Delfino Segura et al v. Griffcon, Inc. et al

Filing 18

MINUTES (IN CHAMBERS) ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO REMAND 10 by Judge Andrew J. Guilford. For these reasons, the Court GRANTS the motion to remand. (Dkt. No. 10.) As such, the motion to compel arbitration is MOOT. (Dkt. No. 8.) MD JS-6. Case Terminated. (es)

JS-6
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL
Case No.

SACV 17-01209 AG (KESx)

Title

DELFINO SEGURA ET AL. v. GRIFFCON, INC. ET AL.

Present: The Honorable

September 25, 2017

ANDREW J. GUILFORD

Lisa Bredahl
Deputy Clerk
Attorneys Present for Plaintiffs:

Proceedings:

Date

Not Present
Court Reporter / Recorder

Tape No.

Attorneys Present for Defendants:

[IN CHAMBERS] ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO
REMAND [10]

Plaintiffs Delfino Segura, Leonicio Segura, and Maurilio Segura originally filed this lawsuit in
the Orange County Superior Court against Defendants Griffcon, Inc., and Chris William
Griffitts. (Compl., Dkt. No. 1-1 at 2–4.) Plaintiffs claims for relief all concern state law—for
example, state wage-and-hour violations, unfair business practices, retaliation, and wrongful
termination. (Id. at 8–23.) But several months after the case was filed, Defendants removed
on the asserted basis of federal question jurisdiction. (Notice of Removal, Dkt. No. 1 at 1–3.)
After investigating the case, Defendants say they learned that Plaintiffs claims may include
relief for “work performed on federal enclaves.” (Id. at 2.) Plaintiffs now move to remand
this case back to state court, readily conceding that they don’t seek any relief for any work
performed on any federal enclaves. (Mot. to Remand, Dkt. No. 10 at 2, 7, 10.)
For the following reasons, the Court GRANTS the motion to remand. (Dkt. No. 10.) CrossDefendant’s motion to compel arbitration is MOOT. (Dkt. No. 8.)
1. PRELIMINARY MATTERS
Defendants ask this Court to take judicial notice of official public records, which appear to
show that Naval Base San Diego, Marine Corps Air Station Miramar, and the Balboa Naval
Medical Center are all well-established federal enclaves. (Dkt. No. 14-1.) Under Federal Rule
CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL
Page 1 of 5

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL
Case No.

SACV 17-01209 AG (KESx)

Date

September 25, 2017

Title

DELFINO SEGURA ET AL. v. GRIFFCON, INC. ET AL.

of Evidence 201(b), a court may “judicially notice a fact that is not subject to reasonable
dispute because it . . . can be accurately and readily determined from sources whose accuracy
cannot reasonably be questioned.” Courts may take judicial notice of “undisputed matters of
public record.” See Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 690 (9th Cir. 2001). Plaintiffs
haven’t disputed that these bases, stations, or sites are in fact federal enclaves, nor have they
filed any opposition or objection to the request for judicial notice. Putting aside whether a
request for judicial notice was necessary here, the Court concludes that it may appropriately
consider these documents for purposes of the pending motion.
2. BRIEF BACKGROUND
In February 2012 or 2013, Plaintiffs apparently began working “general construction” for
Defendant Griffcon. (Compl., Dkt. No. 1-1 at 4, 10.) According to the state-court complaint,
Plaintiffs purport to allege claims for (1) failure to pay wages for all hours worked, (2) failure
to pay overtime wages, (3) failure to provide paid rest breaks, (4) failure to timely pay final
wages, (5) failure to provide accurate itemized wage statements, (6) failure to pay vested
vacation time, (7) unfair and unlawful competition, (8) unlawful retaliation, and (9) wrongful
termination in violation of public policy. (Id. at 8–23.) All these allegedly unlawful labor and
employment practices apparently occurred in Aliso Viejo, California. (Id. at 10.)
This case proceeded in state court for about seven months. But at some point, Defendants
say they “learned” that Plaintiffs “performed nearly 7,600 hours of work [for the company]
within the boundaries of three federal enclaves in San Diego County.” (Opp’n, Dkt. No. 14
at 1–2.) Those federal enclaves include Naval Base San Diego, Marine Corps Air Station
Miramar, and the Balboa Naval Medical Center. (Id.) With those facts, Defendants filed an
amended answer that included the “federal enclave doctrine” as an affirmative defense. (Id. at
4; see also Am. Answer, Dkt. No. 1, Ex. D at 7.) Then a few weeks later, Defendants filed a
notice of removal under 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(3). Specifically, Defendants say they received an
email from Plaintiffs’ counsel apparently providing “tacit confirmation” that Plaintiffs
“intend their claims to include work performed” on certain federal enclaves. (Szumiak Decl.,
Dkt. No. 4 at 3.) The email in questions says, in relevant part, “please note that simply
working at a federal location is irrelevant to [an affirmative defense under the federal enclave
doctrine].” (Id., Ex. 1.)
CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL
Page 2 of 5

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL
Case No.

SACV 17-01209 AG (KESx)

Date

September 25, 2017

Title

DELFINO SEGURA ET AL. v. GRIFFCON, INC. ET AL.

3. LEGAL STANDARD
Federal courts possess “only that power authorized by Constitution and statute.” Kokkonen v.
Guardian Life Ins. Co. of America, 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994) (“It is to be presumed that a cause
lies outside of [a federal court’s] limited jurisdiction,” and “the burden of establishing the
contrary rests upon the party asserting jurisdiction.”). The Constitution provides, in Article
III, § 2, that “[t]he judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under
this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be made,
under their Authority.” And Congress, in 28 U.S.C. § 1331, has authorized district courts to
exercise jurisdiction over “all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of
the United States.”
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a), a defendant may remove from state to federal court “any civil
action” over which the federal district courts “have original jurisdiction.” Congress has
provided two windows for removal: First, a defendant may file a notice of removal “within
30 days after the receipt . . . of a copy of the initial pleading setting forth the claim for relief.”
28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(1). Second, if the case is not removable at first blush, then a defendant
may file a notice of removal “within 30 days after receipt . . . of a copy of an amended
pleading, motion, order or other paper from which it may first be ascertained that the case is
one which is or has become removable.” 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(3). Principles of federalism,
due respect for the state courts, comity, and judicial economy require courts to “scrupulously
confine their [removal] jurisdiction to the precise limits which [Congress] has defined.” See
Shamrock Oil & Gas Corp. v. Sheets, 313 U.S. 100, 109 (1941); see also In re La Providencia Dev.
Corp., 406 F.2d 251, 252 (1st Cir. 1969) (“Removal in diversity cases, to the prejudice of state
court jurisdiction, is a privilege to be strictly construed.”). As this Court has often stated,
“[n]othing is to be more jealously guarded by a court than its jurisdiction.” See United States v.
Ceja-Prado, 333 F.3d 1046, 1051 (9th Cir. 2003) (internal quotation marks omitted).
4. ANALYSIS
The Court must begin, as always, by determining whether subject matter jurisdiction exists.
See Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co., 526 U.S. 574, 583 (1999) (“Article III generally requires a
federal court to satisfy itself of its jurisdiction over the subject matter.”).
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL
Case No.

SACV 17-01209 AG (KESx)

Date

September 25, 2017

Title

DELFINO SEGURA ET AL. v. GRIFFCON, INC. ET AL.

Congress has the power to acquire land from the states—for the erection of forts, magazines,
arsenals, dock-yards, and other needful buildings—and to exercise exclusive jurisdiction over
those lands. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 17; see Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426 U.S. 529, 542 (1976)
(“[T]he legislative jurisdiction acquired may range from exclusive federal jurisdiction with no
residual state police power, . . . to concurrent, or partial, federal legislative jurisdiction, which
may allow the State to exercise certain authority.”). As the Supreme Court has long held, the
Federal Enclave Clause doesn’t command that “every vestige” of state law must “vanish.” See
James Stewart & Co. v. Sadrakula, 309 U.S. 94, 99 (1940). Rather, to ensure that no area “will
be left without a developed legal system for private rights,” the Constitution “permit[s] the
continuance until abrogated of those rules existing at the time of the surrender of sovereignty
which govern the rights of the occupants of the territory transferred.” Id. at 99–100. State
laws that remain in force after the surrender of sovereignty “remain[] operative as federal law
by virtue of the sovereignty of the United States.” See Mater v. Holley, 200 F.2d 123, 124 (5th
Cir. 1952); see Willis v. Craig, 555 F.2d 724, 726 n.4 (9th Cir. 1977) (discussing the “confusing
jurisdictional issue” of “enclave jurisdiction”). Any claims arising under such assimilated law,
“are properly the subject of federal jurisdiction.” Macomber v. Bose, 401 F.2d 545, 546 (9th Cir.
1968); see also Swords to Plowshares v. Kemp, 423 F. Supp. 2d 1031, 1038 (N.D. Cal. 2005).
Defendants believe that a large portion of Plaintiffs’ claims actually concern “work done on
federal enclaves,” even though the complaint says nothing of the sort. (Notice of Removal,
Dkt. No. 1 at 3.) Relying on the convoluted jurisdictional doctrine just described and a
choice-of-law analysis based on the Supremacy Clause, Defendants link together a multifaceted argument to suggest that this Court must exercise federal question jurisdiction over
any “assimilated” or “federal-ized” state-law claims. (Opp’n, Dkt. No. 14 at 8–16.)
That may well be the case, but this Court need not wade into muddied waters.
For starters, the Court isn’t convinced that removal was appropriate here based on an the
purported receipt of an “other paper.” See 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(1). It’s true, Plaintiffs’ counsel
did in fact send an email containing the words “working at a federal location.” (Szumiak
Decl., Dkt. No. 4, Ex. 1.) But after reading the entire email chain in context, that statement
obviously concerned a general discussion of the legal standard governing Defendants’
potential affirmative defense. (Id.) The email statement wasn’t, as Defendants say, “tacit
CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL
Case No.

SACV 17-01209 AG (KESx)

Date

September 25, 2017

Title

DELFINO SEGURA ET AL. v. GRIFFCON, INC. ET AL.

confirmation” of Plaintiffs’s intent to assert claims for work done on federal enclaves.
(Szumiak Decl., Dkt. No. 4 at 3.) Any other reading of the email would defy reality.
Even assuming the notice of removal was proper in this case, the Court isn’t persuaded by
the argument that enclave jurisdiction exists here. As the Supreme Court has long held, “the
plaintiff is the master of the complaint.” Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 398–99
(1987). Because the basis for federal question jurisdiction must ordinarily appear “on the face
of the complaint,” plaintiffs have the ability to “eschew[] claims based on federal law” and
“choose to have the cause heard in state court.” Id. at 399. Critically, Plaintiffs haven’t
disputed that Naval Base San Diego, Marine Corps Air Station Miramar, and the Balboa
Naval Medical Center are all federal enclaves. Nor have they expressed any desire to assert
any claims for any work performed on federal enclaves. (See Mot. to Remand, Dkt. No. 10-1
at 2, 9–10.) Quite to the contrary, Plaintiffs have continuously asserted their willingness to
stipulate to a remand to state court. (Reply, Dkt. No. 16 at 1, 5–6.) This Court is confident
that Plaintiffs will be held to those broad representations by the judges of the Orange County
Superior Court.
Defendants argue that this Court should maintain jurisdiction anyway to decide “whether a
particular parcel qualifies [as] a federal enclave.” (Opp’n, Dkt. No. 14 at 17.) But a defendant
can’t, by merely inserting a subsidiary federal issue into a case, transform the entire lawsuit
“into one arising under federal law.” See Caterpillar, 482 U.S. at 399. Such a practice would
impermissibly allow defendants to “select the forum in which [a] claim shall be litigated,” and
make the plaintiff the “master of nothing.” Id.
5. DISPOSITION
For these reasons, the Court GRANTS the motion to remand. (Dkt. No. 10.) As such, the
motion to compel arbitration is MOOT. (Dkt. No. 8.)
:
Initials of Preparer

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