Catlin v. Ayers

Filing 34

ORDER Granting Petitioner's 32 Motion to Hold Federal Proceedings in Abeyance During Pendency of State Exhaustion Petition signed by Judge Oliver W. Wanger on 04/14/2009. (Flores, E)

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 STEVEN DAVID CATLIN, 10 11 vs. Petitioner, ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) Case No. 1:07-cv-01466-OWW-P DEATH PENALTY CASE Order Granting Petitioner's Motion To Hold Federal Proceedings in Abeyance During Pendency of State Exhaustion Petition UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

12 ROBERT WONG, Acting Warden of San Quentin State Prison, 13 Respondent. 14 15

Petitioner Steven David Catlin ("Catlin") filed his petition for writ of

16 habeas corpus September 24, 2008. Respondent Robert Wong ("the 17 Warden") filed an answer October 24, 2008. The parties filed a joint 18 statement of the exhaustion status of the claims in Catlin's petition 19 December 12, 2008, agreeing that 40 claims, of the 69 claims in the federal 20 petition, were entirely or partially unexhausted. Counsel for Catlin filed a 21 concurrent declaration setting forth the parties' respective arguments 22 regarding the claims where the exhaustion status was disputed. 23 The Court issued an order February 19, 2009, finding another four 24 claims entirely or partially unexhausted. Catlin filed a motion for stay and 25 abeyance of his federal proceedings March 18, 2009, asserting he satisfies 26 the justification required under Rhines v. Weber, 544 U.S. 269, 277 (2005).

1 The Warden filed an opposition to the motion for stay and abeyance April 2 2, 2009. 3 Catlin asserts stay and abeyance of his federal proceedings are 4 justified as he has been diligent, it will serve comity, preserve judicial 5 resources, and will not prejudice the Warden. Catlin argues there is good 6 cause to support granting stay and abeyance, as confusion about whether 7 his state petition will be deemed timely is reasonable due to the vagueness 8 and complexity of California's procedural bar rules, he was unable to 9 earlier exhaust these claims because of ineffective representation on 10 appeal, and these claims are potentially meritorious. 11 The Warden contends the stay and abeyance procedure is only 12 available in "limited circumstances" under Rhines, where there is good 13 cause for the failure to exhaust the claims in state court, the claims are 14 potentially meritorious, and there is no indication of intentially dialtory 15 litigation tactics. The Warden observes Catlin has not yet filed his 16 exhaustion petition in state court, so it is uncertain what precise claims he 17 wants to file and when he intends to file them. The Warden does not 18 dispute that Catlin's currently unexhausted federal claims may be 19 potentially meritorious, and agrees there is no evidence to suggest Catlin 20 has intentionally engaged in dilatory litigation tactics, but submits Catlin 21 has not shown good cause for failing to earlier exhaust these claims. 22 Standards for Stay and Abeyance 23 25 26 Subsection (b)(2) of § 2254, however, permits a district court to deny an unexhausted claim on the merits.
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When a court is presented with a mixed petition, it may not grant

24 relief on any of the unexhausted claims. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1).1 Under

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1 Rhines, abeyance may be ordered if there is good cause for the petitioner's 2 failure to first exhaust his claims in state court, if the claims are not plainly 3 meritless, and if the mixed petition is not stayed indefinitely. 544 U.S. at 4 277-78. While the Court in Rhines did not define good cause, Pace v. 5 Digluglielmo, 544 U.S. 408 (2005), provides guidence by suggesting that 6 good cause is satisfied by the existence of "reasonable confusion about 7 whether a state filing would be timely." Id. at 416. 8 Timeliness Issues 9 Under the Timeliness Standards adopted by the California Supreme 10 Court for filing habeas corpus petitions, a petition filed within 180 days 11 after the final due date for the reply brief on direct appeal is considered 12 presumptively timely. The language used by the Supreme Court is that it 13 would be "presumed to be filed without substantial delay." Supreme 14 Court Policies, Policy 3, Standard 1-1.1. A state habeas corpus petition 15 filed more than 180 days after the final due date for an appellant's reply 16 brief nonetheless "may establish absence of substantial delay if it alleges 17 with specificity facts showing the petition was filed within a reasonable 18 time after petitioner or counsel (a) knew, or should have known, the facts 19 supporting a claim and (b) became aware, or should have become aware, 20 of the legal basis for the claim." Id., Standard 1-1.2. A petition filed after 21 substantial delay may still be considered timely where the petitioner 22 establishes "good cause for the delay" by a "showing of particular 23 circumstances sufficient to justify substantial delay." Id., Standard 1-2. A 24 state petition that is not presumptively timely, or does not demonstrate the 25 absence of subtantial delay, or does not show particular circumstances to 26 justify substantial delay "may be denied as untimely." Id., Standard 1-3
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1 (emphasis added). The Policies further allow for tolling of the 180-day 2 presumptively timely period when the court authorizes the appellant to 3 file supplemental briefing. Id., Standard 1-4. 4 Analysis 5 The Warden only contests Catlin's showing of good cause for stay 6 and abeyance of the federal proceedings. The Warden argues Catlin's 7 criticism of state appellate and habeas counsel is simply "Monday morning 8 quarterbacking," that most of the substance of his federal claims were 9 presented to the state, and the showing of good cause is largely based on 10 federal counsels' ability to file a "better" habeas petition. The Warden 11 contends endorsement of such a broad interpretation of good cause would 12 allow for routine stays of mixed petitions, thus undermining the goals of 13 the AEDPA, delaying the execution of sentences, and reducing the 14 incentive to exhaust all claims in state court.2 15 There can be no serious dispute that the Timeliness Standards for 16 capital habeas corpus petitions in the California Supreme Court lack 17 definite time limits. Only the presumptively timely period of 180 days 18 provides any quantitative, objective guidence. The other standards, 19 establishing the absence of substantial delay and showing good cause for 20 substantial delay are subjective. This has long been a concern of federal 21 courts analyzing California timeliness standards. See Morales v. Calderon, 22 85 F.3d 1387, 1390-93 (9th Cir. 1996) (finding uncertainty and vagueness in 23 the California timeliness standards in the context of determining adequacy 24 25 If the Warden is concerned about delay, and believes the majority of the substance of the federal claims has been presented to the state court, he 26 can elect to waive exhaustion and proceed to the merits of Catlin's federal petition.
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1 of untimely procedural bars). The recitation in the Supreme Court Policies 2 of three different kinds of situations establishing petition timeliness, plus 3 the potential for equitable tolling, demonstrates reasonable confusion. 4 The Warden asserts California's procedural bars are not as vague as 5 Catlin claims, citing Evans v. Chavis, 546 U.S. 189 (2006). However, this 6 case does not assist the Warden. The issue there was whether Chavis was 7 entitled to statutory tolling of the one-year statute of limitations imposed 8 by the AEDPA for a federal petition that had been filed over four years 9 after the AEDPA's effective date. Id., at 200. The Ninth Circuit found 10 Chavis' federal petition timely, holding his state collateral review 11 proceedings were "pending" for three years and 130 days. The Supreme 12 Court reversed, explaining the discrepancy between their holding and the 13 Ninth Circuit's of the timeliness of Chavis' state-court review petition as 14 due to "the uncertain scope of California's `reasonable time' standard." Id., 15 at 198 (emphasis added). Although Chavis provides some clarification of 16 what is a reasonable time to file a notice of appeal in the higher court after 17 an adverse lower court decision, it does not clarify California's timeliness 18 standards. See In re Sanders, 21 Cal. 4th 697, 703 (1999) (Brown, J., 19 concurring and dissenting) (describing California's rules as "a Byzantine 20 system of procedural hurdles, each riddled with exceptions and fact21 intensive qualifications, which only undermine their intended purpose of 22 integrity of judgments, finality, and comity."). 23 Order 24 The facts presented and reviewed demonstrate Catlin has met the 25 three requirements for holding his federal petition in abeyance under 26 Rhines: (1) good cause is established based on diligence in pursuing
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1 exhaustion of state remedies and reasonable confusion about the California 2 timeliness standards; (2) the Warden does not dispute that the 3 unexhausted claims, set forth in this Court's February 19, 2009 order, may 4 be potentially meritorious; and (3) the parties agree there is no evidence 5 Catlin has intentionally engaged in dilatory litigation tactics. Catlin shall 6 file a state petition presenting his unexhausted claims within 60 days of the 7 date of this order. When the California Supreme Court renders a final 8 decision on the exhaustion petition, Catlin is directed to immediately notify 9 the Court of the result so further appropriate action can be taken and 10 federal proceedings resumed if necessary. 11 The motion to hold federal proceedings in abeyance pending 12 resolution of Catlin's state post-conviction petition is granted. During the 13 pendancy of state post-conviction proceedings, Catlin will file quarterly 14 status reports in this court beginning in July, 2009. 15 16 IT IS SO ORDERED. 17 Dated: 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26
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April 14, 2009

b64h1h

/s/ Oliver W. Wanger UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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