Crayton v. Hedgpeth et al

Filing 207

ORDER DENYING 188 Plaintiff's Motion for Terminating Sanctions; ORDER Directing Plaintiff to File an Amended Opposition to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Within Forty-Five (45) Days; and ORDER Directing Clerk of Court to Mail Plaintiff a Copy of the First Amended Complaint and Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, as a One Time Courtesy, signed by District Judge William Haskell Alsup on 4/25/2012. (Jessen, A)

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1 2 3 4 5 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 6 7 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 8 9 No. C 08-00621 WHA (PR) TIMOTHY CRAYTON, 10 For the Eastern District of California United States District Court Plaintiff, ORDER ON MOTION FOR TERMINATING SANCTIONS; MOTION TO DISMISS MISJOINED DEFENDANTS AND CLAIMS; AND FURTHER SCHEDULING 11 12 v. 13 14 CORRECTIONAL OFFICER A. HEDGPETH, et al., 15 Defendants. / 16 17 INTRODUCTION 18 This is a civil rights action filed under 42 U.S.C. 1983 by a California prisoner 19 proceeding pro se. Plaintiff claims that defendants violated his constitutional rights. Plaintiff 20 has filed a motion for terminating sanctions. Defendants have filed their opposition, and 21 plaintiff has filed his reply. Defendants have filed a motion to dismiss misjoined defendants 22 and claims. Plaintiff has filed an opposition, and defendants have filed their reply. Plaintiff has 23 also filed a supplemental opposition in response to defendants’ reply. 24 For the reasons set out below, plaintiff’s motion for terminating sanctions is denied. 25 The court orders further briefing on defendants’ motion to dismiss misjoined defendants and 26 claims. 27 PROCEDURAL HISTORY 28 This action commenced over three years ago. In his First Amended Complaint, plaintiff 1 raised seventeen claims against over thirty prison officials employed by either Salinas Valley 2 State Prison or Kern Valley State Prison. His claims are based on allegations that he had filed a 3 civil suit against several defendants, and as a result, defendants – who were alleged to be part of 4 a group of correctional officers known as the “Green Wall” gang – retaliated against him in an 5 attempt to persuade him to dismiss the suit, as well as other pending suits. Plaintiff’s claims 6 span over a period of years, and accuse defendants of, inter alia, sexual assault; threats; 7 intimidation; physical injuries; confiscation of private property; deliberate withholding of 8 access to plaintiff’s wheelchair, bedding, blankets, and personal property; and failure to provide 9 him with reasonable accommodations. On July 9, 2010, plaintiff filed a motion for an emergency preliminary injunction, in 11 For the Eastern District of California United States District Court 10 which he claimed that defendants and non-defendants at Kern Valley State Prison illegally 12 confiscated legal property related to another federal civil lawsuit filed in the Eastern District of 13 California, Crayton v. Rochester Medical Corporation, No. 07-CV-1318-oww, from plaintiff’s 14 cell. On July 30, 2010, defendants filed a motion to dismiss, as well as a motion for summary 15 judgment. On September 9, 2010, the court denied plaintiff’s motion for emergency 16 preliminary injunction, and referred this matter to the Pro Se Prisoner Settlement Program. On 17 January 7, 2011, the court was informed that the parties were unable to reach an agreement. 18 On February 14, 2011, plaintiff filed a motion to reconsider the dismissal of several 19 claims and defendants in the court’s initial screening order. On March 11, 2011, defendants 20 filed a motion to dismiss for, inter alia, failure to exhaust and failure to state a claim. On March 21 24, 2011, plaintiff filed an opposition to the motions. On April 25, 2011, defendants filed a 22 reply. On May 20, 2011, the court granted in part and denied in part defendants’ motion to 23 dismiss, motion for partial summary judgment, and motion to reconsider. The court ordered 24 further briefing. 25 On July 12, 2011, defendants filed the underlying motion to dismiss misjoined 26 defendants and claims. On July 15, 2011, plaintiff filed the underlying motion for terminating 27 sanctions, which has now been submitted. 28 2 1 2 3 4 ANALYSIS A. Motion for Terminating Sanctions In plaintiff’s motion for terminating sanctions (dkt. 188), he argues that defendants 5 confiscated and destroyed his legal property, in order to hinder the prosecution of this lawsuit. 6 Specifically, plaintiff alleges that, on May 3, 2011, non-defendants Officer Koehler, Lieutenant 7 Augustus, and Sergeant Epperson were acting “in concert with or for” defendant Adams (dkt. 8 188 at 4). These non-defendants demanded that plaintiff waive his single cell housing status, to 9 which plaintiff refused (ibid.). Due to plaintiff’s refusal, Sergeant Epperson signed a placement order for plaintiff to be housed in administrative segregation (ibid.). As a result, plaintiff’s 11 For the Eastern District of California United States District Court 10 personal and legal property was confiscated (ibid.). Plaintiff alleges that defendants have 12 repeatedly engaged in this “pre-emptive retaliation scam of fabricating a plausible excuse to 13 confiscate and destroy my case file records, evidence, etc.,” and obtained dismissals of prior 14 lawsuits that plaintiff has filed (id. at 5). On June 23, 2011, plaintiff was discharged from 15 administrative segregation, and returned to his original single cell (id. at 8). However, not all of 16 plaintiff’s personal property, case file records, including pleadings from this underlying case, 17 have been returned (id. at 9). 18 Defendant Lopez argues that plaintiff’s motion does not implicate her, despite plaintiff’s 19 general accusation regarding “defendants.” The remaining defendants argue that plaintiff’s 20 motion mainly accuses non-defendants of improper acts. Further, defendants allege that 21 plaintiff is attempting to circumvent the PLRA by requesting injunctive relief in this motion for 22 purported activities similar to those raised in his First Amended Complaint. Finally, defendants 23 claim that plaintiff has not met his burden of proof to permit the granting of a sanction of 24 dismissal against them. 25 Federal trial courts are vested with a wide range of inherent powers that allow them to 26 govern their courtrooms and the litigation processes before them. Chambers v. Nasco, 501 U.S. 27 32, 43 (1991). An example of these inherent powers is the discretionary power of a federal trial 28 3 1 court to levy appropriate sanctions against a party who prejudices its opponent through the 2 spoliation of evidence that the spoliating party had reason to know was relevant to litigation. 3 Glover v. Bic Corporation, 6 F.3d 1318 (9th Cir. 1993). A court must use its inherent powers 4 only with restraint and discretion. Chambers, 501 U.S. at 44. party destroyed evidence with notice that the evidence may be relevant to pending litigation. 7 Leon v. IDX Sys. Corp., 464 F.3d 951, 959 (9th Cir. 2006). Dismissal is an available sanction 8 when “a party has engaged deliberately in deceptive practices that undermine the integrity of 9 judicial proceedings” because “courts have inherent power to dismiss an action when a party 10 has willfully deceived the court and engaged in conduct utterly inconsistent with the orderly 11 For the Eastern District of California To levy sanctions due to spoliation of evidence, the court must find that the offending 6 United States District Court 5 administration of justice.” Ibid. (citing Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Natural Beverage Distributors, 12 69 F.3d 337, 348 (9th Cir. 1995)). “For dismissal to be proper, the conduct to be sanctioned 13 must be due to “willfulness, fault, or bad faith.” Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 69 F.3d at 348. 14 Plaintiff’s motion is denied for several reasons. First, although plaintiff alleges that 15 defendants Adams, Phillips, and Morales had roles in the confiscation and presumed destruction 16 of his legal and personal property, plaintiff’s conclusory statements are unsupported by any 17 evidence. As a result, the individuals whom plaintiff accuses of placing him in administrative 18 segregation and confiscating his property, are not defendants in this action. As such, even 19 assuming that the non-defendants acted wilfully or in bad faith, the court has no jurisdiction to 20 sanction them. Plaintiff’s claim that the named individuals in his motion are the “John Doe” 21 defendants previously alleged in his First Amended Complaint is insufficient to establish their 22 liability in this lawsuit. Cf. Brass v. County of Los Angeles, 328 F.3d 1192, 1195-98 (9th Cir. 23 2003) (affirming the district court’s refusal to allow a plaintiff to substitute names for “John 24 Doe” defendants when plaintiff failed to request leave to add new parties or file an amended 25 complaint). 26 27 Second, to the extent defendants had a role in the confiscation of plaintiff’s property, plaintiff provides no evidence that defendants did so willfully or in bad faith. In particular, 28 4 1 plaintiff provides no evidence to contradict defendant Adams’ declaration that Adams had no 2 involvement with plaintiff’s placement into administrative segregation or confiscation of 3 property (Decl. Adams at ¶ 3), nor defendant Morales’ statement that he did not order any 4 prison guard to pre-screen plaintiff’s legal property (Decl. Morales at ¶ 2). Absent any 5 evidence showing that the loss of plaintiff’s property was the result of something other than an 6 accident or innocent mistake, dismissal as a sanction is unwarranted. Cf. Med. Lab. Mgmt. 7 Consultants v. Am. Broad. Cos., 306 F.3d 806, 824 (9th Cir. 2002) (“When relevant evidence is 8 lost accidentally or for an innocent reason, an adverse evidentiary inference from the loss may 9 be rejected.”). Third, plaintiff’s claims regarding the destruction of his legal property are not shining 11 For the Eastern District of California United States District Court 10 examples of clarity. At this stage in the litigation, this court cannot find plaintiff’s assertions 12 any more or less credible than defendants’ denial of responsibility for the missing items. 13 Moreover, most of the allegations hinge on witness credibility, and, at this time, plaintiff’s 14 accusations are not sufficient to support a finding of bad faith or willfulness by the non- 15 defendants, much less the defendants. Accordingly, plaintiff’s motion for terminating sanctions is denied.1 16 17 B. Motion to Dismiss for Misjoinder of Defendants and Claims 18 Defendants argue that plaintiff’s claims and named defendants are misjoined, in 19 violation of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 20(a). Plaintiff opposes the motion, arguing that 20 because he is without any of his legal property regarding the underlying case, defendants’ 21 motion should be denied. Under Rule 20 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a plaintiff may join any persons 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 On February 27, 2012, plaintiff filed a “verified emergency report,” in which he declared that non-defendant Sergeant Epperson confiscated more legal property (dkt. 203 at 2-3). Plaintiff requests a protective order against Sergeant Epperson, as well as an extension of time in which to file his reply to the opposition to motion terminating sanctions and supplemental opposition to motion to dismiss. Plaintiff’s request for a protective order against non-defendant Sergeant Epperson is denied. Plaintiff’s request for an extension of time in which to file his reply and supplemental opposition is granted. Plaintiff’s reply, filed on April 5, 2012, is deemed timely filed. Plaintiff’s supplemental opposition, filed on April 6, 2012, is deemed timely filed. 1 5 the same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences; and (2) there is at 3 least one question of law or fact common to all the defendants. Fed. R. Civ. P. 20(a); Coughlin 4 v. Rogers, 130 F.3d 1348, 1351 (9th Cir. 1997). Once a defendant is properly joined under Rule 5 20, the plaintiff may join, as independent or alternative claims, as many claims as he has against 6 that defendant, irrespective of whether those additional claims also satisfy Rule 20. See Fed. R. 7 Civ. P. 18(a); Intercon Research Assoc., Ltd. v. Dresser Indus. Inc., 696 F.2d 53, 57 (7th Cir. 8 1982) (“[J]oinder of claims under Rule 18 becomes relevant only after the requirements of Rule 9 20 relating to joinder of parties has been met with respect to the party against whom the claim is 10 sought to be asserted; the threshold question, then, is whether joinder of [a defendant] as a party 11 For the Eastern District of California as defendants if: (1) any right to relief asserted against the defendants relates to or arises out of 2 United States District Court 1 was proper under Rule 20(a).”). 12 The “same transaction” requirement in Rule 20 refers to “similarity in the factual 13 background of a claim; claims that arise out of a systematic pattern of events” and have a “very 14 definite logical relationship” arise out of the same transaction and occurrence. Bautista v. Los 15 Angeles County, 216 F.3d 837, 842-843 (9th Cir. 2000) (Reinhardt, J., concurring) (quoting 16 Coughlin, 130 F.3d at 1350 and Union Paving Co. v. Downer Corp., 276 F.2d 468, 470 (9th 17 Cir. 1960)). In addition, “the mere fact that all [of a plaintiff’s] claims arise under the same 18 general law does not necessarily establish a common question of law or fact.” Coughlin, 130 19 F.3d at 1351. Claims “involv[ing] different legal issues, standards, and procedures” do not 20 involve common factual or legal questions. Id. 21 22 The remaining claims in this lawsuit are: C 23 24 Claim 7: plaintiff claims that defendants Hedgpeth, Harrington, and Captain Woods were deliberately indifference to plaintiff’s need for a grab bar C 25 Claim 8: plaintiff claims that defendants Hedgpeth and Harrington were deliberately indifference to plaintiff’s need for a grab bar 26 C Claim 10: plaintiff’s RICO and retaliation claim against Hass 27 C Claim 11: plaintiff’s RICO and retaliation claim against Macaleavey 28 6 1 C Claim 12: plaintiff’s RICO and retaliation claim against Lopez and Matheny 2 C Claim 13: plaintiff’s RICO and retaliation claim against Smith 3 C Claim 16: plaintiff’s RICO and retaliation claim against Adams, Hedgpeth, Harrington, 4 Butterfield, Ward, Rufino, Jeffreys, Molina, Whitehead, Hass, Campagna, Fernando, 5 Phillips, Cruse, Neighbors, Jones, Sellers, and Amavisca; and 6 C Claim 17: plaintiff’s RICO and retaliation claim against Adams, Amavisca, and 7 Hightower. 8 Because plaintiff maintains that he cannot file a meaningful opposition without a copy direct the Clerk of the Court to mail plaintiff a full copy of his First Amended Complaint, as 11 For the Eastern District of California of his complaint or the defendants’ motion, as a one time courtesy, the court will sua sponte 10 United States District Court 9 well as a copy of defendants’ motion to dismiss so that plaintiff may have a fair opportunity to 12 oppose defendants’ motion. The court also grants plaintiff an extension of time to file an 13 amended opposition. Plaintiff is advised that his opposition should be directly related to 14 defendants’ motion to dismiss for misjoinder and argue why the parties and claims do or do not 15 satisfy Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 20(a). Plaintiff’s opposition should not attempt to bring 16 in new claims or arguments related to his underlying claims raised in his First Amended 17 Complaint. Defendants shall file an amended reply within 15 days after the filing of plaintiff’s 18 amended opposition. 19 CONCLUSION 20 1. Plaintiff’s motion for terminating sanctions is DENIED. 21 2. Plaintiff shall file an amended opposition to defendants’ motion to dismiss no later 22 than 45 days from the filing date of this order. Defendants shall file an amended reply 15 days 23 thereafter. Defendants’ motion to dismiss will be deemed submitted upon that date. 24 3. The Clerk of the Court shall mail, as a one time courtesy, to plaintiff a copy of the 25 First Amended Complaint and attachments (dkt no. 43), as well as a copy of defendants’ motion 26 to dismiss (dkt no. 184). 27 4. It is the plaintiff’s responsibility to prosecute this case. Plaintiff must keep the court 28 7 1 informed of any change of address and must comply with the court’s orders in a timely fashion. 2 Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of this action for failure to prosecute pursuant to 3 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b). 4 IT IS SO ORDERED. 5 6 Dated: April 25 , 2012. WILLIAM ALSUP UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 7 8 9 11 For the Eastern District of California United States District Court 10 12 13 14 G:\PRO-SE\WHA\E.D. CAL\CRAYTON621\CRAYTON621mtdsancandjoinder.wpd 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 8

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