In Re Debtor Alan Dale Dickinson

Filing 26

ORDER DENYING APPELLANT'S APPEAL FROM BANKRUPTCY COURT's 4/22/22 ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO STRIKE by Judge Sherilyn Peace Garnett. The decision of the Bankruptcy Court is AFFIRMED. (iv)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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ALAN DALE DICKINSON

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Cross-Plaintiff/Appellant,

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v.

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GOLDEN RAIN FOUNDATION OF
LAGUNA WOODS

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Case No. 8:22-cv-01452-SPG
ORDER DENYING APPELLANT’S
APPEAL FROM BANKRUPTCY
COURT’s 4/22/22 ORDER GRANTING
MOTION TO STRIKE

Cross-Defendant/Appellee.

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This matter is on appeal from the United States Bankruptcy Courts for the Central

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District of California.

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Bankruptcy Court’s order dated April 22, 2022 (the “April 2022 Order”), granting Golden

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Rain Foundation of Laguna Wood’s (“Appellee”) motion to strike Appellant’s first

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amended complaint. (ECF No. 14 (“App.”)).1 After reading and considering the papers

Appellant Alan Dale Dickinson (“Appellant”) appeals the

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The notice of appeal in the present case states that Appellant is appealing from the order
of the Bankruptcy Court dated April 22, 2022. (ECF No. 1 at 2). Appellant has filed a
separate appeal from the Bankruptcy Court’s July 21, 2022, order awarding attorney’s fees
and costs to Appellee and its attorneys. See In re Alan Dale Dickinson, Case No. 8:22-cv01397-SPG, ECF No. 1 at 3. Thus, although Appellant makes some arguments regarding
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filed in connection with this appeal, and for the reasons discussed below, the Court

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AFFIRMS the Bankruptcy Court’s April 2022 Order.

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I.

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BACKGROUND
A.

Factual Background

The following facts are taken from the record in the United States Bankruptcy Court
proceedings, as found in the filed appendices of the parties:

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On February 25, 2021, Appellant filed in the United States Bankruptcy Court for

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the Central District of California a voluntary petition under chapter 13 of the United States

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Bankruptcy Code, which was converted on May 14, 2021, to a petition under chapter 7 of

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the Code. (ECF No. 19 at 268). Golden Rain Foundation of Laguna Woods (“Appellee”)

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filed a complaint against Appellant seeking a determination of nondischargeability under

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Title 11, United States Code, Section 523(a)(6) on June 18, 2021. (Id.). On July 1, 2021,

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Appellee amended its complaint to include a claim for objection of discharge under Section

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727(a)(4)(A). (Id.). Appellant filed an answer to the amended complaint and a cross-

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complaint, which was later amended on August 25, 2021. (Id. at 4-21, 268). The cross-

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complaint contained claims for relief for elder abuse, defamation, libel, slander, intentional

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infliction of emotional distress, intentional infliction of physical distress, negligence

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infliction of emotional distress, negligent infliction of physical distress, and willful and

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malicious injury. (Id.). On September 30, 2021, Appellee filed a motion to strike the cross-

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complaint pursuant to California’s anti-strategic lawsuit against public participation

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statute, Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 425.16 (“anti-SLAPP”). (Id. at 25-44, 268).

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On April 22, 2022, the Bankruptcy Court granted Appellee’s motion to strike

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Appellant’s cross-complaint (the “April 2022 Order”). (Id. at 268). In doing so, the

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Bankruptcy Court explained that “[t]here is long-standing authority in the Ninth Circuit for

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the application of California’s anti-SLAPP law in federal court so long as the claims are

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the July 21, 2022, order in his briefs filed in the present appeal, the Court declines to
address those arguments here and, instead, will address them in the related appeal.

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pendant state law claims and do not involve federal claims for relief.” (Id. at 270 (citing

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United States ex rel Newsham v. Lockheeed Missiles & Space, 190 F.3d 963 (9th Cir.

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1999); Planned Parenthood Fed. of Am., Inc. v. Ctr. for Med. Progress, 890 F.3d 828 (9th

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Cir. 2018), amended by 897 F.3d 1224 (9th Cir. 2018); Restaino v. Bah (In re Bah), 321

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B.R. 41, 46 (9th Cir. BAP 2005)). The Bankruptcy Court then concluded that, because

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Appellant’s cross-complaint explicitly stated that all of his claims for relief arose out of

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California law, the claims were subject to California’s anti-SLAPP statute. (Id. at 270-71).

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The Bankruptcy Court also found that Appellee had satisfied its burden of proof that the

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cross-complaint involved protected activity under California’s anti-SLAPP statute. (Id. at

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271-76). Additionally, the Bankruptcy Court concluded that Appellant had not met his

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burden of establishing a reasonable probability of success on the merits of his claim

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because Appellant failed to provide a sufficient legal or factual basis for any of his nine

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claims. (Id. at 276-84).

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Thereafter, Appellee moved the Bankruptcy Court for an order awarding attorneys’

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fees and costs pursuant to California Code of Civil Procedure Section 425.16(c). (Id. at

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289). In the motion, Appellee asserted that Appellant had “engaged in a pattern of bad

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faith, frivolous, meritless litigation against [Appellee], its volunteers, board members,

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employees, and attorneys. This has resulted in a total of zero dollars paid to [Appellant],

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or awarded to him by a court, a total of zero lawsuits wherein [Appellant’s] cases have not

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been dismissed, either after a bench trial or well before, and a total of 8 judicial officers, in

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this court and throughout the California state system, who have been forced to waste

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countless hours of their precious time, dealing with [Appellant] and his meritless lawsuits.”

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(Id. at 291). Appellee also argued that, as the prevailing party under California Code of

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Civil Procedure Section 425.16(c), the Court was obligated to award attorney’s fees and

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costs to Appellee. (Id. at 292-93). Appellee explained that its counsel’s senior partner

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billed a total of 26.6 hours working on the matter, “which were reasonable and necessary

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to the work defending against [Appellant’s] cross-complaint,” at a billing rate of $400 per

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hour, totaling $10,640.00 in legal fees. See (id. at 294-95). Appellee also explained that

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one of counsel’s associate attorneys spent a total of 65.8 hours working on the matter,

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“which were reasonabl[e] and necessary to the work defending against [Appellant’s] cross-

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complaint,” at a billing rate of $400 per hour, totaling $26,320.00. (Id.). Further, Appellee

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explained that it anticipated it would spend an additional three hours reviewing Appellant’s

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opposition, three hours preparing the Reply to Appellant’s opposition, and two hours to

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appear at the hearing on the motion and to review the court’s ruling, for a total of eight

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hours at a billing rate of $400.00, totaling $3,200. (Id.). Thus, Appellee requested

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$40,160.00 in attorneys’ fees from the Bankruptcy Court. (Id.). For these propositions,

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Appellee attached declarations for each of the attorneys who worked on the matter, along

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with records of their billable hours. See (id. at 299-332). Appellee also urged the court to

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compare its rates to the Laffey Matrix, which Appellee described as being “based on

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attorney rates in metropolitan Washington D.C. and Baltimore” because of “similarities in

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population, density, and competition among a large number of law firms” in Southern

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California.

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$59,409.76 in fees and costs. See (id. at 395-96).

(Id. at 295).

Appellee’s counsel also filed similar motions, requesting

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On July 21, 2022, the Bankruptcy Court granted both motions in full. (Id.). In

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doing so, the Court awarded Appellee $40,160 in fees, and Appellee’s attorneys $58,555

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in fees and $854 in costs, totaling $59,409.76. See (id.).

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B.

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On August 5, 2022, Appellant filed an appeal of the Bankruptcy Court’s April 2022

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Order in this Court. (ECF No. 1). In his opening brief, filed on September 6, 2022,

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Appellant primarily argues that the Bankruptcy Court improperly sustained the Appellee’s

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anti-SLAPP motion because California’s anti-SLAPP statute is inapplicable to the

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Bankruptcy Court. See (ECF No. 14 at 11). On November 16, 2022, Appellee filed its

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reply brief. (ECF No. 18). On August 18, 2022, Appellant filed his own reply brief. (ECF

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No. 20).

Procedural History

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II.

LEGAL STANDARD

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“Findings of fact of the bankruptcy court are reviewed for clear error, and

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conclusions of law are reviewed de novo. Mixed questions of law and fact are reviewed

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de novo.” Harkey v. Grobstein (In re Point Ctr. Fin., Inc.), 957 F.3d 990, 995 (9th Cir.

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2020) (citations omitted).

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considerable deference and are only clearly erroneous if [the reviewing court is] left with

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a definite and firm conviction a mistake has been committed.” Nichols v. Marana

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Stockyard & Livestock Mkt., Inc. (In re Nichols), 618 B.R. 1, 5 (9th Cir. B.A.P. 2020). This

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Court may affirm a decision on any basis supported by the record. Id.

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III.

The bankruptcy court’s “findings of fact are accorded

DISCUSSION

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Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure 8002 requires a party to file a notice of

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appeal with the clerk within fourteen (14) “days of the date of the entry of the judgment,

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order, or decree appealed from.” Fed. R. Bankr. P. 8002(a); see also Fed. R. Bankr. P.

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9021 (“A judgment or order is effective when entered under Rule 5003.”). “The provisions

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of Bankruptcy Rule 8002 are jurisdictional; the untimely filing of a notice of appeal

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deprives the appellate court of jurisdiction to review the bankruptcy court’s order.” In re

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Mouradick, 13 F.3d 326, 327 (9th Cir. 1994). “A request to extend the time for filing a

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notice of appeal must be made by written motion filed before the time for filing a notice of

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appeal has expired, except that such a motion filed not later than 20 days after the expiration

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of the time for filing a notice of appeal may be granted upon a showing of excusable

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neglect.” Fed. R. Bankr. P. 8002(c)(2).

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As previously discussed, the Bankruptcy Court granted Appellee’s motion to strike

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on April 22, 2022. Thus, Appellant had until approximately May 6, 2022, to file a notice

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of appeal challenging this determination. However, Appellant’s notice of appeal was filed

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and entered on August 5, 2022. (ECF No. 1). Thus, Appellant’s appeal of the April 2022

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Order is untimely.

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In its appeal, Appellant seemingly argues that his status as a pro se party, alone,

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justifies allowing the appeal notwithstanding its untimeliness. See (App. at 15). However,

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