaintiff’s motion is denied.

The Administration’s

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findings are supported by substantial evidence and are free from

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material1 legal error.

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Plaintiff’s contrary argument is unavailing.

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The harmless error rule applies to the review of
administrative decisions regarding disability. See Garcia v.
Commissioner, 768 F.3d 925, 932-33 (9th Cir. 2014); McLeod v.
Astrue, 640 F.3d 881, 886-88 (9th Cir. 2011).
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In rejecting the non-examining state agency physician’s opinion

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limiting Plaintiff to sedentary work,2 the ALJ cited, inter alia, the

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conflicting opinion of Dr. Sedgh, an examining physician (A.R. 24).

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Dr. Sedgh opined Plaintiff can perform light work (A.R. 335).

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Generally, “greater weight is accorded to the opinion of an examining

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physician than a non-examining physician.”

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F.3d 1035, 1041 (9th Cir. 1995); 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(c)(1),

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416.927(c)(1).

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without more, cannot constitute substantial evidence when the opinion

Andrews v. Shalala, 53

In fact, the opinion of a non-examining physician,

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conflicts with the opinion of an examining physician.

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See Pitzer v.

Sullivan, 908 F.2d 502, 506 n.4 (9th Cir. 1990).

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Moreover, it was the prerogative of the ALJ to resolve conflicts

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in the evidence.

See Lewis v. Apfel, 236 F.3d 503, 509 (9th Cir.

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2001).

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interpretation,” the Court must uphold the administrative decision.

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See Andrews v. Shalala, 53 F.3d at 1039-40; accord Thomas v. Barnhart,

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278 F.3d 947, 954 (9th Cir. 2002); Sandgathe v. Chater, 108 F.3d 978,

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980 (9th Cir. 1997).

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interpretation of the evidence in the present case notwithstanding any

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conflicts in the record.

When evidence “is susceptible to more than one rational

The Court will uphold the ALJ’s rational

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The vocational expert testified that a person with the residual
functional capacity the ALJ found to exist could perform jobs existing

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One non-examining state agency physician believed
Plaintiff is limited to sedentary work while another nonexamining state agency physician believed Plaintiff can perform
light work (A.R. 54-56, 70-73).
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in significant numbers in the national economy (A.R. 42-43).

The ALJ

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properly relied on this testimony in denying disability benefits.

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Barker v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, 882 F.2d 1474,

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1478-80 (9th Cir. 1989); Martinez v. Heckler, 807 F.2d 771, 774-75

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(9th Cir. 1986).

See

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Plaintiff argues that the ALJ failed to state sufficient reasons

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for preferring the opinion of the examining physician to the opinion

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of the non-examining physician.

This argument lacks merit.

The Ninth

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Circuit has stated that an ALJ need not explicitly detail his or her

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reasons for rejecting the contradicted opinion of a non-treating

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physician.

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In any event, the ALJ’s decision amply discusses the conflicting

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medical opinions, as well as the examination and test results which

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suggest only mild to moderate limitations in functioning (A.R. 22-24).

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The ALJ also pointed out that the non-examining physician did not

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review most of Plaintiff’s treatment records (A.R. 24).

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Security Ruling 96-6p does require that the ALJ “consider” the opinion

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of a state agency physician and “explain the weight” accorded to that

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opinion.

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proper reliance on the opinion of the examining physician, however,

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this Court is unable to conclude that the ALJ committed any material

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error with respect to the opinion of the non-examining state agency

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physician.

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(the Administration “may reject the opinion of a non-examining

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physician by reference to specific evidence in the medical record”);

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Clark v. Colvin, 2013 WL 6189726, at *3 (W.D. Wash. Nov. 26, 2013)

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See Nyman v. Heckler, 779 F.2d 528, 531 (9th Cir. 1986).

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Given the discussion in the ALJ’s decision and the ALJ’s

See Sousa v. Callahan, 143 F.3d 1240, 1244 (9th Cir. 1996)

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(ALJ’s reference to conflicting opinion of examining physician

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sufficed to explain ALJ’s rejection of opinion of non-examining

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physician).

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CONCLUSION

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For all of the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff’s motion for summary

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judgment is denied and Defendant’s motion for summary judgment is

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granted.

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LET JUDGMENT BE ENTERED ACCORDINGLY.

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DATED: November 6, 2017.

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/s/
CHARLES F. EICK
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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