Donna May v. Walt Disney Parks and Resorts U.S., Inc. et al
Filing
21
MINUTES (IN CHAMBERS): ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO REMAND 10 by Judge David O. Carter. Given that the well-pleaded complaint rule bars removal to federal court, the Court hereby GRANTS Plaintiffs Motion to Remand. MD JS-6. Case Terminated. (lom)
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JS-6
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
CIVIL MINUTES – GENERAL
Case No. SA CV 21-00968-DOC-(JDEx)
Date: July 20, 2021
Title: DONNA MAY v. WALT DISNEY PARKS AND RESORTS U.S., INC., et al
PRESENT:
THE HONORABLE DAVID O. CARTER, JUDGE
Kelly Davis
Courtroom Clerk
Not Present
Court Reporter
ATTORNEYS PRESENT FOR
PLAINTIFF:
None Present
ATTORNEYS PRESENT FOR
DEFENDANT:
None Present
PROCEEDINGS (IN CHAMBERS): ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S
MOTION TO REMAND [10]
Before the Court is Plaintiff Donna May’s (“Plaintiff”) Motion to Remand
(“Motion” or “Mot.”) (Dkt. 10). The Court finds this matter appropriate for decision
without oral argument. Fed. R. Civ. P. 78; Local Rule 7-15. After reviewing the papers,
the Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s Motion.
I.
Background
A.
Facts
Plaintiff has been an employee in food and beverage locations at Walt Disney
Parks and Resorts’ U.S., Inc. (“WDPR” or “Defendants”) Disneyland Resort since 1989.
Complaint (“Compl”) (Submitted with Notice of Removal as Attachment 3) (Dkt. 1) ¶
11. Plaintiff’s exclusive bargaining representative with WDRP all times relevant to this
action was her union, Workers United Local 50 (the “Union”). Opp’n at 1. The Collective
Bargaining Agreement (“CBA”) between Defendant and the Union was the “Agreement
on Wage Scale and Working Conditions.” Id. at 2. This was the exclusive contract
governing the terms and conditions of Plaintiff’s employment with Defendant. Id.
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CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
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Plaintiff has a documented shellfish allergy disability that requires work
restrictions to avoid exposure. Compl. ¶¶ 12, 14. Plaintiff is currently an Assistant
Receiver. Id. ¶ 11. Prior to July 14, 2019, she was a Receiver and sometimes Lead
Receiver at a higher pay rate. Id. Plaintiff’s working conditions began changing in 2017
when she was moved to different locations and assigned different shifts due to her
shellfish allergy. Id. ¶¶ 16-17, 22. Between 2017 and 2019, Defendants denied several
requests by Plaintiff for cross-training to become a Lead Receiver at other Disneyland
Resort food and beverage locations that did not serve shellfish. Id. ¶¶ 18-21, 23-24, 3334. Plaintiff also complained to Defendants about her changing working conditions and
certain managers whom she alleges were discriminating against her. Id. ¶¶ 22, 27, 29, 30,
34. In October 2018, Defendants agreed to pay Plaintiff as a Lead Receiver when she was
working lower-paying shifts. Id. ¶ 32. However, in June 2019, Defendants gave Plaintiff
a choice between a conditional, reduced work schedule or a demotion to Assistant
Receiver at a lower pay rate. Id. ¶ 41. Plaintiff chose demotion, fearing the conditions of
her reduced work option would lead to termination. Id. Defendants denied Plaintiff’s
subsequent requests to be reclassified as a Receiver. Id. ¶¶ 43-45
Plaintiff filed an administrative complaint against Defendants with the California
Department of Fair Employment and Housing (“DFEH”) and received a right to sue letter
on May 14, 2020 and an amended right to sue letter on May 20, 2020. Id. ¶ 46. Plaintiff
then brought her suit in state court alleging disability-related violations of the Fair
Employment and Housing Act (“FEHA”) and the California Family Rights Act
(“CFRA”), all state law claims. See Mot. at 7. Plaintiff did not reference her Union or the
Collective Bargaining Agreement in her Complaint. See generally Compl. Defendants
deposed Plaintiff on April 28, 2021. Defendant’s Opposition (“Opp’n) (Dkt. 17) at 2.
Plaintiff’s testimony touched on her allegations related to job classification, shifts, work
locations, cross-training, and demotion and whether and how those topics are related to or
governed by rules in her Union’s Collective Bargaining Agreement (“CBA”). Id. at 2-3.
During her testimony, Plaintiff stated that “the company follows the rules of crosstraining and re-statusing … based off of our seniority.” Id. at 3. Following the deposition,
Defendants removed the case to federal court on the contention that all of Plaintiff’s
claims require interpretation of the CBA and are therefore preempted by Section 301 of
the federal Labor Management Relations Act (“LMRA”). Opp’n at 1.
Plaintiff is a resident of California. Compl. ¶ 2. Defendants do in business in the
County of Orange, State of California, and the alleged liability arises therein. Id. ¶ 1.
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
CIVIL MINUTES – GENERAL
Case No. SA CV 21-00968-DOC-JDE
B.
Date: July 20, 2021
Page 3
Procedural History
On May 29, 2020, Plaintiff filed a civil action against Defendants in the Superior
Court of California, County of Orange. Notice of Removal (Dkt. 1). Defendants removed
the case to this Court on May 28, 2021. See generally id. On June 14, 2021, Plaintiff
moved to remand Defendants’ removal back to state court. Mot. at 1. On July 2, 2021,
Defendants opposed Plaintiff’s motion to remand. See generally Opp’n. On July 12,
2021, Plaintiff replied to Defendants’ opposition. Reply (Dkt. 19).
II.
Legal Standard
“If at any time before final judgment it appears that the district court lacks subject
matter jurisdiction, the case shall be remanded.” 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c). Removal of a case
from state court to federal court is governed by 28 U.S.C. § 1441, which provides in
pertinent part that “any civil action brought in a State court of which the district courts of
the United States have original jurisdiction, may be removed . . . to the district court of
the United States for the district and division embracing the place where such action is
pending.” 28 U.S.C. § 1441. “As a general rule, absent diversity jurisdiction, a case will
not be removable if the complaint does not affirmatively allege a federal claim.”
Beneficial Nat’l Bank v. Anderson, 539 U.S. 1, 6 (2003).
A federal court has diversity jurisdiction if: (1) the controversy is between
“citizens of different States,” and (2) the amount in controversy exceeds the sum or value
of $75,000. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a). Diversity jurisdiction requires complete diversity,
meaning that no plaintiff can be from the same state as a defendant. Abrego Abrego v.
The Dow Chem. Co., 443 F.3d 676, 679 (9th Cir. 2006). Thus, a case ordinarily cannot be
removed to the federal court if a plaintiff and a defendant are citizens of the same state.
See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a).
Congress has authorized the federal district courts to exercise original subject
matter jurisdiction in “all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of
the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 1331. This provision is usually invoked when plaintiffs
plead a cause of action created by federal law. Grable & Sons Metal Products, Inc. v.
Darue Engineering & Manufacturing, 545 U.S. 308, 312 (2005). However, there is a
“special” and “small” category of cases in which federal-question jurisdiction will lie
over state-law claims that implicate significant federal issues. See id. A state-law claim
“arises under” federal law only if it “necessarily raise[s] a stated federal issue, actually
disputed and substantial, which a federal forum may entertain without disturbing any
congressionally approved balance of federal and state judicial responsibilities.” Id. at 314.
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CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
CIVIL MINUTES – GENERAL
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Date: July 20, 2021
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In other words, “federal jurisdiction over a state law claim will lie if a federal issue is: (1)
necessarily raised, (2) actually disputed, (3) substantial, and (4) capable of resolution in
federal court without disrupting the federal-state balance approved by Congress.” Gunn v.
Minton, 568 U.S. 251, 258 (2013).
A federal court may order remand for lack of subject matter jurisdiction or any
defect in the removal procedure. 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c).
III.
Discussion
Plaintiff moves to remand to state court on the grounds that her FEHA and CFRA
claims arise exclusively under California state law. See Mot. at 7. She argues that the
well-pleaded complaint rule prevents removal to federal court because she did not allege
federal claims in her complaint. Mot at 11-12. Defendants contend that Plaintiff’s
allegations and the conditions of employment she seeks are governed exclusively by the
CBA. Opp’n at 1. As a result, Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s causes of action will
require interpretation of the CBA and are thus preempted by Section 301 of the federal
Labor Management Relations Act (“LMRA”). Id. Defendants further argue that the
complete preemption doctrine applies as an exception to the well-pleaded complaint rule.
Opp’n at 6. Plaintiff maintains that the violations she alleges do not require interpretation
of the CBA, and that the CBA at issue is merely a possible defense of Defendant’s. Mot.
at. 7.
In determining whether a federal district court has “arising under” original
jurisdiction over a claim, we must keep in mind “the basic principle marking the
boundaries of the federal question jurisdiction of the federal district courts”: the wellpleaded complaint rule. California Shock Trauma Air Rescue v. State Compen. Ins. Fund,
636 F.3d 538, 541 (9th Cir. 2011). “Under the well-pleaded complaint rule, the Court
must determine whether “a right or immunity created by the Constitution or laws of the
United States must be an element, and an essential one, of the plaintiff’s cause of action.”
Id. Under the well-pleaded complaint rule, “federal jurisdiction exists only when a federal
question is presented on the face of the plaintiff's properly pleaded complaint.”
Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392 (1987).
However, the “complete pre-emption doctrine” is an exception to the well-pleaded
complaint rule. Id. at 392-93. The U.S. Supreme Court has identified two specific types
of state law claims which are completely preempted by Section 301 of the LMRA even
when not plainly stated in a Plaintiff’s complaint: 1) those that are “founded directly on
rights created by collective-bargaining agreements” and 2) those that are “substantially
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
CIVIL MINUTES – GENERAL
Case No. SA CV 21-00968-DOC-JDE
Date: July 20, 2021
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dependent on analysis of a collective-bargaining agreement.” Id. at 394. Nonetheless, the
mere need to reference the terms of the CBA or the possibility that it will be relevant in
resolving a state law claim is not sufficient to preempt a state law claim. Humble v.
Boeing, 305 F.3d 1004, 1007, 1011 (9th Cir. 2002). Moreover, “defensive reliance on the
terms of the CBA … will not suffice.” Id. at 1011.
Here, Plaintiff’s complaint does not present an essential question of federal law.
Defendant does not, and indeed cannot, dispute that Plaintiff did not plead any federal
causes of action. See generally Compl.; Removal Notice; Opp’n. As Plaintiff
acknowledges, allegations of state law violations requiring substantial interpretation of a
CBA would be preempted by the federal LMRA. Mot. at 12-14. However, Defendant
fails to show that substantial interpretation of the CBA is required. For example, as in
Humble, where the Ninth Circuit rejected arguments that CBA seniority provisions would
require interpretation to determine reasonable disability accommodations provided by
state law, here, referencing the seniority provisions of Plaintiff’s CBA does not require
interpretation to determine the merits of her disability-based state law claims. See Opp’n
at 6-7; Humble, 305 F.3d at 1011. Further, unlike Sullivan, a case on which Defendant
relies, our Plaintiff here does not claim any deprivation of due process or other direct
violation under the CBA. See Opp’n at 5; Sullivan v. Aramark Unif. & Career Apparel,
Inc., No. C11-02973 HRL, 2011 WL 3360006, at *4-6 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 3, 2011); see
generally Compl. Additionally, Defendant’s contention that the CBA requires
interpretation because it allowed Defendant “discretion” or “options” regarding certain
actions with Plaintiff is unlike McGowen, where the Plaintiff’s complaint inhered
questions of whether the employer defendant violated the CBA. See Opp’n at 2;
McGowan v. Nestle Food Co., No. 1:06CV01212AWIDLB, 2007 WL 173768, at *5
(E.D. Cal. 2007). Rather, the Court agrees with Plaintiff that she alleged Defendant
violated her free-standing, state statutory FEHA and CFRA rights because of her
disability. See Mot. at 16. Again, mere consultation of the CBA, speculation of its
relevance, or affirmative defenses relying on it do not suffice to pre-empt state-law
claims. Humble, 305 F.3d at 1011.
Accordingly, this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to hear the case.
IV.
Costs and Fees
Following remand of a case upon unsuccessful removal, the district court may, in
its discretion, award attorney’s fees “incurred as a result of the removal.” 28 U.S.C. §
1447(c). “Absent unusual circumstances, courts may award attorney’s fees under §
1447(c) only where the removing party lacked an objectively reasonable basis for seeking
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CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
CIVIL MINUTES – GENERAL
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Date: July 20, 2021
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removal. Conversely, when an objectively reasonable basis exists, fees should be
denied.” Martin v. Franklin Capital Corp., 546 U.S. 132, 141 (2005). Despite our
ultimate holding, Defendant appears to have objectively reasonable bases for contending
that Plaintiff’s claims were “substantially dependent” on the CBA; the distinction
between “interpretation” and “consultation” or “reference” to the CBA is not exacting.
While the Court is bound by the well-pleaded complaint rule and must remand, the Court
declines to award attorney’s fees in this instance.
V.
Disposition
Given that the well-pleaded complaint rule bars removal to federal court, the Court
hereby GRANTS Plaintiff’s Motion to Remand.
The Clerk shall serve this minute order on the parties.
MINUTES FORM 11
CIVIL-GEN
Initials of Deputy Clerk: kd
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