McMaster v. Yates, et al

Filing 61

ORDER signed by District Judge Frank R. Zapata on 9/23/2010 granting in part and denying in part 51 Motion to Dismiss and denying 56 Motion for Protective Order as moot.. (Lundstrom, T)

(PC) McMaster v. Yates, et al

Doc. 61

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I N THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT F O R THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA Dana McMaster, Plaintiff, ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) N o . CV 1-04-6453-FRZ ORDER

D o c to r Thomas, et al., Defendants.

Pending before the Court is Defendants' motion to dismiss pertaining to Plaintiff's Se c o n d Amended Complaint ("Complaint"). See Doc. 19. In essence, Plaintiff's Complaint a lle ge s that he fractured his ankle while incarcerated, that prison medical officials knew he fra c tu re d his ankle, but failed to properly treat his fractured ankle (i.e., by denying pain m e d ic a tio n and proper treatment) causing him unnecessary and extreme pain for an extended p e rio d of time. d e n ie d in part. S ta nda r d of Review: Failure to State a Claim T h e dispositive issue raised by a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim is w h e th e r the facts as pleaded, if established, support a valid claim for relief. See Neitzke v . Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 328-329 (1989). In reviewing a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, a court's review is typically limited to the contents of the complaint. See C le g g v. Cult Awareness Network, 18 F.3d 752, 754 (9th Cir. 1994). Furthermore, a c o u rt must "construe the complaint . . . in the light most favorable to the non-moving p a rty , and [a court must] take the allegations and reasonable inferences as true." Walter v . Drayson, 538 F.3d 1244, 1247 (9th Cir. 2008); Morales v. City of Los Angeles, 214 F .3 d 1151, 1153 (9th Cir. 2000)(in reviewing a motion to dismiss for failure to state a c la im , "we accept all factual allegations of the complaint as true and draw all reasonable in fe re n c e s in favor of the non-moving party."); Clegg, 18 F.3d at 754 (same); see also For the reasons stated below, the motion to dismiss is granted in part and

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B e ll Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 1964-65 (2007)("While a complaint attacked b y a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss does not need detailed factual allegations, a p la in tiff's obligation to provide the grounds of his entitlement to relief requires more than la b e ls and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will n o t do . . . Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the s p e c u la tive level . . . on the assumption that all allegations in the complaint are true (even if doubtful in fact) . . . of course, a . . . complaint may proceed even if it strikes a savvy ju d ge that actual proof of those facts is improbable, and that a recovery is very remote a n d unlikely." )(internal quotes and citations omitted); Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1 9 4 9 (2009)(while Rule 8 does not demand detailed factual allegations, "it demands more th a n an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation . . . Threadbare re c ita ls of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do n o t suffice."). "[S]pecific facts are not necessary; the statement [in the Complaint] need o n ly give the defendant fair notice of what . . . the claim is and the grounds upon which it re s ts . " Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007) (internal quotation omitted). Courts m u s t "continue to construe pro se filings liberally," especially where the plaintiff is a pro s e prisoner in a civil rights action. Hebbe v. Pliler, 611 F.3d 1202, 1205 (9th Cir. 2010). D is c us s ion: Failure to State a Claim D e fe n d a n ts ' motion to dismiss seeks dismissal, in part, on the ground that P la in tiff's Complaint fails to state a claim. However, Defendant also seeks dismissal of th e majority of Plaintiff's claims on the ground that he failed to exhaust them; the Court w ill address the exhaustion issue in more detail later in this Order. The Court will only a d d re s s the merits of Plaintiff's claims that have been exhausted. As the record reflects, a n d Defendants concede, the only claims that Plaintiff properly exhausted pertain to his p rim a ry claim that prison medical officials were deliberately indifferent to his serious m e d ic a l needs in violation of the 8th Amendment and his related California Government C o d e §845.6 claim which imposes liability on government workers who knowingly deny c a re to a prisoner in need of immediate medical care. -2-

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N o t every claim by a prisoner relating to inadequate medical treatment states a vio la tio n of the Eighth Amendment. To state a § 1983 medical claim, a plaintiff must s h o w that the defendants acted with "deliberate indifference to serious medical needs." Jett v. Penner, 439 F.3d 1091, 1096 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 9 7 , 104 (1976)). A plaintiff must show (1) a "serious medical need" by demonstrating th a t failure to treat the condition could result in further significant injury or the u n n e c e s s a ry and wanton infliction of pain and (2) the defendant's response was d e lib e ra te ly indifferent. Jett, 439 F.3d at 1096 (quotations omitted). "Deliberate indifference is a high legal standard." Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d 1 0 5 1 , 1060 (9th Cir. 2004). To act with deliberate indifference, a prison official must b o th know of and disregard an excessive risk to inmate health; "the official must both be a w a re of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious h a rm exists, and he must also draw the inference." Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825,

8 3 7 (1994). Deliberate indifference in the medical context may be shown by a p u rp o s e fu l act or failure to respond to a prisoner's pain or possible medical need and h a rm caused by the indifference. Jett, 439 F.3d at 1096. Deliberate indifference may a ls o be shown when a prison official intentionally denies, delays, or interferes with m e d ic a l treatment or by the way prison doctors respond to the prisoner's medical needs. Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104-05; Jett, 439 F.3d at 1096. Deliberate indifference is a higher standard than negligence or lack of ordinary due c a re for the prisoner's safety. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 835. "Neither negligence nor gross n e glige n c e will constitute deliberate indifference." Clement v. California Dep't of C o r r e c tio n s , 220 F. Supp. 2d 1098, 1105 (N.D. Cal. 2002); see also Broughton v. Cutter L a b s . , 622 F.2d 458, 460 (9th Cir. 1980) (mere claims of "indifference," "negligence," or "m e d ic a l malpractice" do not support a claim under § 1983). "A difference of opinion d o e s not amount to deliberate indifference to [a plaintiff's] serious medical needs." Sanchez v. Vild, 891 F.2d 240, 242 (9th Cir. 1989). A mere delay in medical care, w ith o u t more, is insufficient to state a claim against prison officials for deliberate -3-

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in d iffe re n c e . See Shapley v. Nevada Bd. of State Prison Comm'rs, 766 F.2d 404, 407 (9 th Cir. 1985). The indifference must be substantial. The action must rise to a level of "u n n e c e ss a ry and wanton infliction of pain." Estelle, 429 U.S. at 105. In his Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants Doctor Thomas, Doctor Salazar, D o c to r Ortiz, and Doctor Nicholes all knew that Plaintiff's ankle was fractured based on m e d ic a l records and x-ray reports, but told Plaintiff his ankle was not fractured and did n o t provide any treatment for his injury. Plaintiff also alleges that Defendant Sedwick kn e w Plaintiff's ankle was broken, but failed to provide any pain medication, resulting in e x tre m e pain. Plaintiff asserts that Defendants actions resulted in a long delay in re c e ivin g treatment for his broken ankle, causing extreme pain and further damage. Taking Plaintiff's facts as true, drawing all reasonable inferences in his favor, and c o n s tru in g his pro se pleadings liberally as it must at this stage of the litigation, the Court fin d s that Plaintiff has stated a §1983 deliberate indifference claim pursuant to the 8 th A m e n d m e n t and a California Government Code §845.6 claim against Defendants T h o m a s , Salazar, Ortiz, Nicholes, and Sedwick; furthermore, they are not entitled to q u a lifie d immunity based on the current record before the Court. The Court notes that Plaintiff's Complaint seeks damages against these D e fe n d a n ts . The Complaint is somewhat unclear as to whether Plaintiff is suing these D e fe n d a n ts in their individual or official capacity. While an individual capacity suit for d a m a ge s can go forward, Defendants correctly point out that the Eleventh Amendment b a rs damages actions against state officials in their official capacity. See Flint v. D e n n is o n , 488 F.3d 816, 824-25 (9th Cir. 2007). As such, to the extent Plaintiff's C o m p la in t seeks damages against these state officials in their official capacity, any such c la im s are barred and are therefore dismissed with prejudice. See id. D is c us s ion: Failure to Exhaust U n d e r the Prison Litigation Reform Act ("PLRA"), a prisoner must exhaust a va ila b le administrative remedies before bringing a federal action concerning prison c o n d itio n s . See 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a); Griffin v. Arpaio, 557 F.3d 1117, 1119 (9th Cir. -4-

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2 0 0 9 ). Exhaustion is required for all suits about prison life, Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 5 1 6 , 523 (2002), regardless of the type of relief offered through the administrative p ro c e s s , Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 741 (2001). A prisoner must complete the a d m in is tra tive review process in accordance with the applicable rules. See Woodford v. N g o , 548 U.S. 81, 92 (2006). Exhaustion is an affirmative defense. Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 212 (2007). Thus, the defendant bears the burden of raising and proving the absence of exhaustion. Wyatt v. Terhune, 315 F.3d 1108, 1119 (9th Cir. 2003). Because exhaustion is a matter o f abatement in an unenumerated Rule 12(b) motion, a court may look beyond the p le a d in gs to decide disputed issues of fact. Id. at 1119-20. Further, a court has broad d is c re tio n as to the method to be used in resolving the factual dispute. Ritza v. Int'l L o n g s h o r e m e n 's & Warehousemen's Union, 837 F.2d 365, 369 (9th Cir. 1988) (quotation o m itte d ) . T h e CDC provides an administrative grievance procedure for prisoners. See Cal. C o d e . Regs., Title 15 §3084, et seq. "Any inmate or parolee under the department's ju ris d ic tio n may appeal any departmental decision, action, condition, or policy which th e y can demonstrate as having an adverse effect upon their welfare . . . An appellant m u s t submit the appeal within 15 working days of the event or decision being appealed, o r of receiving an unacceptable lower level appeal decision." See id. at §3084.1(a) and § 3 0 8 4 . 6 (c ). The CDC provides four levels of appeal which includes the informal level, firs t formal level, second formal level, and the third formal level which is referred to as th e director's level; the director's level appeal is final and exhausts all administrative re m e d ie s within the CDC. See id. at §3084.5; Irvin v. Zamora, 161 F.Supp. 2d 1125, 1 1 2 9 (S.D. Cal. 2001). An inmate must proceed to the director's level to properly e x h a u s t administrative remedies and therefore prior to seeking judicial relief. See Booth v . Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 739 (2001). As referenced above, a review of the record reflects that the only claims that P la in tiff properly exhausted pertain to his primary claim that prison medical officials -5-

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w e re deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs in violation of the 8 th A m e n d m e n t and his related California Government Code §845.6 claim. These are the o n ly claims that Plaintiff properly and timely exhausted through all levels of the prison grie va n c e process; as such, these are the only fully exhausted claims that can go forward in this case. Plaintiff's Complaint, for example, summarily asserts claims stemming from n e glige n c e (Doc. 19, p. 6 at paragraphs a, c, d, and e), the Fourth and Fourteenth A m e n d m e n t (Doc. 19, p. 6 at paragraph h), and for "[v]iolating plaintiff's federal Civil R igh ts Act" (Doc. 19, p. 7 at paragraph i). These claims are dismissed without prejudice a s Plaintiff failed to properly and timely exhaust these claims. Furthermore, these claims a re also subject to dismissal as they are vague, speculative, and do not state any viable c la im for relief. Thus, all of the claims in Plaintiff's Complaint (Doc. 19) are dismissed w ith o u t prejudice except for his primary claim that prison medical officials were d e lib e ra te ly indifferent to his serious medical needs in violation of the 8 th Amendment a n d his related California Government Code §845.6 claim. Conclusion A c c o rd in gly , IT IS HEREBY ORDERED as follows: (1 ) Defendants' motion to dismiss (Doc. 51) is granted in part and denied in part. (2 ) Defendants' motion for a protective order (Doc. 56) seeking protection from the b u rd e n s of discovery pending the Court's ruling on the motion to dismiss is denied as m o o t as the Court has now ruled on the motion to dismiss. D A T E D this 23 rd day of September, 2010.

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