James Sanchez v. YRC Inc. et al

Filing 25

MINUTES (IN CHAMBERS) ORDER by Judge Josephine L. Staton granting 18 MOTION to Remand Case to State Court. For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff's Motion to Remand is GRANTED. The Court declines to impose monetary sanctions. The Case is therefore remanded to Orange County Superior Court, Case No. 30-2018-00964494-CV-WT-CJC. (see document for details). MD JS-6. Case Terminated. (dro)

JS-6

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
CIVIL MINUTES – GENERAL
Case No.: 8:18-cv-00430-JLS-JDE
Title: James Sanchez v. YRC Inc., et al.

Date: May 09, 2018

Present: Honorable JOSEPHINE L. STATON, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Terry Guerrero
Deputy Clerk
ATTORNEYS PRESENT FOR PLAINTIFF:
Not Present

N/A
Court Reporter
ATTORNEYS PRESENT FOR DEFENDANT:
Not Present

PROCEEDINGS: (IN CHAMBERS) ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S
MOTION TO REMAND (Doc. 18)
Before the Court is a Motion to Remand filed by Plaintiff James Sanchez. (Mot.,
Doc. 18.) Defendants YRC Inc. and Dominic DeSantis opposed, (Opp., Doc. 20), and
Plaintiff replied, (Reply, Doc. 20). The Court finds this matter appropriate for decision
without oral argument. Fed. R. Civ. P. 78(b); C.D. Cal. R. 7-15. Accordingly, the
hearing set for May 11, 2018, at 2:30 p.m., is VACATED. For the following reasons, the
Motion to Remand is GRANTED.
I.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff James Sanchez, a citizen of California, worked as a driver for YRC for 22
years. (FAC ¶¶ 1, 13, Doc. 1-5.) He identifies as Hispanic and is of Mexican national
origin. (Id. ¶ 127.) Plaintiff was transferred to YRC’s Orange branch in or around 2008,
where his manager was Dominc DeSantis. (Id. 127(a)-(b).) Plaintiff alleges that he
experienced a hostile work environment based on his race and national origin while at the
Orange branch. In particular, DeSantis accused him of being a thief. (Id. ¶ 127(b).)
DeSantis also made “multiple racially insensitive remarks in Plaintiff’s presence,”
including a May 2015 comment that “Mexicans are only good for mowing lawns.” (Id. ¶
127(c).) Defendants also harassed Plaintiff by “routinely subject[ing] Plaintiff to biased
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____________________________________________________________________________
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
CIVIL MINUTES – GENERAL
Case No.: 8:18-cv-00430-JLS-JDE
Title: James Sanchez v. YRC Inc., et al.

Date: May 09, 2018

personnel management decisions,” such as writing him up or suspending him either for
false reasons or for conduct for which non-Hispanic or non-Mexican employees were not
disciplined. (Id. ¶ 127(d).) Plaintiff complained about the environment, including in
January 2016 and May 2016. (Id. ¶ 127(h)-(j).) After he made complaints, “Defendants
increased the intensity and aggressiveness with which they targeted Plaintiff for unjust
discipline.” (Id. ¶ 127(f).) Plaintiff also describes that he was discriminated against due
to a back injury, and that YRC failed to engage in the interactive process regarding his
disability. (See id. ¶¶ 1-125.)
On or about October 13, 2016, Plaintiff filed a complaint of harassment and
discrimination based on race and national origin, and retaliation, with the Department of
Fair Employment and Housing. (Id. ¶ 127(n).) He filed the instant suit in state court on
January 2, 2018. (Id. ¶ 127(p).) He amended his complaint on January 12, 2018,
including eleven causes of action. (See FAC.) All eleven causes of action were brought
against YRC; only two causes of action, those for harassment based on race and national
origin and intentional infliction of emotional distress, were also brought against DeSantis.
(Id.)
II.

LEGAL STANDARD

Generally, subject matter jurisdiction is based on the presence of a federal
question, see 28 U.S.C. § 1331, or complete diversity between the parties, see 28 U.S.C.
§ 1332. Thus, “[a] defendant may remove an action to federal court based on federal
question jurisdiction or diversity jurisdiction.” Hunter v. Philip Morris USA, 582 F.3d
1039, 1042 (9th Cir. 2009). “However, it is to be presumed that a cause lies outside [the]
limited jurisdiction of [the federal courts] and the burden of establishing the contrary
rests upon the party asserting jurisdiction.” Id. (quoting Abrego Abrego v. Dow Chem.
Co., 443 F.3d 676, 684 (9th Cir. 2006)). There is a “strong presumption” against removal
jurisdiction, and courts “strictly construe the removal statute against removal
jurisdiction.” Gaus v. Miles, Inc., 980 F.2d 564, 566 (9th Cir. 1992).
In establishing diversity jurisdiction, “one exception to the requirement for
complete diversity is where a non-diverse defendant has been fraudulently joined.”
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____________________________________________________________________________
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
CIVIL MINUTES – GENERAL
Case No.: 8:18-cv-00430-JLS-JDE
Title: James Sanchez v. YRC Inc., et al.

Date: May 09, 2018

Hunter, 582 F.3d at 1043 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). “In such a case,
the district court may ignore the presence of that defendant for the purpose of establishing
diversity.” Id. “There is a strong presumption against finding fraudulent joinder: ‘In the
Ninth Circuit, a non-diverse defendant is deemed to be fraudulently joined if, after all
disputed questions of fact and all ambiguities in the controlling state law are resolved in
plaintiff’s favor, the plaintiff could not possibly recover against the party whose joinder is
in question.’” Cervantes v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., No. 15-cv-178-JLS-DTBx, 2015
WL 2127215, at *3 (C.D. Cal. May 6, 2015) (emphasis in original) (citing Mireles v.
Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 845 F. Supp. 2d 1034, 1062 (C.D. Cal. 2012).
Only “if there is [no] possibility that a state court would find that the complaint
states a cause of action against any of the resident defendants,” Hunter, 582 F.3d at 1046
(citation omitted) (emphasis added), and “the failure is obvious according to the settled
rules of the state,” McCabe v. General Foods Corp., 811 F.2d 1336, 1339 (9th Cir. 2001),
may a district court retain jurisdiction. “In other words, the case must be remanded
‘unless the defendant shows that the plaintiff would not be afforded leave to amend his
complaint to cure the purported deficiency.’” Wilson-Condon v. Allstate Indemnity Co.,
No. 11-cv-05538-GAF (PJWx), 2011 WL 3439272, at *2 (quoting Padilla v. AT & T
Corp., 697 F. Supp. 2d 1156, 1159 (C.D. Cal. 2009)). “The defendant seeking removal to
the federal court is entitled to present the facts showing the joinder to be fraudulent.”
McCabe, 811 F.2d at 1339 (citation omitted). The “test for fraudulent joinder and failure
to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6) are not equivalent.” Grancare, LLC v. Thrower,
F.3d __, 2018 WL 1955039, at *3 (9th Cir. Apr. 26, 2018). The “district court must
consider . . . whether a deficiency in the complaint can possibly be cured by granting the
plaintiff leave to amend.” Id. at *4.

III.

DISCUSSION

On April 11, 2018, Plaintiff filed the instant Motion, arguing that complete
diversity between the parties is lacking because Plaintiff and DeSantis are both California
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____________________________________________________________________________
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
CIVIL MINUTES – GENERAL
Case No.: 8:18-cv-00430-JLS-JDE
Title: James Sanchez v. YRC Inc., et al.

Date: May 09, 2018

citizens. (Mem. at 1.) Defendants argue that DeSantis is a fraudulently joined “sham”
defendant whose citizenship should be disregarded for purposes of diversity. (Opp. at 8.)
Plaintiff brings two claims against DeSantis, one for harassment based on race and
national origin in violation of FEHA, and one for intentional infliction of emotional
distress. (See FAC ¶¶ 126–139, 230–242.) To establish a prima facie case for a
harassment under FEHA, a plaintiff “must show that he was subjected to unwelcome . . .
race- or . . . [national origin]-related ‘verbal or physical conduct that was sufficiently
severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of plaintiff’s employment and create an
abusive work environment.’” Hooker v. Parker-Hannifin Corp., No. SACV 11-483-JLS
(Ex), 2012 WL 1156437, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 3, 2012), aff'd, 585 F. App'x 386 (9th Cir.
2014) (quoting Stevens v. Cnty. of San Mateo, No. 06-15634, 267 Fed. Appx. 684, 685-86
(9th Cir. Feb. 22, 2008)).
Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s allegations against DeSantis fail for two reasons.
First, Defendants argue that DeSantis’ alleged conduct was not “sufficiently severe or
pervasive” to rise to the level of actionable harassment. (Opp. at 14.) Second, they argue
that DeSantis’ comment to Plaintiff that “Mexicans are only good for mowing lawns” is
outside of the statute of limitations. (Id.) Plaintiff argues that the continuing violations
doctrine applies, and that his complaint includes allegations of routine biased personnel
management decisions intended to harass Plaintiff that continued into the period covered
by the one-year statute of limitations. (Mem. at 16.) To determine if the doctrine applies,
courts consider whether an employer’s actions are “sufficiently similar in kind,” whether
“they occur with sufficient frequency,” and whether “they have not acquired a degree of
‘permanence’ so that employees are on notice that further efforts at informal conciliation
with the employer . . . would be futile.” Richard v. CH2M Hill, Inc., 26 Cal. 4th 798, 802
(2001). The Court concludes that Plaintiff has demonstrated at least a possibility that a
court would apply the continuing violations doctrine to allow consideration of DeSantis’
May 2015 comment. In particular, he alleges that as he “made complaints regarding the
race/national origin harassment, Defendants increased the intensity and aggressiveness
with which they targeted Plaintiff for unjust discipline.” (FAC ¶ 127(f)). He alleges that
these complaints occurred in January 2016 and May 2016, so harassment occurring after
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____________________________________________________________________________
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
CIVIL MINUTES – GENERAL
Case No.: 8:18-cv-00430-JLS-JDE
Title: James Sanchez v. YRC Inc., et al.

Date: May 09, 2018

these complaints falls within the statute of limitations. (Id. ¶¶ 127(h)-(J)). Defendants
highlight that Plaintiff does not specifically name DeSantis as a harasser in these
paragraphs, but this argument is unpersuasive because DeSantis is included in the
category of “defendants.” (Opp. at 15.)
Second, Defendants argue that allegations of DeSantis’s disparate discipline
cannot form part of a harassment claim. (Opp. at 16-17.) However, even “necessary”
managerial actions, when undertaken in a demeaning manner, may constitute harassment
under FEHA. See Roby v. McKesson Corp., 47 Cal. 4th 886, 706 n.10 (Cal. 2009), as
modified (Feb. 10, 2010) (discussing how official employment actions done in
furtherance of a supervisor’s managerial role may constitute harassment, and even
“necessary” actions may constitute harassment if they are undertaken in a demeaning
manner). Against the backdrop of DeSantis’ comment about Mexicans, the Court is not
persuaded that there is no possibility that Plaintiff could establish that these disciplinary
actions communicated a hostile message.
Finally, the Court expresses no opinion as to whether these allegations taken as a
whole are sufficient to rise to the level of actionable harassment. However, to the extent
that there is such a deficiency, Plaintiff could seek leave to amend to allege additional
facts that demonstrate the pervasiveness and severity of DeSantis’ conduct. See
Grancare, 2018 WL 1955039, at *3.
Accordingly, Defendants have failed to establish that “there is absolutely no
possibility that the plaintiff will be able to establish a cause of action against [DeSantis].”
Davis v. Prentiss Properties Ltd., Inc., 66 F. Supp. 2d 1112, 1113 (C.D. Cal. 1999)
(citation omitted). Because the Court concludes that there is a possibility Plaintiff can
establish a FEHA harassment claim against DeSantis, it does not reach the issue of the
intentional infliction of emotional distress claim.
IV.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff’s Motion to Remand is GRANTED. The
Court declines to impose monetary sanctions. The Case is therefore remanded to Orange
County Superior Court, Case No. 30-2018-00964494-CV-WT-CJC.
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