Jacobs v. Woodford et al
Filing
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ORDER ADOPTING IN FULL 26 FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS; DENYING 18 Motion to Dismiss, signed by Chief Judge Anthony W. Ishii on 06/06/2011. (Martin-Gill, S)
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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
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FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
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GEORGE E. JACOBS IV,
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Plaintiff,
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v.
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WOODFORD, et al.,
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Defendants.
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_______________________________________ )
Case No.: 1:08-cv-00369 AWI JLT
ORDER ADOPTING THE FINDINGS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS DENYING
DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS
(Docs. 18, 26)
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Defendants David, Masiel, and Martinez (collectively, “Defendants”) filed a motion to
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dismiss, arguing Plaintiff failed to exhaust the available administrative remedies prior to
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commencing the action. In addition, Defendants assert Plaintiff failed to state a claim against
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defendant Masiel, who they argue is entitled to qualified immunity. (Doc. 18). On April 26, 2011,
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the Magistrate Judge recommended Defendant’s motion to dismiss be denied. (Doc. 26).
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I. Motion to dismiss for failure to exhaust administrative remedies under the PLRA
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Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), a prisoner is required to exhaust all
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administrative remedies prior to filing suit. 42 U.S.C. §1997e(a); Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 211
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(2007). However, the exhaustion requirement is an affirmative defense under which defendants
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must prove the plaintiff failed to exhaust administrative remedies, and exhaustion is not a pleading
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requirement. Jones, 549 U.S. at 216. Failure to exhaust administrative remedies may be excused
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when a prisoner takes “reasonable and appropriate steps to exhaust [a] claim,” but the actions or
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misconduct of a prison official preclude the inmate from exhaustion. Nunez v. Duncan, 591 F.3d
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1217, 1224-25 (9th Cir. 2010); Ngo v. Woodford, 592 F.3d 1108, 1110 (9th Cir. 2008).
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The Magistrate Judge found that the evidence offered by Defendants in support of their
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assertion that Plaintiff failed to exhaust administrative remedies at the prison also corroborates
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Plaintiff’s statement that he attempted to file his appeal properly, but the form was not handled in
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accordance with the administrative procedures. See Roberts v. Salano, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
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44438, at *7 (E.D. Cal. May 29, 2007). Therefore, the Magistrate Judge determined Defendants
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failed to demonstrate Plaintiff’s failure to exhaust administrative remedies should not fall under the
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exception.
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II. Motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim
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On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, “review is limited to the complaint.”
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Cervantes v. City of San Diego, 5 F.3d 1273, 1274 (9th Cir. 1993). “To survive a motion to dismiss,
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a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is
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plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v.
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Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). Pleadings are construed in the light most favourable to the
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plaintiff. Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 421 (1969).
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A. First Cause of Action: Retaliation
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A cognizable claim for retaliation requires the plaintiff to establish: “(1) An assertion that a
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state actor took some adverse action against an inmate (2) because of (3) that prisoner’s protected
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conduct, and that such action (4) chilled the inmate’s exercise of his First Amendment rights, and (5)
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the action did not reasonably advance a legitimate correctional goal.” Rhodes v. Robinson, 408 F.3d
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559, 567-68 (9th Cir. 2005).
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The Magistrate Judge noted Masiel participated in Plaintiff’s escort across the SHU yard,
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during which David grabbed Plaintiff by the collar and pushed him repeatedly, though Plaintiff was
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restrained. The Magistrate Judge noted also Masiel was present when David made threats to
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Plaintiff, explicitly because of Plaintiff’s lawsuit against defendant Martinez. Further, Masiel was
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present when David encouraged Plaintiff to resist so David could “‘Fuck’ Plaintiff ‘up.’” Finally,
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the Magistrate Judge noted Masiel squeezed Plaintiff’s arms while making derogatory comments and
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threatened to kill Plaintiff. The Magistrate Judge concluded, “Taken together, these allegations
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create a reasonably inference that Masiel condoned the abuse inflicted by David, and just has David
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had done, took action and made comments in order to dissuade Plaintiff from pursuing the lawsuit
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against Martinez.” (Doc. 26 at 11). Consequently, the Magistrate Judge found the factual
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allegations were sufficient to state a claim against Masiel.
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B. Second Cause of Action: Excessive Force
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With an excessive force claim, the relevant inquiry is whether “force was applied in a good-
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faith effort to maintain or restore discipline, or maliciously and sadistically to cause harm.” Hudson
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v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 6-7 (citing Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 320-21 (1986)). To
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determine whether the force used was a violation of a plaintiff’s constitutional rights, the Court may
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consider “the need for the application of force, the relationship between the need and the amount of
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force that was used, [and] the extent of injury inflicted.” Whitley, 475 U.S. at 321; Marquez v.
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Guiterriez, 322 F.3d 689, 692 (9th Cir. 2003).
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The Magistrate Judge found the remarks made to Plaintiff by Masiel “support an inference
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that [Masiel] acted maliciously and sadistically for the purpose of causing harm.” (Doc. 26 at 8).
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Also, the Magistrate Judge noted the amount of force used by Masiel was “in excess of that needed
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but was not enough to cause Plaintiff any physical injury.” (Id.) However, the Magistrate Judge
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observed Masiel was present when David subjected him to excessive force, and Masiel failed to
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intervene, and that “a prison official can violate a prisoner’s Eighth Amendment rights by failing to
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intervene.” (Id.) (quoting Robins v. Meecham, 60 F.3d 1436, 1442 (9th Cir. 1995)). Given that
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Masiel failed to intervene with David’s actions, and Masiel squeezed Plaintiff’s arms while voice
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threats, the Magistrate Judge found Plaintiff’s allegations were sufficient to state a cause of action
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under the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment.
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III. Qualified Immunity for Masiel
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Qualified immunity may shield a government official from liability for civil damages unless
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his conduct violates “clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable
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person would have known.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). In general, the test for
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qualified immunity requires “(1) identification of the specific right being violated; (2) determination
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of whether the right was so clearly established as to alert a reasonable officer to its constitutional
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parameters; and (3) a determination of whether a reasonable officer would have believed that the
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policy or decision in question was lawful.” McDade v. West, 223 F.3d 1135, 1142 (9th Cir. 2000).
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Defendants admitted Masiel had a clearly established duty to protect Plaintiff from the
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unlawful force used by others. The Magistrate Judge determined Plaintiff sufficiently alleged
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violations of his rights under the First Amendment and Eighth Amendment. In addition, the
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Magistrate Judge found the prohibition on retaliatory action against a prisoner for the filing of a civil
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complaint is a clearly established law. Therefore, the Magistrate Judge concluded defendant Masiel
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failed to establish that he was entitled to qualified immunity.
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IV. Conclusion and Order
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Although the parties were granted 21 days from April 26, 2011, or until May 17, 2011, to file
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objections to the Magistrate’s Judge’s Findings and Recommendations denying Defendants’ motion,
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neither Plaintiff nor Defendants filed objections.
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In accordance with the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(C) and Britt v. Simi Valley
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United School Dist., 708 F.2d 452, 454 (9th Cir. 1983), this Court has conducted a de novo review of
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the case. Having carefully reviewed the entire file, the Court finds that the findings and
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recommendation are supported by the record and by proper analysis.
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Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:
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1.
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The Findings and Recommendations filed April 26, 2011 (Doc. 26), are ADOPTED
IN FULL; and
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Defendants’ motion to dismiss (Doc. 18) is DENIED.
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IT IS SO ORDERED.
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Dated:
0m8i78
June 6, 2011
CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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