Howard v. Sullivan et al

Filing 15

ORDER DENYING Plaintiff's 13 Motion to Amend ; ORDER DISMISSING (Strike) 12 First Amended Complaint for Failure to State a Claim signed by District Judge G. Murray Snow on 6/7/2010. CASE CLOSED. (Sant Agata, S)

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 Clarence E. Howard, 9 Plaintiff, 10 vs. 11 W .J . Sullivan, et al., 12 Defendants. 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) N o . CV 1-08-1236-GMS ORDER I N THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT F O R THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JK M

C lar e n c e E. Howard, who is confined in the California Correctional Institution in T e h a ch a p i, California, filed a pro se civil rights Complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (D o c . #1.) The Court dismissed the Complaint for failure to comply with Rules 8 and 10 of th e Federal Rules of Civil Procedure with leave to amend. (Doc.# 9.) After obtaining an e x ten sio n of time, Plaintiff filed a First Amended Complaint. (Doc.# 12.) The Court will d is m is s the First Amended Complaint without leave to amend. I. Statutory Screening of Prisoner Complaints T h e Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a governmental entity or an officer or an employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if a plaintiff has raised c la im s that are legally frivolous or malicious, that fail to state a claim upon which relief may b e granted, or that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 2 8 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1), (2). A pleading must contain a "short and plain statement of the claim showing that the p le a d er is entitled to relief." Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2) (emphasis added). While Rule 8 does not

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d e m a n d detailed factual allegations, "it demands more than an unadorned, the-defendantu n law fu lly-h a rm ed -m e accusation." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009). "T h rea d b are recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory s ta te m e n ts , do not suffice." Id. "[A] complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to `state a c la im to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Id. (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 5 5 0 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A claim is plausible "when the plaintiff pleads factual content th a t allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the m i s c o n d u c t alleged." Id. "Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for re lie f [is] . . . a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial e x p e rie n c e and common sense." Id. at 1950. Thus, although a plaintiff's specific factual alleg atio n s may be consistent with a constitutional claim, a court must assess whether there a re other "more likely explanations" for a defendant's conduct. Id. at 1951. II. F ir s t Amended Complaint In his First Amended Complaint, Plaintiff sues Defendants Institution Classification C o m m itte e Chairperson K. Holland and CCI L. Prieto. The identity of the named defendants is the only thing that is clear in the First Amended Complaint. Identification of the relevant f a c ts and interpretation of Plaintiff's intended meaning in his rambling narrative is s u b s ta n tia lly more difficult. Notwithstanding the Court's explicit instruction that "Plaintiff m a y allege only one claim per count" (Doc. #9 at 5), he asserts at least five different c la im s -- d o u b le jeopardy, due process, retaliation, equal protection, and cruel and unusual p u n ish m e n t-- scattered throughout his single-count, 74-paragraph First Amended Complaint. A lth o u g h the specific facts underlying Plaintiff's claims are difficult to discern, it is a p p a re n t that they involve his commitment to administrative segregation. Plaintiff alleges th a t he was falsely accused of rules violations on six occasions, each of which resulted in te rm s of confinement in administrative segregation: (1) on July 20, 2001, he was given a 12m o n th minimum eligibility release date ("MERD"); (2) on October 10, 2001, he was given a 4-month MERD; (3) on June 12, 2003, he was given a 9-month MERD; (4) on April 11, -2-

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2 0 0 3 , he was given an 18-month MERD; (5) on May 6, 2003, he was given a 45-day MERD; (6 ) on March 2, 2004, he was given a 18-month MERD. Plaintiff does not, however, allege that either Defendant Holland or Defendant Prieto were involved in any of those disciplinary e v e n ts . The six disciplinary events are apparently presented only as background for

P la in tif f 's claims against Defendants Holland and Prieto. P la in tif f alleges that at a hearing held on August 14, 2009, Defendants Holland and P r ie to , acting as members of the Institution Classification Committee, classified Plaintiff for a n indeterminate term in administrative segregation. Although the claims are murky, P la in tif f appears to contend that Defendants' decision subjected him to double jeopardy b e c a u se the basis for his indeterminate classification included the incidents underlying his p rio r disciplinary convictions. Plaintiff also makes conclusory claims that his classification to administrative segregation was cruel and unusual punishment, violated his due process and e q u a l protection rights, and was retaliatory. The facts alleged by Plaintiff are insufficient to g i v e rise to a cognizable claim under any of these theories. II I. F a ilu r e to State a Claim T o state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege facts supporting that (1) the c o n d u c t about which he complains was committed by a person acting under the color of state la w and (2) the conduct deprived him of a federal constitutional or statutory right. Wood v. O s tra n d e r, 879 F.2d 583, 587 (9th Cir. 1989). In addition, to state a valid constitutional c la im , a plaintiff must allege that he suffered a specific injury as a result of the conduct of a particular defendant, and he must allege an affirmative link between the injury and the c o n d u c t of that defendant. Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 371-72, 377 (1976). A. D o u b le Jeopardy

T h e Fifth Amendment's Double Jeopardy Clause does not apply to a prison's a d m in istra tiv e determination that disruptive conduct requires transfer to a higher security f a c ility. United States v. Brown, 59 F.3d 102, 105 (9th Cir. 1995) ("such sanctions can still b e explained solely as serving the government's remedial purpose of maintaining institutional o rd e r-- th e y are designed to punish only insofar as such sanctions enable the government to -3-

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f u lf ill its remedial goals"). Accordingly, Plaintiff's allegations concerning his excessive c o n f in e m e n t in administrative segregation do not state a claim under the Double Jeopardy C la u se . B. D u e Process

W h e n prison officials classify a prisoner to even the harshest administrative se g re g a tio n unit, due process only requires notice to the prisoner of the charges against him a n d a chance for the prisoner to present his views. Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209, 2252 2 9 (2005); Toussaint v. McCarthy, 801 F.2d 1080, 1100-01 (9th Cir. 1986). Plaintiff does n o t allege that he was not given notice and an opportunity to be heard before he was c la ss if ie d to administrative segregation. In fact, Plaintiff affirmatively alleges that he was g iv e n a hearing before Defendants Holland and Prieto at which he explained that he should n o t be classified to administrative segregation because his prior "MERD had expired." (Doc. # 1 2 at 4.) Because Plaintiff fails to allege that he was deprived of any constitutionally re q u ire d procedural protection, he has failed to state a cognizable due process claim. C. E q u a l Protection

A plaintiff can establish an equal protection claim in one of two ways: (1) by showing th a t a fundamental right is involved or that a defendant intentionally discriminated against h im on the basis of his membership in a suspect class, such as race, see Nordlinger v. Hahn, 5 0 5 U.S. 1, 10 (1992); or (2) by showing that he is a member of an identifiable class, that he w a s intentionally treated differently from others similarly situated, and that there was no ra tio n a l basis for the different treatment, see Village of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 5 6 4 (2000). Plaintiff does not allege either that a fundamental right is involved or that he is a member of a suspect class. Nor does he allege that Defendants treated him differently from s im ila rly situated prisoners without a rational basis and based upon an impermissible motive. P la in tif f alleges only that "both defendants acts are motivated by racial-classed [sic] based inv id io u s discriminatory animus." (Doc. #12 at 7.) But Plaintiff offers no facts to support th is threadbare recital of the elements of an equal protection cause of action--he does not e v e n allege that his race is different than the race of the Defendants. In fact, Plaintiff alleges -4-

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th a t the reason for his classification to administrative segregation was the conduct underlying h is six prior disciplinary offenses--not his race. Accordingly, Plaintiff has failed to state a c o g n iz a b le equal protection claim. D. R e ta lia tio n

T o state a viable First Amendment retaliation claim, a prisoner must allege facts s u p p o rtin g five elements: "(1) An assertion that a state actor took some adverse action ag ain s t an inmate (2) because of (3) that prisoner's protected conduct, and that such action (4 ) chilled the inmate's exercise of his First Amendment rights, and (5) the action did not re a so n a b ly advance a legitimate correctional goal." Rhodes v. Robinson, 408 F.3d 559, 5676 8 (9th Cir. 2005) (emphasis added). "To prevail on a retaliation claim, a plaintiff must show th a t his protected conduct was `the "substantial" or "motivating" factor behind the d e f en d a n t's conduct.'" Brodheim v. Cry, 584 F.3d 1262, 1271 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting S o ra n n o 's Gasco, Inc. v. Morgan, 874 F.2d 1310, 1314 (9th Cir. 1989)). Plaintiff does not allege that Defendants knew of, and acted classified him to a d m i n is tra tiv e segregation because of, his prior exercise of his First Amendment rights. P la in tif f 's threadbare and conclusory assertion that Defendants Holland and Prieto retaliated a g a i n s t him does not suffice to state a plausible First Amendment retaliation claim against th e m . See Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1937. E. C r u e l and Unusual Punishment

C la s s if ic a tio n of a prisoner to administrative segregation for an indeterminate term, w ith o u t more, does not constitute cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth A m e n d m e n t. See Toussaint v. Yockey, 722 F.2d 1490, 1494 n. 6 (9th Cir. 1984) (more than th e usual hardships associated with administrative segregation are required to state an Eighth A m e n d m e n t claim). Moreover, "prison officials have a legitimate penological interest in a d m i n is tra tiv e segregation, and they must be given wide-ranging deference in the adoption a n d execution of policies and practices that in their judgment are needed to preserve internal o rd e r and discipline and to maintain institutional security." Anderson v. County of Kern, 45 F .3 d 1310, 1316 (9th Cir. 1995) (internal quotations omitted). -5-

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A prisoner can state a cruel and unusual punishment claim only by alleging sufficient f a cts to support an inference that the defendants acted with "`deliberate indifference' to a s u b s ta n tia l risk of serious harm." Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 828 (1994). The S u p r e m e Court has set out a two part test for deliberate indifference. "First, the alleged c o n stitu tio n a l deprivation must be, objectively, `sufficiently serious'" i.e., the official's "act o r omission must result in the denial of `the minimal civilized measure of life's necessities.'" Id . at 834 (quoting Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298 (1991); Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 3 3 7 , 347 (1981)). Second, the prison official must have a "sufficiently culpable state of m in d ," i.e., he must act with deliberate indifference to inmate health or safety. Farmer, 511 U .S . at 834. The Supreme Court has further defined this subjective test: "the official must b o th be aware of the facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of s e rio u s harm exists, and he must also draw the inference." Id. at 837. In his First Amended Complaint, Plaintiff fails to set forth specific facts to support a claim that Defendants Holland and Prieto were aware that their actions deprived Plaintiff o f "`the minimal civilized measure of life's necessities'" or presented a serious risk of harm. P la in tif f alleges that in administrative segregation he has been deprived of personal property, p re v e n te d from working or gaining an education, denied contact visits, and provided with o n ly one hour of outdoor exercise per week. But he does not allege that Defendants Holland a n d Prieto were responsible for these conditions or that they were subjectively aware of them. In its prior Order, the Court warned Plaintiff that in his amended complaint he must allege th a t he "suffered a specific injury as a result of specific conduct of a defendant and show an a f f irm a tiv e link between the injury and the conduct of that defendant." (Doc. #9 at 3.) P la in tiff has not complied with that requirement. Accordingly, Plaintiff has failed to state a cognizable claim for violation of his Eighth Amendment rights. IV . M o tio n to Amend P lain tiff has filed a Motion to Amend (Doc. #13) seeking leave to amend his c o m p l a in t to add to his demand a claim for $1,000 compensatory damages and $2,000 p u n i tiv e damages per day for every day he has spent in administrative segregation. Because -6-

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P lain tiff does not seek leave to amend in order to allege additional facts in support of his c la im s for relief, and because the Court has determined that he has failed to state any c o g n iz a b le claims for relief, his Motion to Amend will be denied. V. D is m is s a l without Leave to Amend A s no claim remains, the Court will dismiss the First Amended Complaint and this a c tio n . Leave to amend need not be given if a complaint as amended is subject to dismissal. M o o r e v. Kayport Package Exp., Inc., 885 F.2d 531, 538 (9th Cir. 1989). The Court's d isc re tio n to deny or grant leave to amend is particularly broad where Plaintiff has previously b e e n permitted to amend his complaint. See Sisseton-Wahpeton Sioux Tribe v. United S ta te s, 90 F.3d 351, 355 (9th Cir. 1996). Failure to cure deficiencies by previous

a m e n d m e n ts is one of the factors to be considered in deciding whether justice requires g r a n tin g leave to amend. Moore, 885 F.2d at 538. The Court has reviewed the First A m e n d e d Complaint and finds that further amendment of Plaintiff's claims would be futile. T h e Court will therefore dismiss the First Amended Complaint without leave to amend. I T IS HEREBY ORDERED: (1) (2 ) T h a t Plaintiff's Motion to Amend (Doc. #13) is denied T h a t the First Amended Complaint (Doc. #12) and this action are dismissed

f o r failure to state a claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1), and the Clerk of Court must e n te r judgment accordingly. (3 ) T h a t the Clerk of Court must make an entry on the docket stating that the

d ism issal for failure to state a claim may count as a "strike" under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). D A T E D this 7th day of June, 2010.

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