Demerson v. Woodford et al

Filing 185

ORDER DENYING Plaintiff's Motion for Default Judgment Against Defendant Gregory, With Prejudice 183 , signed by District Judge Lawrence J. O'Neill on 4/7/14. (Hellings, J)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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EDWARD DEMERSON,

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Plaintiff,

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v.

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ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION
FOR DEFAULT JUDGMENT AGAINST
DEFENDANT GREGORY, WITH
PREJUDICE

JEANNE S. WOODFORD, et al.,

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Case No. 1:08-cv-00144-LJO-SKO (PC)

Defendants.
_____________________________________/

(Doc. 183)
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16 I.

Procedural History

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Plaintiff Edward Demerson (“Plaintiff”), a prisoner proceeding pro, filed this civil rights

18 action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 on January 29, 2008. This action is proceeding on Plaintiff’s
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19 second amended complaint (“complaint”), filed on June 24, 2009, against Defendants Phillips,
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20 Campos, Amaro, Clausing, Bardonnex, Munoz, and Cartagena for using excessive physical force
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21 against Plaintiff, and against Defendants Munoz, Cartagena, Gregory, and Hilliard for acting with

22 deliberate indifference toward Plaintiff’s medical needs, in violation of the Eighth Amendment of
23 the United States Constitution. (Docs. 39, 59.) The events at issue occurred on January 25, 2006,
24 at California Substance Abuse Treatment Facility and State Prison (“CSTAF”) in Corcoran,
25 California.
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Misidentified by Plaintiff as the third amended complaint.
Misidentified as Cartagina in the complaint.
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Misidentified as Hillard in the complaint.
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Default was entered against Defendant Gregory on November 2, 2011; Defendants Munoz,

2 Cartagena, and Hilliard’s motion for summary judgment was granted on July 17, 2013, and
3 Plaintiff’s remaining excessive force claim against Defendants Phillips, Campos, Amaro,
4 Clausing, Bardonnex, Munoz, and Cartagena was set for trial by order filed on July 22, 2013.
5 This action was subsequently dismissed, with prejudice, on November 26, 2013, based on
6 Plaintiff’s failure to comply with the scheduling order.
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Plaintiff filed a late notice of appeal on January 29, 2014, and the appeal was dismissed for

8 failure to prosecute on April 4, 2014. The appellate court’s order of April 4, 2014, constituted
9 mandate, and the Court now reaches Plaintiff’s pending motion for entry of default judgment, filed
10 on February 21, 2014. Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(b)(2).
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Discussion and Order

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Plaintiff seeks default judgment against Defendant Gregory in the amount of $30,000.00.

13 Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(b)(2). Notice to Defendant Gregory was not required given that he never made
14 an appearance in this action, Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(b)(2); In re Roxford Foods, Inc., 12 F.3d 875, 879
15 (9th Cir. 1993), and Plaintiff’s motion has been submitted upon the record, Local Rule 230(l).4
Plaintiff’s claim against Defendant Gregory arises from an incident in which Plaintiff

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17 alleges Gregory acted with deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs, in violation of the
18 Eighth Amendment. Plaintiff’s factual allegations were summarized as follows in the order
19 granting summary judgment, filed on July 17, 2013:
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In his unverified complaint, Plaintiff alleges that on January 25, 2006, he was
brought in from the yard last, shackled, and beaten by Defendants Phillips,
Campos, Amaro, Clausing, Bardonnex, Munoz, and Cartagena. (Doc. 39, pp. 7, 9,
10.) After Plaintiff was placed in a holding cage, he complained of chest pain to
Defendant Munoz. (Id., p. 10.) Defendant Hilliard, a psychiatric technician, was
present to assess Plaintiff’s injuries and complete medical report. (Id.) Plaintiff
alleges that Defendant Hilliard disregarded his request to see a doctor for his chest
pain and refused to write his complaint of chest pain in the report. (Id.) Plaintiff
then complained again to Defendant Munoz about chest pain. (Id., p. 11.)
Defendant Munoz told Plaintiff there was nothing wrong with him, but Munoz said
he would get a nurse. (Id.)

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[Defendant] Gregory subsequently arrived and Plaintiff complained he was having
chest pain. (Id.) Gregory told Plaintiff to stand up and he informed her he was
unable to stand. (Id.) Defendant Munoz opened the holding cage to allow Gregory

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In light of the denial of Plaintiff’s motion, there exist no issues requiring a hearing. Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(b)(2).

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to examine Plaintiff. (Id.) Gregory again told Plaintiff to stand up, but he said he
could not and he reported that his chest pain was worsening. (Id.) Gregory said
Plaintiff would not get any medical treatment unless he stood because she was not
going to bend over. (Id.) Gregory refused to treat Plaintiff or complete a medical
report, leaving Plaintiff to suffer.
Plaintiff was later taken to Defendant Cartagena’s office, where his injuries were
videotaped. Plaintiff reported his chest pain to Defendant Cartagena, “to no avail.”
(Id. at ln. 27.)
Plaintiff alleges that due to Defendants [Gregory,] Munoz, Hilliard, and
Cartagena’s inaction, he was left to suffer in pain without medical treatment. (Id.,
p. 12.) Approximately thirteen hours later, Plaintiff was taken to the CTC
(Correctional Treatment Center), where he was treated with nitroglycerin and other
medication. Plaintiff remained at the CTC overnight before he returned to his cell
with medication. (Id.)

9 (Doc. 173, Order, 3:13-4:9.)
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The Eighth Amendment is violated only when a prison official acts with deliberate

11 indifference to an inmate’s serious medical needs. Snow v. McDaniel, 681 F.3d 978, 985 (9th Cir.
12 2012) ), overruled in part on other grounds, Peralta v. Dillard, __ F.3d __, __, No. 09-55907,
13 2014 WL 878830, at *3 (9th Cir. Mar. 6, 2014); Wilhelm v. Rotman, 680 F.3d 1113, 1122 (9th Cir.
14 2012); Jett v. Penner, 439 F.3d 1091, 1096 (9th Cir. 2006). Plaintiff “must show (1) a serious
15 medical need by demonstrating that failure to treat [his] condition could result in further
16 significant injury or the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain,” and (2) that “the defendant’s
17 response to the need was deliberately indifferent.” Wilhelm, 680 F.3d at 1122 (citing Jett, 439
18 F.3d 1091, 1096 (9th Cir. 2006)). Deliberate indifference is shown by “(a) a purposeful act or
19 failure to respond to a prisoner’s pain or possible medical need, and (b) harm caused by the
20 indifference.” Wilhelm, 680 F.3d at 1122 (citing Jett, 439 F.3d at 1096). The requisite state of
21 mind is one of subjective recklessness, which entails more than ordinary lack of due care. Snow,
22 681 F.3d at 985 (citation and quotation marks omitted); Wilhelm, 680 F.3d at 1122.
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In this case, Defendant Gregory’s involvement in the alleged violation of Plaintiff’s rights

24 occurred during an incident which also involved Defendants Hilliard, Munoz, and Cartagena.
25 However, on July 17, 2013, the Court determined that Defendants Hilliard, Munoz, and Cartagena
26 were entitled to judgment as a matter of law because they acted reasonably in response to
27 Plaintiff’s complaints of chest pain and Plaintiff suffered no harm. With respect to the element of
28 harm, the following evidence was uncontroverted:
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Defendants’ medical expert, Dr. Adams, attested that after the on-call physician
was notified, Plaintiff was treated for musculoskeletal chest wall pain, which
included treatments for acute coronary syndrome and gastro-esophageal reflux
disease. (Adams Dec., ¶7.) Plaintiff’s chest pain was transient and no other similar
complaints of pain were documented in his medical chart after the episode on
January 25 and 26, 2006. (Id., ¶9.) Dr. Adams attested that in his medical opinion,
Plaintiff suffered no injury or harm from the episode and Plaintiff’s overall clinical
condition did not appear consistent with any serious condition. (Id., ¶¶10, 11.)
(Doc. 73, 7:6-12.)

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The Court has discretion to enter or deny default judgment, Eitel v. McCool, 782 F.2d
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1470, 1471 (9th Cir. 1986); Aldabe v. Aldabe, 616 F.2d 1089, 1092 (9th Cir. 1980), and given the
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determinations that other medical personnel involved acted reasonably and that Plaintiff suffered
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no harm as a result of the incident, Plaintiff is not entitled to default judgment against Defendant
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Gregory. Although Defendant Gregory has never appeared, it would nevertheless be incongruent
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and unfair for Plaintiff to obtain an award of damages against Defendant Gregory arising out of an
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incident in which the other similarly situated defendants were entitled to judgment as matter of
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law because they acted reasonably and Plaintiff suffered no harm. Neilson v. Change (In re First
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T.D. & Inv., Inc.), 253 F.3d 520, 532 (9th Cir. 2001) (citing Gulf Coast Fans, Inc. v. Midwest
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Electronics Importers, Inc., 740 F.2d 1499, 1512 (11th Cir. 1984)); accord Garamendi v. Henin,
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683 F.3d 1069, 1082-83 (9th Cir. 2012).
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Accordingly, Plaintiff’s motion for default judgment against Defendant Gregory, filed on

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February 21, 2014, is HEREBY DENIED, with prejudice.
19 IT IS SO ORDERED.
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Dated:

/s/ Lawrence J. O’Neill

April 7, 2014

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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