Ceberiana Pastrana v. Nissan North America, Inc. et al

Filing 21

MINUTES (IN CHAMBERS) ORDER DENYING Plaintiff's Motion to Remand 11 by Judge Fred W. Slaughter: The court finds that the thirty-day removal clock properly started on 3/1/2024, when Defendant, through investigation, determined the amount in controversy could be satisfied. For the reasons set forth above, Plaintiff's Motion is DENIED. (jp)

__________________________________________________________________
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
CIVIL MINUTES – GENERAL
Case No. 8:24-cv-00515-FWS-ADS
Title: Ceberiana Pastrana v. Nissan North America, Inc.

Date: June 3, 2024

Present: HONORABLE FRED W. SLAUGHTER, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Melissa H. Kunig
Deputy Clerk
Attorneys Present for Plaintiff:
Not Present

N/A
Court Reporter
Attorneys Present for Defendant:
Not Present

PROCEEDINGS: (IN CHAMBERS) ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION
TO REMAND [11]
Before the court is Plaintiff Ceberiana Pastrana’s (“Plaintiff”) Motion to Remand (the
“Motion” or “Mot.”) (Dkt. 11). Defendant Nissan North America, Inc. filed an Opposition
(“Opp.”) on May 2, 2024. (Dkt. 15.) Plaintiff filed a Reply (“Reply”) on May 8, 2024. (Dkt.
16.) The court took this matter under submission on May 22, 2024. (Dkt. 20.) Based on the
state of the record, as applied to the applicable law, the court DENIES the Motion.
I.

Background

On March 27, 2022, Plaintiff purchased a 2021 Nissan Altima, having Vehicle
Identification Number (“VIN”) 1N4BL4CV8MN401499 (“Vehicle”). Plaintiff alleges that the
Vehicle was delivered to them with serious defects and nonconformities to warranty and
subsequently developed other serious defects and nonconformities to warranty including, but
not limited to, suspension, steering, and transmission system defects. Due to these defects,
Plaintiff alleges that Defendant breached the written, express, and implied warranties. (See Dkt.
1-1, ¶¶ 9-12,17, 18, 32-38, 45.)
As a result, Plaintiff filed this action in Orange County Superior Court on March 30,
2023. (Dkt. 1-1, (“Complaint” or “Compl.”).) In the Complaint, Plaintiff alleges three claims
related to the Vehicle’s defects which include three violations of the Song-Beverly Consumer
1

__________________________________________________________________
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
CIVIL MINUTES – GENERAL
Case No. 8:24-cv-00515-FWS-ADS
Title: Ceberiana Pastrana v. Nissan North America, Inc.

Date: June 3, 2024

Warranty Act, Cal. Civ. Code §§ 1790 et seq. (“Song Beverly Act”) for breach of express and
implied warranty and violation of Cal. Civ. Code §1793.2(b). (Id.)
On March 11, 2024, Defendant removed to federal court based on diversity jurisdiction
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332. (Dkt. 1, (“Notice of Removal”).) In the Notice of Removal,
Defendant alleges that removal was timely and proper because they first became aware of the
amount in controversy, as asserted by the Plaintiff, rendering the action removable on March 1,
2024. Id. Defendant also alleges that Plaintiff is a citizen of California, Defendant is a citizen
of Delaware and Tennessee, and the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000. (See id. at 4-5.)
On April 10, 2024, Plaintiff filed the Motion to remand this action to state court, alleging
Notice of Removal was untimely filed and thus procedurally defective. (Mot. at 6.)
II.

Legal Standard

Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction with subject matter jurisdiction over only
those suits authorized by the Constitution or Congress. Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co.,
511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994). When a suit originates in state court, a defendant may remove to
federal court only when the suit could have been filed in federal court originally. 28 U.S.C.
§ 1441(a). “In civil cases, subject matter jurisdiction is generally conferred upon federal district
courts either through diversity jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. § 1332, or federal question jurisdiction,
28 U.S.C. § 1331.” Peralta v. Hisp. Bus., Inc., 419 F.3d 1064, 1069 (9th Cir. 2005). Diversity
jurisdiction requires both complete diversity between the parties and an amount in controversy
greater than $75,000. See Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 267, 267 (1806); 28 U.S.C.
§ 1332(a); Matheson v. Progressive Specialty Ins. Co., 319 F.3d 1089, 1090 (9th Cir. 2003)
(“Jurisdiction founded on 28 U.S.C. § 1332 requires that the parties be in complete diversity
and the amount in controversy exceed $75,000.”).
“If at any time before final judgment it appears that the district court lacks subject matter
jurisdiction, the case shall be remanded.” 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c). “Removal statutes are ‘strictly
construed, and any doubt about the right of removal requires resolution in favor of remand.’”
Casola v. Dexcom, Inc., 98 F.4th 947, 954 (9th Cir. 2024) (quoting Moore-Thomas v. Alaska
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__________________________________________________________________
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
CIVIL MINUTES – GENERAL
Case No. 8:24-cv-00515-FWS-ADS
Title: Ceberiana Pastrana v. Nissan North America, Inc.

Date: June 3, 2024

Airlines, Inc., 553 F.3d 1241, 1244 (9th Cir. 2009)). “A defendant seeking removal has the
burden of establishing that removal is proper.” Luther v. Countrywide Home Loans Servicing
LP, 533 F.3d 1031, 1034 (9th Cir. 2008). A defendant’s notice of removal must contain “a
short and plain statement of the grounds for removal.” 28 U.S.C. § 1446(a). Because
Ҥ 1446(a) tracks the general pleading requirement stated in Rule 8(a) of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure,” the defendant’s “statement ‘short and plain’ need not contain evidentiary
submissions.” Dart Cherokee Basin Operating Co., LLC v. Owens, 574 U.S. 81, 84, 87 (2014).
“The mechanics and requirements for removal are governed by 28 U.S.C. § 1446.”
Kuxhausen v. BMW Fin. Servs. NA LLC, 707 F.3d 1136, 1139 (9th Cir. 2013). “Section
1446(b) identifies two thirty-day periods for removing a case.” Id. “The first thirty-day
removal period is triggered if the case stated by the initial pleading is removable on its face.”
Id. The Ninth Circuit has held that for the first thirty-day removal period to apply, “the ground
for removal must be revealed affirmatively in the initial pleading.” Id. If the ground for
removal does not appear from the face of the initial pleading, the second thirty-day removal
period is triggered when “the defendant receives a copy of an amended pleading, motion, order
or other paper from which removability may first be ascertained.” Id.
III.

Discussion
A. Motion to Remand

In the Motion, Plaintiff argues that the case should be remanded to Orange County Superior
Court because the Notice of Removal was filed more than thirty days after service of the
summons and complaint, thus rendering their motion procedurally defective. (See Mot. at 6-7).
In opposition, Defendant contends that service of the summons and complaint did not trigger
the first thirty-day removal period identified in § 1446(b) because the ground for removal,
diversity jurisdiction, does not appear on the face on the Complaint. Specifically, Defendant
argues that the Complaint does not allege facts showing that the amount in controversy exceeds
$75,000. (Opp. at 1.) Defendant argues that the second thirty-day removal period identified in
§ 1446(b) was triggered when Defendant was able to determine the amount in controversy
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__________________________________________________________________
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
CIVIL MINUTES – GENERAL
Case No. 8:24-cv-00515-FWS-ADS
Title: Ceberiana Pastrana v. Nissan North America, Inc.

Date: June 3, 2024

through an investigation which concluded on March 1, 2024. (Id. at 2.) The Notice of Removal
was filed after on March 11, 2024. (Id. at 11.)
The court finds that service of the summons and complaint did not trigger the first thirty-day
removal period, because the Complaint does not allege facts demonstrating that the amount in
controversy exceeds $75,000. (See Dkt. 1-1.) The Complaint seeks damages, including with
regard to the recission of the vehicle sales contract and restitution of all monies expended,
diminution in value, a civil penalty in the amount of twice actual damages and reasonable
attorneys’ fees. (See generally Compl.) However, the Complaint does not list a dollar amount
corresponding to the damages. For example, the Complaint does not allege the sale price of the
Vehicle or any other specific measure of damages, nor does it allege the amount of attorneys’
fees and costs incurred. Without information sufficiently providing an amount in controversy,
the presence of diversity jurisdiction is not “revealed affirmatively in the initial pleading” as
necessary to trigger the first thirty-day removal period. Kuxhausen, 707 F.3d at 1139.
In the Reply,1 Plaintiff argues that given Defendant’s sophistication and knowledge of the
motor vehicle industry, Defendant had the ability to ascertain an approximation of the Vehicle’s
1

The court notes that Plaintiff raises two additional arguments not contained in the Motion as
addressed in this and the following paragraph of this Order. But, “[D]istrict court[s] need not
consider arguments raised for the first time in a reply brief.” Zamani v. Carnes, 491 F.3d 990,
997 (9th Cir. 2007) (citation omitted); see also FT Travel--New York, LLC v. Your Travel Ctr.,
Inc., 112 F. Supp. 3d 1063, 1079 (C.D. Cal. 2015) (“Courts decline to consider arguments that
are raised for the first time in reply.”) (collecting cases). However, the court, in its discretion,
considers these arguments, in this and the following paragraph of this Order. In addition,
Plaintiff’s counsel raised an additional argument at the hearing on the motion, (Dkt. 20), stating,
in summary, that an earlier state superior court case management statement (“Purported CMC
Statement”) provided a basis for removal, thus, making Defendant’s Notice of Removal
untimely. However, Plaintiff’s counsel never supplied the Purported CMC Statement in any
pleading related to litigating the Motion, and did not present the document in a timely manner.
Moreover, the court finds counsel for the Plaintiff’s statements on the record regarding the
Purported CMC Statement does not provide a sufficient basis to support Plaintiff’s argument.
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__________________________________________________________________
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
CIVIL MINUTES – GENERAL
Case No. 8:24-cv-00515-FWS-ADS
Title: Ceberiana Pastrana v. Nissan North America, Inc.

Date: June 3, 2024

market value based on the make, model, year and VIN alleged in the complaint. See Reply at 6.
But removability is not determined “through subjective knowledge” but rather through an
“objective analysis of the pleadings,” Harris v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 425 F.3d 689 at 694,
697 and it was “not clear from the four corners of the Complaint that the amount in controversy
is met.” Cuevas v. Ford Motor Co., 2022 WL 1487178, at *2 (C.D. Cal. May 11, 2022)
(denying motion to remand Song-Beverly case regarding allegedly defective leased car based
on related timeliness issue); Holdings v. Ford Motor Co., 2022 WL 2235815, at *2 (C.D. Cal.
Feb. 22, 2022) (denying motion to remand and rejecting “argument that Defendant was given
notice by the case caption page indicating that damages exceeded $25,000” because
“[D]efendants need not make extrapolations or engage in guesswork” to determine the basis for
removability”) (quoting Durham v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 445 F.3d 1247, 1251 (9th Cir.
2006)).
Based on the record, the court finds that the thirty-day removal clock properly started on
March 1, 2024, when Defendant, through investigation, determined the amount in controversy
could be satisfied. Because the cost of the vehicle was discovered to be $53,627.00 and
Plaintiff could be entitled to twice that amount in civil penalties ($107,254.00) (See Notice of
Removal at 7), it became plausible that the amount in controversy could exceed the $75,000
threshold. The court notes that Defendant then filed a notice of removal ten days after obtaining
this information. (See Opp at 1.) Therefore, the court concludes removal was timely under
Section 1446(b)(3).
IV.

Disposition

For the reasons set forth above, Plaintiff’s Motion is DENIED.
Initials of Deputy Clerk: mku
See DNA Genotek Inc. v. Spectrum Solutions L.L.C., 671 F. Supp. 3d 1105, 1134 (S.D. Cal.
2023) (quoting Icon Health & Fitness, Inc. v. Strava, Inc., 849 F.3d 1034, 1043 (Fed. Cir.
2017)) (“Attorney argument is not evidence.”).
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