Robinson v. Adams, et al.

Filing 290

ORDER DENYING Plaintiff's Motion to Remand the State Claims and ORDER on Defendant's Motion to Alter Judgment 286 and 288 , signed by District Judge Anthony W. Ishii on 06/12/2015. (Martin-Gill, S)

1
2
3
4
5

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

6

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

7

GEORGE H. ROBINSON,

8
9
10
11
12

Plaintiff,
v.
D. G. ADAMS, et al.,
Defendants.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No.: 1:08-cv-01380-AWI-BAM PC
ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO
REMAND THE STATE CLAIMS AND ORDER
ON DEFENDAT’S MOTION TO ALTER
JUDGMENT
(ECF Nos. 286, 288 )

13
14
15

Plaintiff George H. Robinson (“Plaintiff”) is a state prisoner who is proceeded pro se and in

16

forma pauperis in this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The action proceeded to a jury

17

trial on March 10, 2015, and was limited to the following claims: (1) excessive force in violation of

18

the Eighth Amendment against Defendants David, Miranda, Garcia and Martinez on January 22, 2007,

19

while Plaintiff was in hand and leg restraints; (2) failure to protect in violation of the Eighth

20

Amendment against Defendant Ruiz; (3) state law battery against Defendants Martinez, David,

21

Miranda and Garcia on January 22, 2007, while Plaintiff was in hand and leg restraints; (4) excessive

22

force in violation of the Eighth Amendment against Defendant David on January 22, 2007, by

23

tweaking Plaintiff’s ears and fingers; (5) state law battery against Defendant David on January 22,

24

2007, by tweaking Plaintiff’s ears and fingers; (6) excessive force in violation of the Eighth

25

Amendment against Defendant Martinez on January 22, 2007, by pepper spraying Plaintiff in his cell;

26

(7) state law battery against Defendant Martinez on January 22, 2007, by pepper spraying Plaintiff in

27

his cell; (8) excessive force in violation of the Eighth Amendment against Defendant David on

28

January 23, 2007; (9) state law battery against Defendant David on January 23, 2007; (10) excessive

1

1

force in violation of the Eighth Amendment against Defendant Miranda on February 11, 2007; (11)

2

state law battery against Defendant Miranda on February 11, 2007.

3
4
5

On March 12, 2015, the jury returned a verdict in favor of Defendants and against Plaintiff.
(ECF No. 284.) Judgment was entered on March 13, 2015. (ECF No. 285.)
On March 19, 2015, Plaintiff filed a motion requesting that the Court remand the state law

6

claims in this action to the state court. (ECF No. 286.) Defendants did not respond and the motion is

7

deemed submitted. Local Rule 230(l).

8

On April 6, 2015, Plaintiff filed a motion to alter or amend judgment to include findings that

9

the Defendants were liable on the state law battery claims. (ECF 288.) Defendants did not respond

10

and the motion is deemed submitted. Local Rule 230(I).

11
12

I.

13

In seeking remand of the state law claims, Plaintiff argues:

14

The verdict did not answer the state question. In this case there were both State and
Federal claims. The verdict form stated if the finding was no on the constitutional
violation, it move to the next [Eighth] Amendment claim. The jury never made a finding
on the state claims. A finding on one is not a finding on both, because the elements are
different. Because there remain no constitutional claims that need[] to be adjudicated, the
State claims which has not been properly decided must be remanded to the state court for
adjudication. There was no verdict for assault and battery claims. No verdict is no
[adjudication]. Unless the court vacates the judgment on the 8th Amendment claims, this
court no longer has supplemental jurisdiction over the State claims.

15
16
17
18
19
20

Motion for Remand of State Law Claims

(ECF No. 286, pp. 1-2.)

21

Discussion

22

a.

23

At the outset of trial, and prior to the selection of the jury, a defense motion was made to

State Law Assault Claims

24

dismiss certain Defendants. Following the defense motion, the Court began to discuss and inquire

25

about Plaintiff’s assault and battery claims. Plaintiff stated that his claims were just battery, not

26

assault. The Court then explained that it was taking Plaintiff’s representations as a motion to dismiss

27

his assault claims, and that the Court would be modifying the jury instructions so that the state law

28

claims were limited to only claims of battery. Thus, Plaintiff elected only to proceed on the battery

2

1

claim and his assault claim was dismissed. Under these circumstances, there are no assault claims to

2

remand to the state court.
Additionally, to the extent Plaintiff contends that the state law claims were improperly

3
4

not submitted to the jury, a party “waives the right to a jury trial on any issue of fact raised by the

5

pleadings or evidence but not submitted to the jury unless, before the jury retires, the party

6

demands its submission to the jury. . . .” Fed. R. Civ. P. 49(a)(3). In this instance, during the

7

course of trial, the Court held a conference for the sole purpose of addressing both the proposed

8

verdict form and the jury instructions prior to closing arguments and submission to the jury.

9

Plaintiff raised no objections to the special verdict form. Thus, any assertions of error in the

10

special verdict form are untimely and have been waived. See id.; Sloan v. Oakland Police Dept.,

11

376 Fed. Appx. 738, 740 (9th Cir. 2010); Pau v. Yosemite Park, 928 F.2d 880, 891 (9th Cir.

12

1991).

13

b.

14

Plaintiff correctly notes that the jury did not make specific findings on the verdict form

15

regarding his battery claims. However, the failure to do so does not warrant remand to the state court.

16

State Law Battery Claims

The special verdict form directed the jury to make a determination regarding each claim of

17

unconstitutional excessive force under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. If the jury found no excessive force in

18

violation of the Eighth Amendment as to a particular defendant and a particular incident, then the jury

19

was directed to skip questions about Plaintiff’s corresponding state law battery claims.

20

For civil battery, a plaintiff must show that “(1) the defendant intentionally did an act that

21

resulted in harmful or offensive contact with the plaintiff’s person; (2) the plaintiff did not consent to

22

the contact; and (3) the contact caused injury, damage, loss, or harm to the plaintiff.” Tekle v. U.S.,

23

511 F.3d 839, 855 (9th Cir. 2007). In cases involving a peace officer, a plaintiff must also show that a

24

defendant officer used excessive force. Edson v. City of Anaheim, 63 Cal.App.4th 1269, 1273 (1998).

25

Therefore, if a jury does not find excessive force in the first instance, then it is unnecessary for the jury

26

to reach questions about a battery claim arising from the same incident and involving the same

27

defendants. Harding v. City & Cnty of San Francisco, 2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 2856, *7-*8 (9th Cir.

28

Feb. 26, 2015) (“Additionally, under California law, a peace officer is privileged to use reasonable
3

1

force, such as shackling a prisoner, and therefore a California battery claim is a ‘counterpart’ to a

2

federal excessive force claim under § 1983. As previously established, Appellant did not establish an

3

excessive force claim under § 1983 against any Appellee, and her state-law battery claims fail for the

4

same reasons.”); Johnson v. County of L.A., 340 F.3d 787, 794 (9th Cir. 2004).

5

Here, because the jury did not find constitutionally excessive force in connection with any of

6

the incidents alleged by Plaintiff, Defendants were entitled to judgment on the corresponding civil

7

battery claims. Harding, 2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 2856 at *7-*8; Johnson, 340 F.3d at 794; Edson, 63

8

Cal.App.4th at 1273. In other words, because the jury found no excessive force, no questions

9

regarding battery needed to be answered. See id. The failure of the jury to answer questions regarding

10

battery on the verdict form is not a basis for remand.

11
12

III.

Motion To Amend

13

Plaintiff argues that he did not notice that the verdict form permitted the jury to skip the state

14

law battery claims if the answers to the constitutional excessive force claims were “no.” Plaintiff

15

argues that Rule 49(a)(3) permits the Court to make findings on an issue if a party does not request

16

that issue be submitted to the jury, and that the Court should make a finding on the state law battery

17

claims here. Plaintiff contends that a finding on the constitutional question does not answer the state

18

law question because there are different standards for the two claims; thus, there can be finding of

19

liability on one claim with a defense verdict on another. Plaintiff argues that the Court should make a

20

finding in favor of Plaintiff on the state law battery claim. Alternatively, Plaintiff requests that the

21

court grant a new trial to resolve the state law claims.

22

Discussion

23

As discussed above, when a plaintiff sues a peace officer for battery, the plaintiff must show

24

excessive force. See Harding, 2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 2856 at *7-*8; Johnson, 340 F.3d at 794;

25

Edson, 63 Cal.App.4th at 1273. Because the jury in this case found that none of the Defendants used

26

constitutionally excessive force against Plaintiff, this necessarily meant that an element of Plaintiff’s

27

battery claims could not be met. That is, a finding of “no excessive force” means that there must also

28
4

1

be a finding of “no liability” for California state law battery claims. See id. There is no basis to

2

amend the judgment or make additional findings regarding other elements of the battery claims.1

3
Order

4

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiff’s motion to remand (ECF No. 286) and

5
6

Plaintiff’s motion to alter or amend judgment (ECF No. 288) are DENIED.2

7
8

IT IS SO ORDERED.

9

Dated: June 12, 2015
SENIOR DISTRICT JUDGE

10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

1

Plaintiff cites Trujillo v. Goodman, 825 F.2d 1453 (10th Cir. 1985) to argue that there are different standards for battery
and a § 1983 excessive force claim, and that the Court can find for him on the battery claims. The Court will not follow
Trujillo because Trujillo (1) did not involve California law, and (2) is inconsistent with Harding, Johnson, and Edson.
2

Plaintiff has also filed a Rule 50 motion and a motion for extension of time to file an appeal. (ECF Nos. 287, 289).
Those motions will be addressed in a separate order.
5