Rahel Asrat v. CVS Pharmacy, Inc. et al

Filing 26

MINUTES (IN CHAMBERS) Order Denying Motion to Remand 18 by Judge Andrew J. Guilford: The Court DENIES the motion to remand. (Dkt. No. 18). See document for further information. (lwag)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL
Case No.

SACV 17-00975 AG (JDEx)

Title

RAHEL ASRAT v. CVS PHARMACY, INC. ET AL.

Present: The Honorable

August 11, 2017

ANDREW J. GUILFORD

Lisa Bredahl
Deputy Clerk
Attorneys Present for Plaintiffs:

Proceedings:

Date

Not Present
Court Reporter / Recorder

Tape No.

Attorneys Present for Defendants:

[IN CHAMBERS] ORDER DENYING MOTION TO REMAND

Plaintiff Rahel Asrat filed this employment discrimination and wrongful termination lawsuit,
in the Orange County Superior Court, against Defendants CVS Pharmacy, Inc. and CVS
Health Corporation. (Compl., Dkt. No. 1-1 at 4–12.) The complaint doesn’t state a specific
amount of damages, or otherwise contain monetary figures. Rather, Plaintiff seeks certain
forms of general relief, like compensatory damages, exemplary or punitive damages, attorney
fees, pre-judgment interest, and costs. (Id. at 13–14.) After receiving discovery responses
regarding the amount in controversy, Defendants removed this case to federal court. (Notice
of Removal, Dkt. No. 1 at 3–4.) Plaintiff now moves to remand, arguing that Defendants’
notice of removal was untimely under 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b). The Court DENIES the motion
to remand. (Dkt. No. 18.)
“Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction,” and they possess “only that power
authorized by Constitution and statute.” Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of America, 511 U.S.
375, 377 (1994). The Constitution provides, in Article III, § 2, that “[t]he judicial Power [of
the United States] shall extend . . . to all Cases . . . between Citizens of different States.” And
Congress, in 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a), has authorized district courts to exercise jurisdiction over
“all civil actions where the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $75,000,
exclusive of interests and costs, and is between . . . citizens of different States.” Principles of
federalism and judicial economy require courts to “scrupulously confine their [removal]
jurisdiction to the precise limits which [Congress] has defined.” See Shamrock Oil & Gas Corp.
CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL
Case No.

SACV 17-00975 AG (JDEx)

Date

Title

August 11, 2017

RAHEL ASRAT v. CVS PHARMACY, INC. ET AL.

v. Sheets, 313 U.S. 100, 109 (1941). As this Court has often stated, “[n]othing is to be more
jealously guarded by a court than its jurisdiction.” See United States v. Ceja-Prado, 333 F.3d
1046, 1051 (9th Cir. 2003) (internal quotation marks omitted).
To start, the Court must consider whether subject matter jurisdiction exsits. See Ruhrgas AG v.
Marathon Oil Co., 526 U.S. 574, 583 (1999) (“Article III generally requires a federal court to
satisfy itself of its jurisdiction over the subject matter.”). First, both sides of this lawsuit are
“completely diverse.” See Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., Inc., 545 U.S. 546, 553 (2005).
Plaintiff is a citizen of California, while Defendants are either citizens of Delaware or Rhode
Island. (Notice of Removal, Dkt. No. 1 at 3–4.) Second, Defendants have shown, by a
preponderance of the evidence, that the amount-in-controversy requirement has been
satisfied. See Dart Cherokee Basin Operating Co., LLC v. Owens, 135 S. Ct. 547, 554 (2014).
Plaintiff stated that her damages include lost wages of at least $84,000 from 2015 to 2017,
and lost benefits of $1,000 per month. (Anderton Decl., Dkt. No. 4 at 1–2, Ex. D.) The
parties don’t dispute those jurisdictional basics. (Compare Mot. to Remand, Dkt. No. 18 at 1,
with Opp’n, Dkt. No. 19 at 5, and Reply, Dkt. No. 22 at 2–3.)
Next, the Court considers whether the notice of removal was timely. Congress has provided
two windows to remove a civil action to federal court: First, a defendant may file a notice of
removal “within 30 days after the receipt . . . of a copy of the initial pleading setting forth the
claim for relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(1). Second, if the case is not removable at first blush,
then a defendant may file a notice of removal “within 30 days after receipt . . . of a copy of
an amended pleading, motion, order or other paper from which it may first be ascertained
that the case is one which is or has become removable.” Id. § 1446(b)(3). Generally, however,
“[a] case may not be removed . . . on the basis of [diversity] jurisdiction . . . more than 1 year
after commencement of the action.” Id. § 1446(c).
Plaintiff argues that Defendants’ notice of removal was “untimely” because, in her view, the
original complaint “made it abundantly clear that the amount in controversy exceeded
$75,000” and “Defendants waited nine months after service” to remove this case. (Mot. to
Remand, Dkt. No. 18 at 1.) Plaintiff also suggests that there were jurisdictional “red flag[s]”
that should have prompted Defendants to further “investigate the basis for removal.” (Id. at
4, 14.) The Court disagrees.
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL
Case No.

SACV 17-00975 AG (JDEx)

Date

Title

August 11, 2017

RAHEL ASRAT v. CVS PHARMACY, INC. ET AL.

Consider the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Harris v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 425 F.3d 689 (9th
Cir. 2005). There, the question presented was whether “the burden lies with the defendant to
investigate the necessary jurisdictional facts within the first thirty days of receiving an
indeterminate complaint, or whether the determination [is] limited to the face of the initial
pleading.” Id. at 693. Adopting a “bright-line” approach consistent with the majority of other
courts, the Ninth Circuit held “that notice of removability under [28 U.S.C.] § 1446(b) is
determined through examination of the four corners of the applicable pleadings, not through
subjective knowledge or a duty to make further inquiry.” Id. at 694–97. Put another way: If
it’s unclear from the face of the complaint whether federal jurisdiction exists, then the initial
period for removal under 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b) doesn’t begin to run. Id. at 965. Further,
according to the Ninth Circuit, there’s no duty imposed on defendants to follow a trail of
“clues” and “investigate further.” Id. at 696.
Harris makes quick work of the pending motion. Here, the “four corners” of the complaint
didn’t “affirmatively” reveal any information about monetary relief. (Compl., Dkt. No. 1-1 at
13–14.) Significantly, the complaint didn’t contain enough information for Defendants to
persuade this Court, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the amount in controversy was
above $75,000. Simply put, the original complaint was “indeterminate,” so the case wasn’t
clearly removable within the first 30-day window. See 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(1); see also Harris,
425 F.3d at 695. Later on, in May 2017, Plaintiff served certain responses to supplement
interrogatories that revealed damages exceeding $84,000. (Anderton Decl., Dkt. No. 4 at 1–2,
Ex. D.) That document constituted an “other paper from which it may first be ascertained
that the case is one which is or has become removable.” See 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(3); see also
Roth v. CHA Hollywood Med. Ctr., L.P., 720 F.3d 1121, 1126 (9th Cir. 2013). Defendants then
filed a notice of removal within 30 days and, as such, removal was timely. Plaintiff’s contrary
position is unpersuasive and, what’s worse, could encourage “premature and protective”
removals and “a cottage industry of removal litigation.” See Harris, 425 F.3d at 698.
The Court DENIES the motion to remand. (Dkt. No. 18.)
:
Initials of Preparer

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