Coalition for a Sustainable Delta et al v. Carlson et al

Filing 101

ORDER granting in part and denying in part 87 Plaintiffs' Motion to Compel signed by Judge Oliver W. Wanger on 10/15/09. (Coffman, Lisa)

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 1 I. INTRODUCTION Plaintif f s move to c o m p e l production of 39 docume n t s withheld under the d e l i b e r a t i v e process privilege . 87. Doc. COALITIO N FOR A SUST A I N A B L E DELTA, e t al., v. Pl a i n t i f f s , 1:08-CV- 0 0 3 9 7 OWW GSA MEMORANDUM DEC I S I O N RE PLAINTIFFS' MO T I O N T O COMPEL DOCUMENT S WITHHELD BASED ON DELIBERATIVE P R O C E S S PRIVILEGE (DOC . 87.) UNITED STATES DISTRI C T CO U R T FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF C A L I F O R N I A

DONALD K O C H , in his official capacity as Director of the Californ i a Departmen t of Fish and Game, De f e n d a n t , CENTRAL DELTA WATER AGENCY, et al., De f e n d a n t - I n t e r v e n o r s , CALIFORN I A SPORTFISH I N G PROTECTI O N ALLIANCE, et al., De f e n d a n t - I n t e r v e n o r s .

Cou n s e l unsucce s s f u l l y attempted in good fai t h to

resolve the disputed issues, and the parties subm i t t e d a

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joint st a t e m e n t of t h e i r dispute.

Doc. 87-2.

The

document s at issue h a v e been produced for in came r a review. See D o c . 93. Oral argument was heard on Doc. 95.

Septembe r 10, 2009.

II. SUMMARY OF THE CASE This cas e involves a challenge to Cal i f o r n i a ' s Departme n t of Fish a n d Game's ("CDFG") enforcemen t of state sp o r t f i s h i n g r e g u l a t i o n s affecting striped bass populati o n s in the S a c r a m e n t o - S a n Joa q u i n Delta ("stri p e d bass reg u l a t i o n s " ) . Plaintiffs allege that CDFG' s

enforcem e n t of these regulations violates Section 9 of the Enda n g e r e d Speci e s Act ("ESA"), because strip e d bass prey upo n four speci e s listed under the ESA, name l y , the Sacramen t o River win t e r - r u n C h i n o o k salmon, Central Valley s p r i n g - r u n Chinook salmon, Cen t r a l Valley steelhea d , and delta smelt ("Listed Species"). With

respect to the insta n t motion, the disputed factu a l issues i n c l u d e : 1. The exte n t of stripe d bass predation on the Listed S p e c i e s ; 2. Whether the striped bass regulations result in a larger striped bass population than there would be absent the regulations; and 3. Whether the striped bass regulations increase striped bas s predation on the Listed Species. 2

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III. THE DISC O V E R Y AT ISSUE The docu m e n t s in dis p u t e here were withheld from response s to P l a i n t i f f s ' first, second, fou r t h , a n d fi f t h requests for product i o n . Plaintiffs served their first Defe n d a n t

request for producti o n on October 30, 2008. served i t s response on January 9, 2009, and a Suppleme n t a l Respons e on March 16, 2009.

Neither

response asserted th e deliberative process privil e g e . Plaintif f s served th e i r second request for produc t i o n on Febru a r y 5, 2009. Defendant served its respon s e on

March 15 , 2009, but did not assert the deliberati v e process privilege at that time. Plaintif f s served th e i r fourth request for produc t i o n on June 3, 2009. De f e n d a n t responded July 8, 200 9 , to

which De f e n d a n t gene r a l l y asserted the deliberati v e process privilege in response to RFPs 59 & 60: Defendan t objects to this request on the grounds that it is overbroad , seeks information that is not rele v a n t to the subject matter litigation and not reasonably c a l c u l a t e d to lead to the discover y of admissi b l e evidence, and seeks producti o n of inform a t i o n that is privileged by the atto r n e y / c l i e n t privi l e g e , attorney workp r o d u c e privilege, a n d / o r the deliber a t i v e process privilege. Doc. 87- 2 at 11-12 (emphasis added). Plaintif f s served th e i r fifth request for product i o n on June 25, 2009. D e f e n d a n t served its response on 3

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August 7 , 2009, and in response to RFP #76, gener a l l y asserted the d e l i b e r a t i v e process privilege: Defendan t objects to this request to the extent [it] see k s informati o n that is protected by the attorney / c l i e n t priv i l e g e , the attorney workp r o d u c e privilege, or the del i b e r a t i v e proc e s s privileg e , or any co m b i n a t i o n of these.... Doc. 87- 2 at 13. Defendan t eventually produced a privilege log, wh i c h detailed the grounds upon which the disputed docu m e n t s were wit h h e l d : · Document s 34 through 44 and 46 through 54 are

emails b e t w e e n CDFG staff reflecting advisory opinions , recommenda t i o n s , and deliberations rela t i n g to the i s s u e of whet h e r CDFG should recommend amendmen t s to the St r i p e d Bass Policy to the Californ i a Fish and Game Commission ("CFGF"). · Document 45 is an em a i l between CDFG staff

reflecti n g advisory opinions, recommendations, an d delibera t i o n s relati n g to the issue of whether CD F G should r e c o m m e n d cha n g e s to the striped bass slot limit to CFGF. · Document s 46 and 47 also included within the

first ca t e g o r y , are emails between CDFG sta f f reflecti n g advisory opinions, recommendations and delibera t i o n s relati n g to a petition to uplist th e 4

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Delta Sm e l t to endan g e r e d status under the Califo r n i a Endanger e d Species A c t . · Document s Nos. 62, 6 8 , 73, and 75 through 89 are

drafts o f bill analy s e s prepared for the Governor ' s Office a n d emails be t w e e n CDFG staff reflecting advisory opinions, r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s , and deliberat i o n s relating to what pos i t i o n CDFG should take in connecti o n with Asse m b l y Bill 1253. IV. ANALYSIS Summary of Plaintiffs' Position. Plaintif f s argue: (1) Defe n d a n t failed to make a timely and specific objection b a s e d on the deliberative process privilege, w h i c h waived the privilege; (2) Defe n d a n t failed to comply with the procedur a l requireme n t s necessary for invoking this pri v i l e g e , ther e b y waiving the privilege; (3) Defe n d a n t failed to demonstrate the two essentia l elements o f the privilege: (i) that the dispute d documents are predecis i o n a l , and (ii) tha t they are d e l i b e r a t i v e in nature; (4) Even if the docu m e n t s are covered by the qualifie d deliberati v e process privilege, 5

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Plaintif f s ' need for the documents and the public i n t e r e s t in t h e i r disclosure outweigh the CDFG's i n t e r e s t in s e c r e c y ; and (5) Even if the docu m e n t s and/or groups of document s are subjec t to this qualified privileg e , the factu a l material in these document s should be separated and produced. Timeline s s of Assert i o n of the Privilege. Rule 34( b ) ( 2 ) requir e s a party to respond to a request for producti o n within 30 days, and the re s p o n s e must "ei t h e r state t h a t inspection and related ac t i v i t i e s will be permitted as requested or state an object i o n to the requ e s t , includi n g the reasons." 34(b)(2) ( B ) . Fed. R. Civ . P.

Rule 2 6 ( b ) ( 5 ) ( A ) provides that, whe n

claiming a privilege , a party must "(i) expressly make the clai m ; and (ii) describe the nature of the do c u m e n t s , communic a t i o n s , or o t h e r tangible things not prod u c e d or disclose d ­ an d do so in a manner that, without r e v e a l i n g informat i o n itself p r i v i l e g e d or protected, will enable the othe r party to assess the claim." Rule 26(b) ( 5 ) ( A ) .

Rule 34 provides tha t , when objecting to a reques t to produce documents, t h e responding party's objecti o n "must specify the part and permit inspection of the res t . " Rule 34( b ) ( 2 ) ( C ) . 6

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Plaintif f s complain (1) that Defendan t s failure to assert t h e deliberat i v e process privilege in thei r initial responses to certain RFPs constitutes per se waiver, and (2) that Defendants' subsequent produ c t i o n of a privil e g e log seve n months after service of Pla i n t i f f s ' first RF P was untimely, amounting to waiver. Plaintif f s ' pe r se waiver argument is witho u t mer i t . A party' s failure to assert a particular privileg e in an initial response is not a per se waiv e r . " N e i t h e r Rul e

26(b)(5) nor Rule 34 ( b ) mandate waiver upon a par t y ' s failure to obj e c t . " First Sav. Bank, F.S.B . v. First

Bank Sys t e m , Inc., 902 F. Supp. 1356, 1360 (D. Ka n . 1995). The Ninth Ci r c u i t rejected a per se rule that

"failure to produce a privilege log in a timely m a n n e r triggers a waiver of privilege," noting that Rule 26's requirem e n t for prop e r assertion of a privilege d o e s not correlat e with Rule 34's 30-day deadl i n e for serv i n g written responses to discovery requests, "nor doe s it explicit l y articulat e a waiver rule." Burlington

Northern & Santa Fe Railyard Co. v. United States , 408 F.3d 114 2 , 1147 (9th Cir. 2005). Rather, a court should

use Rule 34's 30-day time period as a "defa u l t guidelin e , " for a "c a s e - b y - c a s e determinati o n " wh e t h e r the asse r t i o n of a p r i v i l e g e is timely and suffic i e n t . 7

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Id. at 1 1 4 9 .

Burlington inst r u c t s courts to take into

account the followin g factors: 1) The degr e e to which the objection or assertio n of privile g e enables the litigant seeking discovery an d the court to evaluate whether each of the withheld documents is privileg e d ; 2) The time l i n e s s of th e objection and accompan y i n g informa t i o n about the withheld document s (where ser v i c e within 30 days, as a default guideline, i s sufficient); 3) and The magn i t u d e of the document production;

Id.

4) Other pa r t i c u l a r cir c u m s t a n c e s of the litigati o n that make responding to discovery unusuall y easy or un u s u a l l y hard. Burlingt o n con c e r n e d two issues of first im p r e s s i o n :

(i) whet h e r "a gener a l , boilerplate assertion of an evidenti a r y privileg e in response to a discovery request" is effec t i v e t o properly assert the privile g e ; an d (ii ) whether "the effect of untimeliness in properly a s s e r t i n g the priv i l e g e is to waive or otherwise abandon th e privileg e . " I d . at 1147. With respect to the first

issue, t h e Court fou n d "that a proper assertion of privileg e must be mo r e specific than a generalize d , boiler-p l a t e objecti o n . " Id. On the second issu e , the

Court fo u n d that the failure to produce a timely privileg e log, pursu a n t to "Rule 34's 30-day time limi t , " does not result in a per se waiver of the p r i v i l e g e . at 1149. 8 Id.

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Plaintif f s read Burlington to hold that where a party fails to assert a pa r t i c u l a r privilege in an init i a l written response in any manner, boilerplate or ot h e r w i s e , it amoun t s to a per se wa i v e r of that privilege, whether or not t h e privilege was invoked in a later-produ c e d privileg e log. This reading of Burli n g t o n is

inconsis t e n t with th e Ninth Circuit's refusal to apply a per se w a i v e r to a l a t e - f i l e d privilege log, even afte r finding the boilerpl a t e assertions of privilege in the initial, written res p o n s e to be insufficient. If

assertin g a privileg e in a boilerplate manner is improper , then the p a r t y withholding documents in Burlingt o n fai l e d to prop e r l y assert partic u l a r privileg e s in their initial written responses. Neverthe l e s s , the Burling t o n court fo r g a v e this i n i t i a l failure and permitte d the privilege log to assert the privileg e s for the f i r s t time. This cas e is suffici e n t l y analogous. Even though the

initial written resp o n s e to some of the earlier R F P s did not asse r t the delib e r a t i v e process privilege, on c e Defendan t had an opp o r t u n i t y to thoroughly examin e the responsi v e documents , it determined that assertio n of the privileg e was approp r i a t e and did so. Rather tha n

applying a per se waiver rule, Burlington demands that 9

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Defendan t ' s actions be examined in light of the f o u r factor t e s t . 1. State De f e n d a n t ' s As s e r t i o n of the Privilege Enables the Plaintif f s and the Court to Evaluate Whether the Document s are Privileged.

Defendan t ' s privileg e log describes the wit h h e l d document s by providi n g the identities of the send e r and recipien t and the ge n e r a l subject matter of the communic a t i o n . In a d d i t i o n , submission of the di s p u t e d

document s to the Cou r t in camera perm i t s th e Court to evaluate the privile g e claim completely and thoro u g h l y . 2. Under th e Circumstan c e s , the Objection Was Timely.

The thre e remaining Burli n g t o n factor s -- timeliness of the a s s e r t i o n , ma g n i t u d e of the production, an d other circumst a n c e s -- are appropriately discusse d toge t h e r . Discover y in t h i s case has been complex and voluminous. Defendan t has produc e d over 83,000 pages of docum e n t s , includin g thousands of e- m a i l messages, all of wh i c h had to be re v i e w e d for p r i v i l e g e . 88, at ¶ 1 0 . First Wordham Decl . , Doc.

Plainti f f s ' first RFP, propounded on Octo b e r

30, 2008 , sought inf o r m a t i o n dating back almost 3 0 years to befor e 1980 in so m e cases. The parties then e n g a g e d

in a len g t h y meet-and-con f e r over the scope of Plaintif f s ' discover y requests. 10 Ultimately, the parties

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agreed t h a t all requ e s t s woul d be limited to years aft e r 1980. T h e parties a l s o agreed that written respo n s e s

would be due on Janu a r y 9, 2009, with document pr o d u c t i o n on Janua r y 21, 2009. .

Defendan t engaged in extensive efforts to collect , review a n d produce e-mails from numerous CDFG employee s , potentia l l y involvin g tens of thousands of e-mails. parties agreed that the discovery demands would b e limited to e-m a i l s from approximately eleven CDFG staff who work e d primarily on striped bass issues (the "CDFG striped bass work group"). This limited the potentially The

discover a b l e emails to several thousand. Over the next few mo n t h s , CDFG staff worked to collect e-mail s and provi d e them to counsel for review . After e- m a i l s were p r o v i d e d to counse l by staff, the em a i l s we r e rev i e w e d for relevance and privilege and prepared for product i o n . During this review proc e s s ,

counsel discovered t h a t some of the e-mail communications were sub j e c t to the deliberative process privileg e , among other pr i v i l e g e s . O n or about April 1, 2009, Defendant

produced more than 3 , 5 0 0 emails, the vast majorit y of responsi v e , non-privileged e-mails. Around m i d - M a r c h , 2009, counsel for the Defendant determin e d that the Defendant needed to attempt t o 11

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recover e-mail s and docum e n t s that had been deleted from CDFG sta f f computers between the time the plainti f f s served t h e Defendant with a notice of intent to s u e on or about Oc t o b e r 27, 20 0 7 and the date the litigatio n was initiate d on Februar y 22, 2008, at which time CDF G imposed a litigation hold on CDFG staff e-mails a n d document s . Counsel for the Defendant immediately began

the proc e s s of obtai n i n g a contractor to search a n d retrieve all such e- m a i l s and documents. T h e pro c e s s of

recoveri n g deleted e-mails, reviewing them for relevan c e and priv i l e g e , and prepar i n g them for produ c t i o n was complete d on or abou t May 21, 2009, at which time they were pro d u c e d to pla i n t i f f s . A privilege log, li s t i n g 54

e-mails withhe l d und e r claim of privilege, was th e n produced on May 28, 2009. Exhibit Q. On June 3, 2009, pla i n t i f f s propounded RFP Set 4, which in c l u d e s Reque s t for Production No. 59 and Request for Prod u c t i o n No. 6 0 . Id., Exhibit R. Bo t h req u e s t s First Wordham Decl., D o c . 88,

seek pro d u c t i o n of d o c u m e n t s relating to Californ i a Assembly Bill 1253. In response to RFP Set 4, No s . 59

and 60, the Defendan t objected in part and assert e d the attorney - c l i e n t , att o r n e y work product, and delib e r a t i v e process privileges. On or about July 23, 2009, c o u n s e l 12

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for the state defend a n t served on plaintiffs a re v i s e d privileg e log, listing the e-mails withheld from the response to RFP Set 4. Id., Exhibit T.

In total , Defense co u n s e l has reviewed over 4,200 pages of e-mai l s . Of these over 4,200 pages,

approxim a t e l y 150 pa g e s , or a total of 89 e-mails , hav e been det e r m i n e d to be responsive but subject to a clai m of privi l e g e . been pro d u c e d . Appro x i m a t e l y 4,060 pages of e-mai l s ha v e Id. at ¶ 10.

Discover y in this ca s e has been voluminous and complex, particularl y in light of the need to sea r c h for and retr i e v e deleted emails. Once counsel began to

review r e s p o n s i v e em a i l s , Defendant took a reason a b l e amount o f time to de t e r m i n e that some of the communic a t i o n s were subject to the privilege. Un d e r this

totality of circumst a n c e s , it appears that Defend a n t ' s claims o f privilege were asserted as soon as reasonably practica b l e . Under Burli n g t o n , the p r i v i l e g e has been

appropri a t e l y assert e d . C. Complian c e with Proc e d u r a l Requirements for Invok i n g the Deli b e r a t i v e Pro c e s s Privilege. Plaintif f s cite this court's 1998 decision in Stockton East Water District, et al. v. Bureau of Reclamat i o n , C o n s o l i d a t e d Cases: CV-F-93-5896 OWW and CVF - 9 6 - 5 7 3 8 OWW DLB ("Stockton Order"), which held that 13

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four req u i r e m e n t s mu s t be met before a claim of delibera t i v e process privilege may be sustained: First, a formal clai m of privilege lodged by the head of the departme n t having control over the matter m u s t be made after actual personal consider a t i o n by tha t officer. An affidavit of the resp o n s i b l e agen c y official must explain reasons for preservi n g the confidenti a l i t y of the gove r n m e n t a l com m u n i c a t i o n . A specific designat i o n and desc r i p t i o n of the documents, i.e., a privilege lo g must be made in sufficient detail t o allow a re a s o n e d determination as to the legi t i m a c y of th e claimed privilege. Discoverable factual material must be separated from pro t e c t e d delib e r a t i v e material. Stockton Order at 8- 9 . P l a i n t i f f s assert t h a t th e s e However, the

requirem e n t s were no t met in this case.

district court speci f i c a l l y found in Stockton that these requirem e n t s did not apply where the documents are presente d for in camera inspection. numerous cases). Defendan t submitted concurrently with the joint statemen t the declar a t i o n of John McCamman, Chief Deputy Director of the CDFG . McCamman reviewed al l of the Id. at 9 (citing

conteste d documents and, after describing these document s , concludes that their disclosure would "inhibit the free flow of ide a s among CDFG staff" regardin g proposed changes to the Striped Bass Policy, the possibil i t y of adopt i n g a striped bass slot limit , the review o f a petition to modify the species status of the Delta sm e l t under th e California Endangered Speci e s Act, 14

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and the provision of advice to the Governor's Off i c e regardin g pending le g i s l a t i o n . Doc. 88- 4 , at ¶¶ 2-5. Mr. McCa m m a n ' s offic i a l position as Chief Deputy Director of CDFG mee t s the requirement that the a t t e s t i n g person i s an "indivi d u a l with overall responsibil i t y for the admi n i s t r a t i o n o f the agency." United States v. McCamman Declarat i o n ,

Rozet, 1 8 3 F.R.D. 66 2 , 665 (N . D . Cal. 1998). As for t h e remaining procedural requirements, the privileg e log in thi s case accurately describes t h e withheld documents a n d provides sufficient detail to permit a reasoned de t e r m i n a t i o n as to the legitim a c y of the clai m e d privileg e . Finally, contrary to Plai n t i f f s '

assertio n s , the with h e l d documents contain no discover a b l e factual information that must be sep a r a t e d from the deliberativ e material. The priv i l e g e has be e n properly invoked. D. Applicat i o n of the P r i v i l e g e to the Documents in Dispute. Accordin g to the Sup r e m e Court, "the ultimate pur p o s e of the l o n g - r e c o g n i z e d [deliberative process] privileg e is to pr e v e n t injury to the quality of agency dec i s i o n s . " National Labor Relat i o n s Board v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 421 U.S. 132, 151 (1975) ("NLRB"). The pri v i l e g e is

intended "to insure that a decision-maker w i l l re c e i v e 15

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the unim p e d e d advice of his associates.

The theo r y is

that if advice is re v e a l e d , associates may be rel u c t a n t to be ca n d i d and fra n k . " Fed e r a l Open Market Committe e In a recent

v. Merri l l , 44 3 U.S. 340, 359-360 (19 7 9 ) .

decision addressing the privilege, the Supreme Co u r t declared : The deli b e r a t i v e pro c e s s privilege rests on the obvious realization that officials will not communic a t e candidly among themselves if each remark i s a potentia l item of discovery and front pa g e news, and its object is to enhance "the qua l i t y of agen c y decisions" (citation omitted) by protecti n g open and frank discussion among th o s e who make them within the Government. Departme n t of the Interio r , et al. v. Klama t h Wat e r Us e r s Protecti v e Associati o n , 5 3 2 U . S . 1, 8-9 (20 0 1 ) . In

addressi n g the appli c a t i o n of the privilege to in t e r n a l document s , the Supre m e Court stated: "[i]t would be impossib l e to have a n y frank discussion of legal or policy m a t t e r s in writing if all such writings were to be subjecte d to public scrutiny." EPA v . Mink , 410 U.S. 73,

87 (1973 ) ( s u p e r c e d e d by statute on other grounds, 5 U.S.C. § 552). The Nint h Circuit ha s repeatedly affirmed this pu b l i c policy t o encourage frank and candid intern a l age n c y discussi o n s . See, e.g., United States v. Fernand e z , 231

F.3d 124 0 , 1246 (9th Cir. 2000); Nat'l Wild l i f e Fed'n v. United S t a t e s Forest Serv., 8 6 1 F.2d 1114, 1117 (9th C i r . 16

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1988) (" N W F " ) .

Two conditions apply to the asser t i o n of

the deli b e r a t i v e pro c e s s privilege in the Ninth C i r c u i t : [U]nder the delibera t i v e process' privilege, a document must be bot h (1) pre d e c i s i o n a l or antecede n t to the ad o p t i o n of agency policy and (2) deli b e r a t i v e meaning it must actually b e related to the proce s s by which policies ar e formulat e d . NWF, 861 F.2d at 1117 (internal citations and quotations omitted) ( e m p h a s i s ad d e d ) . As the NWF court explained:

Id.

These tw i n requireme n t s recognize that the underlyi n g purpose o f this privilege is to protect[ ] the consul t a t i v e functions of governme n t by mainta i n i n g the confidentiality of advisory opinions, r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s , and delibera t i o n s compri s i n g part of a process by which go v e r n m e n t a l d e c i s i o n s and policies are formulat e d . "A docum e n t may be c o n s i d e r e d predecisional if it was

prepared in order to assist an agency decisionmak e r in arriving at his deci s i o n . " Carter v. U.S. Dept. of "Material

Commerce , 307 F.3d 1 0 8 4 , 1089 (9th Ci r . 2002).

which pr e d a t e s a dec i s i o n chronologically, but di d not contribu t e to that d e c i s i o n , is not predecisional in any meaningf u l sense." Id. On t h e one hand, the

"predeci s i o n a l " requ i r e m e n t does not mandate that the agency a s s e r t i n g the privilege has taken steps to finalize its decisio n . observed : Our emph a s i s on the need to protect pred e c i s i o n a l documents does not mean that the existenc e of the pri v i l e g e turns on the ability 17 As the Supreme Court has

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of an ag e n c y to iden t i f y a specific decision in connecti o n with whic h a memorandum is prepared. Agencies are, and pr o p e r l y sh o u l d be, engag e d in a contin u i n g process of examining their policies ; this proce s s will generate memoranda containi n g recommend a t i o n s which do not ripen into age n c y decision s ; and the lower courts should b e wary of in t e r f e r i n g with this process. NLRB, 42 1 U.S. at 151, n.18. One California district

court co n c l u d e d "tha t the Supreme Court meant to protect document s that were part of the decision-making proces s , regardle s s of a `fin a l decision'." Cal. Na t i v e P l a n t

Soc'y v. EPA, 251 F.R.D. 408, 411-412 (N.D. Cal. 2008) . On the o t h e r hand, t h e party opposing discovery m u s t identify a specific decision or policy to which t h e withheld documents r e l a t e . As the Ni n t h Circuit

explaine d in M a r i c o p a Audubon Society v. U.S. Forest Service: The [age n c y ] argues that because agencies a r e involved in a contin u a l process of selfe x a m i n a t i o n , it need not identify a specific decision in which th e ... report and the ... letter w i l l culminat e in an order for those material s to be "pre d e c i s i o n a l . " For this position , it relies entir e l y on a footnote in the Supr e m e Court's decision in NLRB v. Sea r s , Roebuck & Co., 421 U . S . 1 3 2 . . . This cauti o n a r y dictum, however, doe s not justify the broad reading ... urged by the government ... Th u s , we are r e q u i r e d to r e j e c t the government's primary argument tha t a continuing process of agency s e l f - e x a m i n a t i o n is enough to render a document "predecisio n a l " and hold, instead, that the agen c y must iden t i f y a specific decision to which th e document i s predecisional. 108 F.3d 1089, 1094 (9th Cir. 1997)(emphasis adde d ) . also Ass e m b l y of the State of Cal. v. U.S. Dept. of 18 See

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Commerce , 968 F.2d 9 1 6 , 921 (9th Cir. 1992) ("Material which pr e d a t e s a dec i s i o n chronologically, but di d not contribu t e to that d e c i s i o n , is not predecisional in any meaningf u l sense."). Document s are delibe r a t i v e only if they are "actu a l l y related to the proce s s by which policies are form u l a t e d . " NWF, 861 F.2d at 1117. For example, purely factual

material s are genera l l y not protected by the priv i l e g e . Id. The impor t a n t inquiry is whether disclosure of the

document exposes "an agency's decisionmaking proc e s s in such a w a y as to dis c o u r a g e candid discussion wit h i n the agency a n d thereby u n d e r m i n e the agency's ability to perform its function s . " Assembly, 968 F.2d at 920

(interna l citation a n d quotation omitted). 1. Document s that Conce r n Whether to Recommend to CFGF an Amendment to the Striped Bass Policy.

Defendan t s assert th a t Documents 34 through 44, 4 6 through 54, and 62 c o n c e r n whether to recommend t o CFGF an amend m e n t t o the striped bass policy. T h e doc u m e n t s

submitte d in c a m e r a reveal that the i s s u e o f whether C D F G should m a k e such rec o m m e n d a t i o n s to CFGF was raised several times and co n s i d e r e d over the course of m o r e than a year, but never ac t e d upon. Plaintif f s mai n t a i n that Defendant's assertion of the privileg e in connect i o n with these documents is 19

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insuffic i e n t under Maricopa Audubon.

Defendant refuse d

to speci f y what amen d m e n t s were proposed to which part(s) of the s t r i p e d bass policy. Because no informati o n wa s

actually given about the substance or timing of t h e putative decisions, Plaintiffs argue the discussi o n of "an amen d m e n t to the Striped Bass Policy" is simp l y "part of a con t i n u i n g proc e s s of agency self-examination." The in c a m e r a review reveals that most of the communic a t i o n s in th i s category, namely Documents 34 through 44, 48 throu g h 54, and 62 concerned speci f i c proposal s to modify striped bass policy. That th e s e

proposal s were never acted upon does not render t h e assertio n of the del i b e r a t i v e process privilege ineffect i v e . This i s not the kind of "continuing process

of agenc y self-examination" with which Maricopa Audubo n was conc e r n e d . Maricopa Audubon simp l y dem a n d s that

withheld documents b e related to a specific polic y proposal . As to Documents 34 through 44, 48 through 54,

and 62, the discussi o n focused on specific propos a l s for striped bass. The d o c u m e n t s were predecisional, These document s are

satisfyi n g the first requirement.

also del i b e r a t i v e because they concern the formulation of policy. Although it is a clo s e call, a careful examinatio n of 20

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document s 46 and 47 reveals no connection to any specific proposal to modify t h e striped bass policy. Modi f y i n g

the stri p e d bass pol i c y is mentioned as a possibl e remedy for conc e r n s r a i s e d in these two emails, but no specific policy c h a n g e s are d i s c u s s e d . Documents 46 and 4 7

qualify as communica t i o n s generated as part of a "continu i n g process of agency self-examination," to wh i c h the deli b e r a t i v e pro c e s s privilege does not apply under Maricopa Audubon. The deli b e r a t i v e pro c e s s privilege is validly app l i e d to Docum e n t s 34 thro u g h 44, 48 through 54, and 62 , but does not apply to do c u m e n t s 46 and 47. 2. Document Concerning the Striped Bass Slot Limit.

Document 45 concerns a particular proposal, which originat e d outside C D F G , to impose a slot limit 1 to protect striped bass . The withheld communication

addresse s whether CD F G should support that propos a l . This doc u m e n t is pre d e c i s i o n a l , as it concerned a specific proposal (w h e t h e r to support the slot limit) that had not yet bee n adopted by CDFG, and delibe r a t i v e , because it concerned the formulation of policy. The

privileg e is properl y asserted with respect to Do c u m e n t

1

A slot limit allows anglers to take fish in a ce r t a i n size ran g e , but requ i r e s the release of anything smaller or large r . 21

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45. 3. Document s Relating t o Petition to Uplist the Delta Sm e l t to Endangered Status under the Californ i a Endangere d Species Act ("CESA").

Document s 46 and 47, in addition to discussing proposal s to recomme n d changes to the striped bas s policy, include a sp e c i f i c proposal to uplist the Delta smelt to endangered status under CESA. Alt h o u g h these

document s do tangent i a l l y discuss the CESA uplist i n g , they are not deliber a t i v e on this issue. In othe r words,

they do not discuss and/or deliberate over policy actions or decis i o n s CDFG mu s t take in relation to the CE S A petition . The privilege does not apply to documents 4 6

and 47 b y virtue of their discussion of the CESA petition . 4. Document s Reflecting Analysis of AB 1253.

Document s 68, 73, an d 75 through 89 documents are all drafts o f bill analy s e s prepared by CDFG for the Governor ' s Off i c e and emails between CDFG s t a f f r e l a t i n g to what position CDF G should take in connection w i t h various drafts of As s e m b l y Bill 1253. at ¶5. See McCamm a n De c l .

These are al l predecisional, as they conc e r n

drafts o f a specific piece of legislation, and delibera t i v e , becaus e they concern the formulatio n of CDFG's p o l i c y toward that bill. 22 The privilege pr o p e r l y

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applies to Documents 68, 73, and 75 through 89. 5. Conclusi o n Re: Appli c a t i o n of the Privilege.

The deli b e r a t i v e pro c e s s privilege applies to all of the docu m e n t s withhe l d on that ground with the ex c e p t i o n of Docum e n t s 46 and 47. Plaintiffs' motion to co m p e l is

GRANTED as to Docume n t s 46 and 47. E. Qualifie d Privilege Analysis: Is Defendant's Interest in Non-Disclosure Overcome By The Plaintif f s ' An d The Public's Interest In Disclosure? The deli b e r a t i v e pro c e s s privilege is a qualified privileg e . To deter m i n e whether the qualified pr i v i l e g e

is overc o m e , courts usually consider four non-exh a u s t i v e factors: (1) the rel e v a n c e of the evidence; (2) t h e availabi l i t y of othe r evidence that contains the same informat i o n ; (3) the government's role in the lit i g a t i o n , i.e., wh e t h e r there is any evidence of bad faith and/or miscondu c t ; and (4) the extent to which disclosur e would hinder f r a n k and ind e p e n d e n t discussi o n reg a r d i n g contempl a t e d policie s and decisions. FTC v . Warner The

Commc'ns , Inc., 742 F.2d 1156, 1161 (9th Cir. 1984).

court ma y also take into account (5) the interest of the litigant , and societ y , in accurate judicial fact- f i n d i n g . North Pa c i f i c a , LLC v. City of Pacifica, 274 F. Supp 2 d 1118, 11 2 2 (N.D. Cal . 2003), and (6) the seriousn e s s of the liti g a t i o n and t h e issues involved, Uni t e d St a t e s v. 23

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Irvin, 1 2 7 F.R.D. 16 9 , 174 (C.D. Cal. 1989). In the S t o c k t o n case , the dis t r i c t court refused to permit d i s c l o s u r e af t e r finding that the document s withheld were only m a r g i n a l l y relevant; the "info r m a t i o n sought [ w a s ] availab l e ... from other sources"; t h e "documen t s [did] not contain evidence of bad fait h or governme n t misconduc t " ; permitting "disclos u r e would chill th e free flow of ideas between members of t h e agency a n d effective cooperation in the developme n t of water po l i c y by stat e and federal agencies in the state of Calif o r n i a ; " and "the documents do not disclos e `the smoking gun,' Plaintiffs' seek." Sto c k t o n Order at 7- 4 1 .

Here, Pl a i n t i f f s ass e r t that the documents may re v e a l relevant documents a n d / o r the "smoking gun" not f o u n d in the Stoc k t o n c a s e . For example, Plaintiffs assert tha t :

[T]he De f e n d a n t ' s di s c u s s i o n of an amendment to the stri p e d bass abu n d a n c e policy will probably discuss the key issu e s of striped bass predation on nativ e fish and E S A implications. Among the document s already pr o d u c e d by CDFG was an email and Repo r t from CDFG employee Marty Gingras, CDFG's s t r i p e d bass expert. (Rubin Decl. ¶ 16, Exh. 7.) In the ema i l Marty Gingras reported that the CDFG "discu s s e d the Commission's striped bass policy as it relates to fishing regulati o n s , spendin g Striped Bass Stamp Funds, and ESA, " and advoca t e d revision of this policy. (Id. (emphasis added).) Moreover, the Report attached to his emai l complains that the striped bass abu n d a n c e polic y is "harmful ... primarily because significant uncertainty remains about the effe c t of stripe d bass predation on native fishes." (Id.) Doc. 97- 2 at 46. Pl a i n t i f f s maintain that this disclosed 24

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email is evidence th a t "Defendant is ... trying t o hide key evid e n c e and adm i s s i o n s based on the delibera t i v e process privilege." Id. Similarly, Plaintiffs a s s e r t

"it is h i g h l y likely that during the discus s i o n o f the striped bass slot li m i t , the CDFG discussed wheth e r this proposed striped bas s regulation would increase o r maintain the striped bass population -- one of the primary issues in di s p u t e . " Id. at 47.

A carefu l review of all of th e remaining disputed document s in c a m e r a proves Plaintiffs ' cont e n t i o n s are meritles s . Although the communications do touch upon the

issue of striped bas s predation upon native speci e s , the withheld documents a r e primarily concerned with v a r i o u s ways to word policy recommendations s o as to accurately reflect the state of the science. The communicat i o n s do

not reve a l bad faith or any effort to withhold informat i o n from the public. Rather, they reveal a

concern over giving policy advice that does not o v e r s t a t e the scie n c e . The wi t h h e l d communications do not discuss

scientif i c informati o n in any detail, nor do they shed meaningf u l light on the ultimate issues in this c a s e , e.g., wh e t h e r the ex i s t i n g striped bass sportfish i n g regulati o n s cause un l a w f u l take of ESA list e d spe c i e s . Moreover , in general , the withheld emails would n o t 25

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add to i n f o r m a t i o n a l r e a d y disclosed.

For exampl e ,

Plaintif f s admit the y are already in possession o f an email in which Marty Gingras advocated revisions to the striped bass p o l i c y in light of ESA concerns. Disclosure

of the v a s t majority of withheld documents would "hinder frank an d independen t discussion regarding contem p l a t e d policies and decisio n s , " without enhancing the re c o r d in any mean i n g f u l way. Plaintif f s have not overcome the priv i l e g e as to the remainin g documents.

F.

Plaintif f s ' Request for Reasonable Expenses. Federal Rule of Civi l Procedure 37(a)(5)(A) requi r e s

the part y or deponen t whose conduct necessitated the motion t o compel "to pay the movant's reasonable expen s e s incurred in making t h e motion, including attorney ' s fees," u n l e s s "the o p p o s i n g party's nondisclosure , response , or objecti o n was substantially justifie d . " Here, St a t e Defendan t s ' nondisclosure was substan t i a l l y justifie d . Although Defendants must disclo s e two of t h e

39 chall e n g e d docume n t s , this reflects the distri c t court's balancing of the parties' and public's in t e r e s t , and does not undermi n e Defendant's right to asser t the privileg e as to all 39 documents in the first ins t a n c e . 26

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Plaintif f ' s re q u e s t for f e e s and reasonable expenses i s DENIED.

V. CONCLUSI O N For the reasons set forth above: (1) Plai n t i f f s ' motion to compel is GRANTED as to Docum e n t s 46 and 47 and DENIED as to all other do c u m e n t s ; and (2) Plai n t i f f s ' requ e s t for reasonable expe n s e s is DENIE D . Plaintif f s shall sub m i t a form of order consisten t with this mem o r a n d u m deci s i o n within ten (10) days of electron i c service.

SO ORDER E D Dated: October 15, 2009 /s/ Oliver W . Wang e r Oliver W. Wang e r United States Distri c t Judge

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