Craig R. Doiron et al v. City of Santa Ana et al

Filing 70

MINUTES OF Motion Hearing held before Judge Christina A. Snyder: RE: DEFENDANTS MOTION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFFS SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT 65 . Court hereby DENIES defendants motion to dismiss plaintiffs claim for violation of § 1983 insofar as i t is based on the September12, 2015 arrest.The Court DISMISSES without prejudice plaintiffs claim for violation of §1983 as against Choe insofar as it is based on the September 21, 2015 arrest.The Court hereby DENIES defendants motion to dismiss plaintiffs claim for violation of § 52.1 as against Choe and Crevier.The Court hereby DENIES defendants motion to dismiss plaintiffs claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress as against Choe and Crevier. The Court DISMISSES with prejudice plaintiffs claim for negligence as against Choe and Crevier. Court Reporter: Lisa Gonzalez. (lc). Modified on 12/4/2018. (lc).

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
Case No. 
Title 

CIVIL MINUTES – GENERAL
‘O’
8:17-cv-01584-CAS-JEMx
Date  December 3, 2018
CRAIG R. DOIRON V. CITY OF SANTA ANA ET AL.

Present: The Honorable 

CHRISTINA A. SNYDER 

Catherine Jeang 
Deputy Clerk 

Attorneys Present for Plaintiffs: 

N/A 

Tape No. 

Attorneys Present for Defendants: 

Brenton Hands 

Kirsten Hart

Proceedings:  

Lisa Gonzalez 
Court Reporter / Recorder 

DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFF’S SECOND
AMENDED COMPLAINT (Dkt. 65, filed November 1, 2018)

I.

INTRODUCTION

On September 19, 2017, pro se plaintiffs Craig R. Doiron and David C. Peterson
filed the instant action against defendants City of Santa Ana (the “City”), Daniel Baek,
Crevier BMW (“Crevier”), Penske Corporation, Penske Automotive Group, Inc., Penske
Vehicle Services, Inc. (collectively, “Penske”), John Choe, and Does 1 through 10
inclusive. Dkt. 1. In October and November 2017, the defendants filed motions to
dismiss the plaintiffs’ initial complaint. Dkts. 7, 24, 29. On January 24, 2018, Jerry L.
Steering and Gregory Paul Peacock filed notices of appearance of counsel on behalf of
plaintiffs. Dkt. 43. On July 9, 2018, the Court dismissed the plaintiffs’ complaint on the
grounds that the plaintiffs failed to provide clear and concise allegations in compliance
with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a). Dkt. 47. The Court provided plaintiffs with
leave to file an amended complaint. Id.
On July 30, 2018, plaintiffs filed the first amended complaint. Dkt. 48. On August
13, 2018, Crevier, Choe, and Penske filed a motion to dismiss plaintiffs’ first amendment
complaint pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 8(a) and 12(b)(6). Dkt. 49. The
same day, the City and Baek also filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6).
Dkt. 50 (“City MTD”). On September 24, 2018, the Court granted in part and denied in
part the defendants’ motions to dismiss and provided plaintiffs with leave to amend. Dkt.
62 (“Order”).
On October 18, 2018, plaintiff Doiron filed a second amended complaint, which no
longer lists Peterson as a plaintiff or any of the Penske entities as defendants. Dkt. 63
(“SAC”). Doiron asserts (1) two claims for unlawful search and seizure of person and

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
Case No. 
Title 

CIVIL MINUTES – GENERAL
‘O’
8:17-cv-01584-CAS-JEMx
Date  December 3, 2018
CRAIG R. DOIRON V. CITY OF SANTA ANA ET AL.

property in violation of the Fourth Amendment and 42 U.S.C. § 1983, as against Baek
and Choe; (2) one claim for violation of freedom of speech in violation of the First
Amendment and § 1983, as against Baek; (3) one claim for violation of California Civil
Code § 52.1, as against Choe and Crevier; and (4) three claims for intentional infliction
of emotional distress, negligence, and civil extortion in violation of California common
law, as against Choe and Crevier. Plaintiff’s claims arise out of Doiron’s arrest for
alleged grand theft auto of a loaner vehicle that Crevier had provided to Peterson while
Crevier attempted to repair Peterson’s vehicle.
On August 13, 2018, Baek filed an answer to the second amended complaint. Dkt.
66. That same day, Choe and Crevier filed a motion to dismiss plaintiffs’ second
amendment complaint pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 8(a) and 12(b)(6).
Dkt. 65 (“MTD”). On September 4, 2018, plaintiff filed an opposition to the motion to
dismiss. Dkt. 68 (“Opp’n”). On November 19, 2018, Choe and Crevier filed a reply.
Dkt. 69 (“Crevier Reply”).
The Court held a hearing on December 3, 2018. After carefully considering the
parties’ arguments, the Court finds and concludes as follows.
II.

BACKGROUND

The following factual allegations are taken from plaintiff’s second amended
complaint.
On June 10, 2015, Peterson’s vehicle was towed to Crevier BMW, a California
company located in Santa Ana, California, for repairs. SAC ¶¶ 21. Crevier agreed to
repair Peterson’s vehicle, and provided Peterson with a loaner vehicle for which Peterson
signed a “contractual agreement.” Id. ¶¶ 23–24. A few weeks later, Crevier informed
Peterson that his vehicle was ready and that it would need to be towed away, as it would
not start. Id. ¶ 25. Doiron spoke with a representative from Crevier and informed the
representative that he and Peterson would pick up the vehicle after all the repairs were
completed. Id. ¶ 26.
Plaintiff alleges that prior to September 12, 2015, Crevier employee Choe and City
of Santa Ana Police Department Officer Baek, conspired to falsely arrest Doiron and
extort him with the threat of criminal prosecution if he did not pay Crevier for the repairs

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
Case No. 
Title 

CIVIL MINUTES – GENERAL
‘O’
8:17-cv-01584-CAS-JEMx
Date  December 3, 2018
CRAIG R. DOIRON V. CITY OF SANTA ANA ET AL.

made to the vehicle. Id. ¶ 27. On September 12, 2015, Baek knocked on the motel room
door in which Doiron and Peterson were staying in Santa Ana, ordered Doiron out of the
room, and arrested Doiron “for grand theft auto” of the Crevier loaner vehicle. Id. ¶¶ 28–
31. Doiron complied and informed Baek that there had been a mistake. Id. ¶ 32. After
Baek placed Doiron in a patrol vehicle, Baek allegedly conducted a “shake down” on
behalf of Crevier and told Doiron that he was going to spend “at least a month in jail” and
that bail would cost at least $5,000. Id. ¶¶ 33, 37. Doiron explained to Baek that he had
no connection to the loaner vehicle, and that Peterson had signed for the vehicle. Id. ¶
38.
Plaintiff alleges that Baek then walked to Choe and Doe Crevier employees located
at the scene, “spoke for a few minutes and conspired to threaten Doiron with arrest if he
did not pay Peterson’s bill.” Id. ¶ 39. Baek informed Doiron that if he paid the bill, he
would not be arrested. Id. ¶ 40. Baek subsequently took Doiron to the motel room where
Doiron retrieved the keys to the loaner vehicle and approximately $1,500 cash. Id. ¶ 43.
Baek then took Doiron back to the patrol vehicle and drove him to Crevier, and upon
arrival walked Doiron to Choe’s office. Id. ¶¶ 44–45. Choe provided Doiron with a bill
that stated that Peterson’s vehicle was not safe to drive and needed to be towed away. Id.
¶ 47. Doiron asked why he needed to pay for a vehicle that was not repaired and that did
not belong to him, and Baek responded to Doiron that he would be arrested for a felony if
he did not pay the bill. Id. ¶¶ 48–49. Doiron paid Choe $1,500 and was released from
custody. Id. ¶ 51. On September 15, 2015, Doiron went to Crevier and demanded a
receipt for his prior $1,500 payment, but “no one would give him one.” Id. ¶ 52.
At some point prior to September 21, 2015, Doiron complained to the City of
Santa Ana about Baek’s actions on September 12, 2015. Id. ¶ 53. On September 21,
2015, Baek and Doe officers returned to the motel in which Doiron was staying and
arrested Doiron pursuant to a three-year-old “arrest warrant … for possession of
cocaine.” Id. ¶ 54. Plaintiffs allege that Baek never produced evidence of this warrant
“because there never was a warrant for Doiron’s arrest.” Id. After three days at the
Orange County Men’s Central Jail, Doiron was released after paying bail at $3,500. Id. ¶
55.
Plaintiff further alleges that Baek “caused a bogus ‘notice to appear’ to be given to
Doiron” for a court date at the Airport Division of the Los Angeles County Superior
Court. Id. ¶ 56. Doiron appeared and was told that he had ten-year-old Beverly Hills

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
Case No. 
Title 

CIVIL MINUTES – GENERAL
‘O’
8:17-cv-01584-CAS-JEMx
Date  December 3, 2018
CRAIG R. DOIRON V. CITY OF SANTA ANA ET AL.

traffic tickets that were unresolved. Id. ¶ 57. Doiron returned to court weeks later and
demonstrated that the traffic citations were resolved, which resulted in a dismissal of the
action against him. Id. ¶¶ 58–59.
Plaintiff alleges that “none of the defendants to this action had a warrant for
Doiron’s arrest,” probable cause to believe that Doiron had committed a crime, or
reasonable suspicion that he was a danger to anyone. Id. ¶ 60.
III.

LEGAL STANDARD

A motion pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) tests the legal
sufficiency of the claims asserted in a complaint. Under this Rule, a district court
properly dismisses a claim if “there is a ‘lack of a cognizable legal theory or the absence
of sufficient facts alleged under a cognizable legal theory.’” Conservation Force v.
Salazar, 646 F.3d 1240, 1242 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting Balisteri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t,
901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1988)). “While a complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6)
motion to dismiss does not need detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff’s obligation to
provide the ‘grounds’ of his ‘entitlement to relief’ requires more than labels and
conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.”
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). “[F]actual allegations must
be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Id.
In considering a motion pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), a court must accept as true all
material allegations in the complaint, as well as all reasonable inferences to be drawn
from them. Pareto v. FDIC, 139 F.3d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1998). The complaint must be
read in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Sprewell v. Golden State
Warriors, 266 F.3d 979, 988 (9th Cir. 2001). However, “a court considering a motion to
dismiss can choose to begin by identifying pleadings that, because they are no more than
conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth. While legal conclusions can
provide the framework of a complaint, they must be supported by factual allegations.”
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009); see Moss v. United States Secret Service,
572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009) (“[F]or a complaint to survive a motion to dismiss, the
non-conclusory ‘factual content,’ and reasonable inferences from that content, must be
plausibly suggestive of a claim entitling the plaintiff to relief.”). Ultimately,
“[d]etermining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief will . . . be a

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
Case No. 
Title 

CIVIL MINUTES – GENERAL
‘O’
8:17-cv-01584-CAS-JEMx
Date  December 3, 2018
CRAIG R. DOIRON V. CITY OF SANTA ANA ET AL.

context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience
and common sense.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679.
As a general rule, leave to amend a complaint which has been dismissed should be
freely granted. Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a). This policy is applied with “extreme liberality.”
Morongo Band of Mission Indians v. Rose, 893 F.2d 1074, 1079 (9th Cir. 1990); Moss,
572 F.3d at 972. However, leave to amend may be denied when “the court determines
that the allegation of other facts consistent with the challenged pleading could not
possibly cure the deficiency.” Schreiber Distrib. Co. v. Serv-Well Furniture Co., 806
F.2d 1393, 1401 (9th Cir. 1986); see Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1127 (9th Cir.
2000).
IV.

DISCUSSION
A.

Plaintiff’s § 1983 Claims as Against Choe

Doiron asserts two § 1983 claims against defendant Choe for: (1) the seizure of
Doiron, and (2) the seizure of $1,500. The Court previously dismissed plaintiff’s § 1983
claim as against Choe with respect to Doiron’s arrest with leave to amend because
plaintiff failed to make any allegations that Choe, rather than Baek, was the proximate
cause of Baek’s arrest of Doiron on September 12, 2015. Order at 16–17. In the second
amended complaint, plaintiff adds the allegation that “Baek failed to exercise his own
independent judgment when he agreed to extort Doiron for the benefit of Choe and
Crevier.” SAC ¶ 62.
Defendants again challenge the sufficiency of plaintiff’s § 1983 claim as against
Choe based on seizure of Doiron’s person. Defendants argue that plaintiff has not
adequately pled facts to establish that Choe proximately caused any seizures of Doiron or
to establish that Choe acted under color of law. The Court previously determined that
plaintiff had sufficiently alleged that Choe acted under color of state law under a theory
of conspiracy with respect to the September 12, 2016 arrest of Doiron. Order at 16. The
Court sees no reason to depart from its earlier ruling.
With respect to proximate cause, the Court observes that causation is an intensely
factual question. Thus, the Court finds that the plausibility and sufficiency of plaintiff’s
theory of proximate causation is better decided on a more developed factual record.

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
CIVIL MINUTES – GENERAL
‘O’
8:17-cv-01584-CAS-JEMx
Date  December 3, 2018
CRAIG R. DOIRON V. CITY OF SANTA ANA ET AL.

Case No. 
Title 

Accordingly, the Court DENIES defendants’ motion to dismiss plaintiff’s § 1983 claim
as against Choe insofar as it is based on the alleged arrest of Doiron on September 12,
2015.
Defendants argue that plaintiffs have not alleged any facts regarding Choe’s
involvement with the September 21, 2015 arrest of Doiron.1 MTD at 12–13. Plaintiff
does not address this particular argument in his opposition. As the second amended
complaint does not include any allegations regarding Choe’s involvement with the
September 21, 2015 arrest of Doiron, the Court GRANTS defendants’ motion to dismiss
plaintiff’s § 1983 claim as against Choe insofar as it is based on the alleged arrest on
September 21, 2015.2
B.

Plaintiff’s State Law Claims as Against Choe and Crevier
i.

California Civil Code § 52.1

Plaintiff brings a claim against Choe and Crevier for violation of California Civil
Code § 52.1(a), also known as the Tom Bane Civil Rights Act, which prohibits “a person
or persons, whether or not acting under color of law, [from] interfer[ing] by threats,
intimidation, or coercion, or [from] attempt[ing] to interfere by threats, intimidation, or
coercion, with the exercise or enjoyment by any individual or individuals of rights
secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States, or of the rights secured by the
Constitution or laws of this state. . . .” Cal. Civ. Code § 52.1(a).

1

In arguing that plaintiff has not stated a clear factual basis for his § 1983 claim,
defendants suggest that plaintiff has alleged one other potential arrest based on Baek’s
interactions with Doiron at the dealership. MTD at 12. The Court understands plaintiff’s
§ 1983 claim regarding the arrest on September 12, 2015 for “grand theft auto” to
encompass Baek’s interactions with Doiron at the dealership because Baek allegedly took
Doiron to the dealership under the guise that Doiron was under arrest, or could be placed
under arrest, for a felony. SAC ¶¶ 31, 33, 37, 40, 49–50.
2

During oral argument, plaintiff indicated that he may seek leave to amend the
complaint if discovery provides a basis for a § 1983 claim as against Choe based on the
September 21, 2015 arrest.   

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
Case No. 
Title 

CIVIL MINUTES – GENERAL
‘O’
8:17-cv-01584-CAS-JEMx
Date  December 3, 2018
CRAIG R. DOIRON V. CITY OF SANTA ANA ET AL.

In its previous Order, the Court found that plaintiff had not alleged that Choe
himself or Crevier, as opposed to Baek, engaged in any threatening, intimidating, or
coercive conduct towards Doiron. Order at 17. In the second amended complaint,
plaintiff alleges that Choe conspired with Baek to violate the California constitution.
SAC ¶ 76. The Court finds that the second amended complaint sufficiently states a claim
for violation of § 52.1 as against Choe and Crevier.
Accordingly, the Court DENIES defendants’ motion to dismiss plaintiffs’ § 52.1
claims as against Choe and Crevier.
ii.

Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress

To state a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress (“IIED”), a plaintiff
must plead: (1) extreme and outrageous conduct by the defendant with the intent of
causing, or reckless disregard of the probability of causing, emotional distress; (2) the
suffering of severe or extreme emotional distress by the plaintiff; and (3) actual and
proximate causation of that distress by the defendant’s outrageous conduct. Hughes v.
Pair, 46 Cal. 4th 1035, 1050 (2009). “Outrageous conduct” is so “extreme as to exceed
all bounds of that usually tolerated in a civilized community.” Id. at 1050–51.
Defendants contend that plaintiff has failed to plead facts to support a claim for
intentional infliction of emotional distress. MTD at 18–19. In its previous order, the
Court found that the issue of whether Choe engaged in extreme and outrageous conduct
was not a matter suited for determination on a motion to dismiss, but dismissed plaintiff’s
IIED claim with leave to amend because he failed to allege underlying facts supporting
the claim that he suffered severe emotional distress. Order at 19. In the second amended
complaint, plaintiff adds the allegation that, as a result of “being kidnapped and extorted
out of money by threat of further arrest and prosecution,” he was substantially physically,
mentally, and emotionally injured” and “incurred medical and psychological costs, bills
and expenses.” SAC ¶ 84, 88. The Court finds that the second amended complaint
sufficiently alleges a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress. Defendants’
concern regarding the severity—or lack thereof—of plaintiff’s emotional distress is better
resolved on a more developed factual record.
Accordingly, the Court DENIES defendants’ motion to dismiss plaintiffs’ IIED
claim as against Choe and Crevier.

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
Case No. 
Title 

CIVIL MINUTES – GENERAL
‘O’
8:17-cv-01584-CAS-JEMx
Date  December 3, 2018
CRAIG R. DOIRON V. CITY OF SANTA ANA ET AL.

iii.

Negligence

To state a negligence claim, a plaintiff must show “that the defendant owed the
plaintiff a legal duty, that the defendant breached that duty, and that the breach was a
proximate or legal cause of injuries suffered by the plaintiff.” Salinas v. Martin, 166 Cal.
App. 4th 404, 411 (2008).
The Court previously dismissed plaintiff’s negligence claim because plaintiff did
not explicitly allege what duty was owed to plaintiffs. Order at 20. In the second
amended complaint, plaintiff has only added an allegation that defendants “have a duty to
refrain from conspiring to kidnap [acquaintances] of their customers and extort them with
prosecution and further arrest if the individual does not pay the acquaintance’s bill.”
SAC ¶ 91. Plaintiff has not alleged a legally cognizable duty. Rather, plaintiff’s claim
for negligence again, for a third time, contains only a formulaic recitation of the elements
of a negligence claim. At oral argument, plaintiff’s counsel sought leave to amend to add
references to statutes criminalizing kidnapping and extortion to clarify the impropriety of
defendants’ course of conduct. The Court finds that the addition of these statutes would
not only fail to clarify exactly what duty defendants owed to plaintiff, but would defeat
plaintiff’s negligence claim because extortion and kidnapping are intentional acts.
Because plaintiff could not allege facts consistent with his prior pleadings that state a
claim for negligence against Choe and Crevier, dismissal shall be with prejudice.
Accordingly, the Court DISMISSES with prejudice plaintiff’s negligence claims as
against Choe and Crevier.
iv.

Vicarious Liability

Under the rule of respondeat superior, “an employer is vicariously liable for the
torts of its employees committed within the scope of the employment.” Lisa M v. Henry
Mayo Newhall Memorial Hospital, 12 Cal. 4th 291, 360 (1995). Under the traditional
rule, “an employee’s actions are within the scope of employment only if motivated, in
whole or part, by a desire to serve the employer’s interest.” Id. at 360. However,
California has departed from this limiting rule and instead courts look “to the
foreseeability of the employee’s conduct, whether it be authorized or unauthorized,
tortious or criminal, because the California rule ‘reflects the central justification for
respondeat superior [liability]: that losses fairly attributable to an enterprise—those which
foreseeably result from the conduct of the enterprise—should be allocated to the

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
Case No. 
Title 

CIVIL MINUTES – GENERAL
‘O’
8:17-cv-01584-CAS-JEMx
Date  December 3, 2018
CRAIG R. DOIRON V. CITY OF SANTA ANA ET AL.

enterprise as a cost of doing business.’” Xu Lu v. Powell, 621 F.3d 944, 948 (9th Cir.
2010) (quoting Farmers Ins. Group v. County of Santa Clara, 11 Cal. 4th 992 (1995)).
Defendants contend that plaintiff has not alleged sufficient facts with respect to the
vicarious liability of Crevier. MTD at 20. In the second amended complaint, plaintiff
alleges that Choe was “acting within the course and scope of [his] employment and for
the benefit of [Crevier.]” SAC ¶¶ 78, 87, 92. According to plaintiff, Choe and Baek
conspired “to falsely arrest Doiron and extort him with the threat of a criminal
prosecution if he did not pay Crevier for repairs made to Peterson’s vehicle.” Id. ¶ 27.
Based on these allegations, Choe’s alleged actions are fairly attributable to Crevier.
Thus, at this juncture, plaintiff’s allegations are sufficient with respect to Crevier’s
vicarious liability.
IV.

CONCLUSION

In accordance with the foregoing, the Court hereby DENIES defendants’ motion
to dismiss plaintiff’s claim for violation of § 1983 insofar as it is based on the September
12, 2015 arrest.
The Court DISMISSES without prejudice plaintiff’s claim for violation of §
1983 as against Choe insofar as it is based on the September 21, 2015 arrest.
The Court hereby DENIES defendants’ motion to dismiss plaintiff’s claim for
violation of § 52.1 as against Choe and Crevier.
The Court hereby DENIES defendants’ motion to dismiss plaintiff’s claim for
intentional infliction of emotional distress as against Choe and Crevier.
The Court DISMISSES with prejudice plaintiff’s claim for negligence as against
Choe and Crevier.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Initials of Preparer 

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                        CMJ 

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