Howard v. Gradtillo et al

Filing 68

ORDER DENYING 67 Plaintiff's Motion to Compel and Request for Sanctions, signed by Magistrate Judge Gerald B. Cohn on 12/20/2011. (Marrujo, C)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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CLARENCE HOWARD,
CASE NO. 1:05-cv-00906-AWI-GBC (PC)

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Plaintiff,

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ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION
TO COMPEL AND REQUEST FOR
SANCTIONS

v.
GRADTILLO, et al.,

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Defendants.

(Docs. 67)

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______________________________________/
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I.

Procedural History

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Plaintiff Clarence Howard (“Plaintiff”) is a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma
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pauperis in this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. This action is proceeding on Plaintiff’s
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amended complaint, filed June 22, 2009, against Defendants Bennett, Avila and Jones (“Defendants”)
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for excessive force on April 3, 2003, in violation of the Eighth Amendment. Doc. 22; Doc. 27. On
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September 7, 2011, and on October 21, Plaintiff filed duplicative motions to compel discovery. Doc.
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56; Doc. 59. On November 22, 2011, the Court denied Plaintiff’s motions to compel, however, gave
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Plaintiff thirty days to submit an amended motion to compel. Doc. 66. On December 7, 2011, Plaintiff
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filed a motion titled “Request to Leave to File Amended Motion to Compel.” Doc. 67. However, the
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Court has already given Plaintiff leave to file and amended motion to compel and it appears that Plaintiff
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is seeking to compel discover in addition to sanctions against Defendants. Doc. 67. Plaintiff requests
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that the Court compels Defendants to “answer interrogatories and produce for inspection copies of the

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requested documents.” Doc. 67 at 5. Without supporting documentation that Plaintiff has served

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Defendants with discovery requests, Plaintiff asserts that Plaintiff has not received an answer to his

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interrogatories nor has been provided with documents that he has requested. Doc. 67 at 5. Plaintiff also

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seeks that Defendants “pay Plaintiff the sum of whatever the court may deem just and proper . . . for

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reasonable expenses in obtaining this order as well as prosecuting this matter . . . on the grounds that the

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Defendants’ refusal to answer the interrogatories or produce the requested documents with no substantial

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justification.” Doc. 67 at 6. The Court will construe Plaintiff’s request as a motion to compel and a

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motion for sanctions.

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II.

Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel
A.

Legal Standard

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“Parties may obtain discovery regarding any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party’s

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claim or defense . . . . Relevant information need not be admissible at the trial if the discovery appears

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reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1). The

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responding party is obligated to respond to the interrogatories to the fullest extent possible, Fed. R. Civ.

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P. 33(b)(3), and any objections must be stated with specificity, Fed. R. Civ. P. 33(b)(4). The responding

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party shall use common sense and reason. E.g., Collins v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., No. 06-2466-CM-

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DJW, 2008 WL 1924935, *8 (D. Kan. Apr. 30, 2008). A responding party is not generally required to

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conduct extensive research in order to answer an interrogatory, but a reasonable effort to respond must

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be made. L.H. v. Schwarzenegger, No. S-06-2042 LKK GGH, 2007 WL 2781132, *2 (E.D. Cal. Sep.

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21, 2007). Further, the responding party has a duty to supplement any responses if the information

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sought is later obtained or the response provided needs correction. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(e)(A).

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If Defendants object to one of Plaintiff’s discovery requests, it is Plaintiff’s burden on his motion

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to compel to demonstrate why the objection is not justified. In general, Plaintiff must inform the Court

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which discovery requests are the subject of his motion to compel, and, for each disputed response,

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inform the Court why the information sought is relevant under Rule 26(b)(1) and why Defendants’

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objections are not justified.
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B. Motion to Compel

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In its order filed on November 22, 2011, the Court previously informed Plaintiff of the

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requirements necessary to submit a motion to compel. Doc. 66. In this current motion, Plaintiff still has

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not met his burden on his motion to compel. In this instance, Plaintiff motioned to compel the

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production of responses, interrogatories and documents which he asserts that he has served on

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Defendants. Doc. 67. Plaintiff’s motion to compel simply describes what discovery Plaintiff asserts he

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has requested from Defendants. Doc. 67.

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When bringing a motion to compel discovery responses, the moving party shall set forth each

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discovery request and the response that is at issue. See E.D. Cal. Local Rule 34-250.3(c); E.D. Cal.

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Local Rule 36-250(c). Plaintiff's motion is procedurally defective because it does not provide Plaintiff’s

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requests for discovery. Plaintiff fails to submit any proof that he has ever submitted a discovery request

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to the Defendants and Plaintiff’s previously filed motions to compel discovery do not satisfy that

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requirement. Therefore, Plaintiff's motions to compel, filed December 7, 2011 is denied. Doc. 67.

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III.

Plaintiff’s Motion for Sanctions

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In his motion filed December 7, 2011, Plaintiff requests that Defendants “pay Plaintiff the sum

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of whatever the court may deem just and proper . . . for reasonable expenses in obtaining this order as

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well as prosecuting this matter . . . on the grounds that the Defendants’ refusal to answer the

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interrogatories or produce the requested documents with no substantial justification.” Doc. 67 at 6.

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Federal courts have inherent power to impose sanctions for attorney misconduct and such

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sanctions include an award of attorney’s fees, against attorneys and parties for “bad faith” conduct, or

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“willful disobedience” of a court order. Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 43 (1991); Roadway

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Express, Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752, 764-766 (1980); In re Akros Installations, Inc., 834 F.2d 1526,

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1532 (9th Cir. 1987); see Republic of Philippines v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 43 F.3d 65, 73 (3rd Cir.

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1995). “Bad faith” means a party or counsel acted “vexatiously, wantonly or for oppressive reasons.”

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Chambers, 501 U.S. at 45-46; see Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. Wilderness Society, 421 U.S. 240,

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258-259 (1975).

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Bad faith is tested objectively. “[A] district court’s finding of bad faith or the absence of bad
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faith in a particular case is a factual determination and may be reversed only if it is clearly erroneous.”

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Ford v. Temple Hosp., 790 F.2d 342, 347 (3rd Cir. 1986); see Baker v. Cerberus, Ltd., 764 F.2d 204,

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210 (3rd Cir. 1985); Perichak v. International Union of Elec. Radio, 715 F.2d 78, 79 (3rd Cir. 1983).

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There must be “some indication of an intentional advancement of a baseless contention that is made for

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an ulterior purpose, e.g., harassment or delay.” Ford, 790 F.2d at 347.

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Defendants do not appear to have engaged in bad faith conduct in requesting a stay of discovery
and in their motion to declare Plaintiff a vexatious litigant.

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IV.

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Conclusion and Order
Accordingly, Plaintiff’s motion to compel and for sanctions is HEREBY DENIED. (Doc. 67)

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IT IS SO ORDERED.

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Dated:
0jh02o

December 20, 2011
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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